Sunni Insurgency in Iraq_1

MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 24Beyond the Islamic State: Iraq’sSunni InsurgencyBy Sinan Adnan with Aaron ReeseThe Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is not the only armed group fighting the government ofIraq today. A number of other armed anti-government groups are active amidst the complicated andunsettled political and security situation in Iraq. These armed groups represent an independent threat tothe government of Iraq. They are also an enduring demonstration that the Sunni population in Iraq maynot return to political life if ISIS is removed from the equation. The formation of Iraq’s new governmentunder PM Haidar al-Abadi will not necessarily mitigate this concern, especially while Shi‘a Militias deployforward with the Iraqi Security Forces, and while Sunni majority cities under the control of ISIS comeunder direct and indirect fire by the state.As the U.S., Iraq, and other allied governments pursue militaryaction against ISIS, it is important to note that the problemof anti-government militancy in Iraq will not be solved bydestroying or degrading ISIS. Military action to counteractthe threat posed by ISIS and protect civilian populations isimportant to prevent the complete collapse of the Iraqi state;but military action alone is insufficient to address the broaderchallenge facing Iraq. A variety of other anti-governmentgroups may step in to fill the vacuum and give rise to asecond Sunni insurgency in Iraq. These groups are likely tocontinue to resist the return of Iraqi Security Forces in areascurrently under ISIS control, and they will retain a modicumof popular support in the absence of political solutions thatrise to address the grievances of these local populations. Theabsence of national Sunni political leadership in Baghdadwith popular support allows insurgent, tribal, and religiousleaders to influence Iraq’s Sunni communities more directly.These anti-government groups include Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqahal-Naqshabandia (JRTN), the General Military Council ofIraqi Revolutionaries, the Fallujah Military Council, theCouncil of the Revolutionaries Tribes of Anbar, the 1920Brigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al-Mujahidin, andAnsar al-Islam. Some of these groups are moderately capable,and they are playing an active role in shaping the militarysituation on the ground against the Iraqi government. All ofthese groups became less active after the U.S. withdrawal offorces in 2011, but actions taken by the Maliki governmentspurred a resurgence of these groups in 2013.1 In thebeginning of 2014, widespread Sunni unrest became outrightrebellion, and the Iraqi government lost control over largeportions of Anbar province. In June of 2014, ISIS seizedMosul and began an urban offensive that led to even morewww.Understandingwar.orgIraqi territory falling out of the hands of the ISF. Some of thisterritory is now controlled by other armed anti-governmentgroups. The Iraqi government is therefore confronted by abroad challenge among its Iraqi Sunni population, whereattacks against ISIS in Sunni areas may give rise to othergroups.These groups hold different ideologies. Some are moreextreme than others, and they express a range of politicalviews. Although all of these groups operate against the IraqiGovernment, they generally do not target Iraqi civilians. Theonly current exception to this is ISIS. Nevertheless, groupsthat confine themselves to military targets are not necessarilyreconcilable within the current political process. Groupslike Jaysh al-Mujahidin and Ansar al-Islam will almostcertainly refuse to participate in any sort of democraticprocess. Meanwhile, groups such as the 1920 Brigades andthe Ba‘athist group JRTN articulate their goals in termsof a political solution, but in practice their political goalsinclude the complete dismantling of Iraq’s current system ofgovernment.These groups are not equally capable of projecting militaryforce against Iraqi government forces. While some areeffective, others are limited in their numbers, experience,and military capabilities, rendering them less effective on thebattlefield. Nevertheless, their attacks can play a role in fixingor degrading the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), thus exposingvulnerabilities in the Iraqi government’s defenses againstwider and more complex military attacks from groups likeISIS. These smaller groups, although active, do not operatein an effective and coordinated national campaign; instead,they operate locally and do not project force far from theirsupport zones.9