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Effect of emotion on the imperfectness of decisionmakingAlessandro A.E.P. Villa ∗NeuroHeuristic Research GroupHEC-ISI University of LausanneCH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerlandalessandro.villa@nhrg.orgSarah MesrobianNeuroHeuristic Research GroupHEC-ISI University of LausanneCH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerlandsarah.mesrobian@nhrg.orgVladyslav ShaposhnykNeuroHeuristic Research GroupHEC-ISI University of LausanneCH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerlandvladyslav.shaposhnyk@nhrg.orgMarina FioriInstitute of PsychologyUniversity de LausanneCH-1015 Lausanne, SwitzerlandMarina.Fiori@unil.chAlessandra LintasNeuroHeuristic Research GroupHEC-ISI University of LausanneCH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerlandalessandra.lintas@nhrg.orgPascal MissonnierNeuroHeuristic Research GroupHEC-ISI University of LausanneCH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerlandpascal.missonnier@nhrg.orgAbstractHuman decision making has demonstrated imperfectness and essential deviationfrom rationality. Emotions are a primary driver of human actions and the currentstudy investigates how perceived emotions may affect the behavior during the UltimatumGame (UG), while recording event-related potentials (ERPs) from scalpelectrodes. We observed a negative correlation (p < 0.001) between positive emotions,in particular happiness, and the amount offered by a participant acting as aProposer in the UG. Negative emotions, in particular fear, showed a positive correlation(p < 0.05) with the offer. The ERPs revealed invariant components at shortlatency in brain activity in posterior parietal areas irrespective of the Responderor Proposer role. Conversely, significant differences appeared in the activity ofcentral and frontal areas between the two conditions at latencies 300-500 ms.1 IntroductionAlthough research has demonstrated the substantial role emotions play in decision-making and behavior[1] traditional economic models emphasize the importance of rational choices rather thantheir emotional implications. The concept of expected value is the idea that when a rational agentmust choose between two options, it will compute the utility of outcome of both actions, estimatetheir probability of occurrence and finally select the one that offers the highest gain. In the field ofneuroeconomics a few studies have analyzed brain and physiological activation during economicalmonetary exchange [2, 3] revealing that activation of the insula and higher skin conductance [4]were associated to rejecting unfair offers. The aim of the present research is to further extend theunderstanding of emotions in economic decision-making by investigating the role of basic emotions∗ http://www.neuroheuristic.org1
(happiness, anger, fear, disgust, surprise, and sadness) in the decision-making process. To analyzeeconomic decision-making behavior we used the Ultimatum Game (UG) task [5] while recordingEEG activity. This task has been widely used to investigate human interaction, in particular the differencesbetween behavior expected according to the ‘rational’ model of game theory and observed‘irrational’ behavior. One hypothesis that has been suggested to explain this divergence is that participantstend to engage in the ‘tit-for-tat’ type of choice establishing a sort of reciprocity rule [6]. Inorder to examine potential interaction effects between reciprocity rules and emotions we employedrepetitive trials to analyze the evolution of participants’ strategy along the game. In addition, weanalyzed the role of individual differences, in particular the personality characteristic of honestyand the tendency to experience positive and negative emotions, as factors potentially affecting themonetary choice. [7].2 Materials and methods2.1 Behavioral paradigmWe administered participants some questionnaire to measure their personality traits (the Hexaco personalityquestionnaire, [8]) as well as their tendency to experience positive and negative affect (thePANAS scale [9]). The Ultimatum Game (UG) is an anonymous, single-shot two-player game, inwhich the “Proposer” (Player 1) has a certain sum of money at his disposal and must propose a shareto the “Responder” (Player 2) [5]. The Responder can either accept or reject this offer. If the Responderaccepts the proposal, the share is done accordingly. However, if the Responder refuses, bothplayers end up with nothing. In either case the game ends after the Responder’s decision. The Subjectswere comfortably seated in a sound- and light-attenuated room, watched a computer-controlledmonitor at a distance of 57 cm, and were instructed to maintain their gaze on a central fixation crossthroughout the experiment. Subjects volunteered to participate in the study and played with virtualmoney. They were tested along three series, each one composed of 2 Blocks. During the first Blockthe participants acted as Proposers (Fig. 1a), while during the second Block the computer made theoffer and the participants acted as Responders (Fig. 1b). Each Block was composed by 30 trials,which means that 90 trials were collected overall for each condition. The task was implemented ona personal computer using the E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, PA15215-2821 USA).abFigure 1: Illustration of Ultimatum Game task along series composed of 2 Blocks. During the firstBlock the participants acted as Proposers (a), while during the second Block the computer made theoffer and the humans acted as Responders (b).Participants were subtly primed with emotional figures while making the decision to share moneywith, or accept the offer of, an hypothetical partner. Becoming aware of an emotional state mayhinder its effect on subsequent behavior. Thus, we instructed participants to make their economicdecision while keeping in the background emotional images, which were meant to induce different2
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T.V. Guy, Institute of Information
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