Sunni Insurgency in Iraq_1

Middle East Security Report 24 | Iraq’s sunni insurgency | Sinan Adnan with Aaron Reese | October 2014Mufti and his rejection of the meeting were significant givenhis role in the beginning of the Anbar crisis mobilizingIraqi Sunnis by giving a statement on December 30, 2013supporting operations carried out by those he described as“revolutionaries” and “mujahidin” against the “sectarian andhateful militias.” 114 Although Rafaie still supports what hedescribed on June 25, 2014 as the “revolution,” he criticizedthe conference. According to him, the attendees limitedtheir dialogue on criticizing Maliki rather than discussing the“problem of the constitution and the political system.” 115Ali Hatem rejected the conference for not representing the“Sunni revolutionaries.” 116 He added that such conferencesshould be held on “liberated Iraqi lands.” This represents adeparture from the perceived alliance between Hatem andthe Islamic Army since Ahmed al-Dabash, the leader of theIslamic Army, was present at the meeting. Indeed, Hatem maynot have been invited to the conference; unlike Hatem, allother attendees are notable for their lack of participation inpolitics after 2003. 117Although not all anti-government Iraqi Sunni representationagreed on this meeting, all of them are pushing to describethe current events as a revolution and are stronglyminimizing the role of ISIS. For example, Sheikh Abdul-Malik al-Saadi discounted the role of ISIS by stating thatthe organization controls a “simple” part of the terrain. Thefairly unified position of these prominent Iraqi Sunni figureslends legitimacy to the idea of an uprising against the IraqiGovernment. Although the individuals and groups describedabove have taken different approaches, they agree that theanti-government movement constitutes a “revolution.” Thisviewpoint will make it challenging for Iraqi Sunni politicianswho are participating in the political process to gaincredibility as authentic representatives of Iraqi Sunnis and tore-establish the legitimacy of the Iraqi central government asa government that is representative of all Iraqis.Jaysh al-MujahidinAlthough like ISIS the group is anti-Shi‘a, it has not claimedor expressed desire to carry out attacks on Shi‘a civilianpopulations.JM has a media presence and posts visual reporting of theirmilitary operations, including the capture of ISF weapons andammunition, maneuvering a tank, and capturing IA soldiers.The group also released a 42-minute video on August 27,2014 that showed its gunmen launching attacks using directand indirect fire on an ISF position in what was claimed tobe Mishaniya in Garma district, northeast of Fallujah andthe area of Dhabitiya, northwest of Baghdad. 120 Operationsof the group mainly take place in Garma, near Fallujah, andtheir claimed attacks use indirect fire, primarily Grad rocketsand mortars in the northern belt of Baghdad. 121 It claims anoperational presence in Taji, Kirkuk, and Baiji, in additionto their notable presence in Garma. 122The group released an additional video on August 30, 2014that showed how goods were transported to and from Garma. 123According to the speaker and several other individuals shownin the video, the ISF blocked all roads to and from Garmain an effort retake the area. Therefore, Jaysh al-Mujahidinestablished a corridor on the Dhira Dijla canal, north of thedistrict. This corridor is used to supply Garma with goodscoming from Samarra in addition to giving herdsmen inGarma access to a route they use to sell their cattle. This isnotable as an attempt to provide aid to local populations,beyond simply anti-government fighting.Jaysh al-Mujahidin has claimed to work with other antigovernmentgroups, including joint operations with Ansaral-Islam, which will be described later, in southwesternKirkuk, near Hawija, a tribal area known for being a hub forIraqi Sunni anti-government armed groups. 124 The groupwas, however, quick to release a statement on July 17, 2014denying that it had participated in the Jordan meeting withJRTN and other anti-government groups with politicalIn addition to the “revolutionary” groups described above,more extreme jihadist groups are also active in Iraq sinceDecember 2013. Jaysh al-Mujahidin (JM) is active inlaunching attacks, primarily against fixed targets using bothdirect and indirect fire. It does not appear to have a nationalcampaign, and generally works locally in parts of Anbar andKirkuk provinces.Compared to groups such as JRTN, JM is a more extremeSunni group that does not believe in working through anysort of political process. Although it does not seek to conquerterritory like ISIS does, JM shares a jihadist orientation andmaintains, for example, a Shari‘a committee. 118 The groupis secretive about its leadership, but reports indicate that themilitary leader of the group is Haqi Ismael al-Shortani. 119Members of JM allegedly assaulting an Iraqi Army headquarters in KirkukProvince.www.Understandingwar.org21