Meneely v Smith - Rick English - Swimming Pool Consultant

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5/31/2011 No. 18036-1-III. - MENEELY v. SMITH IN…Lewis Refrigeration Co., 101 Wash.2d 106, 110, 676 P.2d 466 (1984). “RCW 4.16.300 and.310 were adopted to protect architects, contractors, engineers, surveyors and others fromextended potential tort and contract liability.” Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman Assocs.,Inc., 35 Wash.App. 318, 321, 666 P.2d 937 (1983) (citing Pinneo v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 14Wash.App. 848, 545 P.2d 1207 (1976)). “The protection is based on the premise that thelonger the owner possesses the improvement, ‘the more likely it is that the damage was theowner's fault or the result of natural forces.’ ” Pfeifer v. City of Bellingham, 112 Wash.2d562, 568, 772 P.2d 1018 (1989) (quoting Jones v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 48 Wash.App. 894,899, 741 P.2d 75 (1987)). In further discerning the purpose of RCW 4.16.300, the court inCondit relied upon the statute's language, which lists various construction activities, “includingdesigning, planning, surveying, architectural, or construction or engineering services,” assubject to the six-year accrual period. Condit, 101 Wash.2d at 110, 676 P.2d 466. Thecourt observed these activities concerned the process of building a structure. Id. The court,therefore, concluded that the statute applied to individuals whose activities related to buildingthe improvement. Id. at 111, 676 P.2d 466.Here, NSPI's general counsel, David Karmol, testified that NSPI did not build or design poolsor pool products. He stated that NSPI standards are not a blueprint for any particular pool;rather they set forth recommended, minimum dimensions. At argument on the summaryjudgment motion, Mr. Meneely's attorney noted that NSPI's standards can be applied tovarying pool designs. He argued that the pool “could be kidney shaped. It could be Lshaped. It could be round. This pool could be of any length. It could be 30 feet long.It could be 120 feet long and still comply with NSPI standards.” It follows that theformulation of a safety standard applicable to all swimming pools that are intended for usewith a diving board, is different in kind from the design of a particular swimming pool, inwhich the minimum dimensions of the safety standard are encompassed. RCW 4.16.310applies to the latter activity, but not to the former.NSPI makes much of the fact that Mr. Meneely's attorney characterized NSPI's standard as a“product” rather than a “service,” but at trial three years later proceeded under a common lawnegligence theory rather than a products liability theory. The attorney's characterization isimmaterial. NSPI's duty of care did not arise from either a service provided duringconstruction or from a role as a manufacturer of a product. It arose from its voluntaryassumption of the task of formulating safety standards, knowing that the pool industry wouldconform its products to those standards. See Issue 2 infra. The latter duty does not fallwithin RCW 4.16.300.3The superior court correctly held that the six-year statute of repose did not apply to Mr.Meneely's action against NSPI.2. Duty of Care.NSPI assigns error to the superior court's determination, as a matter of law, that it owed Mr.Meneely a duty to exercise reasonable care when it formulated and promulgated its safetycaselaw.findlaw.com/…/1018182.html 6/14
5/31/2011 No. 18036-1-III. - MENEELY v. SMITH IN…standards. NSPI argues that the voluntary rescue doctrine does not support the superiorcourt's holding.Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Hartley v. State, 103 Wash.2d 768, 778-79,698 P.2d 77 (1985). Here, the court held that “NSPI owed [Mr. Meneely] a continuingduty, based upon Washington common law [Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 293,545 P.2d 13 (1975) ] ․, to exercise reasonable care in the development, formulation anddissemination of its residential swimming pool standards[.]” Further, NSPI owed consumerssuch as Mr. Meneely a duty of care “in the development, formation and dissemination ofinstructions and warnings with respect to the safe use of its member[s'] residential pool anddiving board products[.]” Accordingly, it denied NSPI's motion for summary dismissal ofMr. Meneely's negligence claim.The voluntary rescue doctrine is a well established liability concept. In Brown, 86 Wash.2dat 299, 545 P.2d 13, the court recognized that in certain circumstances, a person may beliable in negligence if he or she gratuitously assumes a duty to act on behalf of another andfails to act with due care in performing that duty. The plaintiffs there had sued the State,alleging that an employee of the real estate division of the Washington Department of MotorVehicles assumed such a duty. The employee had been approached by a noted avalancheexpert who informed him that the plaintiffs' cabins were in a high risk avalanche area. Theemployee led the expert to believe he would convey the warning to the plaintiffs. Instead,the employee met with the plaintiffs' real estate broker and indicated no danger existed.The court in Brown held at page 299, 545 P.2d 13 that the plaintiffs' allegations stated apossible cause of action for misfeasance; i.e., “ the State's agents undertook to prevent theavalanche damage by conferring with [the real estate broker], in effect to rescue [theplaintiffs] from their danger, but in the process ․ negligently misled [the broker] and thusmade [the plaintiffs'] situation worse.” The court relied upon prior Washington case law forthe proposition that “[o]ne who undertakes, albeit gratuitously, to render aid to or warn aperson in danger is required by our law to exercise reasonable care in his efforts, howevercommendable.” Id. And, if the rescuer does not exercise reasonable care and therebyincreases the risk of harm to the other person, he is liable for damages.The court in Brown also held that under the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, the State could beheld liable for nonfeasance; i.e., the representation of the State employee to the avalancheexpert that he would take care of the matter caused the expert to refrain from warning theplaintiffs himself. In other words, the State assumed a duty to warn, upon which the expertrelied, then did not perform the duty.One of the prior Washington cases Brown relied upon is Sheridan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,3 Wash.2d 423, 100 P.2d 1024 (1940). There, an employee of a tenant in the Stirratbuilding in Seattle fell down the shaft of the building's freight elevator. The elevator's doorshad failed to close after the car left the floor and before the plaintiff arrived. The plaintifffell when he stepped into the shaft, believing the car was there. He sued and named as acaselaw.findlaw.com/…/1018182.html 7/14
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Meneely v Smith - Rick English - Swimming Pool Consultant

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