P R O F E S S I O N A L L I A B I L I T YMartin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel & Casino,983 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1993). Aswith the attorney- client privilege, the partyasserting the work product doctrine bearsthe burden of establishing that the documentshe or she seeks to protect were prepared“in anticipation of litigation.” In rePowerhouse Licensing, LLC, 441 F. 3d 467(6th Cir. 2006).Courts follow differentstandards for determiningwhether a document is“prepared in anticipationof litigation.”Courts follow different standards fordetermining whether a document is “preparedin anticipation of litigation.” Somecourts follow a “because of” test, findingthat a document is protected if it was“prepared or obtained because of the prospectof litigation.” United States v. Adlman(Adlman II), 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2dCir. 1998); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l PrestonIndus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1119 (7th Cir.1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979). Other courtsfollow a narrower, “primary motivation,”or “primary purpose,” test for determiningthe applicability of work product protection,under which documents are deemedto have been prepared in anticipation of litigationwhen the “primary motivating purposebehind the creation of the documentwas to aid in possible future litigation.”United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530,542 (5th Cir. 1982). In October, 2009, theUnited States Court of Appeals for the FirstCircuit applied an alternate test. Applyingthis test, only documents “prepared for”litigation would have work product protection.United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d21 (1st Cir. 2009).Broad Discovery Scope andPrivilege ApplicationFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)sets forth a very broad scope of discovery:66 n <strong>For</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> n <strong>July</strong> <strong>2010</strong>any matter, not privileged, which is relevantto the subject matter involved inthe pending action…. <strong>The</strong> informationneed not be admissible at the trial if theinformation sought appears reasonablycalculated to lead to the discovery ofadmissible evidence.It is a well- settled principle that courtswill accord broad and liberal treatmentto the discovery rules in accordance withtheir purpose. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.495, 501, 507 (1947). Under the federalrules, discovery is meant to enable litigantsto obtain the fullest possible knowledge ofthe issues and facts before trial. Id. at 500.However, the attorney- client privilegeand work product doctrine do limit thedisclosure Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) parameters.Courts have recognized that the assertionof a privilege obstructs the search forthe truth and must be “strictly confinedwithin the narrowest possible limits.” In reGrand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1235(quoting 8 Wigmore on Evidence §2291 at545 (1961)). Consequently, the party claimingthe privilege bears the burden of provingthat it applies to the communicationat issue. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 295,506 (1947); United States v. Landorg, 591F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978); Hodges Grant &Kauffmann v. U.S. Gov., 768 F.2d 719 (5thCir. 1985).Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work ProductDoctrine to Outside CounselBased on the general rules discussed above,in most cases, communications between alawyer and a client are protected from disclosure.<strong>The</strong>re are, of course, exceptions toevery rule. How the attorney- client privilegeand work product doctrine apply tocommunications between an insurer andoutside counsel retained by the insureroffer good examples.Documents prepared in the ordinarycourse of business are generally not consideredto have been created in anticipationof litigation and are not covered bythe work product doctrine. Further, a documentproduced in the ordinary course ofbusiness is not protected from disclosuremerely because it was sent to an attorney.Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397,403 (8th Cir. 1987). Crucially, as discussedin greater detail below, these general principlesare especially relevant in the insurancecontext. As one court put it:Application of the work product rule toinsurer investigative documents is one ofthe most difficult and often- litigated discoveryissues because it is the very natureof an insurer’s business to investigateevents which, either directly or indirectly,or as a consequence of the insurers’decisions, often result in litigation.Stout v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 150 F.R.D.594, 597, (1993).Typically, after an insurance companyhires outside counsel but before coveragelitigation begins, the attorney’s role is similarto that of a claims adjuster. He or shewill investigate and analyze claims and determinewhether the insurance companyshould make a payment. Courts routinelycategorize this work as an insurance company’sordinary business functions, as opposedto legal work. Harper v. Auto- Owners,Inc. Co., 138 F.R.D. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1991). Similarly,courts have rejected an insurer’s argumentsthat communications from an outsidelawyer should have protection because theoutside lawyer performed an “enhanced”investigation or handled the claim in anonroutine manner that differed from theinsurer’s normal claims- handling process.Further, many courts have held that aninsurance company may not insulate itselffrom discovery by hiring an attorney to conductordinary claims investigations. To theextent that an attorney acts as a claims adjuster,claims process supervisor, or claimsinvestigation monitor, and not as a legal advisor,the attorney- client privilege does notapply. Mission National Ins. Co. v. Lilly, 112F.R.D. 160, 163 (D. Minn. 1986); First AviationServices Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 205 F.R.D.65 (Conn. 2001). <strong>The</strong> majority of courts haveheld that if a layman could have just as easilyhandled a matter as a lawyer, the privilegewould not apply to that matter. MerrinJewelry Co v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,49 F.R.D. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).Illustrative CasesIn First Aviation, the plaintiffs, two aviationcompanies and two individuals,sought damages under a directors’ & officers’liability and company reimbursementinsurance policy issued by Gulf. First AviationServices Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 205 F.R.D.65 (Conn. 2001). In particular, they sought
