Sunni Insurgency in Iraq_1

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Middle East Security Report 24 | Iraq’s sunni insurgency | Sinan Adnan with Aaron Reese | October 2014The alleged existence of the CRTA raises an important pointwithin the Iraqi Sunni anti-government insurgency. Not everyleader or group is equally effective; some, such as Ali Hatem,release numerous statements without evidence of their leadingan actual fighting force. Ali Hatem has claimed to representtribal forces in Anbar, but in actuality his activity is an attemptto use recent events for political posturing and to appeal to hisanti-government base. Hatem does indeed have a modicum ofpopular support, but this has not historically translated intopolitical success. Ali Hatem participated in the 2010 nationalelections under the State of Law Alliance of former PrimeMinister Nouri al-Maliki, but received very few votes and didnot secure a seat. 83 In the 2014 elections, however, Hatem wasdisqualified by the Independent High Electoral Committee(IHEC) along with a number of other anti-Maliki politiciansfor allegedly “enticing hatred and sectarianism.” 84Although Ali Hatem has refrained from openly criticizing ISISby name, the takeover by ISIS of the Gwer and Makhmourareas proximate to Arbil prompted Ali Hatem to stronglycriticize ISIS. 85 He along with two other anti-governmentfigures held a press conference in Arbil on August 7, 2014and spoke critically of ISIS, describing its attacks near IraqiKurdistan as derailing from the path of the “revolution.”Twitter post of the 1920 Brigades, showing alleged attacks of the GMCIR.They maintained that the revolution is ongoing and thatISIS only represents a minor part that should not be usedto condemn the entire movement. This change of rhetoricThe 1920 Brigades is, however, closely affiliated with thewas meant to calm the ethnic tension between Iraqi ArabsAssociation of Muslim Scholars in Iraq (AMSI) which isand Iraqi Kurds in Arbil, which came to a very high pointled by Harith al-Dhari, a Jordan-based Iraqi Sunni figure.between August 7-8, 2014 when the Peshmerga vacated theirDhari and AMSI oppose the current structure of the Iraqipositions in the face of an ISIS assault on the Ninewa Plains,government created in the wake of the 2003 U.S. invasion. 89east of Mosul; and Gwer, and Makhmour, west of Arbil. It wasWhile calling for a “united” Iraq, the group has called foralso to convey a message to the hosting Kurdistan Regionala complete change in the government and the abolishmentGovernment (KRG) that Hatem and other Arbil-based antigovernmentfigures did not support the ISIS advance towardof its structures. On September 6, 2014, Dhari called for atemporary government after the “revolution prevails” and forIraqi Kurdistan.conducting elections that starts a new political process. 90The AMSI issued a statement in the wake of the declaration1920 Brigadesof a “Caliphate” by ISIS. 91 AMSI rejected the announcementand acknowledged ISIS as a fighting group rather than aThe 1920 Brigades fought against Coalition forces during the state. The statement argued that a pledge of allegiance to theU.S. presence in Iraq, but their activities decreased following “Caliphate” was not required because the “requirements forthe U.S.-led surge. 86 The group is small in comparison to success” in terms of having uncontested control of terrainJRTN, and likely only a fraction of their former strength and being able to provide services had not been properlyfrom 2003-2011. On May 17, 2014 the group started established. The 1920 Brigades does not itself aim to establishrebroadcasting attacks claimed by the GMCIR, suggesting an Islamic Caliphate; their response to ISIS was instead anthat the 1920 Brigades is affiliated with, or a component of, attempt to separate themselves from ISIS while promoting athe GMCIR. 87 It is not clear, however, the extent of their real religious image for themselves.cooperation. Even given affiliation between the two groups,it is unlikely that they have a unified command that drives an Similar to the GMCIR, the 1920 Brigades may share neartermgoals of expelling the ISF from Iraqi Sunni areas witheffective national campaign. The group’s name references the1920 anti-colonial uprising against the British occupation, ISIS, but the statement by AMSI makes it clear that theirand although not Salafist in orientation the group deploys visions for the future of Iraq are starkly different. TheirIslamist, jihadist rhetoric. Despite their likely present-day interactions in the past have also reflected this feud: al-Qaedaassociation with the Ba‘athist-aligned GMCIR, in 2006 the in Iraq accused the 1920 Brigades in 2007 of fighting other1920 Brigades denied any links to Ba‘athism. 8818 www.Understandingwar.org
