Is inflation targeting dead? Central Banking After the Crisis - Vox
Is inflation targeting dead? Central Banking After the Crisis - Vox
Is inflation targeting dead? Central Banking After the Crisis - Vox
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
<strong>Is</strong> <strong>inflation</strong> <strong>targeting</strong> <strong>dead</strong>? <strong>Central</strong> <strong>Banking</strong> <strong>After</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Crisis</strong>of <strong>the</strong> financial system, but, by acting through that channel on market rates, it also hadmacroeconomic effects. Indeed, empirical research shows that it did have small butsignificant effects on <strong>the</strong> real economy -- at least in <strong>the</strong> phase preceding <strong>the</strong> sovereigncrisis (see Lenza, Pill and Reichlin 2010; and Giannone, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin 2012).Although it is possible that <strong>the</strong> existence of a credible commitment to a medium term<strong>inflation</strong> target has made things easier in difficult times (albeit, something difficult toestablish), <strong>the</strong> challenges of <strong>the</strong> day have demanded <strong>the</strong> use of new tools which havefocused on ‘market making’ interventions in key segments of <strong>the</strong> financial market. Thishas been <strong>the</strong> case even when, as in <strong>the</strong> Eurozone, <strong>the</strong> lower bound was not binding (seeGiannone, Lenza and Reichlin 2013 for evidence on this point). It suggests that <strong>the</strong>main problem has not been <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> policy interest rate had reached zero, butthat its relation to key market rates had been broken <strong>the</strong>reby impairing <strong>the</strong> transmissionmechanism in a situation where liquidity and solvency problems have been difficult todisentangle. The use of new tools is not in conflict with <strong>inflation</strong> <strong>targeting</strong> but had someconsequences which have challenged <strong>the</strong> framework.These policies have been effective, but have carried risks. These risks were alreadyclear in 2009-2010 but <strong>the</strong>y became obvious when <strong>the</strong> debt crisis exploded in 2011.Liquidity injection acted, in some cases, as a temporary relief for institutions which infact were facing solvency problems. It is very hard to draw a line between liquidity andsolvency problems in practice. But when a central bank becomes involved in dealingwith solvency problems <strong>the</strong> line between monetary and fiscal policy becomes unclear. In<strong>the</strong> Eurozone, it became increasingly evident that <strong>the</strong> market was segmented, that somebanks were not solvent and were being artificially kept alive. As <strong>the</strong> Eurozone <strong>Crisis</strong>deepened and cross border financial flows dried up, <strong>the</strong> interdependence between bankrisk and sovereign risk became apparent and <strong>the</strong> ECB’s provision of unlimited liquidityto banks located in <strong>the</strong> Eurozone periphery became similar to financing governments.The more recent phase of ECB policy, leading up to <strong>the</strong> so-called Outright MonetaryTransactions is an even a clearer case of a policy which is hard to label. In this case <strong>the</strong>ECB announced that it will act as lender of last resort to achieve an objective which136