Social Watch Report 2010

varying from country to country, in order to reduceGHG emissions.Almost all the developed countries – includingAustralia, Japan and the EU – raised their united voicesto dismantle the Kyoto Protocol, collapsing thetwo tracks into one and producing one single legaloutcome through ensuring inclusion of the advanceddeveloping countries. The US, for example, neitherintends to ratify the Protocol nor accepts a legallybinding agreement; it prefers instead a bottom-upkind of “implementing agreement.” Through a setof clear decisions under the UNFCCC, this wouldformalize and strengthen the existing provisions ofthe Climate Change Convention for voluntary, nonbindingand economy-wide emission commitmentsto reduce GHG and report on emissions. This “pledgeand review” approach is in plain contradiction of theKyoto Protocol and leaves countries with leeway onwhat kind of targets to adopt and how to meet them.While the Kyoto’s approach specifies targets for aspecific period and assessments on whether thosetargets have been reached, the process called forin the Copenhagen Accord resembles the negotiationsin the context of the World Trade Organization(WTO), where every few years countries make newpledges to reduce their trade barriers. 18The Kyoto protocol, which created a global coalitionbetween politicians, experts, bureaucrats, civilsociety organizations and people across the world,outlined an integrated approach to face the challengesof climate change. Now, the approach of “cherry picking”the preferable options by developed countries isreminiscent of the words of the Bush administrationthat “Kyoto is dead.” 19 At the time, this statement waswidely denounced in countries around the world;now these countries need to work to keep the KyotoProtocol functioning towards its next phase.A way forward to CancunAt CoP 15 in Copenhagen, as at CoP 13 in Bali, thecountry Parties negotiated through three majorblocs: (a) the European Union, (b) the US, supportedby Canada and Japan and (c) the G77 and China.Among these, the last is the major one with 132countries including developing countries, LDCs andAOSIS. It is the platform of almost all the non-AnnexI countries that are historically not responsible forthe present climate crisis but, given the disparity ineconomic comparability and GDP growth, it is alsothe most heterogeneous group and is mostly drivenby the interests of the advanced developing countries(China, Brazil, India and South Africa).These three blocs led to “triangular climate diplomacy.”For example, the EU took its stance to producea single legal outcome and attempted to pushprimarily the US, but also the advanced developingcountries, into accepting binding commitments. Onthe other hand, as mentioned above, the US pushed18 Harro van Asselt, “Copenhagen chaos? Post-2012 climatechange policy and international law,” Amsterdam LawForum, 2(2), 2010. Available from: .19 Dick Thompson, “Why U.S. Environmentalists Pin Hopes onEurope,” Time, 26 March 2001. Available from: .Climate funding and the MDGsIan PercyThe USD 30 billion in “new and additional” fundingchampioned in the Copenhagen Accord isfar from assured. The amount may reflect UNpriorities and a commitment to climate changemitigation and adaptation, but the historicaltrend is not encouraging. Developed countrydonors are not on track to meet the target of0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) to beprovided by 2015 for ODA; already there arereports from Finnish civil society, for example,that climate funding is being drawn from its developmentbudget. 1 The situation is similar inmost countries that have made the pledge. Inaddition Better Aid reports the projection thataid receipts are to lose over USD 2 billion onceclimate funds to middle-income countries beginto erode the aid budget. 21 Better Aid. Available from: .2 Ibid.for an “implementing agreement.” For their part, theadvanced developing countries stressed the historicalresponsibility of all the industrialized countries,including the US, and urged them to lead in combatingclimate change as they have committed to inArticle 3.1 of the UNFCCC.Significant divisions also took place amongother members of the G77 and China group; the SIDSand LDCs demanded Long-term Cooperative Actionnegotiations on a protocol that would function alongsidethe Kyoto Protocol. This group also demandedpreferential allocation of adaptation finance, whichthe other advanced developing countries did not support.Unlike in global geo-politics, the positions ofUS and China appear to converge in global climatediplomacy since both countries prioritize their nationalrather than the global interest.The emerging multi-polarity in the global climatediplomacy translates into a number of key actors ableto block substantial progress in the future negotiationleading to the 16 th CoP to be held in November2010 in Cancun (Mexico). Without a complementarypolicy position among the advanced developingand developed countries, including the US, positiveoutcomes and breakthroughs in climate policy areunlikely. Besides, the division of UNFCCC partiesinto two groups – Annex I and non-Annex I countries– is no longer appropriate, given the complexity ofglobal climate policy. Even though many developingcountries and emerging economies insist that thisdichotomy must be maintained, some differentiationwithin the group of non-Annex I countries is neededin order to speed-up the negotiation process.The Millennium Development Goals(MDGs) will not be met, and development islagging behind other stated goals in many areasof the world. A lack of development funding isoften cited as a reason for slow progress onmeeting targets. Based on current trends it iseasy to imagine a severe drop in ODA reservedfor non-climate activities. Political leaders,especially in the Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD), are underincreasing pressure to show results for the aidthey provide. There is a real danger that lessquantitative development goals could be forgottenin favour of verifiable climate changemitigation and adaptation strategies.In order to ensure that donors and developingcountries do not lose sight of developmentcommitments, baselines for climate fundingmust be established at the 16 th Conference ofthe Parties in Cancun. Without verifiable andsuccinct qualifications for “new and additional”funds, there is a danger that education andother development priorities could end up playingsecond fiddle to wind farms and biomassprojects. nConclusionA recent analysis of the Copenhagen outcomes 20by UNDP notes that the conference fell short of acomprehensive agreement on a future frameworkon climate change. However if Parties were to usethe Copenhagen Accord as an overarching politicalguidance on the core issues, the technical negotiationsunder the AWG–KP and AWG LCA could besignificantly advanced and the texts finalized morequickly, while taking into account the concerns ofthose countries that did not agree to the Accord.Meanwhile, the first meeting of country Partiessince the Copenhagen Conference extends the mandateof the two ad hoc working groups – the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP. In fact, there are significantmerits for such a two-track approach since much ofthe required institutional framework already exists.If this approach is not taken, then the progress thathas already been achieved in the negotiation processwill be jeopardized. n20 Alina Averchenkova, “The Outcomes of Copenhagen:The Negotiations and the Accord,” UNDP Environmentand Energy Group Climate Policy Series, February 2010.Available from: .Social Watch23Global climate: the Copenhagen collapse