security in the south pacific: the law enforcement dimension

171SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC:THE LAW ENFORCEMENTDIMENSIONDouglas Ranmuthugala *The island countries in the Pacific are particularly vulnerable to destabilisation due to theirfragile economies and still developing infrastructure in administration and government. The threatto their security does not arise from the conventional areas of inter-state conflict or military action.It is more likely to come instead from internal disaffection due to poor governance, ethnic and tribalrivalries over dwindling resources, increased corruption, the rise of local criminal activity andinternational crime. It may therefore be necessary to rethink questions of Pacific security, movingaway from the traditional defence oriented thinking towards a broader perspective.Les économies naissantes des Etats insulaires du Pacifique ajoutées à une administration et desgouvernements encore fragiles font que ces Etats sont particulièrement vulnérables à toutesmanœuvres de déstabilisation.En fait, les menaces à leur sécurité ne viennent pas des atteintes classiques à leur souverainetételles que les conflits entre Etats ou encore les risques d'incursions militaires.Il y a en effet plus de chances que cela soit du à des dissensions internes telles que des erreurs degouvernement, des luttes entre clans ou des rivalités ethniques pour le contrôle de ressourceslimitées, l'augmentation de la corruption ou encore les activités criminelles locales ouinternationales.Dans ce contexte, l'auteur suggère qu'il est peut être nécessaire de repenser l'approchetraditionnelle des questions de défense au profit d'une conception plus large qui prendrait en compteces particularismes locaux.* Senior Intelligence Analyst, Australian Federal Police, Canberra.

172 RJP (2001)IINTRODUCTIONThe post Cold War era has seen a search for threats to security in a very much broaderarea than what was looked at before. 1 One reason for this may be that the vast machinerypoised to counter threats to security in the conventional sense now found that it wasrunning out of targets. Highly trained and resourced agencies had to face either dramaticcuts or reorient themselves to face newly discovered threats. And suddenly, lawenforcement found that it was no longer the Cinderella in the security field, and that it wasbeing wooed by powerful agencies.But that is not the only cause for looking at crime, or rather trans-national crime, as amajor threat to security, especially in smaller states. The last two decades saw dramaticchanges in communication technology, travel, commercial transport and financialoperations, together with lowering of national barriers and increased globalisation. Moneycould be transmitted rapidly across national boundaries, with considerable anonymity.Such transactions hardly left a paper trail. Travel was easy and fast while visa restrictionswere removed, reduced or where they existed, easily circumvented by the utilisation ofpassports of convenience. Globalisation tended to reduce territorial boundaries stillfurther. The constant movement of large volumes of currency between countries offeredcriminal elements some degree of ease in merging their ill-gotten gains into the swirlingflow of legitimate money.Even in the case of middle level developing nations, threats to security from transnationalcrime are high. The value of earnings by organised crime is placed by the UnitedNations at around US$ 1.1 trillion per year. The international drug trade alone exceedsUS$ 400 billion a year (McFarlane, 1999). That amount of money could obviously wieldconsiderable influence on the international scene. It would "allow criminal organizations toaccumulate a degree of power and wealth that rivals and in some cases surpasses thatpossessed by governments. As these organizations become more deeply entrenched intheir respective societies, they pose a threat to both democracy and the rule of law"(Williams and Savona, 1996).The impact of trans-national crime on the security of states is perhaps more evident inthe case of relatively small Pacific Island nations. Most of these states have poorlydeveloped economies and limited administrative and political expertise. Some states suchas Niue have populations less than 2000. Such small nations would be easy prey to big1 The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect thepolicy of the Australian Federal Police (AFP). The author has based his assumptions andobservations largely on empirical data gathered during 19 years of police work in the Pacific.References have been provided where published works or statements of individuals have beenquoted.

SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIMENSION 173international criminal organisations in search of a base for their illicit operations or a targetfor fraud. The need to guard against such attack would be paramount for these smallerstates struggling to make ends meet and facing with apprehension the looming cloud offinancial catastrophe visible just over the horizon.IIIS THERE A NEED FOR A CHANGE OF PARADIGM?The end of the Cold War did not signify the end of conflict. Today, all over the world,low intensity conflict is raging, almost uncontrolled in some regions. The vision of peacebreaking out all over the world still remains a pipedream. The bulk of these conflicts arebased on ethnic, religious or ideological grounds, and rarely on territorial disputes. In1999, of 27 major armed conflicts recorded, all but two were internal (Yearbook 2000).Exceptions are instances such as the dispute over territory between India and Pakistan andthe Balkan conflicts. These conflicts ensure that the old paradigm of security is still valid tosome extent, though more often than not the conflict is intra-state as opposed to inter-state.In countries that do not face such conflict, threats to security are still there, and perhapsgrowing. These threats are not those that could be dealt with by a well-trained andequipped army. They are more insidious and less apparent to the non-observant eye. Theymay develop from within the country or appear from the international scene. A goodexample of the former is corruption where the very raison d'etre of a State can beundermined to such an extent that security of the nation would be at great risk. This hasbeen noticeable in some African and South American nations where corruption hasbecome endemic.External threats would arise most notably from criminal activities conducted byorganised criminal groups or even entrepreneurial criminals operating individually. Theseattacks can take the form of fraud aimed at the country itself or activities such as moneylaundering that will have tangential effects in discrediting the country in its standing in theworld financial community. The Russian Central Bank had claimed that up to US$ 80billion (A$153 billion) was manipulated through banks chartered in Niue (AFP News2000). The listing of several Pacific Island nations by US monetary authorities as financiallyquestionable during the past year is an example of this aspect. In the case of one Pacificnation, the cash flow situation fell into dire straits and the country had to be bailed out bythe United States providing it temporary relief. 22 In 1999, Nauru faced a major cash flow problem when foreign financial institutions black listed it.Nauru has to import all its needs, and a return to a subsistence economy is not possible. There isno local agriculture or even a proper supply of water. If the cash flow is blocked, the daily needsof the population cannot be met. The US intervened by arranging with the First Hawaiian Bank toprovide relief.

