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US Training of Death Squads in Iraq? - War Is A Crime .org

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guard was called upon. Now people like Adnan, a former Baathist who was sentenced to deathfor conspir<strong>in</strong>g to overthrow Husse<strong>in</strong>, have been given the task <strong>of</strong> defeat<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgency. Thenew strategy is show<strong>in</strong>g signs <strong>of</strong> success, but it is a success that may carry its own costs.A couple <strong>of</strong> hours after Adnan issued his AK-47 threat, I sat with him watch<strong>in</strong>g TV. This wasbus<strong>in</strong>ess, not pleasure. The program we were watch<strong>in</strong>g was Adnan’s bra<strong>in</strong>child, and <strong>in</strong> just a fewmonths it had proved to be one <strong>of</strong> the most effective psychological operations <strong>of</strong> the war. It isreality TV <strong>of</strong> sorts, a show called ‘‘Terrorism <strong>in</strong> the Grip <strong>of</strong> Justice.’’ It features deta<strong>in</strong>eesconfess<strong>in</strong>g to various crimes. The show was first broadcast earlier this year and has quicklybecome a nationwide hit. It is on every day <strong>in</strong> prime time on Al <strong>Iraq</strong>iya, the American-f<strong>in</strong>ancednational TV station, and when it is on, people across the country can be found gathered aroundtheir television sets.Those be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terrogated on the program do not look fearsome; these are not the faces to befound <strong>in</strong> the propaganda videos that turn up on Web sites or on Al Jazeera. The <strong>in</strong>surgents, orsuspected <strong>in</strong>surgents, on ‘‘Terrorism <strong>in</strong> the Grip <strong>of</strong> Justice’’ come <strong>of</strong>f as cowardly lowlifes whokill for money rather than patriotism or Allah. They tremble on camera, stumble over their wordsand look at the ground as they confess to everyth<strong>in</strong>g from contract murders to sodomy. Theprogram’s clear message is that there is now a force more powerful than the <strong>in</strong>surgency: the <strong>Iraq</strong>igovernment, and <strong>in</strong> particular the commandos, whose regimental flag, which shows a lion’s headon a camouflage background, is frequently displayed on a banner beh<strong>in</strong>d the captives.Before the show began that even<strong>in</strong>g, Adnan’s <strong>of</strong>fice was a hive <strong>of</strong> conversation, phone calls andtea-dr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Along with a dozen commandos, there were several American advisers <strong>in</strong> the room,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g James Steele, one <strong>of</strong> the United States military’s top experts on counter<strong>in</strong>surgency.Steele honed his tactics lead<strong>in</strong>g a Special Forces mission <strong>in</strong> El Salvador dur<strong>in</strong>g that country’sbrutal civil war <strong>in</strong> the 1980’s. His presence was a sign not only <strong>of</strong> the commandos’ crucial role <strong>in</strong>the American counter<strong>in</strong>surgency strategy but also <strong>of</strong> his close relationship with Adnan. Steeleadmired the general. ‘‘He’s obviously a natural type <strong>of</strong> commander,’’ Steele told me. ‘‘Hecommands respect.’’Th<strong>in</strong>gs quieted <strong>in</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fice once the episode <strong>of</strong> ‘‘Terrorism <strong>in</strong> the Grip <strong>of</strong> Justice’’ began. First,a deta<strong>in</strong>ee admitted to hav<strong>in</strong>g homosexual relations <strong>in</strong> a mosque. Then several other suspected<strong>in</strong>surgents made their confessions; two <strong>of</strong> them had been captured by Adnan’s commandos <strong>in</strong>Samarra, and their confessions were taped, just hours before, <strong>in</strong> this very <strong>of</strong>fice. Adnan satsmok<strong>in</strong>g Royals and watch<strong>in</strong>g the show like a proud producer.‘‘It has a good effect on civilians,’’ he had told me, through an <strong>in</strong>terpreter. ‘‘Most civilians don’tknow who conducts the terrorist activities. Now they can see the quality <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgents.’’Earlier he said: ‘‘Civilians must know that these people who call themselves resisters are thievesand looters. They are dirty. In every person there is good and bad, but <strong>in</strong> these people there isonly bad.’’The episodes <strong>of</strong> the program I have seen depict an <strong>in</strong>surgency composed almost entirely <strong>of</strong>crim<strong>in</strong>als and religious fanatics. The <strong>in</strong>surgency as understood by American <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficersis a more complex web <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests and fighters. Most <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency is composed <strong>of</strong> Sunnis,7


and it is generally believed that Baathists hold key positions. But the commandos, who are theheroes <strong>of</strong> ‘‘Terrorism <strong>in</strong> the Grip <strong>of</strong> Justice,’’ are also led by Sunnis and have many formerBaathists <strong>in</strong> their ranks, so the Sunni-and-Baathist aspect <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency is carefully obscured.Of course, propaganda need not be wholly accurate to be effective. The real problem with theprogram, accord<strong>in</strong>g to its most vocal critics — representatives <strong>of</strong> human rights groups — is thatit violates the Geneva Conventions. The deta<strong>in</strong>ees shown on ‘‘Terrorism <strong>in</strong> the Grip <strong>of</strong> Justice’’have not been charged before judicial authorities, and they appear to be confess<strong>in</strong>g under duress.Some deta<strong>in</strong>ees are cut and bruised. In one show, a former policeman with two black eyesconfessed to kill<strong>in</strong>g two police <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>in</strong> Samarra; a few days after the broadcast, the formerpoliceman’s family told reporters, his corpse was delivered to them. The government’s humanrights m<strong>in</strong>ister has <strong>in</strong>itiated an <strong>in</strong>vestigation.‘‘Terrorism <strong>in</strong> the Grip <strong>of</strong> Justice’’ is a rat<strong>in</strong>gs success because it humiliates the <strong>in</strong>surgency,satisfy<strong>in</strong>g a popular desire for vengeance aga<strong>in</strong>st the men who spread terror and death. Yet theprogram plays rough not only with its confess<strong>in</strong>g captives but also with the rules and laws thatgovern the conduct <strong>of</strong> war. As I learned <strong>in</strong> Samarra, this approach was not just for television. Itwas Adnan’s effective yet brutal way <strong>of</strong> conduct<strong>in</strong>g a counter<strong>in</strong>surgency.Build<strong>in</strong>g a Home-Grown Counter<strong>in</strong>surgencyMost <strong>of</strong> the Pentagon’s <strong>of</strong>ficial statements <strong>in</strong> the past two years about the ability <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is topolice their own country have been exaggerated. But now reality is beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to catch up withrhetoric. In the months that followed the January elections <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, attacks on allied forcesreportedly fell to 30 to 40 a day <strong>in</strong> February and March, from 140 just before the vote. It’s hardto tell whether this trend will cont<strong>in</strong>ue; <strong>in</strong> April the <strong>in</strong>surgency showed signs <strong>of</strong> renewedstrength. But the successes that the counter<strong>in</strong>surgency has enjoyed are <strong>in</strong> no small part because<strong>of</strong> Adnan’s commandos. With American forces <strong>in</strong> an advisory role, the commandos, as well as afew other effective units, like the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Army’s 36th Commando Battalion and its 40th Brigade <strong>in</strong>Baghdad, have <strong>in</strong>flicted more violence upon <strong>in</strong>surgents than <strong>in</strong>surgents have <strong>in</strong>flicted upon them.That is much <strong>of</strong> what fight<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>surgency amounts to. But successful counter<strong>in</strong>surgencies, ifhistory is a guide, tend not to be pretty, especially <strong>in</strong> countries where violence has been a way <strong>of</strong>life and rules govern<strong>in</strong>g warfare and human rights have been rout<strong>in</strong>ely ignored by those <strong>in</strong>uniform.The template for <strong>Iraq</strong> today is not Vietnam, with which it has <strong>of</strong>ten been compared, but ElSalvador, where a right-w<strong>in</strong>g government backed by the United States fought a leftist <strong>in</strong>surgency<strong>in</strong> a 12-year war beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1980. The cost was high — more than 70,000 people were killed,most <strong>of</strong> them civilians, <strong>in</strong> a country with a population <strong>of</strong> just six million. Most <strong>of</strong> the kill<strong>in</strong>g andtortur<strong>in</strong>g was done by the army and the right-w<strong>in</strong>g death squads affiliated with it. Accord<strong>in</strong>g toan Amnesty International report <strong>in</strong> 2001, violations committed by the army and associatedgroups <strong>in</strong>cluded ‘‘extrajudicial executions, other unlawful kill<strong>in</strong>gs, ‘disappearances’ and torture.. . . Whole villages were targeted by the armed forces and their <strong>in</strong>habitants massacred.’’ As part<strong>of</strong> President Reagan’s policy <strong>of</strong> support<strong>in</strong>g anti-Communist forces, hundreds <strong>of</strong> millions <strong>of</strong>dollars <strong>in</strong> United States aid was funneled to the Salvadoran Army, and a team <strong>of</strong> 55 Special8


