M E D I C A L L I A B I L I T Y A N D H E A LT H C A R E L A Wplaintiff to prove causation through the useof expert testimony. Additionally, expertstestifying on medical causation must statetheir opinions based on a reasonable degreeof medical certainty. If courts allow testimonybased on speculation and mere possibilityto satisfy the plaintiff’s evidentiaryburdens, medical expert testimony reallybecomes meaningless—an empty vesselMost courts adhere tothe traditional evidentiarystandard of proximate cause.into which plaintiffs may pour whateverspeculative theory they can devise.Finally, the traditional standard of proofreflects the importance of scientific studiesand their findings to the real-life, clinicaljudgment that physicians exercise. Whena physician exercises clinical judgmentto construct differential diagnoses or tochoose treatment options, he or she presumablydoes so based on his or her learning,experience, and education. Physicians oftenrely on their knowledge of the latestoutcome studies, information that theyhave learned from morbidity and mortalityconferences, and other developments in thescience of medicine. <strong>The</strong>y make treatmentdecisions based on the clinical pictures ofinjuries or diseases in light of scientific datathat may have a bearing on treatment decisionsin individual cases. When physiciansmake these decisions in emergency roomsor operative suites during trauma surgery,where time for reflection and observationare more limited clinical judgment buttressedby the prevailing science will oftendictate the course of treatment.Causation in the CourtsA lawyer should consider a motion forsummary judgment based on a causationdefense whenever the medical science supportsan argument that too many variablesor alternative explanations exist fora patient’s poor outcome to identify concretelythe alleged negligent act as themore- likely- than- not cause. Counselshould also strongly consider it when the14 n <strong>For</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> n <strong>July</strong> <strong>2010</strong>science behind a medication or a treatmentcannot establish that the medicationor treatment provides a better than 50 percentchance of a favorable outcome.<strong>The</strong> courts have shown willingness toenter a judgment without a trial whenpresented with these types of causationdefenses in a variety of cases. Causationdefenses, for example, often arise in casesinvolving failure to diagnose cancer orin recurrent cancer cases. In these casesthe expert opinion as to the staging ofthe patient’s cancer when the physicianallegedly should have made the diagnosishighly influences the causation analysis.If a plaintiff’s expert cannot specify witha reasonable degree of medical certaintythat a patient had a better than 50 percentchance of survival or of avoiding the badoutcome in dispute—that is, if the expertcannot assign a percentage to the differencethat early diagnosis would have madeto the outcome—then the defense has astrong argument that the clinician is entitledto judgment as a matter of law. Thiscan be a particularly strong argument ifthe patient survives yet still has a mortalityrisk, and the gist of the claim is that thepatient’s chance of surviving would haveimproved with earlier diagnosis and treatment.E.g., Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d119, 122 (Minn. 1992) (stating that “[T]heplaintiff cannot use the fact that her conditionhas worsened as proof the defendantdoctor made it worse. Plaintiff must stillshow causation.”).Causation defenses have prevailed at thesummary judgment stage in many casesother than cancer cases, too. <strong>For</strong> example,a court granted summary judgmentin favor of a physician who unsuccessfullyattempted to wean from a respiratora patient who had been suffering from sepsisand multisystem organ failure after hedetermined that breathing only throughthe machine would not benefit the patientin the long run. <strong>The</strong> plaintiff’s pulmonaryspecialist testified that a person inthe patient’s condition on the day she wasremoved from the respirator only wouldhave had a 40 percent chance of living evenif the person had remained on the respirator.Park Place Hosp. v. Estate of Milo, 39Tex. Sup. Ct. 70, 909 S.W.2d 508, 510–11(Tex. 1995). Another court granted summaryjudgment when a plaintiff’s evidenceshowed only “the mere possibility thattimely discovery of the blood clot at issuewould have made it possible to save thefunction of plaintiff’s kidney.” Goggin v.Goldman, 433 S.E.2d 85, 87 (Ga. Ct. App.1993). It has been granted when a plaintifffailed to show that finger- reimplantationsurgery would have succeeded for a traumapatient. Alfonso v. Lund, 783 F.2d 958, 963(10th Cir. 1986). And a court granted it ina case involving injuries allegedly causedby a postsurgical infection. Farley v. Shook,629 S.E.2d 739, 742 (W. Va. 2006).A federal judge in South Dakota recentlyentered summary judgment for the defendantin a case that nicely illustrates thetype of medical professional liability case inwhich courts should grant summary judgment.<strong>The</strong> plaintiff in Smith v. Bubak sufferedan ischemic stroke and claimed thathe should have received a so-called “clotbusting” drug known as tPA (tissue plasminogenactivator) to increase his chancesof achieving a better outcome despite hisstroke. Smith v. Bubak, No. CIV-0844032,<strong>2010</strong> WL 605269 (D. S.D. Feb. 18, <strong>2010</strong>).