Middle East Security Report 24 | Iraq’s sunni insurgency | Sinan Adnan with Aaron Reese | October 2014mujahidin and taking actions “contrary to the jihad.” 92 On theissue of other religious groups, AMSI released a statement onJuly 20, 2014 criticizing ISIS for expelling Iraqi Christiansfrom Mosul and called for their return. 93 Politically, Dhari’scall for elections in the wake of the “success” of the revolutiondirectly contradicts ISIS’s fundamental rejection of anydemocratic process.The 1920 Brigades, while rhetorically prolific, are not a majorforce on the ground. Although there is evidence of theiractivity during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, their activitiesat present appear dramatically reduced. The group releasesstatements and magazines containing political, military, andreligious content. For example, one of the pages of a magazinereleased on September 5, 2014 was an article that analyzed theU.S. and Iranian stance toward the Iraq crisis, 94 Another pagediscussed Islamic legal issues. 95 However, the bulk of theironline communication is closely linked to that of the GMCIRmaking it impossible to determine its areas of operationoutside of GMCIR activity. It is likely that the group has seenserious attrition, and either carries out sporadic attacks oris merely a shell organization as a minor component of theGMCIR.The Islamic Army in IraqThe Islamic Army in Iraq, similar to the 1920 Brigades, wasoriginally founded to fight against Coalition forces in Iraq untiltheir withdrawal in 2011. Like others armed groups that wereactive during this period, the Islamic Army’s activities declinedafter 2008 following the U.S.-led “Surge.” The organizationresurfaced as of February 2014, and its leader, Ahmed al-Dabashreturned to the public eye in the wake of the 2014 Anbar clashesportraying himself and his men as tribal revolutionaries. 96 TheIslamic Army is likely active in carrying out attacks against the ISF,but its description of its activities through videos posted onlinedo not reflect a national campaign or the conduct of spectacularattacks against major military targets. The group claims that ithas an operational presence in Ramadi, Udhaim, Sadia, andFallujah and posts videos of gunmen allegedly part of their groupas they operate in these areas. 97The Islamic Army in Iraq has expressed a desire to participatein a political solution for Iraq. Their conception of whatthat political solution would look like, however, is one thatis unacceptable to the continued unity of Iraq in that itis predicated on the abolishment of the current system ofgovernment. On June 23, 2014, Dabash held a joint pressconference along with the previously-mentioned Ali Hatem.The event took place in Arbil, in the wake of the fall ofMosul. 98 They listed six demands in a their statement: 1)the resignation of then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki;2) the formation of a temporary salvation government byindependent Iraqi figures; 3) a general conference calling forIslamic, regional, and global support, including “southernwww.Understandingwar.orgAlleged members of The Islamic Army in Iraq posing with captured HUMVEEof the Iraqi Army in Udhaim, in northern Diyala.Iraqi tribes” [referring to Shi‘a areas of Iraq], to support the“revolution;” 4) national reconciliation in which “conflictingparties” forgive each other for past fighting; 5) rejectionof “terrorism” in any form; and 6) rejection of externalintervention while ensuring the “protection” of the interestsof Arab, Islamic, and foreign countries. Dabash and Hatemalso spoke in support of President Barazani and the KRG.Although their list of demands almost certainly overstates theactual influence of these two figures and their ability to affectthe situation on the ground, it reflects the desire by groupsof Iraqi Sunnis to piggyback on the momentum achieved byISIS to accomplish the desired ouster of Maliki from power.The statement was reconciliatory in tone, seeking to presentan acceptable face to the events of the preceding weeks byreaching out to Iraqi Shi‘a and offering to work with regionalneighbors to establish a “salvation” government that couldaccomplish national reconciliation.After the joint statement by these leaders, however, a backlashoccurred against them from other armed anti-governmentgroups. A leader in the GMCIR who was based in Anbarrejected their list of demands stated that they do not representthose of the GMCIR. 99 This leader ridiculed Dabash andHatem for their media appearances, calling them “part ofthe problem” and denying that they represent the GMCIR.In particular, the GMCIR figure rejected any possibility fornegotiation with the government.The Islamic Army has attempted to distance itself from ISIS.A gunman described as a field commander in the IslamicArmy appeared in a video posted on June 23, 2014 after thefall of Mosul. 100 When asked about the goals and aspirationsof the group, he stated that their desire is to conquer Baghdadand to provide Iraqi Sunnis with self-governance in theirareas. He added that this desire does not extend to attacking19
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Sunni Insurgency in Iraq_1

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