y Major James Welch and Captain Adam StoddardIntroductionThe proven success of the Stability Operations InformationCenter (SOIC) in Afghanistan–a white and green analysis cellthat ‘looks beyond the enemy’–must now be made a permanentpart of Army doctrine and remain at the Army divisionlevel, even in peace time. The information providedby the SOIC will augment the pre-existing G2 section, andensure the Division Commander is provided with a muchbroader perspective. Failing to implement this change risksnot capitalizing on opportunities to gain a more comprehensiveunderstanding of the battle space, and fails to reapthe lessons learned during the last twelve years of fightingin Iraq and Afghanistan.BackgroundUpon our arrival at Kandahar Airfield, where our divisionheadquarters would assume command of RegionalCommand-South (RC-S), the 3d Infantry Division (3ID) G2section assumed responsibility for the RC(S) SOIC. Our predecessorsin the 82nd Airborne Division had established aSOIC whose analysts were able to study and analyze theportions of the battlefield not always covered by traditionalintelligence analysis. By understanding the backgroundsand activities of Government of the Islamic Republic ofAfghanistan officials, Afghan National Security Forces leaders,and informal powerbrokers, and how these individuals’actions affected the mission of RC-S, SOIC analysts wereable to provide the Commanding General (CG) a more completepicture of the battle space.Army doctrine has previously recognized the importanceof this information and Army Doctrine ReferencePublication (ADRP) 2-0 makes this point when referencingcivil considerations. However, as yet there is no formal elementin a standard division intelligence (G2) section thatis assigned the task of analyzing this type of information. Itwas not until LTG Michael Flynn called upon the military topursue the concept of SOICs in Afghanistan that such a sectionwas formalized for conventional units. He articulatedthe concept of SOICs in the paper, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprintfor Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” co-authoredby Captain Matt Pottinger and Mr. Paul Batchelor.Since then, SOICs have proven to be an effective tool forhelping leaders better understand the Afghan battle space.SOIC Case Study: Afghanistan 2<strong>01</strong>2-2<strong>01</strong>3Although the RC-S SOIC was not necessarily manned asprescribed by LTG Flynn, it was staffed in a manner that allowedit to become a vital part of the RC-S intelligence section.Like the 82nd Airborne before us, the 3ID SOIC was ledby an Army major who also served as the CG’s Key LeaderEngagement (KLE) advisor. Due to the officer’s accessibilityand knowledge of the CG’s priorities, the SOIC analystswere better able to attune their priorities to ensure the CG’sneeds were met.Assisting the major was an Army captain who served asthe Deputy SOIC chief. As the SOIC chief was often awayon KLEs, it was vital to have a deputy who could managethe ongoing production of the SOIC analysts. The SOIC wasfurther manned by two Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)analysts, as well as a Central Command (CENTCOM) supportedDIA analyst whose primary duty at CENTCOM wasAfghanistan analysis. In addition to the DIA personnel, theNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) providedone analyst whose primary responsibility was to supportthe SOIC analysts in gathering host nation data and portrayingthis information as needed.28 Military Intelligence
Finally, the RC-S SOIC was fortunate to be rounded outwith several contractor billets. These billets were an absolutenecessity as the level of detail required for properanalysis made it essential to divide the battle space into numerousareas of responsibility.How it Works: Fusing the “White and Green”with the “Red”Traditional thoughts on military intelligence (MI) suggestthat our primary consideration should be about the enemy,his most likely and most dangerous courses of action,and how we might counter those actions. However, as hasbeen learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, MI professionals mustalso know and understand the individuals who make up thewhite and green side of the battle space, the governmentand security leaders of the host nation.As typical intelligence analysts are often overwhelmedwith understanding and targeting the enemy, they do notalways have the time necessary to fully evaluate this portionof the battle space. However, SOIC analysts work in tandemwith those analysts responsible for studying enemy (red)targets and networks, allowing the G2 section to presentthe commander a much more comprehensive understandingof the battle space. SOIC analysts are not only responsiblefor studying host country government officials, securityforces, and informal power brokers, they also reach out tothe various entities that work with these leaders and developmutually beneficial information sharing relationships.Relationships Critical to SuccessThe hallmark of the RC-S SOIC was the ability of analysts togather information in the smallest detail, in order to providea thorough analysis of their assigned areas of responsibility.The SOIC analysts were able to do this because of the relationshipsthey established with those Soldiers and civiliansdeployed throughout RC-S. SOIC analysts regularly receivedinformation via email distribution, phone calls, and personalvisits. Additionally, RC-S SOIC analysts traveled acrosssouthern Afghanistan in order to meet with special operationsforces, U.S. State Department officials, military advisors,and conventional military forces.Among those entities that provided the SOIC with themost detailed information were company intelligence supportteams (CoISTs) and Human Terrain System (HTS) socialscientists. Understanding who owns the local land,who directs the local tribes, and who makes decisions atlocal levels proved essential to understanding the battlespace and providing the CG with the most timely and accurateinformation. As SOIC analysts have discovered, CoISTsare particularly adroit at understanding this level of detail.Additionally, HTS social scientists are particularly adept atmaking visual observations in the field, attending village todistrict jirgas, and advising company, battalion, brigade, anddivision leaders on the cultural aspects of an area.These types of relationships allowed the SOIC analyststo gain critical information and get a better understandingof the battle space from a perspective not always knownat a division level (or sometimes even at a brigade level)headquarters. Through these relationships with sometimesdisparate organizations, the SOIC was able to present theintelligence enterprise with a more comprehensive understandingof the RC-S terrain.Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)To assist SOIC analysts in understanding the green andwhite space, and how the actions of those actors affect themission, the SOIC capitalized on the enormous amount ofinformation available from open source means. While thishas traditionally included the monitoring of media sourcesand internet sites for information that may be of intelligencevalue, SOIC analysts also monitor Facebook, Twitter,and blogs. These types of social media offer a great dealof information–often from people who are on the groundand witnessing critical events as they occur. For example,throughout the Arab Spring social media was used as ameans to share valuable information in situations that wereotherwise under media blackout. As has been the case inAfghanistan, journalists and local powerbrokers are oftenthe first people to hear about an event, and the former oftenshare this information using social media.In addition to social media, SOIC analysts were familiarwith the other resources of information that shed light ontheir area of responsibility. This included media articles,documentaries, reports from non-governmental organizations,information provided by local governments, studiesconducted by universities and think tanks, and any othertype of publicly accessible information that helped to betterunderstand the area.Information BrokerageAs LTG Flynn highlighted, there must be an informationbroker to manage the volume of information gathered bythe SOIC analysts, past and present. This issue has yet to beadequately addressed. However, if an effective, standardizedmethod for storing and analyzing the massive amountof information is properly implemented–one that is compatiblewith the rest of the intelligence community (IC)–thiswill allow the vast amount of information collected by SOICanalysts to be readily accessed and available to consumersin a timely manner. At least two systems have alreadyJanuary - March <strong>2<strong>01</strong>4</strong>29
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