After the commandos set up their headquarters at a bombed-out army base at the edge <strong>of</strong> theGreen Zone, Petraeus went for a visit. He was pleasantly surprised, he told me, to see a force thatwas relatively discipl<strong>in</strong>ed and well motivated. He knew the commandos were <strong>of</strong>ficers andsoldiers who had served Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>, he knew many <strong>of</strong> them were Sunni and he certa<strong>in</strong>lyknew they were not under American control. But he also sensed that they could fight. Hechallenged some <strong>of</strong> them to a push-up contest. He was not just embrac<strong>in</strong>g a new militaryformation; he was embrac<strong>in</strong>g a new strategy. The hard men <strong>of</strong> the past would help shape thecountry’s future.Petraeus decided that the commandos would receive whatever arms, ammunition and suppliesthey required. He also assigned Steele to work with them. In addition to his experience <strong>in</strong> ElSalvador, Steele had been <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> retra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Panama’s security forces follow<strong>in</strong>g the oust<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> Gen. Manuel Noriega. When I asked him to describe Adnan’s leadership qualities, Steeledrew on the vocabulary he learned <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America. Adnan, he said approv<strong>in</strong>gly, was a caudillo— a military strongman.Do<strong>in</strong>g It the <strong>Iraq</strong>i WayAdnan’s <strong>of</strong>fensive turned Samarra <strong>in</strong>to a prov<strong>in</strong>g ground for this new strategy, the mostcomprehensive effort to date <strong>in</strong> which United States-backed <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces sought to retake an<strong>in</strong>surgent city. Code-named City Market, the <strong>of</strong>fensive has <strong>in</strong>volved weeks <strong>of</strong> raids bycommandos and their American advisers. After the first wave <strong>of</strong> raids, a new corps <strong>of</strong> police<strong>of</strong>ficers and Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry troops known as Public Order Battalions were deployed to takecommand <strong>of</strong> the streets.Samarra has a population <strong>of</strong> a quarter million, though many have fled after two years <strong>of</strong> warfare.The population is divided among seven tribes whose rivalries created fertile soil for the<strong>in</strong>surgency to take root. S<strong>in</strong>ce 2003, the city has <strong>of</strong>ten been under the control <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgents. InOctober, the United States launched an <strong>of</strong>fensive to retake the city, but the moment the Bradleysand Humvees departed, the <strong>in</strong>surgents returned. (Voter turnout <strong>in</strong> the election <strong>in</strong> January was lessthan 5 percent.)When I arrived <strong>in</strong> March, the part <strong>of</strong> Samarra under American and commando control — CityHall and a Green Zone around it — was a small parcel <strong>of</strong> land r<strong>in</strong>ged with a phalanx <strong>of</strong> concretebarriers, barbed wire and shoot-to-kill lookouts. The ma<strong>in</strong> roads <strong>in</strong>to the city were blocked bycheckpo<strong>in</strong>ts at which <strong>Iraq</strong>i soldiers searched every vehicle. American and <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces rarely leftthe Green Zone on foot, conduct<strong>in</strong>g their patrols <strong>in</strong> heavily armed convoys, and the Green Zonewas hit by mortars almost every day.There were just a few hundred G.I.’s <strong>in</strong> Samarra, mostly liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Green Zone on two bases,Razor and Olsen. The conditions were spartan; soldiers were housed <strong>in</strong> cramped rooms, theyused outdoor latr<strong>in</strong>es and hot d<strong>in</strong>ners were served just three nights a week. At Olsen, a formercas<strong>in</strong>o that is home to troops <strong>of</strong> the Wiscons<strong>in</strong> Army National Guard and the Third InfantryDivision, the soldiers I met spent most <strong>of</strong> their <strong>of</strong>f-hours lift<strong>in</strong>g weights, e-mail<strong>in</strong>g loved onesback home or play<strong>in</strong>g Halo on Xboxes, unw<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g from real combat by engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> simulatedcombat. Three teams <strong>of</strong> a dozen or so G.I.’s went out on the raids with the <strong>Iraq</strong>i commandos.11


(The other soldiers <strong>in</strong> the city performed logistical, adm<strong>in</strong>istrative and perimeter-security duties.)One team was composed <strong>of</strong> Special Forces soldiers, another was drawn from the Wiscons<strong>in</strong>Army National Guard and the third, with which I spent most <strong>of</strong> my time on patrol, was staffed bysoldiers <strong>of</strong> the Third Infantry Division. The squad leader was Capt. Jeff Bennett, a 26-year-oldwhose father is <strong>in</strong> the Air Force.Capta<strong>in</strong> Bennett was on his second tour <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>vasion, he was among the ThirdInfantry Division troops who captured Baghdad airport aga<strong>in</strong>st stiff resistance from RepublicanGuard forces. Bennett wears his division patch on the shoulder <strong>of</strong> his uniform, and soon after hearrived <strong>in</strong> Samarra, the patch was recognized by a few <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i commandos, who <strong>in</strong>formedhim that they had been <strong>in</strong> the Republican Guard unit at the airport that fought his unit. Initially,Bennett was leery about go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to combat with men he had tried to kill, and who had tried tokill him, but after their first battle together, fight<strong>in</strong>g shoulder to shoulder aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>surgents, hisdoubts disappeared.‘‘That’s the great equalizer,’’ Bennett said. ‘‘You get <strong>in</strong>to a firefight with someone, they come toyour side, return fire, cover another person. That k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> seals the relationship.’’Many <strong>of</strong> the commando raids occurred at night. One even<strong>in</strong>g, I watched as preparations began onthe street outside City Hall. A group <strong>of</strong> about 50 <strong>Iraq</strong>is strapped on their body armor, <strong>in</strong>sertedbullet clips <strong>in</strong>to their AK-47’s and listened to heavy metal on the stereos <strong>of</strong> their AmericansuppliedDodge pickups, which now bore coats <strong>of</strong> camouflage pa<strong>in</strong>t and mach<strong>in</strong>e guns on theirflatbeds. The commandos talked and joked loudly, exud<strong>in</strong>g an alpha-male confidence. Bennett’ssquad mixed easily with the commandos, exchang<strong>in</strong>g greet<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> the Arabic phrases theylearned.The commandos cultivate a vaguely menac<strong>in</strong>g look. They wear camouflage uniforms, but alsoirregular cloth<strong>in</strong>g, like black leather gloves and balaclavas — not to hide their identities but to<strong>in</strong>spire fear among the enemy. It is a look I saw among the Serbian paramilitaries who terrorizedCroatia and Bosnia dur<strong>in</strong>g the Balkan wars <strong>in</strong> the 90’s, and it is the look <strong>of</strong> the paramilitaries thatoperated <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America a decade earlier.When it was time to go, the commandos moved out <strong>in</strong> their Dodges, and Bennett’s teamfollowed <strong>in</strong> three armored Humvees. Bennett was not sure <strong>of</strong> the precise dest<strong>in</strong>ation thateven<strong>in</strong>g; though the <strong>Iraq</strong>is and Americans had swapped lists <strong>of</strong> high-value targets, thecommandos generally decided which ones would be pursued. The patrol moved out with lights<strong>of</strong>f, slipp<strong>in</strong>g through Samarra’s barren streets; there was a curfew <strong>in</strong> effect, and even the city’smany stray dogs seemed to have taken shelter. The patrol eventually pulled to a halt at a house afew miles from the Green Zone. A man there, apparently will<strong>in</strong>g to cooperate, said he knewwhere a number <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgents could be found, and he led the way to a nearby house. Those <strong>in</strong>sidewere brought out, one by one. The man identified one as an <strong>in</strong>surgent, and he was flex-cuffed,bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded and thrown <strong>in</strong>to the back <strong>of</strong> a truck.The patrol moved on and made many more stops. House after house was searched. Sometimesthe commandos broke down doors or shot <strong>of</strong>f locks. Other times they entered with a polite knockand had friendly discussions, depart<strong>in</strong>g with handshakes and smiles. The commandos are far12


