Engaging with armed groups - Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

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Mediation Practice Seriestowards a lasting agreement, frequently involving an increasinglybroad and complex array of other actors. At different moments,the varied options for engagement will include :• Initial contacts : Initial contacts with an armed group takea wide variety of forms. In some contexts a group may reachout to a mediator directly. (The UN is approached by armedgroups with some regularity, frequently in circumstances inwhich it knows that its involvement would be unacceptable tothe government concerned). In others, external actors haveapproached armed actors through intermediaries. These mightinclude local journalists, human rights activists or religiousleaders, as well as political actors or members of civil societywho may have local level contacts with the group concerned.In some instances, the intermediaries develop into trustedpartners in the mediation, in others the mediator (and intermediary)may find a sustained relationship too complex tomaintain. Beyond the contacts themselves, early encounterswith an armed group provide an opportunity for the mediatorand armed group to explore the motivations and capacities ofthe other. The armed group may be “vetting” the mediator noless deliberately than the mediator is trying to build his or herunderstanding of the armed group.• Proxies, insider mediators, and track two : In somecontexts it is possible to identify formal or informal proxiesthrough whom engagement can be pursued. In NorthernIreland, the British Government had long maintained a confidentialchannel to the IRA, but engaged in direct negotiationswith Sinn Fein (which also represented the Republicanmovement in the talks chaired by former US Senator GeorgeMitchell). This was facilitated by the authority wielded by SinnFein’s leaders, sympathy for the IRA among the Irish diasporaand in certain quarters in the US, and the British Government’srealisation of the benefits of strengthening Republicanism’spolitical expression. (It stands in contrast to policies adoptedby the Spanish Government, which banned ETA’s political30
Engagingthe Maoists in NepalNepal’s peace process was led and driven by Nepalis, althoughheavily conditioned by the influence of India. However, it alsoinvolved external actors who offered support to dialogue andnegotiation. These included the HD Centre (2000 – 2006); theUnited Nations, which provided “good offices” from 2003, andwhose presence grew in 2005 into an Office of the UN High Commissionerfor Human Rights and, from 2007, a special politicalmission, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN); theCarter Center (2004 – 2006); and a Swiss special adviser on peacebuildingfrom mid-2005.All pursued initial contacts with the Communist Party of Nepal(Maoist) through a Nepali human rights activist and national peacefacilitator. Once trust was established, external actors found theMaoists open to engagement and eager to learn from experienceelsewhere. They particularly welcomed the early attention fromthe HD Centre and the involvement of the UN for the legitimacythey saw it giving their struggle. External engagement, althoughsubordinate to national initiatives and decision-making, helpedpromote acceptance of dialogue in Nepal. It also prepared the wayfor UNMIN’s assumption of responsibilities for the monitoring ofarms and armies, as well as support to the electoral process.Elections held in April 2008 propelled the Maoists into governmentas the largest party in Nepal’s new Constituent Assembly. This was asurprise for many of the external actors involved (including India)and challenging in legal terms for the United States, which hadincluded the Maoists on its “terrorist exclusion list” since 2003. TheUS Ambassador was precluded from direct meetings with Maoists,but was able to secure a waiver that allowed US officials to meet withMaoists holding public office. She also took measures to ensure thatthe US did not knowingly provide Maoists with “material support”.As this could be construed to include tea and coffee, breakfastmeetings were held at the residence of the Norwegian ambassador.31
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