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Is inflation targeting dead? Central Banking After the Crisis - Vox

Is inflation targeting dead? Central Banking After the Crisis - Vox

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Challenges to <strong>inflation</strong> <strong>targeting</strong>after <strong>the</strong> <strong>Crisis</strong>Lucrezia ReichlinLondon Business School and CEPRThe financial <strong>Crisis</strong> and <strong>the</strong> exceptional policies that central banks have used present<strong>inflation</strong> <strong>targeting</strong> with several challenges. This column discusses <strong>the</strong>se challenges,arguing that by blurring <strong>the</strong> distinction between monetary and fiscal policy, centralbanks’ independence, and <strong>the</strong>reby <strong>the</strong> principle of <strong>inflation</strong> <strong>targeting</strong>, has beencompromised. By losing independence, central banks may lose credibility and <strong>the</strong>refore<strong>the</strong>ir anchor. There is thus a case for ei<strong>the</strong>r redefining <strong>inflation</strong> <strong>targeting</strong> or changing<strong>the</strong> framework entirely.The key idea of <strong>inflation</strong> <strong>targeting</strong> is public commitment to a fixed numerical targetfor <strong>inflation</strong> in <strong>the</strong> medium term. Commitment to such a target is consistent with manydifferent paths of real and nominal variables and is consistent with policies which, in <strong>the</strong>short run, aim at stabilising output exploiting <strong>the</strong> <strong>inflation</strong>/output trade-off. In its broaddefinition, <strong>inflation</strong> <strong>targeting</strong> leaves room for much flexibility but, whatever <strong>the</strong> actualimplementation and interpretation, <strong>the</strong> framework is intimately linked to <strong>the</strong> principleof central-bank independence. It is because <strong>the</strong>y have to protect <strong>the</strong>ir independencethat unelected central bankers need to act according to a clear mandate and followa quantifiable and publicly announced target. This makes <strong>the</strong>m accountable. Withoutaccountability and transparent communication, independence would be hard to justifyand would most likely be challenged.Ano<strong>the</strong>r characteristic of <strong>inflation</strong> <strong>targeting</strong> is separation between monetary policyand fiscal- and financial-stability objectives. However, while <strong>the</strong> separation fromfiscal policy is an essential ingredient of independence and is <strong>the</strong>refore essential to <strong>the</strong>framework, it is less clear that <strong>the</strong> separation from financial stability is essential, as it134

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