12.07.2015 Views

Safety_Series_050-SG-O1_1991 - gnssn - International Atomic ...

Safety_Series_050-SG-O1_1991 - gnssn - International Atomic ...

Safety_Series_050-SG-O1_1991 - gnssn - International Atomic ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS
  • No tags were found...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/SAFETY SERIES No. 50-<strong>SG</strong>-01 (Rev. 1)STAFFING OFNUCLEAR POWER PLANTSAND THE RECRUITMENT,TRAINING AND AUTHORIZATIONOF OPERATING PERSONNELA <strong>Safety</strong> GuideINTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCYVIENNA, <strong>1991</strong>


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/FOREWORDby the Director GeneralNuclear power is well established and can be expected to become an even moresignificant part of the energy programmes of many countries, provided that its safeuse can be ensured and be perceived to be so ensured. Although accidents haveoccurred, the nuclear power industry has generally maintained a good safety record.However, improvements are always possible and necessary. <strong>Safety</strong> is not a staticconcept.The <strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy Agency, recognizing the importance of thesafety of the industry and desiring to promote an improving safety record, set up aprogramme in 1974 to give guidance to its Member States on the many aspects ofthe safety of nuclear power reactors. Under this Nuclear <strong>Safety</strong> Standards (NUSS)programme, some 60 Codes and <strong>Safety</strong> Guides dealing with radiological safety werepublished in the IAEA <strong>Safety</strong> <strong>Series</strong> between 1978 and 1986. The NUSS programmewas developed for land based stationary plants with thermal neutron reactorsdesigned for the production of power but the provisions may be appropriate to awider range of nuclear applications.In order to take account of lessons learned since the first publication of theNUSS programme was issued, it was decided in 1986 to revise and reissue the Codesand <strong>Safety</strong> Guides. During the original development of these publications, as wellas during the revision process, care was taken to ensure that all Member States, inparticular those with active nuclear power programmes, could provide their input.Several independent reviews took place including a final one by the Nuclear <strong>Safety</strong>Standards Advisory Group (NUSSAG). The revised Codes were approved by theBoard of Governors in June 1988. In the revision process new developments intechnology and methods of analysis have been incorporated on the basis of internationalconsensus. It is hoped that the revised Codes will be used, and that they willbe accepted and respected by Member States as a basis for regulation of the safetyof power reactors within the national legal and regulatory framework.Any Member State wishing to enter into an agreement with the IAEA for itsassistance in connection with the siting, design, construction, commissioning,operation or decommissioning of a nuclear power plant will be required to followthose parts of the Codes and <strong>Safety</strong> Guides that pertain to the activities to be coveredby the agreement. However, it is recognized that the final decisions and legalresponsibilities in any licensing procedures rest with the Member States.The Codes and <strong>Safety</strong> Guides are presented in such a form as to enable aMember State, should it so desire, to make their contents directly applicable to


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/activities under its jurisdiction. Therefore, consistent with the accepted practice forcodes and guides, and in accordance with a proposal of the Senior Advisory Group,‘shall’ and ‘should’ are used to distinguish for the user between strict requirementsand desirable options respectively.The five Codes deal with the following topics:— Governmental organization— Siting— Design— Operation— Quality assurance.These five Codes establish the objectives and basic requirements that must be metto ensure adequate safety in the operation of nuclear power plants.The <strong>Safety</strong> Guides are issued to describe to Member States acceptable methodsof implementing particular parts of the relevant Codes. Methods and solutions otherthan those set out in these Guides may be acceptable, provided that they give at leastequivalent assurance that nuclear power plants can be operated without undue riskto the health and safety of the general public and site personnel. Although theseCodes and <strong>Safety</strong> Guides establish an essential basis for safety, they may require theincorporation of more detailed requirements in accordance with national practice.Moreover, there will be special aspects that need to be assessed by experts on a caseby case basis.These publications are intended for use, as appropriate, by regulatory bodiesand others concerned in Member States. In order to comprehend the contents of anyof them fully, it is essential that the other relevant Codes and <strong>Safety</strong> Guides be takeninto account. Other safety publications of the IAEA should be consulted asnecessary.The physical security of fissile and radioactive materials and of nuclear powerplants as a whole is mentioned where appropriate but is not treated in detail.Non-radiological aspects of industrial safety and environmental protection are alsonot explicitly considered.The requirements and recommendations set forth in the NUSS publicationsmay not be fully satisfied by older plants. The decision of whether to apply themto such plants must be made on a case by case basis according to nationalcircumstances.


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/C O NTEN TSDEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................. 11. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 9Background (101-102) ....................................................................................... 9Objective (103) .................................................................................. ................... 9Scope (104) ........................................................................................................... 9Structure (105) ..................................................................................................... 102. ORGANIZATIONAL PLAN ............................................................................. 10General (201-208) ............................................................................................... 10Structure (209-210) ............................................................................................ 11Basis of the organizational plan (211-220) .................................................... 12Functions (221-263) ............................................................................................ 14Categories of personnel (264-274) .................................................................. 213. RECRUITMENT ................................................................................................... 22General (301-308) ............................................................................................... 22Professionals (309) ............................................................................................... 24Operators and technicians (310-311) ............................................................... 24Craftsmen (312) .................................................................................................... 24Medical examination (313) ................................................................................. 254. TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION ............................................................. 25General (401-404) ............................................................................................... 25Training system (405-420) ................................................................................. 26Training programmes (421-448) ...................................................................... 29Experience requirements (449-459) ................................................................ 335. AUTHORIZATION ............................................................................................. 35General (501-508) ............................................................................................... 35Positions to be authorized (509-510) ............................................................. 36Basis for authorization (511-513) ................................................................... 36Reauthorization (514-515) ................................................................................. 36


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/6. RECORDS (601-603) ......................................................................................... 37ANNEX: NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS ...... 39CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW ............................................ 45LIST OF NUSS PROGRAMME TITLES ............................................................... 49SELECTION OF PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO THE SAFETY OFNUCLEAR POWER PLANTS .................................................................................... 53


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/DEFINITIONSThe definitions below are intended for use in the NUSS programme and maynot necessarily conform to definitions adopted elsewhere for international use.The relationships between the following fundamental definitions used in manyNUSS publications are illustrated by the accompanying diagram.O perational StatesStates defined under Normal Operation or Anticipated OperationalOccurrences.Norm al O perationOperation of a nuclear power plant within specified Operational Limits andConditions including shutdown, power operation, shutting down, starting, maintenance,testing and refuelling.Anticipated O perational O ccurrences1All operational processes deviating from Normal Operation which areexpected to occur once or several times during the operating life of the plant andwhich, in view of appropriate design provisions, do not cause any significant damageto items important to <strong>Safety</strong> nor lead to Accident Conditions.Accident (or Accident State)A state defined under Accident Conditions or Severe Accidents.Accident ConditionsDeviations2 from Operational States in which the releases of radioactivematerials are kept to acceptable limits by appropriate design features. These deviationsdo not include severe accidents.1 Examples of Anticipated Operational Occurrences are loss of normal electric powerand faults such as a turbine trip, malfunction of individual items of a normally running plant,failure to function of individual items of control equipment, loss of power to main coolantpump.2 A deviation may be a major fuel failure, a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), etc.1


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/Design Basis AccidentsAccident Conditions against which the nuclear power plant is designed accordingto established design criteria.Severe AccidentsNuclear power plant states beyond Accident Conditions including thosecausing significant core degradation.Accident ManagementAccident management is the taking of a set of actions— during the evolution of an event sequence, before the design basis of the plantis exceeded, or— during Severe Accidents without core degradation, or— after core degradation has occurred to return the plant to a controlled safe stateand to mitigate any consequences of the Accident.Plant statesOperational statesAccidentsNormaloperationAnticipatedoperationaloccurrencesAccidentconditionsSevereaccidentsDesignbasisaccidentsAccident managementAcceptable LimitsLimits acceptable to the Regulatory Body.2


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/AuditA documented activity performed to determine by investigation, examinationand evaluation of objective evidence the adequacy of, and adherence to, establishedprocedures, instructions, specifications, codes, standards, administrative or operationalprogrammes and other applicable documents, and the effectiveness ofimplementation.A uthorizationThe granting of written permission to perform specified activities.A uthorized Limits — see Prescribed Limits.Com m encem ent of O perationThe beginning of initial fuel loading.Commissioning3The process during which nuclear power plant components and systems,having been constructed, are made operational and verified to be in accordance withdesign assumptions and to have met the performance criteria; it includes both nonnuclearand nuclear tests.Com petent A uthorityA national authority designated or otherwise recognized as such by theMember State for a specific purpose (see Regulatory Body).C onstruction (see footnote 3)The process of manufacturing and assembling the components of a nuclearpower plant, the erection of civil works and structures, the installation of componentsand equipment, and the performance of associated tests.3 The terms Siting, Design, Construction, Commissioning, Operation and Decommissioningare used to delineate the six major states of the licensing process. Several of the stagesmay coexist; for example, Construction and Commissioning, or Commissioning andOperation.3


