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Is inflation targeting dead? Central Banking After the Crisis - Vox

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Monetary targetry: Might Carney make a difference?Thus, Carney stated,“If yet fur<strong>the</strong>r stimulus were required, <strong>the</strong> policy framework itself would likelyhave to be changed. For example, adopting a nominal GDP (NGDP)-level targetcould in many respects be more powerful than employing thresholds under flexible<strong>inflation</strong> <strong>targeting</strong>. This is because doing so would add “history dependence” tomonetary policy. Under NGDP <strong>targeting</strong>, bygones are not bygones and <strong>the</strong> centralbank is compelled to make up for past misses on <strong>the</strong> path of nominal GDP …However, when policy rates are stuck at <strong>the</strong> zero lower bound, <strong>the</strong>re could be amore favourable case for NGDP <strong>targeting</strong>. The exceptional nature of <strong>the</strong> situation,and <strong>the</strong> magnitude of <strong>the</strong> gaps involved, could make such a policy more credibleand easier to understand.Of course, <strong>the</strong> benefits of such a regime change would have to be weighed carefullyagainst <strong>the</strong> effectiveness of o<strong>the</strong>r unconventional monetary policy measures under<strong>the</strong> proven, flexible <strong>inflation</strong>-<strong>targeting</strong> framework.”One of <strong>the</strong> problems of starting an NGDP target system is that <strong>the</strong> start date for ‘history’to commence is itself entirely arbitrary. By juggling with <strong>the</strong> start date, and <strong>the</strong> desiredgrowth path, one could leave <strong>the</strong> MPC with an immediate requirement that could varyanywhere from a huge expansion to a severe retraction. For example we show belowwhat <strong>the</strong> implicit current gap is between <strong>the</strong> desired path for nominal GDP and <strong>the</strong>actual path for nominal GDP if history were deemed to have started in 1997 Q2, andgrowth paths of, say, 5% and 4% were also deemed to have been appropriate, as anupper and lower example, respectively. With <strong>the</strong> 5% path, <strong>the</strong> MPC would, assumingwe aim to hit <strong>the</strong> target two years ahead, currently have to expand nominal GDP byaround 10% p.a. With <strong>the</strong> 4% path, <strong>the</strong> MPC would have to keep nominal GDP growthdown to around 2.3% p.a. (<strong>the</strong>se estimates are based from <strong>the</strong> end of Q3 2012 to end2014).45

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