174 RJP (2001)McFarlane (1994) lists five types of crime that have an impact on national orinternational stability. These are listed below, with an emphasis on their effect on thePacific.(1) Corruption: As mentioned earlier, corruption can have a serious de-stabilising effecton countries. Russia in recent times has provided a good example of this problem.Corruption had eroded the confidence of the people in their government and ledto serious financial and social repercussions. It is reported that corruption haspermeated all aspects of the State apparatus in Russia and that it enabled criminalelements to drain out the currency reserves of the country.(2) Drug Trafficking: The multi-million dollar profits earned by organised crime groupsdealing in drugs may be used to suborn the State through corruption of politicians,administrators and law enforcement officers. This has been clearly demonstratedin some South American countries and even Asian countries such as Pakistan. Insmall Pacific Island nations, the chances of corrupting inexperienced politiciansand officials are very high, especially as costs of maintaining political powerescalate in monetary terms and 'vote-buying' becomes more prevalent. There havebeen cases of Australian criminal identities paying regular sums of money topoliticians likely to come to power in their own countries. In one recordedinstance, the politician did come to power, though by that time the 'donor' had metwith an untimely death.(3) Narco-terrorism: This is one aspect that has not been manifest in a significant way inthe Pacific though it has led to major destabilisation in countries such as Italy andLebanon. In Colombia and Peru, narco-terrorism had led to the loss of at least24,000 lives in 1991 alone, when terrorists and insurgent groups combined withdrug cartels to thwart Government control. This compares with around 3000deaths through terrorist activity in Northern Ireland over the past 25 years.(4) Organised Crime: Russia is a good example of the effect of organised crime onsecurity of the state. "Criminality has become the most important factorthreatening the change towards (democratisation) in Russia. In particular,organised crime undermines the economy, safety and security of the Russianpeople" (Chebotarev, 1993).(5) Fraud and White Collar Crime: Fraud can lead to the collapse of financial institutions,as seen in the cases of the Bank of Credit and Commerce (BCCI) in UK 3 and the3 BCCI was a largely Abu Dhabi owned bank with assets exceeding US$23b. Depositors werealleged to have been defrauded of over US$20b, and the collapse had significant repercussions inthe British banking sector.

SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIMENSION 175recent allegations of fraud involving the Bank of China. In the latter case, the sumalleged to have been misappropriated was US$28 billion, out of which US$10billion, representing about 50 per cent of China's foreign reserves, is alleged tohave been sent overseas. Vanuatu and Nauru have had near escapes from cases ofpotentially devastating fraud, fortunately diverted in time (Post-Courier 1997,McLeahy 1997). AFP and Victoria police had investigated similar attempts in 1997by Australian criminal groups in Solomon Islands. In the case of the Pacific, thecommonest fraud deals with bank guarantees sought by criminal elements,involving sums that were well above affordable levels of the country concerned.There are other causes that could lead to de-stabilisation in countries. These cover awide spectrum from political instability, ethnic and ideological divisions, and political andadministrative inefficiency to environmental problems and the rapid erosion of availablenatural resources. This paper, however, will concentrate on areas affected by lawenforcement.IIICURRENT SITUATION IN THE PACIFICIf one were to look for a single word that could be applied across the board indescribing the situation in Pacific Island nations, that word would be 'vulnerable'. Most ofthem are very small in land area and population, and some have minimal resources. PapuaNew Guinea (PNG) is perhaps the exception, with its landmass of 461,000 sq km andpopulation exceeding 4.7 million. At the other end of the spectrum are island nations suchas Niue covering 258 sq km, with a population of only about 2000. Any ill wind that blowsacross the South Pacific could do damage to the fragile economies of these countries.During the past fifty years at least, there was no inter-nation warfare involving theisland nations of the South Pacific. The only military intervention was in Vanuatu in 1980when a unit of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) arrived to assist the localGovernment to deal with the Santo affair. In Papua New Guinea itself, the military wasdeployed in the province of North Solomons to deal with an insurgency. But in the lattercase, it was an internal matter within national borders. In a region where in Melanesiaalone, there are over 1200 distinct cultures, those two cases are not significant at all. AsCrocombe (2000) says, "It is a credit to Melanesians that conflict has not been greater. Theyhave achieved a degree of national cohesion and stability much faster than Europe or Asiadid".This fortunate situation enabled most Pacific Island nations to do away with theexpensive pastime of having a military establishment. Among the Pacific Island nations,only PNG, Fiji and Tonga have military forces. Tonga is the odd man out in the region, inthe sense that it is a monarchy where democratic institutions have not reached full bloom.The army in that country performs largely a ceremonial role and has not figured in any