more skilled than American troops I’ve spent time with at know<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>tuitively, whethersomeone represents a threat. A few men were deta<strong>in</strong>ed as the even<strong>in</strong>g unfolded, and when they<strong>of</strong>fered resistance or didn’t provide <strong>in</strong>formation as quickly as the commandos desired, they werepunished with a quick kick, slap or punch.A little after 2 a.m., the commandos rolled <strong>in</strong>to a neighborhood where the homes weresurrounded by walls and had satellite dishes on their ro<strong>of</strong>s. A man who was deta<strong>in</strong>ed earlier <strong>in</strong>the night po<strong>in</strong>ted the commandos toward one house. They entered and soon emerged with aconfiscated computer, but whomever they hoped to f<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong>side was not there.The <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> the raid — a Major Falah — now made it clear that he believed thedeta<strong>in</strong>ee had led them on a wild-goose chase. The deta<strong>in</strong>ee was sitt<strong>in</strong>g at the side <strong>of</strong> a commandotruck; I was 10 feet away, beside Bennett and four G.I.’s. One <strong>of</strong> Falah’s capta<strong>in</strong>s began beat<strong>in</strong>gthe deta<strong>in</strong>ee. Instead <strong>of</strong> a quick hit or slap, we now saw and heard a susta<strong>in</strong>ed series <strong>of</strong> blows.We heard the sound <strong>of</strong> the capta<strong>in</strong>’s fists and boots on the deta<strong>in</strong>ee’s body, and we heard thedeta<strong>in</strong>ee’s pa<strong>in</strong>ed grunts as he received his punishment without resistance. It was a dockyardmugg<strong>in</strong>g. Bennett turned his back to face away from the violence, jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g his soldiers <strong>in</strong> star<strong>in</strong>guncomfortably at the ground <strong>in</strong> silence. The blows cont<strong>in</strong>ued for a m<strong>in</strong>ute or so.Bennett had seen the likes <strong>of</strong> this before, and he had worked out his own guidel<strong>in</strong>es for deal<strong>in</strong>gwith such situations. ‘‘If I th<strong>in</strong>k they’re go<strong>in</strong>g to shoot somebody or cut his f<strong>in</strong>ger <strong>of</strong>f or do anysort <strong>of</strong> permanent damage, I will immediately stop them,’’ he expla<strong>in</strong>ed. ‘‘As Americans, wewill not let that happen. In terms <strong>of</strong> kick<strong>in</strong>g a guy, they do that all the time, punches and stufflike that.’’ It was a tactical decision, Bennett expla<strong>in</strong>ed: ‘‘You only get so many <strong>in</strong>terventions,and I’ve got to save my butt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> for when there is a danger it could go over the l<strong>in</strong>e.’’ But evenwhen he doesn’t say anyth<strong>in</strong>g, he expla<strong>in</strong>ed, ‘‘they can tell we’re not enjoy<strong>in</strong>g it. We’re just k<strong>in</strong>d<strong>of</strong> like, ‘O.K., here we go aga<strong>in</strong>.’’’Though the commandos and their American advisers were work<strong>in</strong>g together <strong>in</strong> Samarra, theirapproaches were decidedly different. The American way <strong>of</strong> combat is heavily planned, withsatellite maps, G.P.S. coord<strong>in</strong>ates and reconnaissance drones. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i way is improvisational,rely<strong>in</strong>g less on honed skills and high-tech than gut <strong>in</strong>st<strong>in</strong>ct and (literally) bare knuckles. It is theAmericans who are learn<strong>in</strong>g to adapt. In brief<strong>in</strong>gs that American soldiers receive, a quotationfrom T.E. Lawrence is sometimes <strong>in</strong>cluded: ‘‘Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do itperfectly.’’Threaten<strong>in</strong>g to Kill a Suspect’s SonOn March 8, I went on a series <strong>of</strong> raids with the commandos, travel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a Humvee with Maj.Robert Rooker, an artillery <strong>of</strong>ficer based <strong>in</strong> Tikrit who was dispatched to Samarra to serve as myescort. The leader <strong>of</strong> the American squad was Andrew Johansen, a 30-year-old lieutenant <strong>in</strong> theWiscons<strong>in</strong> Army National Guard. The commandos led the way <strong>in</strong> a half-dozen Dodges, withJohansen’s team follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> three Humvees. The target was a house outside Samarra whereNajim al-Takhi, thought to be the leader <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>surgent cell, was believed to be hid<strong>in</strong>g.13


The commandos reached an isolated farmhouse and deta<strong>in</strong>ed al-Takhi’s son, who looked to be <strong>in</strong>his early 20’s. This was an excellent catch. The son <strong>of</strong> a suspect usually knows where the suspectis hid<strong>in</strong>g; if not, he can be deta<strong>in</strong>ed and used as a barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g chip to persuade the father tosurrender. With al-Takhi’s son flex-cuffed <strong>in</strong> the back <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the pickups, the commandos,excited, drove to another farmhouse less than a mile away. They believed that al-Takhi might bethere, but a quick search yielded noth<strong>in</strong>g. The leader <strong>of</strong> this raid was a short, chubby capta<strong>in</strong> whowas enthusiastic and, as I noticed on previous raids, effective at lead<strong>in</strong>g his men. (When I laterasked his name, he refused to give it.) The capta<strong>in</strong> was conv<strong>in</strong>ced that al-Takhi was nearby, butthe son was tell<strong>in</strong>g him he didn’t know where his father was. Was he ly<strong>in</strong>g?The capta<strong>in</strong>’s methods were swift and extreme. He yelled at the son, who was wear<strong>in</strong>g a loosetunic; <strong>in</strong> the tussle <strong>of</strong> the arrest the young man had lost one <strong>of</strong> his sandals. The capta<strong>in</strong> pushedhim aga<strong>in</strong>st a mud wall and told everyone else to move away. Stand<strong>in</strong>g less than 10 feet from theyoung man, the capta<strong>in</strong> aimed his AK-47 at him and clicked <strong>of</strong>f the safety latch. He wasthreaten<strong>in</strong>g to kill him. I was close enough to catch some <strong>of</strong> the dialogue on my digital recorder.‘‘Where is your father?’’ the capta<strong>in</strong> shouted. ‘‘Say where your father is!’’‘‘He left early <strong>in</strong> the morn<strong>in</strong>g,’’ the son responded, clearly <strong>in</strong> terror. ‘‘I told my father to divorcemy mother, to not leave us <strong>in</strong> such a state.’’The son asked for mercy. ‘‘I swear, if I knew where he is, I would for sure take you to him.’’ Helooked around. ‘‘Oh, God, what should I do?’’The capta<strong>in</strong> was not persuaded.‘‘Just tell us where he is, and we will release you now,’’ he shouted.‘‘I swear to you, though you did not ask me to make an oath, <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> endur<strong>in</strong>g all thesebeat<strong>in</strong>gs I would tell you where he is if I knew.’’Major Rooker was just a few feet from the angry capta<strong>in</strong>. He moved closer and nudged thecapta<strong>in</strong>’s AK-47 toward the ground.‘‘You are a pr<strong>of</strong>essional soldier,’’ Rooker told him. ‘‘You know and I know that you need to putthe weapon down.’’The capta<strong>in</strong> scowled but ended the execution drama.‘‘O.K., guys,’’ he shouted to his men, ‘‘let’s ride back.’’As the commandos pulled their prisoner away, Lieutenant Johansen conferred with Rooker.‘‘They don’t operate the way we do, that’s for damn sure,’’ Johansen said. ‘‘We have to be niceto people.’’ Especially <strong>in</strong> the aftermath <strong>of</strong> Abu Ghraib, they were both aware that threaten<strong>in</strong>g aprisoner with death was illegal under the Geneva Conventions.14


