20-35_Roundup.qxd 4/6/09 5:39 PM Page 25Round Upand international interest.”To be sure, signs have already emerged that showsome people are starting <strong>to</strong> feel around for a bot<strong>to</strong>m.In the first week of January, for instance, BorgWarnerrejected a mini-tender offer from Toron<strong>to</strong>-based TRCCapital Corp., dismissing it as <strong>to</strong>o low. Meanwhile, inLear Corp.’s third quarter conference call, Merrill Lynchanalyst John Murphy noted that the company’s marketcap, at $190 million, roughly equaled its annualcapital expenditure budget. After making this point, heasked, “Have you thought about taking the companyprivate?”Lear chairman and CEO Robert Rossiter, according<strong>to</strong> a transcript of the call found on Thomson OneAnalytics, merely responded, “Thanks for pointingthat out.” He later clarified that Lear was “not interestedin any help.” Roughly a month later, Dana’s marketcap had fallen below $100 million and the NewYork S<strong>to</strong>ck Exchange warned the parts maker that itcould be delisted.Still, it may be a while before the bigger namesin the au<strong>to</strong> parts space look <strong>to</strong> consolidate or seekout a rescue. In the meantime, many willpursue asset sales if possible. Modine International,for instance, is looking <strong>to</strong> <strong>to</strong> divestits Korean HVAC operations, with anyproceeds going <strong>to</strong> improve the company’sbalance sheet. ArvinMeri<strong>to</strong>r, meanwhile, istrying <strong>to</strong> unload its light-vehicle systems division.In its fourth-quarter conference callheld in November, the company disclosedthat it was in negotiations <strong>to</strong> sell the business,but as of press time, on January 6, a dealhad yet <strong>to</strong> materialize.Part of the problem, like that facing the au<strong>to</strong> industryin general, is that buyers are in short supply. Privateequity, as has been well documented, has beenhampered by the credit crunch, while strategics —even the stronger companies in the sec<strong>to</strong>r like TRW— are remiss <strong>to</strong> even consider acquisitions if it meanssacrificing balance sheet flexibility.BBK’s Bill Diehl, the president and CEO of theDetroit advisory firm, issued a statement in mid-November in support of the federal au<strong>to</strong>motivebailout. He also made a case that capital should go<strong>to</strong> the suppliers as well. “While support is neededby the Detroit Three, additional financing is criticalfor its supply base <strong>to</strong> encourage the efficiency andrationalization that is so badly needed after the lossof market share by [the OEMs]” he wrote. “Some ofthe funding provided for the industry should be earmarkedfor consolidating transactions in the supplybase.”Additional reporting by Ken MacFadyen“ Some of thefundingprovided forthe industryshould beearmarked forconsolidatingtransactions inthe supplybase.”chemicals company, bought Dow Chemical’sthermoplastic polyurethane business,a unit that generated $85 million in revenuesfor Dow in 2007. Terms of the dealwere not disclosed.The deal brings <strong>to</strong> Lubrizol Dow’s thermoplasticpolyurethane commercial, productionand research and developmentassets and 40 additional employees. Theacquisition will be fac<strong>to</strong>red in<strong>to</strong> Lubrizol’sEstane engineered polymers business.The Dow brand names will be retainedand unified under the Estane engineeredpolymers business.February 2009 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 25
20-35_Roundup.qxd 4/6/09 5:39 PM Page 26Round UpStrategics Reverse CourseReverse breakup fees were once considered just an LBOphenomenon; now corporate bidders are on boardBy Avram Davis“ There aresomecompanies thatsay ‘as amatter ofpolicy, we donot agree <strong>to</strong>breakup fees,and wenever will.”The propensity of reverse break-up fees in dealdocuments has climbed alongside the rise ofprivate equity, and when acquisitions startedblowing up last year, buyout shops leaned heavily onthe escape clause. Traditionally, reverse breakup feeshave been considered part of the LBO phenomenon,although increasingly, deal pros say, they are poppingup in more transactions involving corporate buyers.The growing prevalence in strategic deals is partiallythe result of the credit crunch. While