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/Decommissioning (see footnote 3)The process by which a nuclear power plant is permanently taken out ofOperation.Design (see footnote 3)The process and the result of developing the concept, detailed plans,supporting calculations and specifications for a nuclear power plant and its parts.Nuclear <strong>Safety</strong> (or simply <strong>Safety</strong>)The achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents ormitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of Site Personnel, thepublic and the environment from undue radiation hazards.Operating OrganizationThe organization authorized by the Regulatory Body to operate the nuclearpower plant.Operating PersonnelThose members of the Site Personnel who are involved in the operation of thenuclear power plant.Operation (see footnote 3)All activities performed to achieve the purpose for which the nuclear powerplant was constructed, including maintenance, refuelling, in-service inspection andother associated activities.Operational Limits and ConditionsA set of rules which set forth parameter limits, the functional capability andthe performance levels of equipment and personnel approved by the Regulatory Bodyfor safe operation of the nuclear power plant.Operational RecordsDocuments, such as instrument charts, certificates, log books, computer printoutsand magnetic tapes, made to keep objective history of a nuclear power plant’sOperation.4


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/Plant ManagementThe members of Operating Personnel who have been delegated responsibilityand authority by the Operating Organization for directing the Operation of thenuclear power plant.Prescribed L im its4Limits established or accepted by the Regulatory Body.Qualified PersonA person who, having complied with specific requirements and met certainconditions, has been officially designated to discharge specified duties andresponsibilities.Q uality AssuranceAll those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequateconfidence that an item or service will satisfy given requirements for quality.Regulatory BodyA national authority or a system of authorities designated by a Member State,assisted by technical and other advisory bodies, and having the legal authority forconducting the licensing process, for issuing licences and thereby for regulatingnuclear power plant Siting, Design, Construction, Commissioning, Operation andDecommissioning or specified aspects thereof.5Residual HeatThe sum of the heat originating from radioactive decay and shutdown fissionand the heat stored in reactor related structures and in heat transport media.<strong>Safety</strong> — see N uclear <strong>Safety</strong>4 The term ‘authorized limits’ is sometimes used for this term in IAEA documents.5 This national authority could be either the government itself, or one or more departmentsof the government, or a body or bodies specially vested with appropriate legal authority.5


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/<strong>Safety</strong> LimitsLimits on process variables within which the Operation of the nuclear powerplant has. been shown to be safe.<strong>Safety</strong> ReportA document provided by the applicant or licensee to the Regulatory Body containinginformation concerning the nuclear power plant, its Design, accident analysisand provisions to minimize the risk to the public and the Site Personnel.<strong>Safety</strong> SystemsSystems important to <strong>Safety</strong>6, provided to assure the safe shutdown of thereactor or the residual heat removal from the core, and/or to limit the consequencesof Anticipated Operational Occurrences and Accident Conditions.<strong>Safety</strong> System SettingsThose points of actuation of appropriate automatic protective devices which areintended to initiate action to prevent a safety limit from being exceeded and to copewith Anticipated Operational Occurrences and Accident Conditions.SiteThe area containing the plant, defined by a boundary and under effectivecontrol of the Plant Management.Site PersonnelAll persons working on the Site, either permanently or temporarily.Siting (see footnote 3)The process of selecting a suitable Site for a nuclear power plant, includingappropriate assessment and definition of the related design bases.VendorA design, contracting or manufacturing organization supplying a service,component or plant.6 See Code 50-C-D (Rev. 1).6


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/STRUCTURE105. Section 2 summarizes the functions required for the safe operation of one ormore nuclear power plants, and in particular those functions which are generally performedby the site personnel under the authority of the plant management. The personnelis divided into the following broad categories: professionals, operators,technicians and craftsmen. The next section deals with the factors which need to betaken into account in recruitment. The fourth section, concentrates on training systems,training programmes and experience requirements. A systematic approach totraining is described and recommended. Essential features in the training programmesof different groups of personnel as well as in the continuing training programmesare described. Typical experience requirments derived from average levelsin countries with extensive nuclear programmes are also included. The fifth sectiondeals with authorization and reauthorization by the operating organization and theregulatory body and the last section deals with training records.2. ORGANIZATIONAL PLANGENERAL201. The operating organization which operates or intends to operate one or morenuclear power plants shall establish an organizational structure to meet the generalrequirements for the safe and reliable operation of the plants, taking into considerationany particular situation or conditions involved.202. The operating organization shall be aware of the special emphasis that needsto be placed on safety. Although the operating organization may already have anorganizational structure for managing non-nuclear power plants, this special emphasisand the commitment to achieving safety will require more than a simple extensionof the earlier organizational structure.203. This Guide does not deal in detail with the individual functions required tobe performed for the safe operation of one or more nuclear power plants. These functionsare described in the Code on Operation, in <strong>Safety</strong> Guide 50-<strong>SG</strong>-09 and alsoin <strong>Safety</strong> Guides 50-<strong>SG</strong>-02, 50-<strong>SG</strong>-04, 50-<strong>SG</strong>-05, 50-<strong>SG</strong>-06, 50-<strong>SG</strong>-07, 50-<strong>SG</strong>-0 8 , 50-<strong>SG</strong>-010 and 50-<strong>SG</strong>-011.204. The operating organization shall examine the various functions and decidewhich ones will be performed at the plant site, which off the site but within theoperating organization, and which outside the operating organization.10


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/205. In addition, the complexity of the planned nuclear power plant, its engineeringfeatures, the number of nuclear and other plants already in operation, under constructionor planned for construction and the general structure of the operatingorganization itself shall be considered.206. On the basis of these decisions and of all applicable regulatory requirementsand national industrial practices, the operating organization shall establish anorganizational plan which indicates general policies, lines of responsibility andauthority, lines of communication, the duties and numbers of persons needed andtheir qualification requirements. Both operational and accident states shall be takeninto account.207. The organizational plan shall be established well in advance, so that therequired structure (including recruitment and training of personnel) is operational asrequired for the commissioning phase and in any case before commencement of operation.It shall form the basis for the first recruitment and training programme as wellas for all subsequent such programmes.208. The organizational plan shall be regularly reassessed and if necessary updatedto reflect developments in safe operation. In general, the operating organization,including the nuclear power plant itself, shall be staffed with competent managersand personnel having both the proper awareness of the technical and administrativerequirements of safety and the motivation to implement safety policies.STRUCTURE209. The description of the structure and of the functions to be performed by theindividual departments in the operating organization, on and off the site, and by theindividual persons in each department, as well as the lines of responsibility, authorityand communication, shall be unambiguous and shall leave no space for improvisationin either operational states or accident conditions. In some Member States, thisdescription is required as a part of the quality assurance programme and, as far asthe plant organization is concerned, is subject to prior approval by the regulatorybody. Functions to be performed by external organizations or consultants shall alsobe indicated in the description, together with the related lines of communication andauthority.210. The description of the responsibilities of each position forms the basis for thedefinition of the required qualifications and of the prerequisites for recruiting, trainingand continuing training of the individual persons. Further guidance may be foundin <strong>Safety</strong> Guide 50-<strong>SG</strong>-09.11


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/safety. He is also responsible for assessing the adequacy of the training of the personnelin his group and for reporting to the persons responsible for the training anyproposal for improvement or corrective actions.Shift Supervisor235. The Shift Supervisor is responsible for the supervision of his shift and for thedirect operational control of the plant in accordance with operational limits and conditionsand with authorized instructions and procedures set out in appropriatedocuments.236. In multi-unit power plants, one Shift Supervisor may be responsible for twounits, and another person is responsible to him for the operation of each unit. Thisperson may be called a Unit Supervisor.237. The Shift Supervisor is responsible for the initial assessment of the nature andextent of any unusual occurrence, including any which might result in radioactiverelease, and subsequently for taking the first steps necessary to minimize the consequences,to ensure safety of personnel and to initiate the actions required by theemergency plan.238. In some Member States, a Shift <strong>Safety</strong> Engineer is appointed to give advice orto take over responsibilities in some cases. These responsibilities and the lines ofauthority shall be clearly established in writing.239. The Shift Supervisor shall be capable of directing or assuming the duties ofthe Control Room Operator to ensure the safe operation of the plant if he considerssuch action necessary.240. He is also responsible for the authorization within established instructions andprocedures to remove from service or restore to service plant systems and/or components,and for the issue of the associated permits to carry out work or tests on suchitems.Operators241. Under the authority of the Shift and/or Unit Supervisor, the Control RoomOperators are responsible for the manipulation of controls in the control room inaccordance with the relevant operating instructions and procedures. Other operatorsare responsible for the control of operational activities outside the control roomunder the general direction of the Control Room Operators and in accordance withthe relevant operating instructions and procedures.242. The number of operators on each shift and their responsibilities should bedetermined on the basis of the complexity of the plant and degree of automation.16


