The Memorial: <strong>to</strong> successfully push for <strong>the</strong> creationThe memorial of a permanent ICC. But <strong>the</strong> highand cemetery costs and glacial movement of <strong>the</strong>in Srebrenica- tribunal’s cases, along with itsPo<strong>to</strong>cari honors inability <strong>to</strong> gain trust in resistant<strong>the</strong> victims of <strong>the</strong> settings like Serbia or <strong>to</strong> measurably1995 massacre. promote reconciliation (at times,Remains are still it has seemed <strong>to</strong> do <strong>the</strong> opposite),being identified raised concerns. Critics have usedand buried. <strong>the</strong>se shortcomings <strong>to</strong> argue thatinternational tribunals are not onlydivisive but a waste of resources that could be spent betterelsewhere in fledgling societies.More practically, <strong>the</strong> shortcomings also contributed<strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.N. Security Council and <strong>the</strong> ICTY developing<strong>the</strong> 2003 completion strategy that placed an increasedresponsibility on <strong>the</strong> national courts. The completionstrategy also reflected a belief that <strong>the</strong> passage of timehad stabilized national governments of <strong>the</strong> formerYugoslavia <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> point where <strong>the</strong>y could begin <strong>to</strong> handle<strong>the</strong>ir own war crimes cases. (In fact, some war crimes trialshad taken place in national courts in <strong>the</strong> region, though <strong>the</strong>credibility of <strong>the</strong> proceedings were of regular concern <strong>to</strong>human rights groups.)The situation in Serbia was never<strong>the</strong>less harrowing in2003. Milosevic was ousted in 2000 by <strong>the</strong> DemocraticOpposition of Serbia, a tenuous alliance between <strong>the</strong>nationalism of Vojislav Kostunica, who became president,and <strong>the</strong> more moderate and pro-West factions led by ZoranDindic, who became prime minister. Dindic operatedbehind Kostunica’s back <strong>to</strong> orchestrate Milosevic’s arrestand transfer <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> ICTY in 2001. In March 2003, anorganized crime group assassinated Dindic in an operationreportedly called “S<strong>to</strong>p The Hague.”The tragedy not only intensifiedcrackdowns on organized crime,which had flourished underMilosevic, but it also createdincreased momentum for a WarCrimes Chamber. Significantdomestic support already existedfor <strong>the</strong> establishment of a newchamber for organized crimecases. International pressure fromEurope and <strong>the</strong> U.S. along with <strong>the</strong>expectation of ICTY case transfersallowed <strong>the</strong> creation of <strong>the</strong>Belgrade War Crimes Chamber <strong>to</strong>be “folded in<strong>to</strong>” <strong>the</strong> same process,according <strong>to</strong> OSCE’s Jovanovic;both new chambers were createdin 2003. Jovanovic also said <strong>the</strong>rewas a genuine desire on <strong>the</strong> part ofsome Serb prosecu<strong>to</strong>rs and judgesas well as o<strong>the</strong>r members of <strong>the</strong> government <strong>to</strong> prove thatSerbia could handle its own war crimes cases.Vukcevic said he accepted <strong>the</strong> job because he felt it wasimportant and honorable work."We prosecute people whose hands are stained with bloodand who brought shame on our country," he said. "Ourchildren do not deserve <strong>to</strong> be left with such a heavy burdenon <strong>the</strong>ir shoulders, and that is ... a strong motive behindone’s decision <strong>to</strong> take on a duty like this."A successful completion strategy would also requirecredible domestic prosecutions in <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r republics.In Bosnia-Herzegovina, where <strong>the</strong> war had inflictedtremendous damage <strong>to</strong> physical and administrativeinfrastructures, <strong>the</strong> new domestic chamber required moreformal international participation, even though <strong>the</strong>re wasa stronger demand for war crimes cases in that country.The U.N. Office of <strong>the</strong> High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina and <strong>the</strong> ICTY established a specialized warcrimes chamber in Sarajevo that began operations in 2005.Though part of <strong>the</strong> domestic justice system, <strong>the</strong> court wasset up as something of