176 RJP (2001)affairs of the State. In the other two countries, the military forces have unfortunatelydeveloped a poor reputation vis a vis security, being more a cause than an antidote forinstability. One must, however, credit the Fiji military forces for having earned an enviablereputation in peacekeeping in the troubled Middle East. Forces in both these countries hadalso served with distinction during World War II.Papua New Guinea does indeed have a case for the retention of a military force. It isthe only island nation with a land border, in this case, with the troubled Indonesianprovince of West Papua. Problems involving the movement of insurgents from WestPapua into PNG territory and the need to patrol the border would necessitate a militarypresence. The need to maintain the security of the State against internal separatistmovements too would argue for such an arrangement.The case for a military force in Fiji is less easy to defend. The country has no externalthreat to face or a land border to police. So far, the military forces in the country havefigured in two major attacks on the stability of the State. But with around 1000 soldiersengaged in peacekeeping tasks worldwide, Fiji would find it difficult to review the issue,as peacekeeping duties have been financially beneficial and bolster national pride.The other independent island nations in the region rely on their police forces to dealwith all aspects of internal security, including surveillance of borders and exclusiveeconomic zones. Police serve on the patrol boats supplied by Australia under the PacificBoat scheme. 4 Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have para-military sections of the policeforces that attend to these tasks. In both countries, these para-military units have figured insituations of instability. It was especially so in Vanuatu where the Vanuatu Mobile Force(VMF) had virtually set themselves up as a military force, and developed an unenviablerecord in undisciplined behaviour. The most notable case occurred in 1994 when elementsof the VMF abducted the President and mutinied over alleged payment problems.However, it would be unfair to associate the presence of military or para-militaryforces with instability. What is more useful is to examine whether de-stabilising factorswere already present in the country, creating a need for the establishment of such units. Inthe case of Vanuatu, the problems in Santo perhaps gave some validity for the need of a4 Australia announced the Pacific Patrol Boat project in August 1983, designed to assist a number ofSouth Pacific countries with a capability to monitor their economic zones. Under this project, 22patrol boats were supplied to the selected countries, the first in 1987 to PNG while the last was tothe Federated States of Micronesia in 1997. The boats had a life span of 15 years but it has sincebeen determined that complete refits would be done at the end of that period, adding another 15years to their life. The package included training of crew, provision of advisers, and meeting costof refits and some aspects of maintenance. The boats are used extensively in search and rescueoperations, surveillance, policing tasks and, in some cases, border patrolling (Bergin and Bateman,1999, RAN 2000, www).

SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIMENSION 177body capable of taking on a coercive role. As far as the Solomon Islands is concerned, priorto the current 'troubles' the major problem was in the islands bordering PNG during theBougainville insurrection in 1988. Both the Bougainville Revolutionary Army and the PNGDefence Force ignored the territorial border from time to time. This even led to somedestruction of property in the Western Province of the Solomon Islands. But the paramilitaryunit of the Royal Solomons Island Police (RSIP) had been established much earlierat a time when urban public order situations were the only threats in the horizon. Thatthreat was well within the ambit of police riot squads to deal with. Nevertheless it is a factthat the 'militarisation' of the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Unit of the RSIP occurredduring the height of the Bougainville episode. Assault rifles and General Purpose MachineGuns (GPMG) replaced riot gear, a change that has had tragic consequences during themilitancy problems in Guadalcanal in 2000.Members of the Mobile Forces from Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands have taken partin peacekeeping operations in Bougainville, and those from Fiji and Vanuatu in theSolomon Islands. However, with the exception of those from Fiji, the units from thesecountries have failed to make an impact in the field. Sometimes, such operations could becounter-productive. As Bell (1994) says of the United Nations, if any organisation "takes ontasks for which it is not fitted, and which it cannot sustain or conclude effectively, it willdamage itself as well as the people of the area concerned".The major threats to Pacific Island nations are internal. Of these, problems of lawenforcement stand out as one of the major issues. These problems vary from country tocountry. In PNG, violent crime has become the major threat. Unlike in Russia, where fraudand other types of white-collar crime had made inroads into the administration, PNG facescrime in the 'raw' or violent version. In Port Moresby, a siege mentality has developed dueto the feeling of insecurity experienced by residents and by commercial enterprises.Attacks on banks, restaurants, or any commercial institute with cash on the premises haveescalated. At the same time, violence has become almost gratuitous. The rate of murder orserious injury due to crime has escalated dramatically. Business enterprises have toincrease their prices to cover security. Physical security measures have to be establishedaround institutions and guards employed on a 24 hour basis. Transport of goods andmoney becomes a costly and dangerous exercise. At the top end of the scale, unlawfulgroups have threatened even the Parliament itself and some politicians have becomedependent on criminal elements for their safety and even for the retention of power.Even in the Solomon Islands, subsequent to the initial outbreak of violence due toethnic clashes, crime has become a major obstacle to peace. While the leaders areparticipating in negotiations, the economy is being brought to its knees by criminalsattacking commercial enterprises, extorting large sums of money and generally practising