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/Chemistry248. The chemistry function provides the necessary chemical and radiochemicalassistance to ensure safe operation, the long term integrity of systems and components,as well as control and reduction of radiation levels in working areas. Thefunction includes monitoring, analyses, instructions to operations about chemicalprocesses and evaluation of operating results. In many power plants, the chemicaland radiochemical activities may include environmental monitoring, in particularwhen the chemistry and radiation protection activities are both performed by onegroup.Radiation protection249. The aim of radiation protection is to ensure implementation of the radiationprotection programme, as described in <strong>Safety</strong> Guide 50-<strong>SG</strong>-05, and to advise theplant management on all related problems. This requires maintaining appropriaterecords, and monitoring work implementation so that all on-site activities are performedin accordance with the relevant requirements of the regulatory body, the policiesof the operating organization and the ALARA principle. The Head of RadiationProtection (sometimes called Station Health Physicist) shall be directly responsibleto the Plant Manager, independently of any other on-site group. <strong>Safety</strong> Guide 50-<strong>SG</strong>-0 5 includes guidance for the environmental monitoring and effluent release control.Surveillance and testing250. Surveillance and testing covers all the activities involved in in-service inspection,surveillance and testing contained in <strong>Safety</strong> Guides 50-<strong>SG</strong>-02 and 50-<strong>SG</strong>-08:monitoring plant parameters and system status, checking and calibrating instrumentation,testing and inspecting structures, systems and components, and evaluating theresults of these actions.Planning251. Planning covers both long term and day to day planning and co-ordination ofthe on-site operation and maintenance activities, and in particular those important tosafety. Its aim is to achieve maximum availability of systems and components importantto safety, especially during complex activities such as refuelling, general overhauland significant plant modifications.18


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/Training263. The function of the training organization is the development and implementationof an integral training programme. The training programme covers training ofall personnel directly involved in safety related activities. Details of recommendablearrangements and actions are given in Section 4.CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL264. This Guide deals with those aspects of qualifications and training which areimportant to the safe operation of nuclear power plants. It does not cover the otherqualifications (managerial capabilities, financial, personnel management, etc.) whichmay be required to fully implement the functions of each position.265. The following broad categories of personnel are involved: professionals, operators,technicians and craftsmen.Professionals266. The professional category shall include personnel who will fill the managementpositions such as Plant Manager and the operational line down to, and in someinstances including, the Shift Supervisors. It shall also include the heads, and theirsenior assistants, of the maintenance and technical support groups.267. Persons in this category shall have graduated in engineering or science orhave another appropriate educational background, according to the national educationsystem. They may also have attained the required equivalent knowledge throughappropriate experience and training.268. These persons shall have adequate practical experience in keeping with theduties and responsibilities assigned to them. For the senior operational, maintenanceand technical positions and for the senior reactor physics and radiation protectionpositions, it is desirable that they have nuclear related experience. If persons withsuch experience are not available, staff members with suitable qualifications andexperience may be recruited from industrial plants, design groups and nuclearresearch establishments, and be given appropriate training and practical experiencein nuclear power plants.Operators269. The operator category includes persons who will operate the reactor controlsand equipment. Such persons shall have education appropriate to the performance21


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/being assigned responsibility for operation. In particular, the following factorsshould be taken into account:(1) The time needed to train a person after recruitment in order to gain the qualificationsand experience required.(2) The time taken for the training of any person involved in the training of otherpersonnel.(3) The training of any person in relation to suppliers’ activities; for example,attachment to suppliers involved in pre-shipment testing or assembly of plantitems.(4) The duties the person is required to perform prior to the date of initial fuelloading. Many of these duties may need to be performed several years beforethis date and could include:(a) Assistance in the recruitment of other staff;(b) Preparation of commissioning procedures;(c) Pre-operational tests;(d) Preparation of operating and maintenance manuals;(e) Preparation of radiation protection procedures;(f) Specification and selection of equipment for the chemical and healthphysics laboratories, for the maintenance and instrumentation shops andfor radiation protection, and of spare parts, stores and other supplies;(g) Commissioning and operation of auxiliary systems;(h) Preparation of an in-service inspection programme.302. It is desirable that the members of the site personnel participate in design andconstruction activities in order to acquire a better understanding of the design intentsand assumptions, of the safety criteria and of the technical characteristics of theplant.303. Professionals should participate in design, fabrication and construction activitiesand maintenance personnel should acquire experience by working with vendors,both at the factories and during construction at the site.304. Technicians and craftsmen should acquire experience during construction atthe site.305. The operating organization shall ensure continuing training of personnelassigned to the above mentioned pre-operational tasks.306. The results of the consideration given to the above factors will be influencedby the type and size of the plant, the geographical location of the project in relationto the design and supply organizations, and the manpower resources in the locality.307. The operating organization should prepare a schedule showing how recruitment,training and continuing training will be planned and implemented. The periodcovered by this schedule, in the case of the first plant, will begin with the start of23


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/construction work. As additional plants are constructed and operated, this periodmay be reduced.308. The general features of this schedule for the first plant should be along thelines given in the following paragraphs.PROFESSIONALS309. A few senior professionals, including in particular the Plant Manager and hisdeputy, shall be recruited at the beginning of the recruitment period, since one oftheir first duties is to plan and carry out further recruitment and training. This groupshould increase in number with the ongoing training and other pre-operational activities.Particular attention shall be given to an early recruitment of Shift Supervisorsand senior operators.OPERATORS AND TECHNICIANS310. Relatively early recruitment of operators and technicians is advisable as timewill also be needed for training and some of their duties start before the commencementof commissioning. The initial recruitment of these personnel may start abouta year later than the recruitment of persons in the professional category, especiallyif operators and technicians with substantial previous experience are recruited. Asjunior staff are appointed, they shall be placed in training groups and be given preoperationalduties. The increase in personnel shall be brought about in steps so asto facilitate organized training.311. An important aspect of training for some of these persons could be workingwith the construction organization in the checking and initial calibration of instrumentsand controls and in initial operation of equipment prior to fuel loading. Someindividuals may thus be located at the site well before the commencement of operation,and others may be sent to suppliers’ plants to acquire experience with new andcomplex equipment.CRAFTSMEN312. The initial recruitment of the most experienced craftsmen should start aboutone year after recruitment of those in the operators and technicians category. Theymay receive specialized training at suppliers’ plants during the assembly and preshipmenttesting of special equipment, for example diesel or gas turbine sets or largepumps or fuel handling equipment. Personnel should continue to be recruited at a24


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/rate commensurate with the length of training they will require and also with theopportunities available to place them into the construction and commissioning workto provide experience with the installed equipment and systems.MEDICAL EXAMINATION313. In addition to the provisions established by national regulations and practicesrelating to industrial medicine, all member of the operating staff whose duties havea bearing on safety shall be examined at the time of recruitment and at appropriatetimes thereafter to ensure that their health is compatible with the duties and responsibilitiesassigned to them. The use of aptitudinal tests may be recommended whereapplicable. Some Member States include a phychological test as well. All site personnelwho may be occupationally exposed to radiation at the nuclear power plantshall be subjected to an initial and to periodic medical examinations as appropriate(see <strong>Safety</strong> Guide 50-<strong>SG</strong>-05).4. TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONGENERAL401. The operating organization is responsible for the recruitment and training ofstaff and for the definition of qualifications and competence levels. Only qualifiedpersons shall be entrusted with functions important to safety. These functions andthe relative duties and responsibilities shall be clearly indicated in the description ofthe operating organization (see para. 206). Member States, in general, recognizethree broad levels of duty and responsibility: professional, technicians and craftsmen.At each level there is a requirement for an individual to become appropriatelyqualified by means of:— basic educational level (e.g. academic qualifications)— previous experience— training and continuing training— medical fitness— authorization, when so required.402. The responsibility of ensuring that individuals are appropriately qualified andremain so rests with the operating organization. A formal authorization issued by theregulatory body or by another body delegated or authorized by the competentauthority may be required before a person is assigned to a designated position asdescribed in Section 5.25