‘‘I th<strong>in</strong>k it was all an act to try and get him to talk,’’ Rooker said. ‘‘But for a fraction <strong>of</strong> a secondI didn’t know that. I thought the guy was go<strong>in</strong>g to cap him.’’The commandos moved about 100 yards away, where they <strong>in</strong>terrogated the young man aga<strong>in</strong>,this time without an AK-47 <strong>in</strong> his face. With an execution no longer <strong>in</strong> the <strong>of</strong>f<strong>in</strong>g, Rookerdecided not to irritate the capta<strong>in</strong> further. ‘‘They’ll shake him up a little bit more,’’ he said to thedriver <strong>of</strong> his Humvee. ‘‘Stay back and let them do their job.’’Later, I asked Johansen about what had happened.‘‘I’m about 99 percent sure it was <strong>in</strong>timidation to put fear <strong>in</strong>to the guy,’’ he told me. ‘‘I knowthey use different means <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terrogation, but I didn’t expect them to raise a weapon at adeta<strong>in</strong>ee. I don’t th<strong>in</strong>k they know the value <strong>of</strong> human life Americans have. If they shootsomebody, I don’t th<strong>in</strong>k they would have remorse, even if they killed someone who was<strong>in</strong>nocent.’’Inside the Detention CenterIn Samarra, the commandos established a detention center at the public library, a hundred yardsdown the road from City Hall. The library is a one-story rose-hued build<strong>in</strong>g surrounded by afive-foot wall. There is a Arabic <strong>in</strong>scription over its entrance: ‘‘In the name <strong>of</strong> Allah the mostgracious and merciful, Oh, Lord, please fill me with knowledge.’’These days, the knowledge sought under its ro<strong>of</strong> comes not from hardback books but frombl<strong>in</strong>dfolded deta<strong>in</strong>ees. In guerrilla wars <strong>of</strong> recent decades, detention centers have played anotorious role. From Lat<strong>in</strong> America to the Balkans and the Middle East, the worst abuse hastaken place away from the eyes <strong>of</strong> bystanders or journalists. Dur<strong>in</strong>g my first few days <strong>in</strong> the city,I was told I could not visit the center; I was able only to observe, discreetly, as deta<strong>in</strong>ees wereled <strong>in</strong>to it at all hours. But one day Jim Steele asked whether I wanted to <strong>in</strong>terview a Saudi youthwho had been captured the previous day. I agreed, and he took me to the detention center.We walked through the entrance gates <strong>of</strong> the center and stood, briefly, outside the ma<strong>in</strong> hall.Look<strong>in</strong>g through the doors, I saw about 100 deta<strong>in</strong>ees squatt<strong>in</strong>g on the floor, hands bound beh<strong>in</strong>dtheir backs; most were bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded. To my right, outside the doors, a leather-jacketed security<strong>of</strong>ficial was slapp<strong>in</strong>g and kick<strong>in</strong>g a deta<strong>in</strong>ee who was sitt<strong>in</strong>g on the ground. We went to a roomadjacent to the ma<strong>in</strong> hall, and as we walked <strong>in</strong>, a deta<strong>in</strong>ee was led out with fresh blood aroundhis nose. The room had enough space for a couple <strong>of</strong> desks and chairs; one desk had bloodsta<strong>in</strong>srunn<strong>in</strong>g down its side. The 20-year-old Saudi was led <strong>in</strong>to the room and sat a few feet from me.He said he had been treated well and that a bandage on his head was a result <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>jury hesuffered <strong>in</strong> a car accident as he was be<strong>in</strong>g chased by <strong>Iraq</strong>i soldiers.A few m<strong>in</strong>utes after the <strong>in</strong>terview started, a man began scream<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong> hall, drown<strong>in</strong>g outthe Saudi’s voice. ‘‘Allah!’’ he shouted. ‘‘Allah! Allah!’’ It was not an ecstatic cry; it waschill<strong>in</strong>g, like the screams <strong>of</strong> a madman, or <strong>of</strong> someone be<strong>in</strong>g driven mad. ‘‘Allah!’’ he yelledaga<strong>in</strong> and aga<strong>in</strong>. The shouts were too loud to ignore. Steele left the room to f<strong>in</strong>d out what washappen<strong>in</strong>g. By the time he returned, the shouts had ceased. But soon, through the w<strong>in</strong>dow beh<strong>in</strong>d15


me, I could hear the sounds <strong>of</strong> someone vomit<strong>in</strong>g, com<strong>in</strong>g from an area where other deta<strong>in</strong>eeswere be<strong>in</strong>g held, at the side <strong>of</strong> the build<strong>in</strong>g.Earlier I spoke briefly with an American counter<strong>in</strong>telligence soldier who works at the detentioncenter. The soldier, who goes by the name Ken — counter<strong>in</strong>telligence soldiers <strong>of</strong>ten use falsenames for security reasons — said that he or another American soldier was present at 90 percent<strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terrogations by the commandos and that he had seen no abuse. I didn’t have anopportunity to ask him detailed questions, and I wondered, <strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong> the beat<strong>in</strong>gs that I had seensoldiers watch without <strong>in</strong>terven<strong>in</strong>g, what might constitute abuse dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terrogation. I alsowondered what might be happen<strong>in</strong>g when American soldiers weren’t present.The Saudi I <strong>in</strong>terviewed seemed relieved to have been captured, because his service <strong>in</strong> the<strong>in</strong>surgency, he said, was a time <strong>of</strong> unhappy disillusion. He came to <strong>Iraq</strong> to die with <strong>Is</strong>lamicheroes, he said, but <strong>in</strong>stead was drafted <strong>in</strong>to a cell composed <strong>of</strong> riffraff who stole cars andkidnapped for money and attacked American targets only occasionally. When I asked, throughan <strong>in</strong>terpreter, whether he had planned to be a suicide bomber, he looked aghast and said hewould not do that because <strong>in</strong>nocent civilians would be killed; he was will<strong>in</strong>g to enter paradise bybe<strong>in</strong>g shot but not by blow<strong>in</strong>g himself up. He gladly gave me the names <strong>of</strong> the members <strong>of</strong> thecell. One was a Syrian who had been arrested with him.That even<strong>in</strong>g, as I was eat<strong>in</strong>g d<strong>in</strong>ner <strong>in</strong> the mess hall at Olsen base, I overheard a G.I. say<strong>in</strong>g thathe had seen the Syrian at the detention center, hang<strong>in</strong>g from the ceil<strong>in</strong>g by his arms and legs likean animal be<strong>in</strong>g hauled back from a hunt. When I struck up a conversation with the soldier, herefused to say anyth<strong>in</strong>g more. Later, I spoke with an <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>terpreter who works for the U.S.military and has access to the detention center; when I asked whether the Syrian, like the Saudi,was cooperat<strong>in</strong>g, the <strong>in</strong>terpreter smiled and said, ‘‘Not yet, but he will.’’One afternoon as I was stand<strong>in</strong>g near City Hall, I heard a gunshot from with<strong>in</strong> or beh<strong>in</strong>d thedetention center. In previous days, I saw or heard, on several occasions, accidental shots bycommandos — their weapons discipl<strong>in</strong>e was far from perfect — so I assumed it was anothernegligent discharge. But with<strong>in</strong> a m<strong>in</strong>ute or so, there was another shot from the same place —<strong>in</strong>side or beh<strong>in</strong>d the detention center.It was impossible to determ<strong>in</strong>e what was happen<strong>in</strong>g at the detention center, but there wascerta<strong>in</strong>ly cause to worry. A State Department report released <strong>in</strong> February noted that <strong>Iraq</strong>iauthorities have been accused <strong>of</strong> ‘‘arbitrary deprivation <strong>of</strong> life, torture, impunity, poor prisonconditions — particularly <strong>in</strong> pretrial detention facilities — and arbitrary arrest and detention.’’ Areport by Human Rights Watch <strong>in</strong> January went further, claim<strong>in</strong>g that ‘‘unlawful arrest, longterm<strong>in</strong>communicado detention, torture and other ill treatment <strong>of</strong> deta<strong>in</strong>ees (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g children)by <strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities have become rout<strong>in</strong>e and commonplace.’’When I returned to the United States, I asked the American authorities responsible for Samarrafor a comment about potential human rights abuses at the detention center. They forwarded mye-mail message to a spokesperson for the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry, who wrote <strong>in</strong> reply: ‘‘TheM<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior does not allow any human rights abuses <strong>of</strong> prisoners that are <strong>in</strong> the hands <strong>of</strong>16


