Engaging with armed groups - Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

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Mediation Practice Seriessecular and internationalist approach. (The peace jirga held inAfghanistan in June 2010 concluded with a call for help fromMuslim countries, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey).• Pre-conditions : Rigid pre-conditions may not be an obstaclein the early phases of engagement (pre-negotiation), but willbecome so as parties move into “talks about talks”. Frequentlysuch conditions – whether they are for an end to violence,a ceasefire, recognition of an occupying power, or therenouncing of secessionist goals – touch upon either thearmed group’s primary source of leverage upon the process(its arms), or the core issue in contention. It should not surprisea potential mediator, or the armed group’s adversary, that thegroup in question will not be prepared to concede such issuesat the beginning of a process.• Absence of a clear or “realistic” agenda : A lack of clarityon what is wanted from a political process by the armed group,or the reiteration of maximalist but “impossible” goals (such asAl Qæda’s demands for the establishment of a new caliphate)both present obstacles to negotiations. Such obstacles neednot necessarily preclude other forms“You can negotiatewith someone who has apolitical agenda. The LRAdoes not have one.”Salva Kiir, First-Vice President of Sudan,President of the Government of SouthernSudan 13of engagement that might help shiftan armed group’s positions, or reachout to affiliates of the group in questionwith more localised concerns(such as Al Shabaab). However, inpractice, the perception that there is“nothing to talk about” with an armedgroup represents one of the mostfrequent deterrents to engagement.• Competition : The presence, or interest, of other potentialmediators can complicate engagement with an armed groupand overcrowd the mediation. In some cases – such as Darfurat different moments – it has not been just the rebels who dothe “forum shopping”. There have been external actors, some22
The ICC and theLRA in conflict at thepeace tableFor many years the international community neglected the conflictbetween the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by the enigmaticJoseph Kony, and the Government of Uganda with devastatingconsequences for the people of Northern Uganda. Peacemakingwas pursued by the Ugandan politician Betty Bigombe, whoreceived discreet support from the UN and a number of states. Herefforts ended in early 2005. By then, at the request of the UgandanGovernment, the International Criminal Court had initiated aninvestigation into the situation. In July 2005, ICC judges issuedsealed warrants for the arrest of Kony and four LRA commanders.They were unveiled in October that year.A new peace process began in mid-2006 in Juba, at the instigationof the Government of Southern Sudan, facilitated by its Vice-President, Riek Machar, and actively supported by UN envoy,former President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique. This processrepresented a confrontation between two different forms ofengagement with an armed group : one driven by peace and theother by justice. The parties reached agreement on the text of acomprehensive peace agreement, but the ICC arrest warrants hungheavily over them as Kony, and the other indicted commanders,refused to attend formal talks in Juba. The LRA was insteadrepresented by exiled Acholi in the diaspora and others whoseability to speak for Kony was never fully validated.Kony’s refusal to sign the peace agreement ended the process.The experience demonstrated the challenges of a peace processin which personal incentives cannot be offered. The agreementproposed Ugandan criminal justice processes as an alternativeto the ICC. However, with Kony’s rejection of the deal andrenewed military activity by the LRA, regional and internationalactors increasingly saw the LRA not as a legitimate political force,but as an armed band led by war criminals. In his final briefingto the Security Council in mid-2009, Chissano recommended atwo-pronged strategy involving military action against the LRAas well as negotiations.23
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