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/403. For each of the positions in the operating organization having importance tosafety, a series of requirements for training and continuing training should be prepared.These requirements vary according to the individual positions, level ofresponsibility and specific levels of competence required and should be prepared bypersons having specific competence in power plant operation and experience in trainingactivities.404. It is the responsibility of the Plant Manager, with reference to each positionhaving importance to safety, to ensure that:(1) The appropriate qualification requirements are established;(2) The training needs are analysed and an overall training programme isdeveloped;(3) The proficiency of the trainee at the various stages of the training is reviewedand verified;(4) The effectiveness of the training is reviewed and verified;(5) The competence acquired is not lost after the final qualification;(6) The competence of the persons occupying each position is periodically checkedand continuing training is provided on a regular basis.TRAINING SYSTEM405. A systematic approach is recommended for the analysis, design, development,implementation and evaluation of both initial and continuing training to ensurethat all job competence requirements are established and achieved.406. A separate initial and continuing training programme should be defined andimplemented for each group of personnel. The job specific training and qualificationprogramme should be developed to provide and enhance the knowledge, skills andattitudes necessary for the performance of the assigned tasks and functions under allconditions.407. The training programme for most nuclear power plant positions shouldinclude on the job training for ensuring that trainees obtain the required job relatedknowledge and skills in the actual work environment. Formal on the job training provideshands-on experience and allows the trainee to become familiar with plant routines.However, on the job training does not mean just working in the job/positionunder the supervision of a qualified individual but also involves the use of learningobjectives, qualification guidelines and trainee assessment. This training shouldbe conducted and evaluated in the work environment by qualified, designatedindividuals.26


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/408. A performance based training programme based on an analysis of the responsibilitiesand tasks of a job should be designed, developed and implemented for eachmajor station work group. The programme should include the following elements:(1) Identification of all tasks for each work group;(2) Analysis of these tasks in terms of the knowledge, skills and attitudes requiredto perform the tasks adequately;(3) Written compilation of learning objectives;(4) Definition of the basic educational and experience requirements and selectionof the trainees;(5) Specification and design of the training programme;(6) Development of training material and equipment;(7) Planning, scheduling and holding of classroom, simulator, special workshopand on the job training in a structured manner;(8) Verification of the learning results;(9) Validation and improvement of the programmes.409. The first step is to conduct job and task analysis for safety related jobs/positionsand then to identify the training needs. The analysis identifies the knowledge,skills and attitudes required and the results are used to ensure that personnel are competentto perform all predicted tasks and to avoid improper operation.410. In the development of a training programme, clear objectives should be compiledstating the anticipated performance, conditions and standards. Training activitiesand methods are subsequently specified.411. The following training methods are widely used:(1) Classroom instruction is the most widely adopted training method. Its effectivenessis enhanced by the use of training media such as written material,transparencies, audio, video and computing devices and plant scale models andpart-task simulators.(2) On the job training should be conducted in accordance with prescribed guidelinesby incumbents who have been trained to deliver this form of training.Progress should be monitored and assessment carried out by an independentassessor.(3) Initial and continuing simulator based training for the control room shift teampersonnel should be conducted on a simulator which is a representative of thepower plant control room and has software of sufficient scope to cover normaloperation, anticipated operational occurrences and a range of accidentconditions.(4) Laboratory/workshop training is needed to ensure safe working practices.Training mock-ups and models should be provided for activities that have to27


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/be carried out quickly and skilfully and that cannot be practised with actualequipment. Training mock-ups should be full scale to the extent possible.(5) Self-study training can be undertaken at home and at the work place. In allcases the trainees require support from a designated expert.412. In general, the training shall consist of periods of formal training in the classroomintermixed with intervals of simulator or laboratory/workshop training as wellas practical training in the plant.413. In some Member States central training facilities are available and haveproved to be beneficial. The use of overseas training facilities may involve the additionalrequirement for the trainees to know a particular foreign language and mayinvolve different system and component identifications.414. Even if off-site training facilities are to be used, a training unit should stillbe included in the plant organization. This unit should advise the Plant Manager onquestions related to training, co-ordinate training activities on the site, ensure properliaison with the off-site training facilities and collect the appropriate evidence ofsatisfactory completion of the training and continuing training of individuals.415. The existence of a full time training staff does not relieve the plant linemanagement from their responsibility to ensure that their staff are adequately trainedand qualified. Each supervisor should recognize and provide for training needs ofhis subordinates. The responsibilities and the authority of training personnel, as distinctfrom those of line management, should be clearly defined and understood.416. The personnel in the on-site training unit should be properly trained, in particularon matters concerning the policies of the operating organization, the regulatoryrequirements and quality assurance practices.417. The training instructors, on and off the site, should have sufficient technicalknowledge in their assigned areas of responsibilility. This means that they should betechnically competent and have credibility with the students and other station personnel.In addition, the instructors should be familiar with the basics of adult educationand have adequate instructional skills. They should also be given the timenecessary to maintain their technical and instructional competence through workexperience and continuing training.418. The training progress shall be assessed and documented. Assessment oftrainee performance includes written examinations, oral questioning and performancedemonstrations.419. A combination of written and oral techniques has been found to be the mostappropriate for demonstrating knowledge and performance. Assessment of simulatortraining should utilize prepared checklists to improve objectivity. Assessment shouldnot be regarded as a once-off activity. In some Member States reassessment of28


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/individuals at regular intervals is undertaken by instructors and their immediatesupervisors.420. The training programme and training facilities and material shall be periodicallyreviewed and modified if necessary. The review shall cover the adequacy and effectivenessof the training, with due consideration given to the actual performance ofpersons in their jobs. It shall also examine training needs, training programmes andtraining facilities and material necessary to deal with changes to regulations, changesin the facility and lessons learned from industry experience. Such a review shouldbe undertaken by persons other than those directly responsible for the training.TRAINING PROGRAMME<strong>SG</strong>eneral421. All new employees starting work at nuclear power plants shall be introducedto their work environment in a systematic and consistent manner. General employeetraining programmes shall give new employees a basic understanding of their responsibilitiesand of safe work practices.422. The training programme for professionals, control room operators and seniortechnicians shall provide a thorough understanding of the basic principles of nucleartechnology, nuclear safety and radiation protection, of the design intents and assumptionsand of the theoretical basis of the plant activities, together with the necessaryon the job training. The programme for other operators and technicians and forcraftsmen should have a more practical orientation with explanations of the theoreticaland safety related aspects.423. All persons likely to be occupationally exposed to ionizing radiation, and notonly the radiation protection staff, shall receive suitable training in radiation risksand the technical and administrative means required to prevent undue exposure andimplement the ALARA principle (see <strong>Safety</strong> Guide 50-<strong>SG</strong>-05).Training for operations personnel424. Operators shall receive general employee training and overall operationaltraining comparable to that given to those in the professional category.425. Formal training of operators shall cover areas of technology to the levelsnecessary for the task to be performed. It shall develop a thorough theoretical andpractical knowledge of plant systems, their function, layout and operation. Participationin the pre-operational phase and plant startup provide a valuable opportunity forthis training. Emphasis shall be placed on systems having safety significance. The29


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/training shall emphasize the importance of maintaining the plant within the operatinglimits and conditions and the consequences of the violation of these limits.426. Control room operators should also get extensive experience in plant diagnostics,control manipulations, team work and administrative tasks. Shift supervisorsshould additionally be trained in supervisory techniques and communication skills.Their training should in general be more broadly based than that of other operators.427. The training of control room operators should consist of classroom lecturesand seminars, on the job training and simulator training. On the job training shouldbe planned and controlled to ensure that all necessary topics are completed duringthe training period. Simulator exercises should be structured and planned in detailto ensure adequate coverage of relevant topics. The exercises should include preliminarybriefings and follow-up critiques.428. Training at a representative full scope simulator facility is of paramountimportance for operators who work in real time with immediate consequences on theplant behaviour and who may be confronted with abnormal situations which have lowprobability of occurrence and which cannot therefore be enacted in real plant practice.Consideration shall be given to training control room staff as a unit to developstrength in interaction as members of a team.429. Trainees shall learn routines for normal operation of the plant and theresponse of the plant to changes that could cause damaging accidents if not counteracted.The programme shall improve the diagnostic skills of the trainees. Operatingprocedures for normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences as well asappropriate actions for design basis accidents and, as far as practicable, for severeaccidents shall be included in the programme and shall be practised at the simulator,so that the trainees may recognize the negative consequences of errors or violationsof the procedures.430. In addition to general employee training, the field operators shall receiveoverall operational training commensurate with their duties and responsibilities. Allpersonnel in this category shall have detailed knowledge of the operational featuresof the plant and hands-on experience. This knowledge shall cover both the controlrooms and the plant as a whole.Training for maintenance personnel431. Initial training of maintenance staff shall develop knowledge about plant layoutand the general features and purposes of plant systems, quality assurance andquality control, maintenance procedures and practices, including surveillance andinspections, and special maintenance skills.30