M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior Security Forces. . . . Reports <strong>of</strong> human rights violations are deeply<strong>in</strong>vestigated by the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior’s Human Rights Department.’’The Uses <strong>of</strong> FearIn El Salvador, a subpar army fought an <strong>in</strong>surgency to a stand<strong>of</strong>f that eventually led to a politicalsolution. Kalev Sepp, who was a Special Forces adviser <strong>in</strong> El Salvador and is currently apr<strong>of</strong>essor at the Navy’s Center on Terrorism and Irregular <strong>War</strong>fare, said he believes that thehandful <strong>of</strong> United States-tra<strong>in</strong>ed Salvadoran strike battalions made the difference. ‘‘Those sixbattalions held back the guerrillas for years,’’ he said <strong>in</strong> a recent phone <strong>in</strong>terview. ‘‘The rest <strong>of</strong>the army was guard<strong>in</strong>g bridges and power l<strong>in</strong>es.’’In <strong>Iraq</strong>, the <strong>in</strong>surgency does not fight everywhere; most attacks occur around Baghdad and <strong>in</strong> theSunni Triangle. This allows a small and agile counter<strong>in</strong>surgency force to play adisproportionately large role, and the commandos are precisely that k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> force. As aparamilitary unit, they are not slowed down by heavy weapons, and they do not engage <strong>in</strong> theattrition warfare <strong>of</strong> lumber<strong>in</strong>g army regiments with thousands <strong>of</strong> troops and tanks and artillerypieces. Instead, they go wherever there is trouble, rac<strong>in</strong>g up and down the highways at 90 milesan hour <strong>in</strong> their Dodge trucks (so quickly, <strong>in</strong> fact, that Humvees cannot keep up with them).When Mosul erupted <strong>in</strong> November, with local police <strong>of</strong>ficers flee<strong>in</strong>g their stations as <strong>in</strong>surgentstook control <strong>of</strong> the streets, several battalions <strong>of</strong> commandos sped to the city and restored order(or what passes for order <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>). When National Guard troops collapsed <strong>in</strong> Ramadi earlier thisyear, a battalion <strong>of</strong> commandos was rushed <strong>in</strong>. The commandos <strong>in</strong> Samarra will return to theirbase <strong>in</strong> Baghdad once their mission is completed — or they will head to the next hot spot.Intrigu<strong>in</strong>gly, a reputation for severity can accomplish as much as severity itself. One day atroublesome local leader, Sheik Taha, met with Adnan at Samarra’s City Hall. Lt. Col. MarkWald, who commands the Third Infantry Division troops <strong>in</strong> the city, told me that Taha supportedthe <strong>in</strong>surgency but was reconsider<strong>in</strong>g his options now that Adnan had arrived with hiscommandos. I assumed that Adnan conveyed a message to the sheik that was not dissimilar tohis warn<strong>in</strong>g to the commando who found an arms cache — do as I say or you will lose a preciousbody part.After the meet<strong>in</strong>g, I asked Adnan whether the sheik had agreed to fall <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e. ‘‘It is not importantwhether he is with us or aga<strong>in</strong>st us,’’ he growled <strong>in</strong> response. ‘‘We are the authority. We are thegovernment, and everybody must cooperate with us. He is beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to cooperate with us.’’Adnan’s remarks were put <strong>in</strong>to context for me by Wald, a graduate <strong>of</strong> the University <strong>of</strong>California at Berkeley. He po<strong>in</strong>ted at the door beh<strong>in</strong>d which Adnan and Taha met. ‘‘This is whatI consider an <strong>Iraq</strong>i solution,’’ he said. ‘‘The beauty <strong>of</strong> an <strong>Iraq</strong>i solution is that they know howjustice has been dealt with <strong>in</strong> the past years. They know what they are subject to. We are boundby laws. I th<strong>in</strong>k they are, too, but that doesn’t mean a guy like Sheik Taha doesn’t go <strong>in</strong> therefear<strong>in</strong>g it’s an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth.’’17


No End <strong>in</strong> SightParamilitary forces have a tendency to become politicized. Whereas the mission <strong>of</strong> army troopsis national — they exist to defend aga<strong>in</strong>st foreign threats — paramilitaries are used for <strong>in</strong>ternalcombat. In the Middle East and elsewhere, they <strong>of</strong>ten serve the <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>of</strong> the regime or <strong>of</strong>whatever faction <strong>in</strong> the regime controls them. (It is no accident that the commandos are run out<strong>of</strong> the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry and not the Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry.) In a country as riven as <strong>Iraq</strong> — withShiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Turkmen vy<strong>in</strong>g for power — a paramilitary force that is controlled byone faction can be a potent weapon aga<strong>in</strong>st others. That is why the commandos are a conundrum— <strong>in</strong> the country’s unstable military and political landscape, it is impossible to know where theyare head<strong>in</strong>g.The commandos and their leaders <strong>in</strong>sist that they are loyal to the government rather than to anypolitical or religious group. ‘‘There is no Sunni or Shia,’’ Adnan told me, mean<strong>in</strong>g that he doesnot pay attention to the religious orig<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> his men or the <strong>in</strong>surgents they hunt. ‘‘Anyone whotries to stop <strong>Iraq</strong> from mov<strong>in</strong>g forward, I will fight them.’’ Adnan’s statement is predictable, butis it conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g? The commando cha<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> command is largely Sunni — they were set up by aSunni m<strong>in</strong>ister (Naqib) and are led by a Sunni general (Adnan). At this po<strong>in</strong>t, the commandosconsist ma<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>of</strong> two brigades. The commander <strong>of</strong> one brigade is Rashid al-Halafi, who is Shiitebut is regarded warily by other Shiites because he held senior <strong>in</strong>telligence posts under SaddamHusse<strong>in</strong>. The other brigade was founded by Gen. Muhammed Muther, a Sunni who commandeda tank regiment under Husse<strong>in</strong>.Of course, the commandos are an effective fight<strong>in</strong>g force precisely because <strong>of</strong> their Sunnibackground. Sunnis occupied the top positions <strong>in</strong> Husse<strong>in</strong>’s security apparatus and are, as aresult, the country’s most experienced fighters. They are particularly well suited to fight <strong>in</strong> theSunni Triangle — they have deep ties there and can extract more <strong>in</strong>telligence than outsiders,which is what Shiites and Kurds are considered <strong>in</strong> Samarra, Baqubah, Falluja, Ramadi and other<strong>in</strong>surgent strongholds. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i government improves its ability to fight the <strong>in</strong>surgents bybr<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g veteran Sunni military men on board.Their presence is useful politically, too: it makes it hard for the <strong>in</strong>surgency to claim that thegovernment ignores Sunni <strong>in</strong>terests. History has shown that the best way to end an <strong>in</strong>surgency isto br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgents or potential <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong>to the political system. The Salvadoran war endedwith a 1992 peace accord between the government and the F.M.L.N., the rebel movement, whichthen grew <strong>in</strong>to a legitimate political party. Similarly, the conflict <strong>in</strong> Northern Ireland came to anend with the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which provided for power shar<strong>in</strong>g with S<strong>in</strong>n Fe<strong>in</strong>,the political w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Irish Republican Army.The true loyalties <strong>of</strong> the commandos rema<strong>in</strong> unclear, however. It is difficult to generalize aboutthe reasons ex-Republican Guard generals and soldiers who are Sunni have jo<strong>in</strong>ed thecommandos. Loyalty to the Shiite-dom<strong>in</strong>ated government is a possibility. A larger considerationamong the rank and file is a good paycheck (by <strong>Iraq</strong>i standards). Capta<strong>in</strong> Bennett said that theirdesire to once aga<strong>in</strong> earn a liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> their old l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> work — fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a pr<strong>of</strong>essional militaryand be<strong>in</strong>g paid to do it — is more important than warm feel<strong>in</strong>gs for the government.18