financingwas rarely in question for strategics in the past, <strong>to</strong>daythere’s no guarantee that even corporate buyers canprocure the necessary debt for deals. Moreover, sellersmay also be worried about a buyer’s covenants. Whenchemicals maker Ashland acquired Hercules, last fall,the company negotiated a $77.5 million reverse breakupfee that safeguarded the seller against the possibilitythat Ashland would either fail <strong>to</strong> find financing orbreach its covenants, prospects that could potentiallytrip up the transaction.Another issue that has sellers concerned is the possibilitythat regula<strong>to</strong>rs, after a deal is cinched and paidfor, could step in <strong>to</strong> block a transaction. Over theyears, a few deals have taken precautions <strong>to</strong> guardagainst this possibility. In 2006, when Whirlpool sweetenedits offer for Maytag, the company included a$120 million reverse breakup fee, which would havebeen payable had regula<strong>to</strong>rs shot down the sale onantitrust concerns.Indeed, many anticipate uncertainty over antitrusttreatment will become more of an issue as a new administrationsweeps in<strong>to</strong> Washing<strong>to</strong>n. The consensus amongdeal pros is that President Barack Obama will tightenthe screws somewhat, at least compared the GeorgeBush administration, which <strong>to</strong>ok a lax view <strong>to</strong>wardantitrust. This reason, deal pros and lawyers cite, couldperhaps be the thrust behind the use of reverse breakupfees among strategic bidders.Jonathan Layne, partner at Gibson Dunn and cochairof the law firm’s mergers and acquisitions group,notes that if the coming administration is, in fact,“more robust in its antitrust involvement,” sellers willneed <strong>to</strong> make a deeper economic analysis of the corporaterisks. He adds that as it relates <strong>to</strong> antitrust, “therewill be a much greater risk <strong>to</strong> get a deal d<strong>one</strong>,” andadds that both sides will be keen <strong>to</strong> discuss “how <strong>to</strong>mitigate” those liabilities.Initially, reverse breakup fees were considered a seller-friendlyaddition <strong>to</strong> a deal’s documents. However,as it played out at the onset of the credit implosion —with many PE buyers gladly paying the penalty for aclean break — it could be argued that the provisos wereleaving sellers in the lurch. Also, as demonstrated bythe litigation over many broken deals, the clauses werenot as black and white as initially thought. For instance,when Apollo Management walked away from its offer<strong>to</strong> buy Huntsman, the firm was hoping it would onlyhave <strong>to</strong> pay the negotiated, $325 million reverse-breakupfee. After lengthy litigation, though, Apollo, along withthe deal’s lenders, were forced <strong>to</strong> pay a <strong>to</strong>tal of $1 billion<strong>to</strong> the spurned target.Sellers, it is expected, will seek <strong>to</strong> clarify the detailsaround reverse breakup clauses. One such discussionwill likely be the timeframe of termination. A brokentransaction at the outset of negotiations typically hasfewer consequences than a deal that collapses after manymonths. Layne suggests that reverse breakup fees couldbe stepped <strong>to</strong> increase the penalty as time goes on, althoughsuch a scenario could unduly penalize buyers,especially in antitrust cases when a deal’s fate lies out ofa bidder’s control. The Whole Foods/Wild Oats merger,for example, is still facing Federal Trade Commissionscrutiny a full year after it was completed.<strong>Not</strong> every<strong>one</strong> is on board with idea of breakup fees.According <strong>to</strong> Paolo Morante, a partner at DLA Piper’santitrust and trade regulation practice, “There are somecompanies that say ‘as a matter of policy, we do notagree <strong>to</strong> breakup fees, and we never will.’”From the buyer’s perspective, they may be remiss<strong>to</strong> lock themselves in<strong>to</strong> something that can ultimatelybe beyond their control. Sellers, meanwhile, mightprefer a market MAC, which can be <strong>to</strong>ugher <strong>to</strong> provethan a mere breakup fee — especially after watching somany companies get burned in 2008.26 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS February 2009