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/432. Training of maintenance staff shall emphasize the potential safety consequencesof technical or procedural errors. Past experience of faults and hazardscaused by such errors shall be reviewed.433. Controls should be established to ensure that maintenance personnel are qualifiedon equipment to which they are assigned to work. This qualification could bebased on training given by the component manufacturer, training on equipmentmock-ups and on the job training under supervision by experienced staff. Maintenancepersonnel should have access to training mock-ups and models for trainingin maintenance activities that have to be carried out quickly and cannot be practisedwith actual equipment. Wherever maintenance training may be undertaken, its effectivenessremains the responsibility of the Plant Manager. Evaluation of eachindividual’s skills and knowledge in performing a given maintenance activity shouldnormally precede qualification.Training for other technical personnel434. Personnel involved in chemistry, health physics, nuclear engineering or otherfunctions should have qualifications and receive training appropriate to their jobs andresponsibilities. Such training should be determined by a systematic approach asdescribed above for operators and maintenance personnel.435. Technicians may be assigned to carry out work similar to their own at otherplants or with equipment suppliers. Emphasis shall be placed on the development ofspecific skills, with classroom training limited to essentials. In some cases, laboratoriesand part-scope simulators may have to be established to impart basic andspecific skills.436. Craftsmen shall receive general employee training and some overall planttraining. The main objective shall be to impart and develop the basic and specializedskills required for work on the installed equipment. Methods to achieve this objectivecould include attaching persons to suppliers of equipment and components and toconstruction groups. The basic skills could also be developed with the help of partscopesimulators, as appropriate.Training for supervisory personnel437. In addition to the training described above it is recognized that technicians andprofessionals may require additional technical knowledge and skills and also supervisoryskills.438. Managers and supervisors should have mastered their own technical fieldthrough basic training and long experience in the nuclear field. They should have athorough understanding of relevant standards, rules and regulations. They should31


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/also have a good overall knowledge of the plant and its systems. Those havingresponsible positions in the emergency preparedness organization should be speciallytrained for their emergency duties.439. Since supervisory personnel will hold leading positions in the plant organization,it is important that they acquire a particular capacity for promoting among theirsubordinates, mainly by example, the consciousness of the need to consider safetyas a primary objectives in all day to day activities.440. There should be a management development programme to ensure that anadequate number of qualified persons are available to fill any management position,should a need suddenly arise. Training of managers and supervisors, and their potentialsuccessors, should include courses and seminars on management and supervisoryskills.Training for emergencies441. General training shall be provided for all staff members who have assignmentsunder the emergency plan. Supplementary training shall be provided to thosestaff members who must perform specialized duties required in the event of an accident.442. Training for accident response and management should be emphasized. Suchtopics as nuclear safety analysis, applicable codes, standards and regulations, informationon evaluated safety margins of the plant, symptom oriented procedures andaccident management measures should be covered. The principal results of anyprobabilistic safety assessment of the plant, showing the importance of plant systemsin preventing damage or severe accidents, shall be covered by the trainingprogramme.Continuing training443. Continuing training is that training necessary to maintain and enhance thecompetence of nuclear power plant staff in terms of their knowledge, skills and attitudes.It can also include training to improve the career development potential ofselected individuals. Continuing training must therefore be regarded as an integralpart of the operations of a nuclear power plant. Continuing training based on a systematicapproach is essential to ensure that the levels of qualification and competenceare maintained and upgraded when necessary.444. Continuing training shall be carried out on a regular basis. An annualprogramme is recommended. Included in the programme should be all groups of personnelwhose functions are important to the safe operation of the nuclear powerplant.32


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/445. All site personnel shall have continuing training in the performance of theirduties in an emergency.446. Persons occupationally exposed to ionizing radiations shall receive periodictraining in radiation protection.447. Operators should undergo formal continuing training on a regular basis andthe time needed for this should be taken into account when work schedules are established.Continuing training at a simulator facility is essential and simulator trainingexercises should be planned annually and systematically. Such exercises shouldreflect operating experience with emphasis on those situations which do not occurfrequently, for example startup, shutdown, special transients and accident conditions.In the case of the maintenance group, refresher training should be given oninfrequently performed maintenance activities.448. The continuing training should include updates on the plant and proceduralchanges or modifications, operating experience gained in-house and elsewhere in theindustry as well as trends in job performance.EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENT<strong>SG</strong> eneral449. Some guidance is given in this section on the previous experience requiredof candidates before they are assigned to the various positions in the plant organization.Only general guidance can be given because of the large variety of validexperience possible. The information below is derived from average levels in countrieswith extensive nuclear programmes.450. Successful performance in subordinate positions is an acceptable form ofexperience for head positions. The Plant Manager, and the Heads of Operations andMaintenance (as well as of Technical Support, if such a comprehensive group is foreseen),require a variety of experience in positions of increasing responsibility. Therequirements for these positions and for the Shift Supervisors must include demonstrationof leadership ability.451. On the job training does not always correspond to practical experience. Theirequivalence in terms of both duration and effectiveness for qualification purposesshould be assessed case by case.Professionals452. The Plant Manager shall have experience in several of the key areas of plantactivity such as operation, maintenance or technical support. This experience may33


Major 2010 tournaments & EventsU.S. GO CONGRESSTOURNAMENT WINNERSNORTH AMERICANMASTERS TOURNAMENTTDs: Ken Koester/Sam Zimmerman/ChrisKirschner•Winner: Hui Ren Yang 1P•Runner Up: Eric LuI 8D3: Ming Jiu Jiang4: Juyong Koh5: Yongfei Ge6: Yilun Yang7: Curtis Tang8: Daniel Chou9: Jie Liang10: Tianyu (Bill) Lin11: Irene Sha12: Jianing Gan13: Yuan Zhou14: Hugh Zhang15: James Sedgwick16: Benjamin Lockhart17: William Lockhart18: Kevin Chao19: Justin Teng20: Keith L. Arnold21: Steven F. Burrall22: Yinli Wang23: Nathan Harwit24: Andy Olsen25: Andrew Jackson26: Nick Sibicky27: Martin Lebl28: Jack Shih29: Frank Salantrie30: Haskell Small31: Matthew Harwit32: Keiju TakeharaUS OPEN WINNERSTDs: Ken Koester/Sam Zimmerman/ChrisKirschnerOpen Section1st: Myung Wan Kim 9P2nd: Francis Meyer 8D3rd: Eric Lui 8D4th: Juyong Koh 8D5th: Jie Liang 8D6th: Shiyao Qiao 1P6D Section1st: James Sedgwick2nd: Rongrong Zhang3rd: Ben Lockhart5D Section1st: Jack Shih2nd: Kevin Chao3rd: Erwin Yu4D Section1st: Shangyu Han2nd: Mamoru Matsumoto3rd: Ryan Smith3D Section1st: Peter Zhang2nd: Ashish Varma3rd: Justin Teng2D Section1st: Albert Guo2nd: Oliver Wolf3rd: Aaron Ye1D Section1st: Terry Benson2nd: Jesse O’Brion3rd: Shoichi Sugita1K Section1st: Fujitaro Onoshita2nd: Matthew Mallory3rd: Michiyo Yamamori2K Section1st: Andrew Shang2nd: Xiaojing Du3rd: Myron Souris3K Section1st: April Ye2nd: Steffen Kurz3rd: Rick Rodgers4K Section1st: Larry Russ2nd: Jason Preuss3rd: Bart Jacob5K Section1st: Wenhua Niu2nd: Darrel Speck3rd: Alfred Mikula6K Section1st: Roger Schrag2nd: Jeff Putney3rd: Ken Crumpler7K – 9K Section1st: Joel Olson 7K2nd: Dave Whiteside 8K3rd: Sathya Anand 7K4th: David Niu 8K5th: Gurujeet Khalsa 9K10K – 15K Section1st: Tucker Burgin 11K2nd: Garrett Smith 12K3rd: Charles Polkiewicz 14K4th: Gordon Castanza 12KNovice Section1st: Alvin Hu 16K2nd: Gary Smith 25K3rd: Eric Sumner 17KSTRONG PLAYERSONLINE TOURNAMENTTD: Edward Zhang•Myung Wan Kim•Jianing Gan•Eric LuiSELF-PAIREDTOURNAMENTTD: Greg Alexander•Champion: William Philiips 1K•Hurricane: David Frankel 1K•Giant Killer: David Frankel 1K•Keith Arnold: Jeffrey Horn 1D•Grasshopper: Yokito Abe 3D•Straight Shooter: W. Phillips 1K•Dedicated: G. Castanza 12K•Sensei: Wayne Nelson 1D•Faithful: Gordon Castanza 12K•Philanthropist: G. Castanza12K•Optimist: Winston Jen 14KDIE HARD TOURNAMENTTD: Martin Lebl•Section A1st: Kory Stevens 5D2nd: Hiroshi Yuyama 3D3rd: Ryan Smith 4D•Section B1st: Albert Guo 2D2nd: Hildegard Puttkammer 1D3rd: Colin Liu 2D•Section C1st: Xiaojing Du 2K2nd: Steffen Kurz 3K3rd: Robert Sorenson 1K•Section D1st: Bart Jacob 4K2nd: Darrell Speck 5K3rd: David Rohde 5K42 2010 AMERICAN GO YEARBOOK