‘‘For some, there’s def<strong>in</strong>itely a desire to make <strong>Iraq</strong> better, but for a lot <strong>of</strong> them, it’s just the lifethey know,’’ he said. ‘‘For most <strong>of</strong> them, the cause isn’t really that important. They’re more usedto work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this role. This is what they know, this is all they know. I th<strong>in</strong>k they feel a lot betterthat their actions now are aga<strong>in</strong>st genu<strong>in</strong>e threats, as opposed to threats aga<strong>in</strong>st the regime,’’mean<strong>in</strong>g Husse<strong>in</strong>’s government. ‘‘But I th<strong>in</strong>k for a lot <strong>of</strong> them, they couldn’t fathom do<strong>in</strong>gsometh<strong>in</strong>g different with their lives.’’Whatever the motivations, the <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> the commandos <strong>in</strong>to the security forces stanches oneflow <strong>of</strong> experienced fighters <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>in</strong>surgency. Some commandos, and perhaps many <strong>of</strong> them,might have gravitated to the other side if their unemployment endured. ‘‘It’s human nature,’’said Casteel, the adviser to Naqib, the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister. ‘‘If you cannot feed your family, youwill f<strong>in</strong>d a way to feed your family.’’ Naqib, Casteel expla<strong>in</strong>ed, sees the commandos ‘‘as a wayto re-employ people who could be on the other side but have skills that can be used.’’Yet their presence <strong>in</strong> the new security forces is not universally welcomed. Shiites and Kurdsfaced mass murder dur<strong>in</strong>g Husse<strong>in</strong>’s regime, and they are understandably concerned aboutgiv<strong>in</strong>g a share <strong>of</strong> military power to Sunnis, especially those who served Husse<strong>in</strong>. They worry thata Sunni-led security force could be a Trojan horse for the return <strong>of</strong> oppression by Sunnis.Because Naqib chose Husse<strong>in</strong>-era military figures to lead the commandos and fill other topInterior M<strong>in</strong>istry positions, he made few friends among Shiites and Kurds <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terimgovernment, and he was not expected to reta<strong>in</strong> his portfolio <strong>in</strong> the government <strong>of</strong> the new primem<strong>in</strong>ister, Ibrahim Jafari, who is Shiite. As Haydar al-Abadi, an <strong>in</strong>fluential member <strong>of</strong> Jafari’s<strong>Is</strong>lamic Dawa Party, told The Wall Street Journal: ‘‘The Baathists believe they are back, and thatthey can behave as before. People are afraid aga<strong>in</strong>.’’If Jafari purges former Baathists, the commandos may lose their leaders, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Adnan. Thatwould almost certa<strong>in</strong>ly test their loyalties. Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, on a visitto <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>in</strong> April, evoked those concerns, tell<strong>in</strong>g reporters, ‘‘It’s important that the newgovernment be attentive to the competence <strong>of</strong> the people <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>istries, and that they avoidunnecessary turbulence.’’ In the worst case, a purge could prompt some commandos to jo<strong>in</strong> the<strong>in</strong>surgency or evolve <strong>in</strong>to a Sunni militia beyond government control. Already, <strong>Iraq</strong> has aKurdish militia, the 90,000-strong pesh merga, outside the control <strong>of</strong> the central government;there is also the Badr Brigade, the Iranian-tra<strong>in</strong>ed w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Council for the <strong>Is</strong>lamicRevolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, which is Shiite; and there is the Mahdi Army, loyal to the Shiite militantMoktada al-Sadr. The last th<strong>in</strong>g the country needs is another militia.It is a fraught situation — a country at war without a unified and competent national army. Anddespite the improved security forces and the reduction <strong>in</strong> attacks on coalition forces, it is hard tosee an end to the war any time soon. Just as the right political developments can tame an<strong>in</strong>surgency, so, too, can the wrong developments give new life to it. Arriv<strong>in</strong>g at the correctcalibration <strong>of</strong> military force and political compromise is excruciat<strong>in</strong>gly difficult. Historically,<strong>in</strong>surgencies have lasted at least 5 to 10 years; the endgame tends to beg<strong>in</strong> when one or bothsides become exhausted, and that rarely occurs after only a year or two.In El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Turkey, Algeria and other crucibles <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgency andcounter<strong>in</strong>surgency, the battles went on and on. They were, without exception, dirty wars.19


http://zmagsite.zmag.<strong>org</strong>/Images/gupta0505.htmlSpecial Report:Unravell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>’s Secret MilitiasRuthless <strong>US</strong> Tactics are Propell<strong>in</strong>g Country Toward Civil <strong>War</strong>Z Magaz<strong>in</strong>eBy A.K. GuptaMay, 2005In the U.S. war aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Iraq</strong> it appears that the Pentagon may be ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the upper hand aga<strong>in</strong>stthe armed resistance, but it is do<strong>in</strong>g so at the cost <strong>of</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g the conditions for civil war. Theclearest <strong>in</strong>dicator <strong>of</strong> a dim<strong>in</strong>ished <strong>in</strong>surgency comes from the number <strong>of</strong> U.S. casualties, whichhave decl<strong>in</strong>ed by 75 percent s<strong>in</strong>ce their peak <strong>of</strong> 126 combat deaths <strong>in</strong> November 2004. Part <strong>of</strong>that is probably due to sweep<strong>in</strong>g thousands <strong>of</strong> Sunni Arab males <strong>of</strong>f the street—<strong>Iraq</strong>isimprisoned under U.S. control have more than doubled s<strong>in</strong>ce last October to 10,500.But even more ruthless methods may be hav<strong>in</strong>g a greater effect on squeez<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgency.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to a report by the Wall Street Journal from February 16, numerous “pop-up militias”thousands strong are proliferat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Not only are many <strong>of</strong> these shadowy militias l<strong>in</strong>ked to<strong>Iraq</strong>i politicians, but the Pentagon is arm<strong>in</strong>g, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, and fund<strong>in</strong>g them for use <strong>in</strong> counter<strong>in</strong>surgencyoperations.Most disturb<strong>in</strong>g, one militia <strong>in</strong> particular—the “Special Police Commandos”—is be<strong>in</strong>g usedextensively and has been s<strong>in</strong>gled out by a U.S. general for conduct<strong>in</strong>g death squad strikes knownas the “Salvador option.” The Police Commandos also appear to be a reconstituted Husse<strong>in</strong>security force operat<strong>in</strong>g under the same revived government body, the General SecurityDirectorate, that was formerly tasked with suppress<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternal dissent.At the highest levels, White House <strong>of</strong>ficials consider the Police Commandos as the lead<strong>in</strong>g forceaga<strong>in</strong>st the <strong>in</strong>surgency. In hear<strong>in</strong>gs before the Senate Appropriations Committee on February 16Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense Donald Rumsfeld said the commandos are among “forces that are go<strong>in</strong>g tohave the greatest leverage on suppress<strong>in</strong>g and elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgency.”Greg Jaffe, the Journal reporter, identified at least six such militias, one with “several thousandsoldiers” lavishly armed with “rocket-propelled-grenade launchers, mortar tubes and lots <strong>of</strong>ammunition.” Yet these militias owe their allegiance not to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i people or government, butto their self-appo<strong>in</strong>ted leaders and associated politicians, such as <strong>in</strong>terim Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister IyadAllawi. Even the commander <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces <strong>in</strong> the Middle East, Gen. John P. Abizaid, admitted<strong>in</strong> testimony before Congress on March 1 that such militias are “destabiliz<strong>in</strong>g.”Of these militias, at least three are l<strong>in</strong>ked to Allawi. Jaffe writes, “First came the MuthanaBrigade, a unit formed by the order <strong>of</strong>…Allawi.” The second is the Defenders <strong>of</strong> Khadamiya,referr<strong>in</strong>g to a Shiite shr<strong>in</strong>e on the outskirts <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, which appears to be “closely aligned20