defense and settlement costs incurred in athird-party lawsuit alleging wrongful termination,breach of contract, and bad faith.In the course of the coverage dispute,the plaintiffs moved to compel productionof all claims documents created by Gulf’soutside attorneys, as well as all claims andunderwriting manuals and interpretivedocuments. <strong>The</strong> plaintiffs asserted thatGulf retained its outside attorneys to investigateand make coverage determinationsabout their D & O claim. <strong>The</strong>y contendedthat this task is normally performed by aninsurance company’s claims department,and thus the claims- handling documentswere not protected by the attorney- clientprivilege. Gulf responded that its outsideattorneys served as legal advisors and,thus, their communications were entitledto attorney- client privilege protection.<strong>The</strong> court explained that the attorneyclientprivilege does not, in fact, generallyprotect all transactions that involve an attorneyand a client, nor can all the factsknown by a party have immunity from discoverysimply because the party told themto an attorney. Id. at 68 (citing ReichholdChemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & IndemnityCo., 2000 Conn. Super. Lexis 2164,2000 WL 1227306 (Conn. Super. Aug. 15,2000)). <strong>The</strong> court further stated that onlycommunications between client and attorneywhen made in confidence for the purposeof seeking or giving legal advice areprivileged. Id. Finally, the court held that arequest that an attorney obtain informationfrom outside sources is not privileged. Id.In making its ultimate ruling granting theplaintiffs’ motion to compel, the court reliedon the testimony of Gulf’s own expertwitness who testified that Gulf’s outside attorneysfunctioned as claims handlers andprimarily made business decisions.Overall, courts have held that theattorney- client privilege cannot become amechanism for avoiding disclosure of documentsthrough an assertion of privilege.On similar grounds, a court will not affordwork product protection to documents in aclaim file that were prepared for an insurancecompany as part of its ordinary courseof business, even if these documents wereprepared by an attorney. Courts have recognizedthat consultations between an insurancecompany and its attorneys during aninvestigation “is an important factor whichgenerally weighs in favor of” a court findingthat the work product doctrine protects documents.Burr v. United Farm Bureau Mut.Ins. Co., 560 N.E. 2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. Ct.App. 1990). However, more often than not,courts rule that documents prepared for aninsurer prior to a coverage determination donot have work product protection becausethey have been prepared in the ordinarycourse of the insurer’s business. Pete Rinaldi’sFast Foods, Inc. v. Great American Ins.Cos., 123 F.R.D. 198, 202 (M.D.N.C. 1988).Other courts have looked at the date onwhich documents were created and whetherat that time a lawsuit was likely. Fontaine v.Sunflower Beef Carrier, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 89,93 (E.D. Mo. 1980). Still other courts haveadopted a case-by-case analysis. Schmidt v.California State Automobile Association, 127F.R.D. 182, 184 (D. Nev. 1989).To summarize, documents preparedafter an insurance company retains outsidecounsel are not necessarily protectedby the work product doctrine in cases inwhich the insurance company continuesto investigate claims without denying coverage.<strong>The</strong> retention of outside counseldoes not alone indicate a decision to litigatea claim. Accordingly, insurance companieshave a difficult time claiming, priorto denying coverage, that documents preparedin the context of investigations enjoyprotection because they were prepared inanticipation of litigation. This is becausean investigation of a claim often continueseven after outside counsel is retained.Cutrale Citrus Juices USA, Inc. v. ZurichAmerican Ins. Group, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis22487 (M.D. Fla. 2004), illustrates onecourt’s interpretation of the work productdoctrine in the insurance context. In thatcase, the plaintiff, Cutrale, sued Zurich forbreach of two insurance contracts. Duringthe course of the litigation, the plaintifffiled a motion to compel production ofall claim file documents, including investigativematerials. Zurich asserted that thedocuments were protected because theywere prepared in anticipation of litigatingthe plaintiff’s bad-faith claim; however,it agreed to submit the documents tothe court for an in camera inspection priorto the hearing on the plaintiff’s motion.Among other things, the plaintiff arguedat the hearing that if the documents wereprepared in the normal course of business,they were not protected under the workproduct doctrine, and the defendant mustproduce them. <strong>The</strong> court held that whileno bright line rule in the insurance contextseparated documents produced underthe work product privilege from documentsproduced in the ordinary course ofbusiness, a claim coverage denial date isthe proper date after which an insurer cananticipate litigation with relative certaintyand, thus, documents generated after thatdate would have work product protection.Id. Indeed, a number of courts have agreed.See, e.g., Ring v. Commercial Union Ins.Co., 159 F.R.D. 653, 656 (M.D.N.C. 1995)(stating that “in general, only documentsaccumulated after the claim denial will beprepared in anticipation of litigation”). Specifically,the Cutrale Citrus court found thatall documents considered responsive to theplaintiff’s production request in the claimsfile dated before November 11, 1999, thedate of Zurich’s denial, did not have workproduct protection, and Zurich must producethem. Cutrale Citrus Juices USA, Inc. v.Zurich American Ins. Group, 2004 U.S. Dist.Lexis 22487 (M.D. Fla. 2004).In rare cases, courts have held that documentsprepared by attorneys for insurancecompanies were protected by bothattorney- client privilege and the workproduct doctrine, extending those protectionsto documents prepared during thecourse of an investigation. <strong>For</strong> instance, theUnited States Court of Appeals for the FifthCircuit upheld a protective order issued fordocuments prepared by an insurance company’sattorneys during the course of theinvestigation of a claim. Dunn v. State FarmFire & Casualty Co., 927 F.2d 869 (5th Cir.1991). In Dunn, State Farm insured Mollieand Melvin Dunn’s home and it contents.<strong>The</strong> Dunns separated, and, shortlyafter, a fire burned their house. <strong>The</strong> firedepartment suspected arson, and, a fewdays after the fire, Mr. Dunn confessed tosetting the fire intentionally. Mrs. Dunnfiled a claim with State Farm based on herinterest in the house and her share of itscontents. After conducting an investigation,State Farm denied Mrs. Dunn’s claimsbased on alleged misrepresentations andsuspicions that she had been complicit inthe arson. Mrs. Dunn filed a bad-faith suit,and the trial court found in favor of StateOutside Counsel, continued on page 88<strong>For</strong> <strong>The</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> n <strong>July</strong> <strong>2010</strong> n 67