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/5. AUTHORIZATIONGENERAL501. The operating organization, in carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation,shall establish procedures by which persons controlling or supervising changesin the operational status of the plant, or with duties having a direct bearing on safety,have to be authorized before they are allowed to perform these duties.502. These procedures shall provide for an assessment of the capabilities of personsto be authorized. These capabilities shall include a thorough knowledge of theestablished safety rules and regulations, as well as of the particular nuclear powerplant and its safety aspects.503. Persons occupying positions of the type referred to in para. 501 should holda formal authorization issued by the regulatory body or by an other bodyacknowledged by the competent authority. In some Member States a proposalregarding the positions for which personnel must be authorized by the regulatorybody has to be submitted to the regulatory body for approval.504. The term ‘authorization’ will be used below to indicate both the authorizationby the operating organization and the formal authorization issued by the regulatorybody.505. In some Member States, the regulatory body requires documented evidenceof the qualifications of other persons (not authorized by the regulatory body) whoseduties have a significant, though not immediate, bearing on safety.506. Independently of any formal authorization issued by other bodies, it is theresponsibility of the operating organization to ensure the appropriate qualification ofall members of site personnel and off-site personnel.507. The operating organization has the the responsibility for establishing qualificationcriteria for its own personnel and for contractor personnel who perform activitiesimportant to safety. Assurance is required that contractor personnel meet thequalification criteria prior to active involvement in plant maintenance or other supportactivities.508. Work on safety related structures, systems or components carried out by contractorpersonnel shall be monitored by a representative of the operating organizationwho meets the training and qualification criteria established for such work.35


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/P O S IT IO N S T O B E A U T H O R IZ E D509. As a minimum, the persons who occupy the following positions shall beauthorized:(1) Shift Supervisor (and any person who is designated to take charge of the directplant or unit operation);(2) Reactor Operator.510. In addition, consideration should be given to making it a requirement that personsin designated positions such as the Plant Manager, Heads of Operations andMaintenance and Chiefs in Technical Support (e.g. Chief Health Physicist) beauthorized.BASIS FOR AUTHORIZATION511. The authorization of persons occupying positions specified in para. 509 whichentail direct responsibility for the manipulation of the operational controls in the controlroom shall be based on a careful evaluation of the individual’s qualifications.512. Any authorization of persons occupying positions such as those named inpara. 510 should be on the basis of the individual’s qualifications, including education,experience, training and personal attributes.513. Authorization of persons occupying responsible positions other than thoseindicated in paras 509-510 shall be based on an evaluation of their knowledge andexperience in the relevant fields they have to supervise.REAUTHORIZATION514. If an authorized individual moves to a different nuclear power plant or to adifferent position in the same plant for which an authorization is also required, heshall satisfy the specific qualification requirements before he is authorized to assumethe new position.515. Consideration shall be given to the need for periodic reauthorization as wellas for reauthorization of individuals who are to resume authorized duties after anextended period of absence from performing the duties of the authorized position.The authorization is generally subject to periodic reviews (2-3 years) of the competenceof the authorized person and may be withdrawn or not extended if the requiredconditions are no more met. Renewal or extension of the authorization shall in anycase be subject to a medical examination.36


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/AnnexNUCLEAR POWER PLANT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/UNITED KINGDOMStation ManagerProduction Manager Engineering Manager Resources ManagerAdministrarionOperations Maintenance Engineering Technical Health Management Planning Training QAPhysicsServices& EmergencyPreparednessMechanical Electrical C&l Reactor Chemistry Reactor OperationalPhysics FeedbackPlantPerformance<strong>Safety</strong>Analysis


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/MechanicalEngineeringPublicRelationsProductionPlant<strong>Safety</strong>BuildingSecurityElectricalEngineeringGERMANYPower PlantAdministrationII1MonitoringMechanicalEngineering(nuclear)Power PlantShiftOperationHeavy currentEngineeringPhysicsMechanicalEngineering(conventional)Process &ThermalEngineeringInstrumentationand ControlRadiationProtectionEquipmentMaintenanceTrainingInstructionElectricalEngineering &Instrumentationand Control:OperationsChemistryMaterials,Welding,Testing


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/TEOLLISUUDEN VOIMA OY, FINLAND


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/PENLY, FRANCE(during startup)


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/UNITED STATES OF AMERICAVice PresidentNuclear OperationsDirectorQuality AssuranceSite DirectorGeneral ManagerPlant OperationsDirectorTechnical ServicesDirectorNuclear Engineeringi&cManagerOutage Operations MaintenancePlanning Manager ManagerManagerLicensing & Site Training TechnicalCompliance Protection Manager SuperintendentManager ManagerMechanicalMaintenanceSupervisorElectricalMaintenanceSupervisorRadiationProtectionManagerChemistryManagerOperationsSupervisor


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEWDuring the development phase the following experts participated in one or more ofthe meetings (1975-1977):Burkhardt, W.Burtheret, J.Davediuk, F.Feger, M.Franzen, L.F.Council for Mutual Economic AssistanceFranceCanadaFranceGermanyGanguly, A.K.IndiaGarnett, C.R.Grier, B.H.Gronow, W.S.United KingdomUnited States of AmericaUnited KingdomHaig, R.Hedgran, A.Hendrie, J.Higashi, A.Hurst, D.Iansiti, E.Ikegame, R.Jarschky, R.Kaut, W.Klik, F.Komarov, E.I.SwitzerlandSwedenUnited States of AmericaJapanCanada<strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy AgencyJapanGermanyCommission of the European CommunitiesCzechoslovakiaWorld Health Organization45


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/Konstantinov, L.V.Kovalevich, O.M .Kiiffer, K.McCubbin, J.<strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy AgencyUnion of Soviet Socialist RepublicsSwitzerlandCanadaMessiah, A.Milhoan, J.L.Minogue, B.Mongini, L.Nilson, R.Nilson, R.Pele, J.FranceUnited States of AmericaUnited States of AmericaCommission of the European CommunitiesSweden<strong>International</strong> Organization for StandardizationCommission of the European CommunitiesPhilip, G.Sanchez Gutierrez, JSevcfk, A.Smyth, H.E.Stadie, K.B.Sundaram, S.M.Timm, M.Uchida, H.Van Reijen, G.V61ez, C.Wachter, K.P.<strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy AgencyMexicoCzechoslovakiaCanadaNuclear Energy Agency of the OECDIndiaGermanyJapanCommission of the European CommunitiesMexicoGermanyWagadarikar, V.K.India46


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/Wright, H.A. <strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy AgencyZuber, J.F.SwitzerlandDuring the revision phase the following experts participated in the meetings(1988-1990):Aro, I. <strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy AgencyBertini, A.Chapman, C.Endou, T.ItalyUnited KingdomJapanFranzen, F. <strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy AgencyGrauf, E.Kiss, I.Milley, D .C.GermanyHungaryCanadaNovak, S. <strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy AgencyPersson, P.-E.Recarte, I.Sebal, P.Shankman, S.SwedenSpainFranceUnited States of AmericaNUCLEAR SAFETY STANDARDS ADVISORY GROUP (NUSSAG)Aro, I. <strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy AgencyBrooks, G.Denton, H.Dong, BainianCanadaUnited States of AmericaChina47


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/Fischer, J.<strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy AgencyHavel, S.Herttrich, P.M .Hohlefelder, W.CzechoslovakiaGermanyGermanyIsaev, A.Ishikawa, M.Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsJapanKovalevich, O.MLaverie, M.Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsFranceLee, Sang HoonPele, J.Reed, J.Ryder, E.Sajaroff, P.Sarma, M .S.R.Versteeg, J.Korea, Republic ofCommission of the European CommunitiesUnited KingdomUnited KingdomArgentinaIndiaNetherlands48


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/LIST OF NUSS PROGRAMME TITLESIt should be noted that some books in theseries may be revised in the near future.Those that have already been revised are indicated by theaddition o f ‘(Rev. 1 )’ to the number.1. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION50-C-G (Rev. 1)50-<strong>SG</strong>-G150-<strong>SG</strong>-G250-<strong>SG</strong>-G3Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Governmentalorganization<strong>Safety</strong> GuidesQualifications and training of staff of the regulatory bodyfor nuclear power plantsInformation to be submitted in support of licensingapplications for nuclear power plantsConduct of regulatory review and assessment during thelicensing process for nuclear power plants198819791979198<strong>050</strong>-<strong>SG</strong>-G4 Inspection and enforcement by the regulatory body fornuclear power plants50-<strong>SG</strong>-G6 Preparedness of public authorities for emergencies atnuclear power plants1980198250-<strong>SG</strong>-G850-<strong>SG</strong>-G9Licences for nuclear power plants: content, format andlegal considerationsRegulations and guides for nuclear power plants198219842. SITING50-C-S (Rev. 1)50-<strong>SG</strong>-S1 (Rev. 1)50-<strong>SG</strong>-S250-<strong>SG</strong>-S350-<strong>SG</strong>-S4Code on safety of nuclear power plants: Siting<strong>Safety</strong> GuidesEarthquakes and associated topics in relation to nuclearpower plant sitingSeismic analysis and testing of nuclear power plantsAtmospheric dispersion in nuclear power plant sitingSite selection and evaluation for nuclear power plantswith respect to population distribution1988<strong>1991</strong>19791980198049


