The-Polyester-Prince

captive market. The ‘Eleven Day Wonder’s as the 22 August - 2 September intervalcame to be called, seemed tailor-made for the benefit of Reliance.Whether or not bogus exports were made under the High Unit Value Scheme byDhirubhai has never been proven, and certainly Reliance did make genuine efforts tosell its own products overseas. Its export manager, Rathibhai Muchhala, became afamiliar figure around the trade stores of the Gujarati diaspora in East Africa, theMid-East, and later the United Kingdom, trying to place stocks of Vimal artificial silks.S. B. Khandelwal, the owner of the emporium Sari Mandir (Sari Temple) in theEnglish city of Leicester where many Gujaratis settled after being expelled from EastAfrica, recalls a visit by Muchhala early in the 1970s. ‘They were very anxious to getinto export business,’ Khandelwal said. ‘I took 200 saris on credit. No money wasexpected upfront. Muchhala said: “Just say Shri Ganesh.”(Meaning: Just for luck.)Up until around 1977, exports took between 60 per cent and 70 per cent of thefabrics produced at Naroda, Dhirubhai noted to Business India in 1980. That exportsceased to be a significant activity of Reliance soon afterwards indicates that theywere propped up by the High Unit Value Scheme and the artificial shortages for PFYcreated by import controls.The new environment encouraged Dhirubhai to step up his domestic promotion ofVimal and to expand his franchised exclusive shops to more than 600 by early 1980.Advertisements were plastered across newspapers and billboards. ‘Only Vimal offersyou exclusive innovations in high-fashion wear,’ went one, listing products such asDisco Dazzle Sports Jersey or Supertex dress material.It was a Rs 10 million a year advertising spend, then unprecedented in India andmore than four times that of established textile producers such as Bombay Dyeing.And it worked. In 1979, Reliance Textile Industries raised its sales to Rs 1.55 billion(then US$190 million), making it the largest textile producer in the country.Dhirubhai had meanwhile decided to help bring an end to the Janata government ofMorarji Desai. The government had not been particularly friendly to him, after theinitial favourable turn in yarn import policy, and Kantilal Desai had become toocontroversial a figure to be much help. A judicial inquiry set up by Morarji Desai inreply to charges of influence peddling by relatives of ministers did indeed find, inFebruary 1980, a Prima facie case for further inquiry’s that Kantilal Desai hadinfluenced the government to relax its policy on PFY imports in August 1977.Dhirubhai put his resources behind Indira Gandhi’s efforts to split the Janatacoalition, which focused on the ambition of the finance minister, Charan Singh, whohad a huge powerbase among the prosperous Jat caste of farmers in Uttar Pradesh.Dhirubhai’s role was to provide the suitcases of cash needed to induce MPs to takethe risk of leaving the government benches and joining the splinter group. In July1979 the Desai government fell when Charan Singh’s supporters withdrew support inparliament. Charan Singh, pledged support by Indira’s Congress, was invited to forma government and demonstrate his support within a month. A vote of confidence wasnever taken: Indira demanded as a condition that Charan Singh agree to withdrawlegislation setting up special courts to try herself and Sanjay for alleged crimescommitted during the Emergency. This he was unable to do. In August, the Presidentdissolved parliament and called elections for the first week of January 1980, withCharan Singh as caretaker prime minister.