178 RJP (2001)looting and pillage on all and sundry. Each such act adds another obstacle to the alreadyoverburdened tasks of the negotiators at the peace talks.Externally, the criminal threat poses a different type of danger. Many island states havebeen victimised by criminals and unscrupulous financiers. Hardly a month passes withouta new group of 'benefactors' offering the cash strapped government of some small islandnation a package of assistance from dubious sources. These range from treasures of ancientOrders with a mandate to do good to the needy, to a share of "Hitler's or Marcos' gold".Offers have been made to set up investment schemes ranging from grandiose holidayresorts to mines looking for non-existent minerals and even theatre productions thatcannot fail. The magnatite affair in Vanuatu and the musical in London financed by Nauruare two good examples. 5 In the case of offered assistance, the receiving country is asked toprovide Bank Guarantees for a substantial sum to 'show good will'. In one instance, theGovernment of Vanuatu signed Bank Guarantees to a value exceeding the annual budgetof the country (Post-Courier, 1997, McLeahy, 1997). It took the combined efforts of lawenforcement agencies in several countries to retrieve the instruments and to bring theoffenders to justice.A more insidious threat is posed by the proliferation of off shore banking centres in thePacific and the spread of cyber-crime. In the case of several countries, the existence ofpoorly regulated off shore centres led to countries like the U.S. taking punitive fiscalmeasures against them. In 1999, three countries were blacklisted by American internationalbanks, leading to considerable financial distress. 6The internet suddenly appeared as a heaven-sent source of earning money withminimum outlay and effort. The establishment of internet gambling, e-marketing andrenting or sale of cyber space became quite lucrative to small nations looking for cash. Theamounts earned were significantly large and there was no visible danger to the country.While such activity is not necessarily criminal, one of the possible harmful effects could befinancial ostracising by developed countries.5 The Vanuatu Government was offered in 1997 a development scheme costing about 1.5 billion USdollars on the grounds that 4 billion tonnes of magnetite was found in the country. There was noevidence to show that such a deposit existed. In 1993 the Nauru Government underwrote amusical titled "Leonardo' in London, produced by the adviser himself, to the tune of 4.5mAustralian dollars. The entire Cabinet was flown by chartered aircraft to attend the premiere. Theshow collapsed after one month.6 In late 1999, Palau, Vanuatu and Nauru were blacklisted by several international banks in the U.S.over concerns regarding money laundering. Such action could be a disincentive to investment anddisrupt financial activity of the countries concerned.

SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIMENSION 179The effect of succumbing to such criminal attacks would be devastating especially tosmaller economies that have no reserve to fall back upon. A country could easily facebankruptcy and its investments and resources lost beyond redemption.It is unfortunate that most Pacific Island States do not have law enforcement machinerythat can effectively deal with these problems. In some cases such as violent crime or thesimpler types of fraud, a well-trained and resourced police force would be able to dealsatisfactorily with the problem. Unfortunately, even in larger countries with significantresources such as PNG, the police forces are poorly equipped, inadequately trained andlack resources necessary for operations. As a result of these shortcomings, the morale ofpolice personnel falls, thereby entering a vicious spiral that pushes the law enforcementeffort downwards at an ever-increasing rate.Most Pacific Island States would find the tackling of cyber-crime and other moresophisticated attacks on the security of the state, with any degree of success, beyond thecapability of their law enforcement agencies. Even for the law enforcement agencies ofdeveloped nations this is new territory. "New technology enables various forms of crime tobe carried out from remote sites, faster, with greater anonymity and on a larger scale.Electronic crime is difficult to detect and investigate because it is often multi-jurisdictional,committed at great speed, and the electronic trails go cold very quickly" (Keelty 2000).The trade in illicit drugs is perhaps one of the most destabilising factors in the world.Estimated by the United Nations International Drug Control Programme to be in theregion of US$400 billion, it is approximately eight percent of total international trade (TheEconomist, 1997). In several South American countries, drug barons have assumed powerover political leaders by colossal levels of bribery.The situation in the Pacific is not as serious but has the potential to develop into amajor destabilising factor. Currently, the only illicit drug produced in commercialquantities in the region is cannabis, and that too only in very few countries. Even where itis produced, there is still a discernible lack of sophistication in processing and marketing.While the trade in cannabis is lucrative, it has still not reached levels where it could make asignificant impact on local politics or the security of a state.The danger lies largely in the prospect of international drug trafficking where theregion would become a transit point in global trade routes. Australia and New Zealand aretarget countries for the trade in heroin, cocaine and cannabis. The major flow of heroin andcannabis is from the so-called Golden Triangle, especially from Burma, and the GoldenCrescent, comprising mainly Afghanistan and Pakistan. Cocaine is routed via the Pacificfrom South America. During the last ten years, seizures by Australian Law EnforcementAgencies, mainly the Australian Federal Police, indicate that there is indeed a considerableflow of such illicit drugs. In 1994, 15 tonnes of cannabis resin were seized, with the