with prom<strong>in</strong>ent Shiite cleric Husse<strong>in</strong> al Sadr.” Al Sadr ran on Allawi’s ticket <strong>in</strong> the Januaryelections.A third militia, the Special Police Commandos, is led by Gen. Adnan Thabit, who participated <strong>in</strong>the disastrous 1996 coup aga<strong>in</strong>st Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> that Allawi coord<strong>in</strong>ated. Thabit was jailed andsubsequently released shortly before the 2003 U.S. <strong>in</strong>vasion. He is also the uncle <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>’s<strong>in</strong>terim m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terior, under which the Commandos operate.Thabit told the Armed Forces Press Service last October that the Commandos are drawn from“police who have previous experience fight<strong>in</strong>g terrorism and also people who received specialtra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g under the former regime” <strong>of</strong> Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>. A report from October 20, 2004, alsoquotes U.S. Army Col. James H. C<strong>of</strong>fman Jr., who specifies that Police Commandos are “formerspecial forces and [former Directorate <strong>of</strong> General Security] personnel….”C<strong>of</strong>fman reports to Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, who heads the mammoth U.S. effort to create <strong>Iraq</strong>’smyriad security forces. Petraeus calls the Police Commandos “a horse to back” and has done soby provid<strong>in</strong>g it with “money to fix up its base and buy vehicles, ammunition, radios and moreweapons.” In a satellite brief<strong>in</strong>g to the press on February 4, Petraeus repeatedly praised theSpecial Police Commandos, call<strong>in</strong>g the leadership “tremendously aggressive” <strong>in</strong> operations.Petraeus also revealed that the Commandos, the Muthana Brigade, and another militia, called theDefenders <strong>of</strong> Baghdad were used to provide security on election day.The Directorate <strong>of</strong> General Security was one <strong>of</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong> security services Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> usedto ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> an iron grip on <strong>Iraq</strong>. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies describes the service’srole as “detect<strong>in</strong>g dissent among the <strong>Iraq</strong>i general public” by monitor<strong>in</strong>g “the day-to-day lives <strong>of</strong>the population, creat<strong>in</strong>g a pervasive local presence.”Ironically, Allawi—with U.S. encouragement—has put a network <strong>of</strong> former Baathists <strong>in</strong> charge<strong>of</strong> various security services to fight what the U.S. claims are other Baathists who form the core<strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency. They <strong>in</strong>clude Thavit’s nephew, Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister Falah al-Naqib, the son <strong>of</strong> aprom<strong>in</strong>ent Baath <strong>of</strong>ficial. The M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> Defense is Hazem al-Shaalan, a former Baathist fromal-Hillah, and Brig. Gen. Muhammad Abdullah Shahwani, an old-time Baath <strong>of</strong>ficer, now head<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i secret police, accord<strong>in</strong>g to author and analyst Milan Rai.This policy <strong>of</strong> “re-baathification” is actively supported by the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration. TheWash<strong>in</strong>gton Post reported on December 11, 2003 that the CIA met with Allawi and anothermember <strong>of</strong> his <strong>Iraq</strong>i National Accord party to create “an <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>telligence service to spy ongroups and <strong>in</strong>dividuals <strong>in</strong>side <strong>Iraq</strong> that are target<strong>in</strong>g U.S. troops and civilians work<strong>in</strong>g to form anew government.” The plan was to “screen former government <strong>of</strong>ficials to f<strong>in</strong>d agents for theservice and weed out those who are unreliable or unsavory.” Evidence <strong>of</strong> this role comes fromThabit who told the Armed Forces Press Service that former regime personnel <strong>in</strong> his force “wereefficiently chosen accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>formation about their background.”Even before he <strong>of</strong>ficially assumed the post <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terim prime m<strong>in</strong>ister, Allawi announced are<strong>org</strong>anization <strong>of</strong> security forces at his first press conference on June 20, 2004. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to aHuman Rights Watch report on torture <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, Allawi mentioned, “Special police units would21


also be created to be deployed ‘<strong>in</strong> the frontl<strong>in</strong>es’ <strong>of</strong> the battle aga<strong>in</strong>st terrorism and sabotage, anda new directorate for national security established.” Human Rights Watch also noted that Al-Nahdhah, an <strong>Iraq</strong>i newspaper, reported on June 21 that the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry “appo<strong>in</strong>ted a newsecurity adviser to assist <strong>in</strong> the establishment <strong>of</strong> a new general security directorate modeled onthe erstwhile General Security Directorate…one <strong>of</strong> the agencies <strong>of</strong> the Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>government dissolved by the CPA <strong>in</strong> May 2003.” That security advisor was “Major GeneralAdnan Thabet al-Samarra’i.”On July 15, 2004, two months before the Police Commandos became public, Allawi said thegovernment would establish “<strong>in</strong>ternal <strong>in</strong>telligence units called General Security Directorate(GSD) that will annihilate those terrorist groups.” Jane’s Intelligence Digest commented that theGSD, “will <strong>in</strong>clude former members <strong>of</strong> Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>’s feared security services, collectivelyknown as the Mukhabarat. These former Ba’athists and Saddam loyalists will be expected tohunt down their colleagues currently <strong>org</strong>anis<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgency.”It seems former Baathist brutes may have gone from one security service under Husse<strong>in</strong> to theexact same one as under Allawi, another ex-Baathist. And the rogues apparently haven’tf<strong>org</strong>otten their old tactics.The Police Commandos have been supply<strong>in</strong>g suspects who confess their crimes to the TV show,“Terrorism <strong>in</strong> the Hands <strong>of</strong> Justice.” Described as the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government’s “slick new propagandatool,” the program runs six nights a week on the <strong>Iraq</strong>iya network, which was set up by thePentagon and is now run by the Australian-based Harris Corporation (a major U.S. governmentcontractor that gave 96 percent <strong>of</strong> its political fund<strong>in</strong>g, more than $260,000, to Republicans <strong>in</strong>2004). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Boston Globe, camera crews are sent “wherever police commandosmake a lot <strong>of</strong> arrests.”The show features an unseen <strong>in</strong>terrogator harangu<strong>in</strong>g alleged <strong>in</strong>surgents for confessions.Virtually every press account notes that the suspects appear to have been beaten or tortured, theirfaces bruised and swollen. The London Guardian states, “Some have…robotic manners <strong>of</strong> thosebeaten and coached by police <strong>in</strong>terrogators <strong>of</strong>f-camera.” The Boston Globe observed, “The neatconfessions <strong>of</strong> terrorist attacks at times fit together so seamlessly as to seem implausible.” Thenthere’s the nature <strong>of</strong> the confessions. Many suspects admit to “drunkenness, gay <strong>org</strong>ies andpornography,” accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Guardian. The F<strong>in</strong>ancial Times reported, “One long-beardedpreacher known as Abu Tabarek recently confessed that guerrillas had usually held <strong>org</strong>ies <strong>in</strong> hismosques.” Another preacher giv<strong>in</strong>g a confession said he was fired for “hav<strong>in</strong>g sex with men <strong>in</strong>the mosque.” The Globe account stated that suspects “frequently admit to rape and pedophilia.”The show is said to be popular, particularly among many Shiites and Kurds, which causesconcerns that depict<strong>in</strong>g Sunni Arab nationalists as “thiev<strong>in</strong>g scumbags” could deepen communalstrife. Political and religious leaders from the Sunni Arabs have denounced the show, call<strong>in</strong>g forit to be pulled <strong>of</strong>f the air. The show has explicitly promoted sectarian tensions, <strong>in</strong> one case air<strong>in</strong>gthe confession <strong>of</strong> a member <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>Is</strong>lamic Party, a Sunni-based group<strong>in</strong>g, say<strong>in</strong>g he dr<strong>in</strong>ksalcohol and doesn’t pray.22


