Sunni Insurgency in Iraq_1

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Middle East Security Report 24 | Iraq’s sunni insurgency | Sinan Adnan with Aaron Reese | October 2014Some of these groups are rhetorically prolific, attemptingto present an image of effectiveness to their constituenciesin order to achieve political gains. They seek to maintainthe momentum of the current anti-government offensiveby raising popular support. Regardless of their rhetoric,ISIS remains the dominant military force in Iraq that isexecuting a national military campaign to bring about acohesive political vision involving the destruction of the Iraqistate. Other groups have in some cases jumped on the ISISbandwagon, taking advantage of anti-government momentumand claiming credit for successes that rolled back the IraqiSecurity Forces.Although these groups share an anti-government orientation,they have a troublesome relationship with ISIS. Some IraqiSunni armed anti-government groups, such as JRTN, haveworked with ISIS to accomplish short-and medium-termgoals of expelling the Iraqi Security Forces and controllingterrain. Others have coordinated with ISIS in areas of mutualpresence. However, over the long-term their visions for Iraqare incompatible. Some of these groups, including Jaysh al-Mujahidin and Ansar al-Islam, are openly anti-ISIS. All ofthese groups have on at least one occasion clashed with ISIS,particularly after ISIS declared an Islamic “Caliphate” anddemanded all other groups pledge allegiance to its leader AbuBakr al-Baghdadi.These groups are all opposed to the return of the ISF toSunni heartland areas. Consequently, they do not representviable anti-ISIS ground forces to partner with the ISF and theinternational anti-ISIS coalition. Instead, they demonstratehow difficult it will be for Iraq to identify Sunni populationsthat will combat ISIS on behalf of the state. These antigovernmentgroups likely garner more tribal support thanISIS, but they may actually impede the positive long-termeffects of tribal mobilization and local security forces thatwould be essential to Iraq’s immediate security strategy. TheIraqi government must overcome these groups and reconnectwith Iraq’s disenfranchised Sunni population if an effectiveanti-ISIS program is to take hold within Sunni areas.A unified military effort is extremely important to preventthe collapse of the Iraqi state and to regain Iraqi governmentcontrol over its territory. It is important to note that thecurrent crisis in Iraq was largely the result of populargrievances inspired by the policies of former PM Nouri al-Maliki and the heavy-handed tactics employed by the ISF.Anti-government groups captured the momentum generatedby Iraq’s longstanding protest movements, which ISISalso exploited as a critical vulnerability of the Iraqi state.Therefore, even if ISIS is militarily degraded, Iraq’s Sunnipopulation may not return willingly to rejoin Iraq. This willundermine Iraq’s efforts to build a ground force that candefeat and destroy ISIS long term. The following study willexamine these other players, seeking to characterize theirideological orientation, rhetoric, operational presence, andtheir desired political end-state. Although this report maynot be comprehensive in describing every armed Sunni antigovernmentactor in Iraq, the groups described below canbe considered representative of the trends within the antigovernmentmovement.Background: From Protest to InsurgencyThe origins of the current Sunni insurgency in Iraq can betraced to the end of the previous one. The previous Sunniinsurgency ended when former insurgents dropped theirarms and reconciled with the Iraqi government. With thegovernment, they then took up arms against ISIS’s predecessororganization, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in what became knownas the Sahwa or “Awakening” movement. The Sahwa uprisingof Iraqi Sunni tribes against AQI marked the major turningpoint in the battle against AQI that ended the last Iraq War.In conjunction with the U.S. military ‘surge’ of 2007-2008,the Awakening movement managed to rapidly break AQI’sterritorial control over Sunni areas and drive the group intoremission. 2 Despite this victory, Iraqi Shi‘a politicians weredeeply suspicious of the Awakening and its fighters, many ofwhom had previously fought against the central governmentas members of the insurgency.After American ground forces left Iraq in 2011, formerPrime Minister Nouri al-Maliki failed to integrate Awakeningmembers into the national military and instead consolidatedhis control over a centralized political and security apparatusregarded by most Sunnis as authoritarian and sectarian. 3Sunni popular resentment finally boiled over on December20, 2012, after Prime Minister Maliki arrested the bodyguardsof Sunni Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi in a targeted movemeant to sideline Maliki’s political rivals. 4 Within weeks,large-scale protests had spread across the Sunni-dominatedprovinces of Anbar, Salah ad-Din, Ninewa, Kirkuk, andDiyala, as well as Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad. 5Despite the fears of many government officials, the Sunniprotest movement remained relatively peaceful, althoughIraq’s first provincial elections post-U.S. withdrawal werepostponed due to security in Anbar, Ninewa, and Kirkukprovinces in March 2013. 6 However, on April 23, 2013,Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) stormed a protest camp in Hawija,southwest of Kirkuk, and opened fire, killing 20 Sunniprotestors and wounding over 100 others. 7 Violent resistanceerupted almost immediately across Iraq’s Sunni-majorityprovinces, with more than 200 people killed in armed clashesover the following five days. 8 Over the following months, thecrisis developed distinct sectarian overtones as Iraqi Sunnisincreasingly vocalized support for an armed resistance whichincluded tribal militias and insurgent groups (such as theBa‘athist Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandia – JRTN) while10 www.Understandingwar.org
Middle East Security Report 24 | Iraq’s sunni insurgency | Sinan Adnan with Aaron Reese | October 2014ANTI-GOVERNMENT GROUPS CLAIMED AREAS OF OPERATIONThe map above depicts the systems where known anti-government groups may be active. The three systems include: TheHamrin system, the Anbar system, and the Baghdad Belts.Hamrin: The GMCIR, Ansar al-Islam, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, the 1920s Brigades, and the Islamic Army are assessedto operate in this region.Anbar: The GMCIR, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, the Islamic Army, and the Fallujah Military Council are assessed tooperate in this region.Baghdad Belts: The GMCIR, Ansar al-Islam, Jaysh al-Mujahideen, and the 1920s Brigades are assessed tooperate in this region.www.Understandingwar.org11
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Sunni Insurgency in Iraq_1

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