180 RJP (2001)operation stretching from Australia to Noumea. In 1997, ten tonnes of cannabis resin wereseized in Australian waters while the ship that brought the drugs to the Pacific was seizedin New Caledonia. In 1999, the AFP and other law enforcement agencies seized 50kilograms of heroin shipped to Australia via Vanuatu. In October 2000, AFP officersassisted the Fijian police to seize 357 kilograms of heroin in Suva and to dismantle acriminal ring with connections to several countries.The nexus between illicit trade in drugs and organised crime has been too welldocumented to bear repetition. 7 The drug trade is invariably followed by organisedcriminal activity, corruption of political and administrative leaders, and social upheaval.The permeative effects of drug abuse have been seen in many countries through which thetrade passes. Pakistan has been used as a conduit for heroin and cannabis produced inAfghanistan, which lacks a seacoast. Today, abuse of illicit substances, mainly heroin, inPakistan has reached unbearable proportions, with percentage figures of addicts higherthan in any other country. A similar situation has arisen in China, where the number ofofficially registered addicts quadrupled during the last decade. Unleashing this spectre onthe fragile political systems and economies in the Pacific could lead to horrendous results,posing perhaps the biggest threat to security in the region.IVCASE STUDIESA Papua New GuineaIn its 25 years of existence as an independent State, PNG has faced many threats to itssecurity. A country with over 700 different clans, it faced problems right from itsformation. Moves for autonomy by some provinces predated independence. Tribal warfarewas a regular feature in the newly independent nation. An insurrection in the NorthSolomons Province flared into near civil war in 1988 and has been festering ever since. Anattempt to end the problem in Bougainville by using mercenaries created a major securityproblem in 1998 in what is known as Sandline Affair. 8 Crime has escalated in the cities and7 Evidence of this nexus is extensively documented in several papers produced by the USDepartments of State and Justice, examples being (a) International Narcotics Control StrategyReport, Money Laundering: A Changing Scenario (1997) US Dept. of State Washington, and (b) USDepartment of Justice, The National Money Laundering Strategy for 1999 (1999) Washington. Severalarticles are also available on web site www.ex.ac.uk/~Rdavies/arian/scandals/launder.html Anexample is South, N, On Cooling Hot Money: Transatlantic Trends in Drug-related Money Launderingand its Facilitation (1995) www.alternatives.com/crime/SOUTH.HTML.8 In 1998 the Government of PNG sought the assistance of the mercenary group Sandline to putdown the rebellion in Bougainville. The episode ended when the Commander of the DefenceForce arrested the Sandline personnel and deported them. This led to a serious destabilisation ofthe country, but the democratic institutions stood the test. Effective work by the police assisted inpreventing the country sliding into anarchy (Post-Courier, 1998).

SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIMENSION 181has reached endemic proportions, affecting industry, commerce and life in general. Butdespite all this, the country has maintained a vibrant democratic form of government withan independent judiciary and an active free press. This certainly is in stark contrast withsome newly independent states elsewhere in the world that degenerated into dictatorshipand civil instability.PNG is one of the few states in the region to possess a defence force. The PNGDF hasits roots in World War II where it formed part of the Australian army, with several of itssoldiers being recognised for valour. The current strength of the force is 4300 officers andother ranks, which constitutes 0.89 per thousand of the population. In comparison,Australia and New Zealand have military forces in the region of 2.5 per thousand whileFiji, with its peacekeeping commitments worldwide, has double that figure. The PNGDFhas small maritime and air elements, with very limited capacity (O'Connor, 2000).Financially, the PNGDF is in dire straits. The current annual budget is insufficient forits day-to-day needs and even the bare essentials such as food are often in short supply.Soldiers in some bases have been sent to their homes, as there is no money to feed them.Allowances have not been paid and uniforms are in short supply. These are ingredientsthat could lead to mutiny, and soldiers have taken to the streets in demonstrations on theslightest provocation. In September 2000 there were widespread protests by PNGDFpersonnel over living conditions (Post-Courier 2000, The National 2000). Unless theseproblems are rectified with sustainable allocation of resources, the PNGDF could very wellbe a cause of insecurity rather than being available to serve as a remedy.On the other side of the coin, the threat the country faces from across its borders is verylimited. PNG's only land border is with the Indonesian Province of West Papua. There hasbeen a movement for independence in that province, spearheaded by a guerrillaorganisation called the Organasasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), which is ill armed and poorlyled. However, with the example of East Timor before them, the OPM and the more recentgroup, Papua Taskforce, 9 could develop a serious threat to Indonesian national integrity.In the early 1980s, there were problems with Indonesian troops trespassing into PNG insearch of OPM rebels. But since then, relations between the two countries have been good,despite grass roots support in PNG for their Melanesian brethren over the border.Nevertheless, some military presence would be necessary on the border to uphold PNG'ssovereignty. Other than this limited problem, PNG faces no foreign military threat.Could the PNGDF be utilised to preserve the country's territorial integrity? Theattempt to use military force in the North Solomons Province ended in failure. In the9 The Papua Taskforce is a group trying to enforce the right to fly the Papuan flag in West Papua. Itclaims a following of 30,000.

