Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure - College of ...

Why bother with Rights when Public Safety is at risk?Process (2nd ed., Oxford U.P., 1998), pp. 50-52; see also, e.g. R. Friedman,"Anchors and Flotsam: is Evidence Law adrift?" (1998) 107 Yale L.J. 1921, at p.1942.33 Criminal Law Revision Committee, 11th Report, Evidence (General) (1972),para. 140, adopted in Lambert [2001] 3 W.L.R. 206.34 per Dickson C.J.C. in Whyte (1988) 51 D.L.R. 4th 481.35 Section 101 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 has been interpreted asrequiring this.36 A. Ashworth and M. Blake, "The Presumption of Innocence in EnglishCriminal Law" [1996] Crim.L.R. 306.37 e.g. in the Public Order Act 1986: see [1987] Crim.L.R. 153-155.38 cf. R v. Kebilene, ex p. D.P.P. [2000] 2 A.C. 326, and Lambert [2001] 3 W.L.R. 206;two relevant legislative provisions, imposing only evidential burdens on thedefence when persuasive burdens might have been expected, are found ins. 118(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 and s.53 of the Regulation of InvestigatoryPowers Act 2000.39 The leading decision on Article 6(2), Salabiaku v. France (1988) 13 E.H.R.R. 379,does not contain persuasive reasoning, and in Phillips v. U.K. [2001] Crim.L.R.817, the Court did not improve upon this.40 [2001] 3 W.L.R. 206.41 The process has begun: see, e.g. Carass, The Times, January 21, 2002, reinterpretings. 206 of the Insolvency Act 1986 so as to impose only an evidentialburden on the defence. For other possibilities, see, e.g. Philcox v. Carberry[1960] Crim.L.R. 563 on the offence of driving a vehicle without valid motorinsurance; cf. the "essential elements" test propounded by Lord Woolf in LeeKwong-kut v. R. [1993] A.C. 951, with which the ruling in Philcox and severalother statutory provisions are inconsistent.42 For a learned discussion, see P. Mirfield, Silence, Confessions and ImproperlyObtained Evidence (Oxford U.P., 1997), esp. pp. 13-18.43 See the recent review by S. Sedley, "Wringing out the Fault: Self-Incriminationin the 21st Century" (2001) 52 N.I.L.Q. 107.44 For the first clear statement of this rationale, see ]ohn Murray v. U.K. (1996) 22E.H.R.R. 29, para. 45.45 Saunders v. U.K. (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 313, para. 68.46 IJL, GMR and AKP v. U.K. (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 225, para. 100.47 (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 264.48 Funke v. France (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 297.49 In the United States the Supreme Court has stopped short of including withinthe privilege most requirements to produce documents: see Fisher v. U.S. 425U.S. 391 (1976).50 See also ].B. v. Switzerland [2001] Crim.L.R. 748, holding that the imposition of"disciplinary fines" under tax legislation for failure to give information aboutthe source of certain income breached the privilege against self-incrimination,because the sums involved were "not inconsiderable" and therefore exertedimproper compulsion.51 (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 313.52 ibid., para. 69.53 In decisions such as Schmerber v. California 384 U.S. 757 (1996) and U.S. v.Hubbell 120 S. Ct. 2037 (2000).54 For different shades of this rationale, see e.g. P. Arenella, "Schmerber and thePrivilege against Self-Incrimination: a Re-Appraisal" (1982) 20 Amer.Crim.L.R.31, D.J. Galligan, "The Right to Silence Reconsidered", [1988] C.L.P. 80.55 cf. K. Greenawalt, "Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right" (1981) 23William & Mary L.R. 15 with D. Dolinko, "Is there a Rationale for the Privilegeagainst Self-Incrimination?" (1986) 33 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 1063.46