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/50-<strong>SG</strong>-S550-<strong>SG</strong>-S650-<strong>SG</strong>-S750-<strong>SG</strong>-S850-<strong>SG</strong>-S950-<strong>SG</strong>-S 10A50-<strong>SG</strong>-S 1 OB50-<strong>SG</strong>-S11A50-<strong>SG</strong>-S 1 IBExternal man-induced events in relation to nuclear powerplant sitingHydrological dispersion of radioactive material in relationto nuclear power plant sitingNuclear power plant siting: hydrogeological aspects<strong>Safety</strong> aspects of the foundations of nuclear power plantsSite survey for nuclear power plantsDesign basis flood for nuclear power plants on river sitesDesign basis flood for nuclear power plants on coastalsitesExtreme meteorological events in nuclear power plantsiting, excluding tropical cyclonesDesign basis tropical cyclone for nuclear power plants1981198519841986198419831983198119843. DESIGN50-C-D (Rev. 1)50-<strong>SG</strong>-D150-<strong>SG</strong>-D250-<strong>SG</strong>-D350-<strong>SG</strong>-D450-<strong>SG</strong>-D550-<strong>SG</strong>-D650-<strong>SG</strong>-D750-<strong>SG</strong>-D850-<strong>SG</strong>-D9Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Design<strong>Safety</strong> Guides<strong>Safety</strong> functions and component classification forBWR, PWR and PTRFire protection in nuclear power plantsProtection system and related features in nuclearpower plantsProtection against internally generated missiles andtheir secondary effects in nuclear power plantsExternal man-induced events in relation to nuclearpower plant designUltimate heat sink and directly associated heat transportsystems for nuclear power plantsEmergency power systems at nuclear power plants<strong>Safety</strong>-related instrumentation and control systems fornuclear power plantsDesign aspects of radiation protection for nuclearpower plants198819791979198019801982198119821984198550


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/50-<strong>SG</strong>-D 10 Fuel handling and storage systems in nuclear power plants 198450-<strong>SG</strong>-D 11 General design safety principles for nuclear power plants 198650-<strong>SG</strong>-D 12 Design of the reactor containment systems in nuclear 1985power plants50-<strong>SG</strong>-D13 Reactor cooling systems in nuclear power plants 198650-<strong>SG</strong>-D 14 Design for reactor core safety in nuclear power plants 198650-P-l Application of the single failure criterion 19904. OPERATION50-C -0 (Rev. 1) Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Operation 1988<strong>Safety</strong> Guides50-<strong>SG</strong>-01 (Rev. 1) Staffing of nuclear power plants and the recruitment, <strong>1991</strong>training and authorization of operating personnel50-<strong>SG</strong>-02 In-service inspection for nuclear power plants 198<strong>050</strong>-<strong>SG</strong>-03 Operational limits and conditions for nuclear power plants 197950-<strong>SG</strong>-04 Commissioning procedures for nuclear power plants 198<strong>050</strong>-<strong>SG</strong>-05 Radiation protection during operation of nuclear 1983power plants50-<strong>SG</strong> -06 Preparedness of the operating organization (licensee) 1982for emergencies at nuclear power plants50-<strong>SG</strong>-07 (Rev. 1) Maintenance of nuclear power plants 199<strong>050</strong>-<strong>SG</strong>-08 (Rev. 1) Surveillance of items important to safety in nuclear 1990power plants50-<strong>SG</strong> -09 Management of nuclear power plants for safe operation 198450-<strong>SG</strong>-010 Core management and fuel handling for nuclear 1985power plants50-<strong>SG</strong>-011 Operational management of radioactive effluents and 1986wastes arising in nuclear power plants5. QUALITY ASSURANCE50-C-QA (Rev. 1)Code on the safety of nuclear power plants:Quality assurance198851


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/50-<strong>SG</strong>-QA1<strong>Safety</strong> GuidesEstablishing of the quality assurance programme for anuclear power plant project198450-<strong>SG</strong>-QA2 Quality assurance records system for nuclearpower plants50-<strong>SG</strong>-QA3 Quality assurance in the procurement of items andservices for nuclear power plants50-<strong>SG</strong>-QA4 Quality assurance during site construction of nuclearpower plants19791979198150-<strong>SG</strong>-QA5 (Rev. 1)50-<strong>SG</strong>-QA650-<strong>SG</strong>-QA750-<strong>SG</strong>-QA850-<strong>SG</strong>-QA1<strong>050</strong>-<strong>SG</strong>-QA11Quality assurance during commissioning and operationof nuclear power plantsQuality assurance in the design of nuclear power plantsQuality assurance organization for nuclear power plantsQuality assurance in the manufacture of items fornuclear power plantsQuality assurance auditing for nuclear power plantsQuality assurance in the procurement, design andmanufacture of nuclear fuel assemblies19861981198319811980198352


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/SELECTION OF IAEA PUBLICATIONS RELATINGTO THE SAFETY OFNUCLEAR POWER PLANTSSAFETY SERIES9 Basic safety standards for radiation protection:1982 edition49 Radiological surveillance of airborne contaminantsin the working environment52 Factors relevant to the decommissioning of land-basednuclear reactor plants55 Planning for off-site response to radiationaccidents in nuclear facilities57 Generic models and parameters for assessingthe environmental transfer of radionuclidesfrom routine releases: Exposures of critical groups67 Assigning a value to transboundary radiation exposure69 Management of radioactive wastes from nuclearpower plants72 Principles for establishing intervention levels for theprotection of the public in the event of a nuclear accidentor radiological emergency73 Emergency preparedness exercises for nuclearfacilities: Preparation, conduct and evaluation19821979198019811982198519851985198575-INSAG-175-INSAG-275-INSAG-3Summary report on the post-accident review meetingon the Chernobyl accidentRadionuclide source terms from severe accidents tonuclear power plants with light water reactorsBasic safety principles for nuclear power plants19861987198877 Principles for limiting releases of radioactiveeffluents into the environment79 Design of radioactive waste management systemsat nuclear power plants81 Derived intervention levels for application incontrolling radiation doses to the public in the event of anuclear accident or radiological emergency: Principles,procedures and data19861986198653


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/84 Basic principles for occupational radiation monitoring86 Techniques and decision making in the assessmentof off-site consequences of an accident in a nuclear facility93 Systems for reporting unusual events innuclear power plants94 Response to a radioactive materials releasehaving a transboundary impact97 Principles and techniques for post-accidentassessment and recovery in a contaminatedenvironment of a nuclear facility98 On-site habitability in the event of anaccident at a nuclear facility:Guidance for assessment and improvement101 Operational radiation protection: A guide to optimization103 Provision of operational radiation protectionservices at nuclear power plants104 Extension of the principles of radiation protectionto sources of potential exposure198719871990198919891989199019901990TECHNICAL R EPO RTS SERIES155 Thermal discharges at nuclear power stations163 Neutron irradiation embrittlement of reactor pressurevessel steels (being revised)189 Storage, handling and movement of fuel andrelated components at nuclear power plants198 Guide to the safe handling of radioactive wastes atnuclear power plants200 Manpower development for nuclear power:A guidebook202 Environmental effects of cooling systems217 Guidebook on the introduction of nuclear power224 Interaction of grid characteristics with design andperformance of nuclear power plants: A guidebook230 Decommissioning of nuclear facilities:Decontamination, disassembly and waste management19741975197919801980198019821983198354


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/237239242249262Manual on quality assurance programme auditingNuclear power plant instrumentation and control:A guidebookQualification of nuclear power plant operationspersonnel: A guidebookDecontamination of nuclear facilities to permitoperation, inspection, maintenance, modification or plantdecommissioningManual on training, qualification and certificationof quality assurance personnel19841984198419851986267268271274282292294296299300301306Methodology and technology of decommissioningnuclear facilitiesManual on maintenance of systems and componentsimportant to safetyIntroducing nuclear power plants into electrical powersystems of limited capacity: Problems and remedialmeasuresDesign of off-gas and air cleaning systems at nuclearpower plantsManual on quality assurance for computer softwarerelated to the safety of nuclear power plantsDesign and operation of off-gas cleaning andventilation systems in facilities handling low andintermediate level radioactive materialOptions for the treatment and solidificationof organic radioactive wastesRegulatory inspection of the implementationof quality assurance programmes: A manualReview of fuel element developments for water coolednuclear power reactorsCleanup of large areas contaminated as a resultof a nuclear accidentManual on quality assurance for installation andcommissioning of instrumentation, control andelectrical equipment in nuclear power plantsGuidebook on the education and training of techniciansfor nuclear power19861986198719871988198919891989198919891989198955