a hybrid with <strong>the</strong> participation ofinternational judges and prosecu<strong>to</strong>rs who have been phasedout of <strong>the</strong> operations over time. Like Serbia, Croatia’swar crimes cases have taken place without internationalparticipation, most of <strong>the</strong>m in various local courts around<strong>the</strong> country, though recent reforms are designed <strong>to</strong> funnel<strong>the</strong> cases <strong>to</strong> specialized chambers.All of <strong>the</strong>se domestic efforts have received <strong>the</strong>ir share ofmixed re<strong>view</strong>s over <strong>the</strong> years. The dedicated chambers inBosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia have been generally <strong>view</strong>edas meeting international legal standards for war crimesprosecutions. The cases in Croatia, with so many tried indispersed local courts, have received <strong>the</strong> most criticism forL A W D R A G O N 42 I s s u e 13Pho<strong>to</strong> by: john ryan
perceived biases in predominantly targeting <strong>the</strong> country’sSerbs, many of whom have been convicted on weakevidence and in absentia. The process has become moreprofessionalized in recent years as <strong>the</strong> prosecu<strong>to</strong>r’s officehas focused on more substantiated cases, including thoseagainst Croats, according <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> OSCE. (The U.N. Mission<strong>to</strong> Kosovo, and more recently <strong>the</strong> European Rule of LawMission in Kosovo, have been responsible for war crimescases <strong>the</strong>re; an OSCE report in 2010 found a systematicfailure <strong>to</strong> process war crimes cases adequately.)Though staffed only with Serbs, international assistancehas played an important part in <strong>the</strong> establishment andoperations of <strong>the</strong> domestic system. ICTY staff, <strong>the</strong> OSCEand <strong>the</strong> U.S. government have provided training <strong>to</strong> Serbprosecu<strong>to</strong>rs, judges and related personnel. The OSCE andan outside team of experts retained by <strong>the</strong> organizationprovided assistance in drafting <strong>the</strong> 2003 war crimeslegislation, and <strong>the</strong> OSCE began moni<strong>to</strong>ring all of <strong>the</strong> casesfrom <strong>the</strong> outset. The U.S. Marshals helped <strong>the</strong> InteriorMinistry, which includes <strong>the</strong> police forces, establish awitness protection unit <strong>to</strong> protect and if necessary relocatewitnesses. The chamber also has a victim and witnesssupport unit, which coordinates logistical matters forwitnesses and victims attending proceedings.In Jovanovic’s <strong>view</strong>, some of <strong>the</strong> biggest challengesin 2003 resulted from <strong>the</strong> lack of experience in “highlycomplex criminal cases with cross-border dimensions” thatwould require <strong>the</strong> participation of reluctant witnesses and<strong>the</strong> incorporation of evidence and rulings generated by <strong>the</strong>ICTY – all procedurally new in Serbia. By and large, <strong>the</strong>technical assistance and hard work by domestic ac<strong>to</strong>rs hassucceeded. Despite criticism over a lack of cases against <strong>the</strong>highest-level remaining offenders, prosecu<strong>to</strong>rs and judgeshave demonstrated <strong>the</strong>ir ability <strong>to</strong> process complex andunpopular war crimes cases.“Ten or 15 years ago, <strong>the</strong> idea that Serb judges andprosecu<strong>to</strong>rs would be conducting credible cases againstSerbs in Belgrade for crimes committed during <strong>the</strong> warswas unthinkable,” said Mark Ellis, <strong>the</strong> executive direc<strong>to</strong>rof <strong>the</strong> International Bar Association, an expert hired by <strong>the</strong>OSCE <strong>to</strong> evaluate <strong>the</strong> domestic environment in 2003 andassist with <strong>the</strong> drafting of <strong>the</strong> legislation. “I think in thathis<strong>to</strong>rical context, you have <strong>to</strong> see it as a success.”Ellis said he saw a critical mass of political will <strong>to</strong> get<strong>the</strong> chamber off <strong>the</strong> ground in 2003, noting that Serbianofficials agreed <strong>to</strong> a number of important revisions <strong>to</strong><strong>the</strong> proposed legislation before it reached <strong>the</strong> NationalAssembly. Still, Ellis, like many observers, recognized astrong “culture of impunity” in Serbia, and he knew thatsupport of <strong>the</strong> cases would not be widespread throughout<strong>the</strong> state machinery and <strong>the</strong> public.Indeed, training and <strong>the</strong> efforts by justice advocates –including prosecu<strong>to</strong>rs, judges and victims’ representatives– can only do so much in a setting that is extremelyresistant <strong>to</strong> accountability mechanisms. One relativelyuncontroversial <strong>the</strong>ory in <strong>the</strong> area of transitional justice isthat prosecutions and o<strong>the</strong>r justice mechanisms are morelikely <strong>to</strong> take hold in societies that have a clean break with<strong>the</strong> past – a complete military vic<strong>to</strong>ry or a <strong>to</strong>ppling of agovernment – or where incoming and outgoing regimesreach some agreement about how <strong>to</strong> address past crimes.This was not <strong>the</strong> case after <strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> Milosevic erain Serbia, which has witnessed a constant push and pullbetween nationalist and reformist political forces withoutany agreement on how <strong>to</strong> forge a full reckoning of <strong>the</strong> warsand <strong>the</strong> complicated his<strong>to</strong>ry that preceded <strong>the</strong>m.A k e y e v e n t o n t h e r o a d t o w a r w a s<strong>the</strong> 1980 death of Josip Broz Ti<strong>to</strong>, <strong>the</strong> longtime leader of <strong>the</strong>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who had held its sixrepublics <strong>to</strong>ge<strong>the</strong>r since World War II. As recounted in manywritten works, including Gary Bass’ popular book about warcrimes trials, “Stay <strong>the</strong> Hand of Vengeance,” Ti<strong>to</strong> suppressedmany of <strong>the</strong> ethnic divisions simmering from that war,which included massacres of Serbs by <strong>the</strong> Croatian fascistswho supported <strong>the</strong> Axis powers, as well as reprisal attacksby <strong>the</strong> vic<strong>to</strong>rs. His death led <strong>to</strong> a resurgence of nationalismand ethnic suspicions in <strong>the</strong> decentralized republic. Thevoid also made citizens of <strong>the</strong> republics more susceptible <strong>to</strong>attaching <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>to</strong> strong-willed nationalist leaders likeMilosevic and Croatia’s Franco Tudjman, according <strong>to</strong> KemalKurspahic, whose book “Prime Time Crime: Balkan Mediain War and Peace” documents Milosevic’s alarming controlover <strong>the</strong> public mindset. Kurspahic writes that Milosevic firstused <strong>the</strong> media <strong>to</strong> help maneuver his rise <strong>to</strong> power, <strong>the</strong>n keptnear-<strong>to</strong>tal control throughout his reign over <strong>the</strong> state mediaand o<strong>the</strong>r private news outlets, which were run by ardentsupporters or intimidated from straying from <strong>the</strong> nationalistline; <strong>the</strong> state-owned TV channel was known as “Slobovision.”The endlessly promoted narrative was that of Serbia as <strong>the</strong>long-suffering victim that needed <strong>to</strong> defend itself againstsurrounding existential threats from Muslims in Kosovo andBosnia, and Croats. (The narrative easily drowned out some of<strong>the</strong> courageous work of independent outlets.)Drawing comparisons <strong>to</strong> Nazi Germany, one scholar,Nenad Dimitrijevic, describes <strong>the</strong> Milosevic government as “apopulist criminal regime” characterized not by repression butpopular support. Sabrina Ramet, who has published a numberof academic works on Serbia, writes that Serbia suffers from“a denial syndrome” that when coupled with nationalistsentiments creates “a powerful concoction in which <strong>the</strong>society is able <strong>to</strong> escape in<strong>to</strong> a mythic reality in which people(in this case, <strong>the</strong> Serbs) are portrayed as simultaneouslyheroic and victimized.” Outsiders more casually familiar withSerbia’s complicated his<strong>to</strong>ry, including visiting journalists,might best avoid making such weighty assessments while atleast grasping <strong>the</strong> obvious – that <strong>the</strong> carryover of nationalistsentiments was going <strong>to</strong> cause serious headaches for <strong>the</strong>ICTY. Similarly, Serbia, which is 83 percent Serb with smallI s s u e 13 43 l a w d r a g o n . c o m