182 RJP (2001)context of PNG's multi-ethnic problems, any answer to separatist tendencies should bepolitical, not military. The danger is that such problems could be exacerbated by the lack ofgood governance and the opportunistic involvement of criminals and unruly elements.Both these factors were noticeable in Bougainville. What was lacking was the failure on thepart of the central government to provide adequate goods and services and appropriatemeasures of law enforcement. Both these elements are vital if political solutions are sought.There are many other issues affecting security in PNG. These include, inter alia, ethnicdisputes, injudicious exploitation of resources, and poor governance in so far as theadministration fails to provide goods and services, prevent corruption and provideeffective control of crime and threats to public order. Most of these issues are common tomany South Pacific Island nations.The criminal threat to the stability of the country is serious. The major cities aresubjected to violent crime at unacceptable rates. In Port Moresby, the capital, crime figuresare extraordinary. In 1999 this city of less than 300,000 people saw 81 cases of murder, 1495cases of robbery (average of four a day), 282 rapes and 1152 vehicle thefts (RPNGC 2000). 10Violence has become a way of life, and people have begun to develop a siege mentality.This has major repercussions on local industrial and commercial sectors, affectingproductivity and escalating costs, and seriously harming the quality of life of the people.Sikani says, "The many forms of criminal activity can severely hinder social and economicdevelopment. In Papua New Guinea, the increase in crime is virtually accepted as the pricethat we have to pay to achieve development" (Sikani 2000).Fraud is one type of crime that is showing a marked increase. A decade ago, fraud waslimited largely to someone having their fingers in the till. But today, fraud takes a heavytoll from commerce and government financial activities. In 1999, the RPNGC received 137complaints of serious fraud, a figure no doubt below the actual level of such criminalactivity.Something similar occurred in the appearance of 'Quick Money' schemes such as U-Vistract and Money Rain. These two 'investment' schemes offered returns of over 1000percent per year on money invested over short periods. More than 472 million Kina wasinvested in U-Vistract alone. A few of the early investors received handsome returns, paidfrom the money invested by subsequent investors. The very large majority of the investorsreceived nothing but promises and excuses, the bulk of the capital having been sent out ofthe country through devious means. Despite the failure of these schemes to repay the10 Statistics from Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary records. It is very likely that these figuresare not accurate as many crimes are unreported or unrecorded. The actual situation could bemuch worse.

SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIMENSION 183investors, similar new schemes are still continuing to operate. It may be remembered thatin Albania, a similar concoction led to social and political chaos when the bubble finallyburst.Foreign criminals, too, have offered fraudulent schemes that appear attractive topolitical leaders looking for money to fund development. Fortunately, PNG has not yetrisen to this bait, though there have been some close calls.Corruption has become virtually endemic, 11 and the current Prime Minister Sir MekereMorauta's drive to eradicate it has so far met with limited success.The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) has an authorised strength of5200 but the actual strength is about 1000 below that. The RPNGC has a proud tradition ofover one hundred years of police work and is arguably the best police force in the PacificIsland nations. However, the ratio of police per 1000 population is very poor incomparison with countries such as Australia and New Zealand, being slightly over one perthousand compared to Australia's 2.2.Financially, the RPNGC is badly underresourced. The current annual budget of Kina97,113 million (A$63,123m) is barely sufficient for recurrent expenditure and leaves nomargin for pro-active policing or operations. Wages and pensions take up 72 percent of thetotal. In real value terms, there has been a decline of 35.3 percent from 1995. The Force isplagued with morale and discipline problems and it is only due to the efforts of a numberof officers with great dedication that it has been able to function with some degree ofefficiency. So far, it has maintained its professional approach when faced with situations 12threatening the stability of the nation, such as the Sandline crisis referred to earlier and themany political crises over the past few years.B The Solomon IslandsThe problems facing the Solomon Islands today have a long history. The security of theState has been threatened by inter-ethnic violence that has evolved over the utilisation ofland and resources in Guadalcanal. Although united under one constitution, the people ofthe Solomon Islands belong to different ethnic groups and have primary loyalties to theirown particular island tribal affiliations. The country has yet to develop a nationalsentiment overriding such ties.11 This statement is based on the author's observation of developments in PNG for the past 18 years,discussions with PNG-based AFP officers, RPNGC officers, the PNG Ombudsman, and mediareports over the past decade, such as Pitt (1992) and Pentanu (2000).12 AFP Liaison Officer's and Australian Department of Foreign Affairs reporting over the period,and reports in local media (Post-Courier 1998 and The National 1998).