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/307 Management of abnormal radioactive wastesat nuclear power plants1989IAEA-TECDOC SERIES225238248276294303308332341348355377379387390416424Planning for off-site response to radiation accidentsin nuclear facilitiesManagement of spent ion-exchange resins fromnuclear power plantsDecontamination of operational nuclear power plantsManagement of radioactive waste from nuclearpower plants<strong>International</strong> experience in the implementation oflessons learned from the Three Mile Island accidentManual on the selection of appropriate quality assuranceprogrammes for items and services of a nuclear power plantSurvey of probabilistic methods in safety and riskassessment for nuclear power plant licensing<strong>Safety</strong> aspects of station blackout at nuclear power plantsDevelopments in the preparation of operatingprocedures for emergency conditions at nuclear powerplantsEarthquake resistant design of nuclear facilities withlimited radioactive inventoryComparison of high efficiency particulate filter testingmethods<strong>Safety</strong> aspects of unplanned shutdowns and tripsAtmospheric dispersion models for application inrelation to radionuclide releasesCombining risk analysis and operating experience<strong>Safety</strong> assessment of emergency electric power systemsfor nuclear power plantsManual on quality assurance for the survey, evaluation andconfirmation of nuclear power plant sitesIdentification of failure sequences sensitive tohuman error198019811981198319831984198419851985198519851986198619861987198756


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/425443444450451458497498499508510522523525529540542543547550Simulation of a loss of coolant accidentExperience with simulator training for emergencyconditionsImproving nuclear power plant safety throughoperator aidsDose assessments in NPP sitingSome practical implications of source termreassessmentOSART resultsOSART results IIGood practices for improved nuclear power plantperformanceModels and data requirements for human reliability analysisSurvey of ranges of component reliability datafor use in probabilistic safety assessmentStatus of advanced technology and design forwater cooled reactors: Heavy water reactorsA probabilistic safety assessment peer review:Case study on the use of probabilistic safety assessmentfor safety decisionsProbabilistic safety criteria at thesafety function/system levelGuidebook on training to establish and maintainthe qualification and competence of nuclear power plantoperations personnelUser requirements for decision support systemsused for nuclear power plant accident preventionand mitigation<strong>Safety</strong> aspects of nuclear power plant ageingUse of expert systems in nuclear safetyProcedures for conducting independent peer reviews ofprobabilistic safety assessmentThe use of probabilistic safety assessment in therelicensing of nuclear power plants for extended lifetimes<strong>Safety</strong> of nuclear installations: Future directions1987198719871988198819881989198919891989198919891989198919891990199019901990199057


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/553 Computer codes for level 1 probabilistic safety 1990assessment561 Reviewing computer capabilities in nuclear power plants 1990570 OSART mission highlights, 1988-1989581 <strong>Safety</strong> implications of computerized process control <strong>1991</strong>in nuclear power plants586 Simulation of a loss of coolant accident with rupture <strong>1991</strong>of the steam generator hot collector590 Case study on the use of PSA methods: <strong>1991</strong>Determining safety importance of systems and componentsat nuclear power plants591 Case study on the use of PSA methods: <strong>1991</strong>Backfitting decisions592 Case study on the use of PSA methods: <strong>1991</strong>Human reliability analysis593 Case study on the use of probabilistic assessment methods: <strong>1991</strong>Station blackout risk at the Millstone Unit 3PROCEEDINGS SERIESSTI/PUB/566 Current nuclear power plant safety issues 1981STI/PUB/593 Quality assurance for nuclear power plants 1982STI/PUB/628 Nuclear power plant control and instrumentation 1983STI/PUB/645 Reliability of reactor pressure components 1983STI/PUB/673 IAEA safety codes and guides (NUSS) in the light of 1985current safety issuesSTI/PUB/700 Source term evaluation for accident conditions 1986STI/PUB/701 Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear 1986facilitiesSTI/PUB/716 Optimization of radiation protection 1986STI/PUB/759 <strong>Safety</strong> aspects of the ageing and maintenance of 1988nuclear power plantsSTI/PUB/761 Nuclear power performance and safety 1988STI/PUB/782 Severe accidents in nuclear power plants 198858


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/STI/PUB/783Radiation protection in nuclear energy 1988STI/PUB/785STI/PUB/803STI/PUB/824STI/PUB/825STI/PUB/826Feedback of operational safety experiencefrom nuclear power plantsRegulatory practices and safety standardsfor nuclear power plantsFire protection and fire fighting in nuclear installationsEnvironmental contamination following amajor nuclear accidentRecovery operations in the event of a nuclear accident orradiological emergency1989198919891990199059


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/HOW TO ORDER IAEA PUBLICATIONSAn exclusive sales agent for IAEA publications, to whom all ordersand inquiries should be addressed, has been appointedfor the following countries:CANADAUNITED STATES OF AM ERICAUNIPUB, 4 611-F Assem bly Drive, Lanham , MD 20706-4391, USAIn the following countries IAEA publications may be purchased from thesales agents or booksellers listed or throughmajor local booksellers. Payment can be made in localcurrency or with UNESCO coupons.AR G E N TIN A Comision Nacional de Energfa Atom ica, Avenida del Libertador 8250,RA-1429 Buenos AiresA U S T R A L IA Hunter Publications, 58 A Gipps Street, C ollingw ood, Victoria 3066BELG IU M Service C ourrier UNESCO, 202, Avenue du Roi, B-1060 BrusselsCHILE Comisi6n Chilena de Energta Nuclear, Venta de Publicaciones,Amunategui 95, Casilla 188-D, SantiagoC H IN A IA E A Publications in Chinese:China Nuclear Energy Industry C orporation,Translation Section,P.O. Box 2103, BeijingIA E A Publications other than in Chinese:China National Publications Im port & E xport C orporation,Deutsche A bteilung, P.O. Box 88, BeijingC ZEC H O SLO VAKIA S.N.T.L., Mikulandska 4, CS-11686 Prague 1A lfa, Publishers, Hurbanovo namestie 3, CS-815 89 BratislavaFRANCE O ffice <strong>International</strong> de Docum entation et L ib ra irie ,4 8 , rue Gay-Lussac,F-75240 Paris Cedex 05H U N G AR Y Kultura, Hungarian Foreign Trading Company,P.O. Box 149, H-1389 Budapest 62IN D IA O xford Book and Stationery Co., 17, Park Street, Calcutta-700 016O xford Book and Stationery Co.,Scindia House, New Delhi-110 001ISR AEL Heiliger & Co. Ltd.23 Keren Hayesod Street, Jerusalem 94188ITALY Libreria Scientifica, D ott. Lucio de Biasio "aeiou",Via Meravigli 16, 1-20123 MilanJAPAN Maruzen Company, L td , P.O. Box 5<strong>050</strong>,100-31 Tokyo <strong>International</strong>PAKISTAN Mirza Book Agency, 65, Shahrah Quaid-e-Azam, P.O. Box 729, Lahore 3PO LAND Ars Polona-Ruch, Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego,Krakowskie Przedmiescie 7, PL-00-068 WarsawR O M A N IA llexim , PO. Box 136*137, BucharestSOUTH A F R IC A Van Schaik Bookstore (Pty) L td , P.O. Box 724, Pretoria 0001SPAIN Diaz de Santos, Lagasca 95, E-28006'MadridDiaz de Santos, Balmes 417, E-08022 BarcelonaSWEDEN AB Fritzes Kungl. Hovbokhandel, Fredsgatan 2, P.O. Box 16356,S-10327 StockholmU N IT E D KIN G D O M HMSO, Publications Centre, Agency Section,51 Nine Elms Lane, London SW8 5DRUSSR Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga,Smolenskaya-Sennaya 32*34, Moscow G-200Y U G O S LA V IA Jugoslovenska Knjiga,Terazije 27, P.O. Box 36, YU-11001 Belgrade■Orders from countries where sales agents have not yet been appointed andrequests for information should be addressed directly to:“ Div's'on °* Publications” ^ it <strong>International</strong> <strong>Atomic</strong> Energy Agency° Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria


This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/


INTERNATIO NALATOMIC ENERGY AGENCYVIENNA, <strong>1991</strong>This publication is no longer validPlease see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!