<strong>The</strong> causation defense relied on a rangeof authoritative tPA outcome studies thatshowed conclusively that 32 percent of patientstreated with tPA achieved a betteroutcome from receiving the drug. Id. at *7,n.5. In fact, a significant percentage of patientshad worse outcomes as a result of receivingthe drug than would otherwise havebeen the case. <strong>The</strong> court held that SouthDakota law required the plaintiff to provethat he would have had a “better than evenchance of improvement” to establish causation.Because the outcome studies showedclearly that the probability of improvementcould not exceed 50 percent, as required bylaw, the court barred the plaintiff’s expertfrom testifying and granted summary judgmentto the physician. Id. at *8.<strong>The</strong> ObstaclePlaintiffs faced with meeting the “probability”burden have argued that the requirementthat they prove that injuries wouldmore likely than not have occurred butfor the physicians’ negligence should notalways apply in cases of alleged medicalnegligence. <strong>The</strong> biggest weapon in theirarsenal in this battle has been the loss ofchance doctrine. <strong>The</strong> loss of chance doctrinestands for the proposition that a jury
should have an opportunity to consider testimonythat the alleged negligence diminisheda patient’s chances for recovery orsurvival, even if he or she is unable to provideexpert testimony that the negligencemore likely than not caused the patient’sloss. Courts have justified this relaxed burdenof proof on various grounds.One justification offered by courts insupport of the loss of chance doctrine isthat the relaxed burden of proof forestallsinjustice by preventing arbitrary distinctionsamong plaintiffs based on their abilityto locate witnesses willing to testify thatpatients had a 51 percent chance, ratherthan a 49 or 50 percent chance, of achievingbetter outcomes. Anyone who regularlyhandles medical liability cases knows,however, that this is a polemical argumentbecause it is exceedingly rare to encountera plaintiff with a decent causation argumentwhose claim fails because he or shecannot find an expert to testify that adifferent course of treatment would haveresulted in at least a 51 percent chance ofachieving a better outcome.Courts have also asserted that the loss ofchance doctrine serves a purpose becauserequiring testimony to meet the traditionalstandard of proof under all circumstances,and in particular, when physicianshave been clearly negligent, would providethem with a “blanket release fromliability” merely because the injured partieshad poor prospects even without malpractice.Herskovits v. Group Health Coop.of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 476 (Wash. 1983).<strong>The</strong>se courts have concluded that permittingpatients to recover damages by showingonly that malpractice diminished theirprospects for a better result provides aneffective deterrent to negligence in thetreatment of patients whose prospects arepoor. McMackin v. Johnson County HealthcareCtr., 73 P.3d 1094, 1099 (Wyo. 2003).In addition, courts have said that a courtshould not permit a defendant to raise conjecturesabout a patient’s lost opportunitieswhen the defendant’s own conduct eliminatedthe possibility of their realization.Courts following this line of reasoning haveconcluded that a patient’s loss of chance fora better outcome should be recognized asan injury in and of itself.Matsuyama v. Birnbaum exemplifieshow some courts have been swayed by thesiren song of the loss of chance doctrine.890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008). A close readingof the decision, however, also providesclues about how a lawyer can challenge theloss of chance doctrine even in the jurisdictionswhere it is the law. Matsuyama executedan end-run around all the argumentsin favor of traditional causation analysisby a clever turn of legal legerdemain. <strong>The</strong>court opined that the loss of chance doctrinewas “not a theory of causation, but…a theory of injury.” 890 N.E.2d at 832. <strong>The</strong>court then held that that injury—the lossof chance for a better outcome—had to beproved by a preponderance of the evidence,providing the appearance of adherenceto traditional causation proof rules whileactually making a plaintiff friendly pivot.As the next section will address, however,lawyers may use the court’s reasonssupporting this approach to attackattempts by plaintiffs to invoke this doctrine.<strong>For</strong> example, the court reasonedthat “<strong>The</strong> key is the reliability of the evidenceavailable to the fact finder.” Id. at 833.Thus, even in loss of chance jurisdictions,plaintiffs’ experts may remain vulnerableto exclusion based on the reliability of thesupport that they provide for their opinions.Also, the court rested its adoption ofthis doctrine, in part, on the reasoning that“Although there are few certainties in medicineor in life, progress in medical sciencenow makes it possible, at least with regardto certain medical conditions, to estimate apatient’s probability of survival to a reasonabledegree of medical certainty.” Id. at 832.Fighting the Loss of Chance DoctrineLawyers practicing in jurisdictions thathave not adopted the loss of chance doctrineshould aggressively analyze everyangle of possible causation defenses withan eye to possibly moving for summaryjudgments. Study the medical literature,consult with your client on the scientificbases for his or her decisions, and exploityour retained experts’ knowledge of the<strong>For</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> n <strong>July</strong> <strong>2010</strong> n 15