184 RJP (2001)Guadalcanal is the largest island in the country, approximately 5650 sq.km in area.Eighteen percent of the nation resides in this island, of which, 30,000 people (11% of totalpopulation) live in the capital, Honiara. The people on Guadalcanal claim that migrantsfrom the neighbouring densely populated island of Malaita have taken a stranglehold overthe local economy and even the public sector. Employment opportunities in the Capital aswell as in plantations set up by foreigners have attracted a large number of Malaitans toGuadalcanal. By 1989, Malaitans constituted 40 percent of the residents of Honiara, ofwhom about half were third generation. Over 50 percent of workers in theCommonwealth Corporation Oil Palm Company were Malaitans (Naitoro 2000).The situation has erupted into violence on a number of occasions, notably in 1988 and1989. These incidents were brought under control with a mixture of policing and theMelanesian system of compromise. However, in late 1998, a group calling itself theGuadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA) embarked on a course of violence that the policeforce was incapable of dealing with. The ethnic divide unfortunately spread to theadministration and the police. Malaitans living in Guadalcanal were harassed andproperty destroyed. It is estimated that about 20,000 Malaitans left Guadalcanal forMalaita. Consequently, the Malaitans formed an armed organization called the MalaitanEagle Force (MEF) to counter the threat and managed to gain control of Honiara and thesurrounding area. It would appear that a considerable section of the police force acted incollusion with the MEF, which managed to lay its hands on assault-type firearms issued tothe police. Violence had not ended at the time of writing despite a negotiated settlementbrokered by Australia and New Zealand.An unfortunate aspect of this affair was that a significant quantity of sophisticatedfirearms had been made available to the police prior to the uprising. This was in anattempt to counter problems created by the Bougainville situation in PNG, where both therebels and the PNG armed forces occasionally trespassed into Solomon Islands territory.These weapons now fell into the hands of the MEF, who used them with devastating effect.Two armed patrol vessels operated by the police were also commandeered by the MEF.To compound the issue, internal AFP and Department of Foreign Affairs reportingindicate that the Western Province too has shown indications of a desire of autonomy,though no positive action has thus far been taken to further this aim.While the problems in both cases were basically ethnic, the factors that exacerbatedthem were economic hardship and lack of services from the government. There was afeeling of disillusionment; a feeling that the government could not, or would not, provide asolution to a problem that affected the day-to-day life of the people (Naitoro, 2000;Hughes, 1999).

SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIMENSION 185There is no easy solution to the problems facing the Solomon Islands. Two questionsthat could be asked are:• Would it have been possible for an efficient police force to stop developments fromescalating into a major problem?• Could the presence of a military force have made a difference?The answer to the first would appear to be in the affirmative. An effective police force,with a reputation for independence from political or ethnic constraints, would have gone along way towards controlling violence. Although the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP)took firm action at the outset, it was not consistent in its operations and allowed themovement to escalate into a virtual insurrection. It would appear that there was too great adependency in seeking overseas assistance, looking for an external solution. When theMalaitans found that they had no recourse to assistance from the police, the MEF arose tofulfil the need. It may be worth remembering that in PNG, the RPNGC had remained firmagainst threatened serious outbreaks of violence that could have degenerated to similarsituations. A determined insurrectionary movement cannot be controlled by the police, aswas seen in Bougainville. However, in Solomon Islands, the situation was not all thatserious at the outset. Determined, impartial political activity coupled with the judicioususe of efficient police work could have solved the problem.The role of the army is more difficult to predict. In roughly similar situations, theKumul Force succeeded in Vanuatu 13 while the PNGDF failed dismally in Bougainville. Inthe Solomon Islands, ethnic divisions may have split the military apart, as it did the police.It could even have led to an escalation of violence, as such action did in Bougainville. Onthe other hand, the presence of a well-armed military unit may have proved to be adeterrent to anyone planning armed insurrection. But once again in Bougainville, it wasnot the case. An essential ingredient for success would be the quality of the army.It can be argued that had proper resources been allocated to improve governance anddevelop a strong and fair law enforcement mechanism, with effective courts and anefficient police force, the situation could have been avoided. The country has a youngpopulation, 60 percent of it being below 20 years of age. The seeds of discontent had beenapparent for quite some time, and had not been addressed. Threats to security were lookedat from a conventional point of view, and the Solomon Islands Government spent13 In 1980, a small uprising in the island of Espiritu Santo, led by Jimmy Stevens, was effectively putdown by a unit called the Kumul Force from the PNGDF that arrived on the invitation of theGovernment of Vanuatu. There was no bloodshed, and the insurrection was totally controlled,with Stevens being deported from Santo to imprisonment on the main island of Efate (PacificIslands Yearbook, 1994).

