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command and control of military operations or intelligence gathering, have often been regardedas military objectives. 1775.7.8.3 Examples of Military Objectives – Transportation Objects. Transportationobjects, including facilities (e.g., port facilities and airfields) and equipment that could be part oflines of communication (e.g., highways, railroads, waterways, and bridges connecting militaryforces with logistics depots and storage areas), have often been regarded as militaryobjectives. 1785.7.8.4 Examples of Military Objectives – Places of Military Significance. Areasof land that are militarily significant may constitute military objectives. 179 For example, anti-177 For example, ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO BombingCampaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 71-72 (Jun. 13, 2000) (“On 23 April 1999, at 0220,NATO intentionally bombed the central studio of the RTS (state-owned) broadcasting corporation at 1 AberdarevaStreet in the centre of Belgrade. … The bombing of the TV studio was part of a planned attack aimed at disruptingand degrading the C3 (Command, Control and Communications) network. In co-ordinated attacks, on the samenight, radio relay buildings and towers were hit along with electrical power transformer stations.”).178 For example, DoD statement, Dec. 26, 1966, X WHITEMAN’S DIGEST 427 (“U.S. policy is to target militarytargets only, particularly those which have a direct impact on the movement of men and supplies into SouthVietnam. These targets include but are not limited to roads, railroads, bridges, road junctions, POL facilities,barracks and supply depots. … In the specific case of Nam Dinh and Phu Li, targets have been limited to railroadand highway bridges, railroad yards, POL dumps and air defense sites.”); Report of the United Nations CommandOperations in Korea for the Period 1 to 15 August 1950, enclosure to Note Dated 2 September 1950 From thePermanent Representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council Transmitting theThird Report of the United Nations Command in Korea in Accordance with the Security Council Resolution of 7July 1950 (S/1588), U.N. Doc. S/1756 (Sept. 2, 1950) (“United States Far East Air Force medium bombers struckheavy blows at north Korean industrial targets of military significance and at the north Korean transportationsystem. The Korean manufacturing complex, the largest in the Far East, and the oil refinery at Wonsan, have beenextensively damaged by successive attacks. The marshalling yards in Pyongyang, Wonsan, and Seoul have beenrepeatedly attacked, as have yards of less consequence. A general transportation interdiction program continueswith destruction of rail and highway bridges along principal lines of communication. The rail and porttransportation center at Najin-dong was also bombed.”).179 See, e.g., Canada, Statement on Ratification of AP I, Nov. 20, 1990, 1591 UNTS 462, 465 (“It is theunderstanding of the Government of Canada in relation to Article 52 that: a. A specific area of land may be amilitary objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in the Article as to what constitutes a militaryobjective, its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in the circumstances governing at the time offers adefinite military advantage, … .”); Germany, Statement on Ratification of AP I, Feb. 14, 1991, 1607 UNTS 526, 529(“Article 52 of Additional Protocol I is understood by the Federal Republic of Germany to mean that a specific areaof land may also be a military objective if it meets all requirements of Article 52, paragraph 2.”); Netherlands,Statement on Ratification of AP I, Jun. 26, 1987, 1477 UNTS 300 (“It is the understanding of the Government of theKingdom of the Netherlands that a specific area of land may also be a military objective if, because of its location orother reasons specified in paragraph 2, its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization in the circumstancesruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage;”); New Zealand, Statement on Ratification of AP I, Feb. 8,1988, 1499 UNTS 358 (“In relation to Article 52, it is the understanding of the Government of New Zealand that aspecific area of land may be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons specified in the Article,its total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation in the circumstances ruling at the time offers a definitemilitary advantage.”); United Kingdom, Statement on Ratification of AP I, Jan. 28, 1998, 2020 UNTS 75, 77 (“Re:Article 52 It is the understanding of the United Kingdom that: A specific area of land may be a military objective if,because of its location or other reasons specified in this Article, its total or partial destruction, capture orneutralization in the circumstances ruling at the time offers definite military advantage; … .”).214