Sunni Insurgency in Iraq_1

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Middle East Security Report 24 | Iraq’s sunni insurgency | Sinan Adnan with Aaron Reese | October 2014lists of operations in addition to video releases that show AIgunmen carrying out attacks against the ISF. The attacks weremainly concentrated around Hawija, in southwestern Kirkukprovince; in Garma and Sichar, near Fallujah; in Udhaimin northern Diyala; in Latifiyah, south of Baghdad; and inBalad, Ishaki, and Yankaja in Salah ad-Din province. 154In a video release on March 11, 2014 that documented attackscarried out by the group in in Mosul, several members of thegroup “renewed” their pledge of allegiance to the “Emir” ofAnsar al-Islam, Sheikh Abu Hashim al-Ibrahim. 155 A previousmessage released to members of Ansar al-Islam, purportedlysigned by the same Sheikh al-Ibrahim, was released inDecember 2011. 156 That name, clearly a pseudonym, makesit unclear if Shafei remains associated with or the leader ofthe group.In the wake of ISIS’s rapid advance in Iraq, Ansar al-Islam hasposted claims and pictures of its attacks in the Hamrin Ridge ineastern Diyala province, Tikrit, and Kirkuk. 157 On July 1, 2014Ansar al-Islam released an official statement regarding the fallof Mosul and what they termed the “conquering” of many areasof northern Iraq by gunmen. The group congratulated theUmmah (Muslim community), but specifically stated that Ansaral-Islam had not joined any other groups or pledged allegianceor bayah to anyone. 158 This can be read as specifically reiteratingthe independence of the group from ISIS. 159 Although ISISpublished images of dozens of Ansar al-Islam members joiningISIS ranks, Ansar al-Islam re-iterated on August 25, 2014 thatit had not joined ISIS. 160Given the group’s long history of operations, Ansar al-Islamwill almost certainly persist in conducting attacks against ISF.The denial by Ansar al-Islam that its members had joinedISIS indicates that the groups remain competitors, althoughthe fact that AI has negotiated ceasefires with ISIS in the pastindicates that they may seek to avoid direct conflict. Ansaral-Islam may work with other groups, particularly Jaysh al-Mujahidin, in carrying out operations against the ISF. Aswith other groups described above, operations by the ISF,United States, and allied forces that degrade ISIS are likelyto provide opportunities for Ansar al-Islam to grow strongerand expand their areas of operation.ConclusionThis paper has discussed a variety of groups across theideological spectrum, from the secular GMCIR to the SalafistjihadistAnsar al-Islam. Many of these groups had beenactive historically, and they reemerged as Sunni discontentescalated after the Hawija protest incident in April 2013.They have escalated further since the Anbar clashes of late2013. As anti-government influencers, all of these groupshave facilitated the recent advance led by ISIS. These groupshold different end goals, and their relationships to ISIS willlikely shift going forward as groups reject ISIS’s demands thatthey pledge allegiance to the self-styled Caliph Ibrahim (akaAbu Bakr al-Baghdadi).ISIS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani released astatement in April 2014 directed at the other armed groupsoperating in Iraq, specifically in Fallujah. He stated thatin “the cities and areas under your [ISIS’s] control, and atthe head of them Fallujah, will never be ruled, with God’spermission, after today by anything other than God’s law.”Furthermore, in the areas that ISIS controls “there is no placefor secular [groups].” 161 ISIS members who entered cities likeFallujah “will never return to the desert.” ISIS has alreadyshown it will put this stance into practice as it has attempted toeliminate potential competition and undermine the GMCIRas well as other groups.It will be important to watch for violent clashes betweenthese groups and ISIS. JRTN, Ansar al-Islam, and Jaysh al-Mujahidin are the strongest among these groups in termsof military capability. Although they are not as organizedand sophisticated as ISIS, their attacks can fix the ISF anddegrade their defenses. They can potentially inflict similareffects against ISIS, but their presence behind ISIS lines willgenerate further difficulty for the Iraqi Security Forces ratherthan advantage. While the Ba‘ath Party, JRTN, and the IslamicArmy have expressed their demands in a political framework,this does not reconcile them to the current political