Sunni Insurgency in Iraq_1

Recommendations

Info

Middle East Security Report 24 | Iraq’s sunni insurgency | Sinan Adnan with Aaron Reese | October 2014government-in-waiting, producing regular statements aboutongoing events. It is interesting to note that many statementsby the group reflect anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoricvery similar to that of the former Hussein regime. The partyis comprised of three factions as a result of internal disputes.The most prominent faction is the command of Izzat al-Duri,who served as vice president under Saddam Hussein and alsoserves as the head of JRTN. Given his leadership role inJRTN, the largest component of the Council, it is likely thatthat Duri plays a major role in the GMCIR as well.Al-Duri also heads a group called the Jihad, Liberation,and National Salvation Front, a 2009 reincarnation of ananother organization called the Higher Command of Jihadand Liberation that dates back to October 2, 2007. 29 Thesegroups seemingly served as umbrella organizations to uniteanti-government groups across ethnic and sectarian lines. 30JRTN was listed as a leading component of the Front at thetime of its formation. 31 A leader in the Iraqi Ba‘ath Party,Abdul-Sammad al-Ghrairi, highlighted the role of the IraqiBa‘ath Party in the Front as recently as July 2014, althoughit seems that the other components of the group are nowdefunct.The second faction is that of Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmed,who held several senior positions within the Ba‘ath Party andserved as the governor of Ninewa under Saddam Hussein. 32Ahmed had a contentious relationship with Izzat al-Duri.Their disagreement came to a head when Ahmed, along withother party members, held a conference in Syria in 2007announcing that they were expelling Izzat al-Duri from theparty. Ahmed’s group claimed to assume leadership of theparty in what they called a reform move. 33 Ahmed and theother attending members were consequently expelled fromthe Ba‘ath Party by Duri, but continue to claim to be thelegitimate representation of the Ba‘ath Party in Iraq.The third faction is that of Abdul-Baqi al-Sadun, a formermember of the Saddam regime who generally speaks on behalfof the southern, mostly Shi‘a component of the Iraqi Ba‘athParty. On January 27, 2014 Sadun accused Duri of plotting totarget him and of cooperating with the Maliki government. 34In the same statement, Sadun stated that he was elected by nineprovinces to be the leader of the Ba‘ath Party replacing Izzatal-Duri. The following day, the Iraqi Ba‘ath Party releaseda statement describing Sadun as a traitor. 35 Sadun’s factionclaims to be active in the fighting in the wake of the 2014Anbar clashes. On April 5, 2014 Sadun released a statementin support of the anti-government clashes. 36 Sadun claimedthat members of his faction had established armed formationsto participate in the anti-ISF clashes. To demonstrate theirparticipation in combat, he claimed that 15 members of thisgroup were killed and others injured in clashes.The splintering of the Iraqi Ba‘ath Party and the participationof the Party, along with its component JRTN, within thesevarious umbrella organizations demonstrate the complexity ofthe environment for armed anti-government groups. Theremay be many numerous small groups and factions that jointogether in various coalitions and joint statements, but thereis no evidence to point to them having any significant rolein fighting. JRTN clearly remains the most prominent groupinvolved in the fighting. The GMCIR has not announced anyof its leaders officially, aside from its spokesperson. Becauseof the major role played by JRTN within the GMCIR, thisreport will generally treat the GMCIR and JRTN as beinginterchangeable and as the most significant Ba‘athist actor inIraq.Participation in attacksThe GMCIR has been publishing daily situation reports sinceFebruary 1, 2014 via its social media outlets. These reportsdescribe attacks claimed both by unspecified “revolutionaries”and “revolutionaries of the military council.” 37 It does notappear, however, that these attacks are part of a comprehensivenational campaign. Instead, local councils appear to conductisolated activities that are launched as separate efforts. Also,the attacks were for the most part described as simple indirectfire and IED attacks rather than complex attacks or attacksthat involve large numbers of ground troops. The latter attackthreshold distinguishes professionalizing armed groups thatmight be capable of bigger engagements to seize territory likeISIS.GMCIR has also posted videos seeking to demonstrate itseffectiveness and planning. On April 2, 2014, a video surfacedon YouTube with the GMCIR logo on the top left corner ofthe screen showing a man wearing a military uniform similarto that of officers in the pre-2003 Iraqi Army. The mandelivered a military planning briefing, describing a battle planin the vicinity of Yusufiyah, south of Baghdad and referring toa large military map in the background. 38 Although there wasno evidence that the attack was actually conducted, the releaseof the video demonstrates that the GMCIR is attempting todisplay itself as a highly organized military force that is capableof conducting complex attacks.In a statement published on the GMCIR’s Facebook page,the organization claimed that it played a major role in theISIS offensive on June 10, 2014 stating that “revolutionaries”seized the western side of Mosul. 39 Its statements portrayGMCIR as the leading force on the ground. 40 It is not yet clearto what extent the GMCIR and other groups facilitated the fallof Mosul, but given the fact that ISIS destroyed many shrinesthat are considered sacred even to Sunnis, implementedreligious law, and expelled Christians from Mosul, it is clearthat ISIS is able to exert its own agenda on the ground overother armed groups. It is nevertheless significant to observethat the GMCIR may independently control territory withinMosul, likely at the neighborhood level. JRTN’s historical14 www.Understandingwar.org
