slow-down in trading and sometimes pandemonium when defaults were found. Butbrokers and traders need not settle even then, if they could afford the upfrontmargin payments and sometimes exorbitant interest rates on finance for a badla(carry-forward) deal.Using this prototype futures system, settlement could be deferred for months, oftenamplifying speculative runs in prices. On occasion, a script would pass through 50buy and sell transactions before being lodged for transfer of ownership. If thesignature of the original seller did not pass muster, professional forgers operating inthe side lanes of Dalal Street would guarantee an authentic-looking copy. It was anenvironment where research was just another word for insider trading, where thekey knowledge was finding out which stocks were going to be ramped upwards ordriven down by cartels of moneybag brokers and operators.Though it had thousands of listed companies and a nominal capitalisation similar tothat of middle-sized stock markets like Hong Kong or Australia, the Indiansharemarket was not very liquid. Huge blocks of equity in the better companies werelocked up by investment institutions or controlling families. Many of the smallercompanies hardly traded at all. <strong>The</strong> floating equity in the major companies formingthe market indices amounted to a few billion US dollars. Even in the 1990s, aconcerted move with a relatively small amount of funds, upwards of US$50 million,could make the market jump or crash.Investors outside Bombay who could not hang around Dalal Street, browse the issuedocuments sold off barrows or pavements, or listen to the gossip while snacking on abhel puri (potato-filled puff-bread) from a nearby stall, had to rely on a network ofsub-brokers and agents reporting to the fully-fledged stockbrokers in the big towns.<strong>The</strong>y scanned a new crop of market tipsheets with names like Financial Wizard andRupee Gains for news of their stocks. In some small towns, investors impatient withtheir remoteness took trading into their own hands: teachers, shopkeepers and otherlocal professionals would gather after work in public halls to conduct their owntrading, settling on the basis of prices in newspapers from the city.It was a situation made for a populist like Dhirubhai. His ebullience and punctiliousnursing of relationships were transferred to a larger stage, using the masscommunications techniques learned in marketing the Vimal brand name.‘<strong>The</strong> people of Reliance,’ began one typical promotion, on the cover of an annualreport. ‘<strong>The</strong>rein lies our strength. In the skills of the scientists, the technologists; inthe commitment of the engineers, the employees; in the dedication of the brokersthe traders and above all, in the undisputed loyalty of the investors. <strong>The</strong>se are thepeople of Reliance. In their growth lies our growth; in their prosperity, ourprosperity. For we are a family; we are all one. We are ... Reliance.’ In those years,Dhirubhai and Reliance had a success story to tell. On the technical side, thepolyester plant at Patalganga was put up in a fast 18 months, and put into regularproduction in November 1982. Construction and the debugging of production lineshad been supervised by Mukesh Ambani, who had been pulled out of StanfordUniversity immediately on completing his master of business administration degree,and put in charge of the new project. Aged 24 at the outset, with a degree inchemical engineering, Mukesh Ambani won his spurs as an industrial manager atPatalganga.
Reliance made sure that a comment by Du Point’s then international director,Richard Chinman, that such a plant would have taken 26 months to build in theUnited States, had wide publicity in India. ‘Reliance Textile Industries, now the fourthlargest private sector company in the country, continues to burn up the track with itsblistering growth record’, said the magazine India Today in February 1983. ‘Close onthe heels of the commissioning of its polyester filament yarn plant at Patalganga inMaharashtra, the company has set its sights on still bigger projects.’ Dhirubhai stilldemonstrated his uncanny grip on government trade and industrial policy, and theirimplementation. While the canalization of imports through the State Trading Corphad been abandoned in April 1981, and polyester filament yarn (PFY) and partiallyorientedyarn (POY) placed on the ‘pen general list’s of imports, the right to importthe yarn was still confined to so-called actual users. <strong>The</strong> Customs House in Bombaytook the line that these did not include large cotton textile mills - despite the growingdemand for cotton-polyester blends-but only the small ‘art silk’s power-looms.Reliance had already organised power-looms as outsources, giving them polyesteryarn and taking back their grey cloth for finishing and dyeing at Naroda, On 23November 1982, three weeks after Patalganga went into production, the governmentput an additional Rs 15 000 a tonne duty on PFY and POY imports, allowing Relianceto raise its prices and still force India’s small yarn crimpers and power- looms to buyits products. <strong>The</strong> policy switch had been telegraphed early in November by asubmission made to New Delhi by the Association of Synthetic Fibre Industry thatdumping of PFY and POY by foreign producers under the open general licencechannel was causing a curtailment of local production and pile-up of inventories,leading to heavy losses.<strong>The</strong> All-India Crimpers’ Association, representing about 150 small processors whotexturised PFY and POY into fibre ready for weaving and knitting, took out a series ofanguished newspaper advertisements headlined: ‘should the country’s texturisingindustry be allowed to die?’ <strong>The</strong> crimpers said the case for anti-dumping duty was ‘isleading, distorted and untruthful’. Domestic polyester output had risen 60 per cent in1981 to 16000 tonnes, and still fell short of demand estimated at 50000 tonnes ayear. <strong>The</strong> rush into PFY production by new producers scarcely pointed to a gluttedmarket.Existing customs duties worked out to a total 650 per cent on landed costs forimporters, topped by further excise duty and sales tax on the processed product.Texturised polyester yarn had become more lucrative for smugglers than thetraditional gold, wristwatches and electronics-and huge consignments had recentlybeen intercepted, usually misdeclared as some other low-duty goods. Instead a caseexisted for an immediate duty cut and freedom for anyone to import.<strong>The</strong> pleas were ignored. ‘<strong>The</strong> government has finally declared a deaf car to our cry ofanguish,’ said the Crimpers’ Association in an advertisement on 7 December. By itscalculation, the effective duty on PFY and POY had risen to 750 per cent with theaddition of the Rs 15 000 a tonne anti-dumping levy. <strong>The</strong> Reliance plant atPatalganga immediately exceeded its licensed capacity and produced some 17600tonnes of polyester yarn in 1983, its first full year, thereby doubling India’s totaloutput. <strong>The</strong> extra duty in effect added Rs 240 million to Reliance’s revenue. In late1984, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee announced a new policy to endorse higherthan licensed capacity on the part of industry, and consequently in late 1985Reliance received an effective retrospective licensing of its capacity to 25 125 tonnesa year.
