law_war_manual15

fashion, for comparison, the GC deliberately excludes from its application the nationals ofcertain States in order to avoid creating complications or inconsistencies in procedures shouldboth the GC and the law applicable to normal diplomatic representation apply. 22In some cases, treaties explicitly clarify that they do not affect States’ rights under thelaw of war. 23 For example, the 1944 Chicago Convention on civil aviation explicitly providesthat it does not affect the freedom of action of States during armed conflict. 24 However, evenwhen not explicitly stated, infringements on the law of war through international agreements thatprimarily address situations other than armed conflict are not to be presumed. 25 For example, theLOS Convention has been interpreted not to impair a State’s rights during armed conflict, eventhough this principle is not explicitly stated in the treaty. 26 In addition, the InternationalConvention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism has been understood not topreclude any State Party to the Convention from conducting any legitimate activity against anylawful target in accordance with the law of armed conflict. 27instrument expressly prohibits or regulates the use of nuclear weapons. Consequently, such an internationalenvironmental instrument could be applicable only by inference. Such an inference is not warranted because noneof these instruments was negotiated with the intention that it would be applicable in armed conflict or to any use ofnuclear weapons. Further, such an implication is not warranted by the textual interpretation of these instruments.”);Edwin D. Williamson, Agent of the United States of America, Preliminary Objections Submitted by the UnitedStates of America, Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, I.C.J. (Iran v. United States), 207 (Mar. 4,1991) (“When, 14 years later, the ICAO Assembly drafted Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention, discussedabove, it was careful to include in the Article a statement that it ‘should not be interpreted as modifying in any waythe rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;’ which included the inherent rightof self-defense. The participants at the Montreal conference would have included a similar provision if they hadintended the Montreal Convention to modify the laws of armed conflict, and particularly if they had intended toaddress actions by military forces in armed conflict. There is no such provision in the Montreal Convention.”).22 Refer to § 10.3.3.3 (Nationals of a Neutral State or Co-Belligerent State While Normal Diplomatic RepresentationExists).23 See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of Submarine Cables, art. 15, Mar. 14, 1884, 24 STAT. 989, 997 (“It isunderstood that the stipulations of this Convention shall in no wise affect the liberty of action of belligerents.”).24 Refer to § 14.1.1.1 (1944 Chicago Convention and Freedom of Action of States During Armed Conflict).25 Edwin D. Williamson, Agent of the United States of America, Preliminary Objections Submitted by the UnitedStates of America, Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, I.C.J., (Iran v. United States) 203 (Mar. 4,1991) (“Infringements on the laws of armed conflict through international agreements primarily addressingsituations other than armed conflict are not to be presumed. There is no indication that the drafters of the MontrealConvention intended it to apply to military forces acting in armed conflict. If they had so intended, they would havehad to address a myriad of issues relating to acts by military forces.”); The S.S. Wimbledon, (United Kingdom,France, Japan v. Germany), Judgment (MM. Anzilotti and Huber, dissenting), 1923 P.C.I.J. (series A) 1, 35, 36 (3)(“In this respect, it must be remembered that international conventions and more particularly those relating tocommerce and communications are generally concluded having regard to normal peace conditions. If, as the resultof a war, a neutral or belligerent State is faced with the necessity of taking extraordinary measures temporarilyaffecting the application of such conventions in order to protect its neutrality or for the purposes of national defence,it is entitled to do so even if no express reservations are made in the convention. This right possessed by all nations,which is based on generally accepted usage, cannot lose its raison d’être simply because it may in some cases havebeen abused;”).26 Refer to § 13.1.1 (The Law of the Sea During Armed Conflict).27 United States, Statement on Ratification of International Convention for the Suppression of the FinancingTerrorism, Jun. 26, 2002, 2185 UNTS 611, 612 (“(1) Exclusion of legitimate activities against lawful targets. The11