Middle East Security Report 24 | Iraq’s sunni insurgency | Sinan Adnan with Aaron Reese | October 2014expulsion of Iraqi Christians from the city of Mosul. 44 Thestatement strongly criticized the act but specifically avoidedreferring to ISIS by name. The statement also reiterated thenationalist nature of JRTN describing itself as the extensionof the former IA and inclusive of Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen,Christians, Yazidis, and Sabians.Members of JRTN posing with Iraq and JRTN flag.presence in the city suggests this possibility, though ISIS hasalso assassinated former Iraqi Army officers in the city as ofSeptember 8, 2014. 41JRTN/GMCIR and ISISIn his first speech after the fall of Mosul, published on July12, 2014, Izzat al-Duri spoke positively of ISIS and describedthem as “heroes and knights.” 42 Duri also called for unityamong anti-government armed groups in order to achievevictory. He also called for jihadi groups to transcend sectariandivides. The positive mention of ISIS and jihadists was mostlikely a rhetorical addition aimed at minimizing the conflictsbetween these groups during a critical period. Other leadershave also attempted to minimize differences with ISIS. Ina statement by party leader Abdul-Sammad al-Ghrairi at aconference in Jordan on July 17, 2014, he refused to refer tothe group as “Daesh,” a pejorative Arabic term used to referto ISIS, saying “now we call it the Islamic State.” He alsoacknowledged that ISIS “accomplished goals and helped therevolutionaries achieve their goals and we are semi-[parallel]with them in facing the Iranian Safavid [a pejorative termreferring to Iran] project in Iraq.” 43Despite this statement, ISIS and the GMCIR do not share anideological orientation. Actions taken by ISIS against non-Sunni religious and ethnic communities in areas consideredto be “liberated” by the GMCIR ran counter to the GMCIR’snationalist rhetoric that emphasized Iraqi unity. Theexpulsion of Iraqi Christians from Mosul, the fleeing of IraqiYazidis to Mount Sinjar, and the destruction of shrines inthe city were the most major example of where ISIS actionscontradicted the GMCIR’s stated goals. However, becauseof ISIS’s strength on the ground, the GMCIR and JRTNwere forced to tread carefully in addressing these problems.On July 21, JRTN issued a statement in response to theTwo days later, the Ba’ath Party in Iraq released a statementthrough its official representative, Khudhaier al-Murshidi.The statement was in defense of Iraqi Christians andreiterated Ba’ath rhetorical desire to defend all Iraqis,including Christians. 45 The statement did not mention ISISand emphasized the “malicious” role of “government of spies inBaghdad and its American, Zionist, and Persian masters” overamplifyingreported threats against Christians adding that thesethreats were either issued by “some of the gunmen” or that thestatements had been falsely attributed as part of a campaign todelegitimize their groups. The “gunmen” here is a delicate wayof referencing the forces controlling the city without namingtheir affiliations. In a separate statement, Murshidi criticizedthose who attacked the shrines and expelled “citizens” withoutreferring to ISIS. 46 He described the perpetrators as part of aconspiracy aimed to negatively impact the “revolution.”These reactions were echoed by a member of the mediadepartment of the GMCIR allegedly based in Mosul. He statedin a phone interview with the Al-Mosul satellite TV channelthat was later uploaded to the GMCIR YouTube channel thatIraqi Shi‘a from Tal Afar distributed leaflets marked with theISIS logo and accompanied with a bullet to Iraqi Christiansin Mosul. 47 He described the act as a conspiracy planned bythe “Maliki government.”The disagreement between ISIS and the GMCIR came to ahead when ISIS launched offensives in northern Iraq forcingthousands of Iraqi Yazidis to flee to Mount Sinjar. Thisprompted the council to issue a statement on August 6, 2014criticizing ISIS for taking the “revolution to a different path”rather than attacking Baghdad in order to topple the seat ofgovernment. 48 On August 23, 2014, the council criticizedISIS by name after the Islamic State demanded that anotheranti-government group in Garma, Jaysh al-Mujahidin, pledgeallegiance to ISIS or depart the area. 49 As of September 2014,the GMCIR’s standing position remains to express inclusivityof other religious groups and supportive of military efforts byother anti-government forces. They have pushed back againstISIS where this position is challenged, but not to the extent ofdirect, open confrontation.ISIS is putting the GMCIR in a tough position, especiallyin Mosul. The former is adamant on implementing Shari’alaw as a major pillar along with the establishment of fullcontrol in the areas where it is present. 50 This forces theGMCIR to explain to its constituency why acts that it doesnot support are occurring in areas where “revolutionaries”www.Understandingwar.org15
Page 1 and 2: October 2014Sinan Adnan with aaron
Page 4 and 5: Executive SummaryMiddle East Securi
Page 7 and 8: table of contentsMiddle East Securi
Page 9 and 10: MIDDLE EAST SECURITY REPORT 24Beyon
Page 11 and 12: Middle East Security Report 24 | Ir
Page 13: Middle East Security Report 24 | Ir
Page 27 and 28: NOTESof the military council of rev
Page 29 and 30: NOTESD9%86%D9%82%D8%B4%D8%A8%D9%86%
Page 31 and 32: NOTES%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B
Page 33 and 34: NOTESBanner for Establishment and R
Page 35: NOTES166. [“Peshmerga and fighter

Sunni Insurgency in Iraq_1

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?