- Page 2: AcknowledgementsIntroduction: an in
- Page 7 and 8: several years. I sent off some clip
- Page 9 and 10: esearch led me into all corners of
- Page 11 and 12: A PERSUASIVE YOUNG BANIAAmong all t
- Page 13 and 14: proportion of these from Kathiawar.
- Page 15 and 16: looked far beyond their immediate p
- Page 17 and 18: which involved boycotting imported
- Page 19 and 20: One of the students was a fellow Mo
- Page 21 and 22: The outpost had been a punishment s
- Page 23 and 24: As he developed more familiarity wi
- Page 25 and 26: water and haven for international t
- Page 27 and 28: Junagadh named Rathibhai Muchhala a
- Page 29 and 30: eing ‘suite luxurious’ compared
- Page 31 and 32: Dhirubhai was again lucky in that,
- Page 33 and 34: A FIRST-CLASS FOUNTAINDhirubhai Amb
- Page 35 and 36: minority government in 1996, and se
- Page 37 and 38: Corporation of India. Soon afterwar
- Page 39 and 40: Over two years in the early 1970s,
- Page 41 and 42: captive market. The ‘Eleven Day W
- Page 43 and 44: GURU OF THE EQUITY CULTIndira Gandh
- Page 45 and 46: politicisation of the machinery Fro
- Page 47: By the end of 1986, Dhirubhai was t
- Page 51 and 52: half-hour of panic just before the
- Page 53 and 54: politicians and bureaucrats. ‘It
- Page 55 and 56: Friends in the right PlacesThis was
- Page 57 and 58: act of parliament as far back as 19
- Page 59 and 60: control, and a very long and favour
- Page 61 and 62: in the Telegraph’s leader. Facing
- Page 63 and 64: In December 1983, Dhirubhai had hos
- Page 65 and 66: Pydhonic to sell his polyester and
- Page 67 and 68: give money to political parties. We
- Page 69 and 70: estimated demand of 80 000 tonnes o
- Page 71 and 72: support the big investment in domes
- Page 73 and 74: others. Orkay was accused of pledgi
- Page 75 and 76: corruption. On the backs of ordinar
- Page 77 and 78: Financial Express, had carried both
- Page 79 and 80: constant ridicule and demonisation.
- Page 81 and 82: inquiries overseas, the little-trav
- Page 83 and 84: conversion was allowed, the holding
- Page 85 and 86: The company’s shares had already
- Page 87 and 88: In a four-part article published ov
- Page 89 and 90: The case against Reliance had been
- Page 91 and 92: companies, possibly to help strengt
- Page 93 and 94: Nusli Wadia’s children). Pandit b
- Page 95 and 96: carrying a relentless, campaign of
- Page 97 and 98: The committee asked Reliance at lea
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To clinch a prosecution under the F
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operators of the Indian havala trad
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While the law enforcers were closin
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the obligatory disclosures in the p
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On 5 December, the Central Excise a
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LETTING LOOSE A SCORPIONDhirubhai A
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identified himself as an inquiry ag
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But the CBI’s two investigating o
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had been booked into the hotel unde
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dismissing Rajiv and appointing ano
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extended and gruelling interrogatio
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BUSINESS AS USUALDhirubhai Ambani w
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udget for the year starting April 1
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asket from UTI (by value) were Lars
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on the Financial Times of London. A
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1988, two allied activists, journal
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But just as the opposing forces see
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had continued social meetings with
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they recorded Babaria calling Kirti
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arrests on 1 August. When a reporte
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After the initial appearance of Kir
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Though he could not avert the storm
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Dhirubhai’s new newspaper, launch
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and indifferent to the bloodshed in
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temple at Ayodhya, he put off the f
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arriving at Rajiv’s heavily guard
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Securities and Exchange Board of In
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The shouting continued for half an
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The 1991-92 boom helped Dhirubhai q
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Because of this burden, any other n
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the proceeds of the previous Euro-i
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The telephone licences covered near
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HOUSEKEEPING SECRETSOn 29 November
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compliant bank to give in return fo
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According to sources close to the M
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Merrill Lynch. Jain had meanwhile c
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put on its screens. On 29 November,
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1992 into the tax evasion aspects o
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At least one former fund manager, a
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and avoids a prosecution in court.
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Reliance could no longer look eithe
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other hand, the ANZ Grindlays bank