process.Salafist-jihadist groups like Jaysh al-Mujahidin and Ansaral-Islam are also irreconcilable to Iraq’s secular governmentsystem. ISF advances into Sunni heartland territory will meetwith violent confrontation by more than just ISIS. Despitetheir dissent against ISIS governance, these groups have notmounted a strategic counter-attack against ISIS. This is almostcertainly because they do not possess the military strength andorganization to do so. It is also because all of these groupsshare the goal of preventing the ISF from reentering theirareas, a mission that would be very challenging without themilitary support of ISIS. If ISIS is degraded militarily, thesegroups will most likely work to fill the vacuum and continueto be destabilizing actors as long as they have some popularsupport. This popular support was originally and by large theresult of policies of the Maliki government. It is importantto watch for any decrease in popular support for thesegroups now that a new government is formed with a widerrepresentation of the Iraqi Sunni community.Iraqi Sunni leaders like Usama al-Nujaifi, Atheel al-Nujaifi,and Salih al-Mutlaq have lost most of the popular support theyhad by the end of 2013. Unlike Iraqi Sunni politicians, thegroups described in this report enjoy local support from theircommunities hence the locality of their operations. Thesesocial ties will present these groups as alternatives to ISIS if24 www.Understandingwar.org
Middle East Security Report 24 | Iraq’s sunni insurgency | Sinan Adnan with Aaron Reese | October 2014the latter was successfully degraded or defeated militarily.Therefore, the efforts to incorporate Iraqi Sunni politicalleaders who do not have real influence in their communitieswill not necessarily translate to success on the ground.The armed groups discussed above do not represent theaspirations of all Iraqi Sunni communities. Instead, thereare Sunni communities that do not favor anti-governmentgroups, some of which are actively cooperating with thegovernment in order to defend themselves from an existentialISIS threat. These are mostly tribal communities, includingthe Jughaifi tribe in Haditha, west of Ramadi; 162 the Albu Issa,Fhailat, Ihrimat, Halabasa, and Albu Alwan tribes in Amiriyatal-Fallujah, southeast of Fallujah; 163 the Jubur in Dhuluiya,southeast of Samarra; 164 the Izza tribe in Mansouriya,northeast of Baquba; 165 and Shamar tribe in Rabia, west ofMosul . 166 There are also Sunni communities where ISISquelled tribal resistance at early stages; nevertheless, thesecommunities will likely act against ISIS if they can be assuredthat the government or another armed group would providethem with the necessary military and political backing.These Iraqi Sunni communities are within or nearby ISISterritories, including components of the Jubur tribe inAlam, east of Tikrit; 167 the Ubaid tribe in and around Hawija,southwestern Kirkuk; 168 and elements of the Jubur tribe inZowiya, northern Salah ad-Din. 169 Multiple influences exist toswing this participation one way or the other, from pro-ISIS orpro-insurgent, to neutral, to actively pro-government. Theseinclude the opportunity to participate in re-formed NationalGuard units, where Iraqi Sunnis can draw a government salaryto defend and control their areas in a semi-independent fashionfrom central federal forces. 170 It may also include incentives todisplaced persons to return to their homes once they have beenreturned to Iraqi government control.ISIS control of tribal areas takes place on an area-by-area,ground-up level by seeking or coercing the support oflocalized tribal leaders and members. Therefore, a policythat supports Iraqi Sunni tribal alignment against ISIS mustfollow a similar model. Engaging the tribes at a distance willnot be possible; remote populations will remain under thecoercion of ISIS and possibly under the influence of otheranti-government groups. Engaging populations in multiculturalurban centers currently occupied by ISIS, likeMosul, will also prove difficult without forward presence.Forward military presence by the Iraqi Security Forces, whichremains a perceived sectarian actor, may meet resistancemotivated and fuelled by sectarian sentiments. Yet resistanceis mounting to ISIS by Sunni populations. This resistanceindicates that there is potential for Sunni tribal involvementin Iraq’s security strategy to deny ISIS control of Iraq’s Sunniheartland.www.Understandingwar.org25
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