186 RJP (2001)considerable sums of money in obtaining sophisticated weapons, some of which wereobviously unsuited for the needs of the country. A large consignment of weapons orderedby a previous Government is languishing in New Zealand when a new Prime Ministerdecided not to utilise them. However, some sophisticated and expensive weapons werepurchased, and these ended up in the hands of one group of militants, thereby escalatingthe level of violence.It may be worthy of note that during the initial stages of the problem in the SolomonIslands, the lawfully established government of the country sought assistance fromAustralia to police the situation. Australian policy at the time was that assistance could beprovided only in training and advice, but not at an operational level. Direct interventionmay have complicated matters due to the complex ethnic problems involved in thedispute.VPROJECTED DEVELOPMENTSIt is likely that the Pacific Region will see more instability of the kind witnessed inPNG and the Solomon Islands in the near future. Fiji has still not recovered from its lastattempted coup. Despite serious attempts at restoring normalcy, the prognosis for peace inthat country is not very bright. While it is unlikely that a violent insurrectionary movementwill develop in Fiji, political stability may be difficult to achieve. In most other PacificIsland nations, the ingredients for instability are clearly visible. Poor governance, a drop inresources (mainly in primary produce) and deep-seated ethnic rivalries are likely tocontinue and even worsen.Vanuatu, in particular, has the makings of a trouble spot in the near future. Most of thefactors reviewed here are present in the country. The government has failed to provide asatisfactory level of goods and services. Natural resources face the threat of unsustainableexploitation. Corruption has become a major threat to stability. The capability of theVanuatu Police Force to deal with any serious breakdown of law and order is questionable,while the Vanuatu Mobile Force is showing signs of discontent and indiscipline. Provincialor tribal loyalties have not yet fused together to form a concept of nationhood.Similar problems, if perhaps at lesser levels, exist in most Pacific Island nations. Tongahas its own problems with democratic practices of the Westminster type struggling to beborn, coming into conflict with tradition. Samoa has experienced a political assassination.The very small nations face a bleak future, with resources dwindling and populationgrowth threatening to outstrip sustainability. In cases where there is an escape valve in theform of an ability to migrate to other countries such as New Zealand, the threat hadreceded to some extent. But not all island peoples have such a capacity.Most problems faced by these countries are universal. They occur in varying degrees ofseverity in all parts of the world. However, in the South Pacific, the redeeming feature is

SECURITY IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIMENSION 187that some problems are not beyond solution. Prophets of the environment have issued direthreats of global warming and rising sea levels that could engulf some of the island nationswhere the landmass is barely above sea level. On the other hand, most Pacific Islandnations do not have unbearable population pressure, though in places such as Nauru thepost-colonial period has seen increases in population to possibly unsustainable levels(Pacific Islands Yearbook 1994, Canberra Times 1999). The economies are small and needcomparatively little in terms of aid to keep them afloat. Disputes have not always led toconflict. Solutions have been, and can be, found through the tradition of avoidingconfrontation and the ability to talk through problems.The nature of these problems and the failure of some aspects of traditional aid patternsmay call for a change of attitude towards aid. The social problems of education, health andunemployment are the main obstacles in the path of development. It may be necessary totake a detailed look at 'hands on' assistance in these fields. Attempts should be made todevelop a culture of good governance to replace current practises that verge on cargo cultphilosophies so as to provide the background for stability. These are long-term issues, andaid donors cannot hope for a 'quick fix'. They will have to be ready for the long haul.At the same time, cooperation and assistance in law enforcement should be enhancedto rid the countries of the burden of criminal threat that is crippling some societies. Thiscannot be done by increasing the firepower of law enforcement agencies and providingthem with more and more training suited to developed nations. There are some officers inPacific Island nation police forces who have undergone more training overseas than mostofficers in developed countries. But the parent services have not benefited from the effectof such training. This failure may largely be due to the fact that training is imparted in anatmosphere totally removed from the officer's environment. As such, it becomes anacademic exercise, divorced from the reality of law enforcement in a Pacific Island.Law enforcement agencies should be taught to make maximum use of available socialforces and practices in establishing communal peace, while being moved away from theconcept of projecting an image of power. Some difficulty may arise in changing from theidea of armed constabularies and paramilitary organisations, as these cater to the warriorethic of some local societies. But if social peace is to be established, concepts must change.An atmosphere of security is vital to enable communities to develop a healthy regard fornation states, thereby providing stability.Overall, the immediate prospect offers few grounds for complacency, yet the problemsfaced are capable of solution. However, these matters need to be addressed early beforethey give rise to violent confrontations. What is most needed now is a change of directionin the search for security in the South Pacific.

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