The Police Commandos’ penchant for tall tales caused them considerable embarrassment afterthey crowed about a major operation that killed more than 80 <strong>in</strong>surgents at a tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g camp alongLake Tharthar <strong>in</strong> Al Anbar on March 22. With<strong>in</strong> a day many discrepancies emerged—how many<strong>in</strong>surgents were killed, reports <strong>of</strong> more than 20 prisoners versus none, a number <strong>of</strong> differentlocations cited, many miles apart. The story fell apart after an AFP reporter visited the camp andfound 40 to 50 <strong>in</strong>surgents camped there.But the Police Commandos are still receiv<strong>in</strong>g special treatment from the U.S. occupation. AState Department report to Congress from January 5 noted that at the request <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>iM<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> the Interior, “billet<strong>in</strong>g space” was provided for 1,500 police commandos <strong>in</strong> theBaghdad Public Safety Academy.The militias are a tacit admission that the U.S. effort to create an <strong>Iraq</strong>i military force has been acolossal failure, cost<strong>in</strong>g at least $5 billion to date. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the most recent large-scale militarycampaign, “Operation River Blitz,” U.S. Mar<strong>in</strong>es raided towns west <strong>of</strong> Baghdad along theEuphrates. The first order <strong>of</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong> many <strong>of</strong> these Sunni Arab towns, accord<strong>in</strong>g to theChristian Science Monitor, was to “round up and deta<strong>in</strong> police <strong>of</strong>ficers”—the very ones who hadbeen “tra<strong>in</strong>ed” by the U.S. to fight the <strong>in</strong>surgency. In Tikrit <strong>in</strong> early March, the police went onstrike after U.S. troops raided the prov<strong>in</strong>cial police headquarters there and arrested two highrank<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong>ficers. (About the same time <strong>in</strong> Samarra, the mayor and city council resigned after themayor’s <strong>of</strong>fice was raided and <strong>in</strong> protest <strong>of</strong> U.S. troops refus<strong>in</strong>g to withdraw from the city asagreed.)In late March, police brandish<strong>in</strong>g Kalishnikovs staged a demonstration <strong>in</strong> Hit, one <strong>of</strong> the townstargeted, demand<strong>in</strong>g their jobs back. An AP account <strong>of</strong> the protest dated March 29 noted thatpolice forces have been dismissed across the prov<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>of</strong> Al Anbar, the heart <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency,and “former local police <strong>of</strong>ficers have been protest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> several cities <strong>in</strong> recent weeks aga<strong>in</strong>st anew plan to replace them with police from other <strong>Iraq</strong>i prov<strong>in</strong>ces.”A column by David Ignatius <strong>in</strong> the February 25 Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post notes that Thabit “commands aforce <strong>of</strong> about 10,000 men,” which would make them larger than the British military, the secondlargest foreign force <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. The Commandos have been used extensively, first last October <strong>in</strong>the assault on Samara that was called a “model” for how to retake a city from <strong>in</strong>surgents (butwhich is still roiled by regular attacks). The Commandos have also become a fixture <strong>in</strong> majorcities such as Ramadi and Mosul. In Ramadi the Stars and Stripes describes the commandos as“the <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces that might soon be responsible for security <strong>in</strong> the city.”A report <strong>in</strong> the December 25 issue <strong>of</strong> the Advisor—a Pentagon publication with the tagl<strong>in</strong>e“<strong>Iraq</strong>’s Official Weekly Command Information Reporter”—stated that the “Special PoliceCommandos have been deployed all over <strong>Iraq</strong> to hunt down <strong>in</strong>surgents and to help providesecurity for the upcom<strong>in</strong>g Jan. 30 elections.”Jaffe notes many <strong>of</strong> the pop-up militias come “from Shiite-dom<strong>in</strong>ated southern <strong>Iraq</strong>.” Theyappear to be operat<strong>in</strong>g ma<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong> Sunni Arab areas. The Police Commandos <strong>in</strong> particular aretak<strong>in</strong>g the lead <strong>in</strong> operations <strong>in</strong> such Sunni Arab hotspots as Samarra, Ramadi, Mosul, Tikrit, andBaghdad. Last October they were assigned to Haifa Street, which had been a resistance23


stronghold on the edge <strong>of</strong> the Green Zone, the heart <strong>of</strong> the U.S. occupation. It’s a district <strong>of</strong>170,000 Sunnis and Shiites where <strong>in</strong>surgents f<strong>in</strong>d will<strong>in</strong>g recruits among the Sunn<strong>in</strong>eighborhoods. Two <strong>Iraq</strong>i battalions <strong>of</strong> more than 2,000 patrol the neighborhood, and the NewYork Times observes that one is lead by a Shiite general “command<strong>in</strong>g a unit composed mostly<strong>of</strong> Shiites” (the units are the <strong>Iraq</strong>i 302nd and 303rd Battalions; it’s unclear if they are affiliatedwith the Police Commandos assigned there).Knight Ridder correspondent Tom Lasseter filed a report from Haifa on March 16, also not<strong>in</strong>g,“Most <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i troops who patrol the area…are Shiite.” Dur<strong>in</strong>g the operations, Lasseter wrote,“When <strong>Iraq</strong>i and American soldiers deta<strong>in</strong>ed a suspected Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgent <strong>in</strong> Haifa this week, agroup <strong>of</strong> the Shiite troops crowded around him. A sergeant kicked him <strong>in</strong> the face. Anothersoldier grabbed him by the neck and slammed his head <strong>in</strong>to a wall. A third slapped him hard <strong>in</strong>the face.” The U.S. forces’ <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>terpreter yelled at the deta<strong>in</strong>ee, “If you come with us, we willslaughter you.”The ethnic-based militias are hav<strong>in</strong>g a trickle-down effect on <strong>Iraq</strong>i society. With no function<strong>in</strong>ggovernment, various communities are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly arm<strong>in</strong>g themselves. In another report,Lasseter spoke to a Shiite soldier who claimed, “Shiite neighborhoods on the edges <strong>of</strong> Haifa haveformed militias to enforce the sectarian boundary.” The soldier added, “That militia is secretlyfunded by a sheik at a local Shiite mosque.... what’s happen<strong>in</strong>g right now could be the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> civil war <strong>in</strong> Baghdad.” In what rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> Fallujah, “Sunni residents say anger toward Shiitetroops is reach<strong>in</strong>g a boil<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t.”Military analyst William L<strong>in</strong>d notes, “the rise and spread <strong>of</strong> Shiite militias devoted to fight<strong>in</strong>gSunni <strong>in</strong>surgents puts ever-greater pressure on <strong>Iraq</strong>’s Sunnis to cast their lot with the<strong>in</strong>surgency.” Add to this the use <strong>of</strong> Kurdish Peshmerga militias also aga<strong>in</strong>st Sunni Arabs andthere is an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g likelihood that civil war may result.As for the “hunt” for <strong>in</strong>surgents, it seems to <strong>in</strong>clude death squads. Retired Gen. Wayne Down<strong>in</strong>g,former head <strong>of</strong> all U.S. Special Operations forces, appeared on NBC’s “Today” show on January10 to discuss a Newsweek report about the Salvador option. The reference is to the extensive use<strong>of</strong> death squads by El Salvador’s military dur<strong>in</strong>g its war aga<strong>in</strong>st the left <strong>in</strong> the 1980s. Down<strong>in</strong>gcalled it a “very valid tactic” that has been employed “s<strong>in</strong>ce we started the war back <strong>in</strong> March <strong>of</strong>2003.” In the account, brought to light by analyst Stephen Shalom, Down<strong>in</strong>g adds, “We haveSpecial Police Commandos now <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces which conduct these k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> strikeoperations.”Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the March 12 London Times, the body <strong>of</strong> Qahtan Jouli was delivered to his family<strong>in</strong> Samarra by commandos from the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry. He had appeared on “Terror <strong>in</strong> the Grip <strong>of</strong>Justice” and confessed to collaborat<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong> ten kill<strong>in</strong>gs. Qahtan’s father charged,“My son was killed after he was tortured by the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry commandos…. They killed himto cover up the lies they broadcast on the al-<strong>Iraq</strong>iya channel that my son killed many people,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i army <strong>of</strong>ficers.”Despite the pressure, the <strong>in</strong>surgency is still capable <strong>of</strong> conduct<strong>in</strong>g large-scale attacks. It’s stillmount<strong>in</strong>g 50 to 60 strikes a day across <strong>Iraq</strong>. The difference is U.S. forces have become more24


effective at respond<strong>in</strong>g to the attacks—with more armor, more surveillance, and electroniccountermeasures. The <strong>in</strong>surgents have responded by shift<strong>in</strong>g their targets to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i securityforces and <strong>in</strong>tensify<strong>in</strong>g economic sabotage by crippl<strong>in</strong>g the electrical and petroleum<strong>in</strong>frastructure.The militias are central to many <strong>of</strong> these roundups. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Advisor, <strong>in</strong> Samarra, theSpecial Police Commandos deta<strong>in</strong>ed 200 suspected <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong> the “short time [they] havebeen operational <strong>in</strong> the area.” In one week <strong>in</strong> the Mosul area, accord<strong>in</strong>g to a December 7 pressrelease from U.S. Task Force Olympia, the Commandos and <strong>Iraq</strong>i National Guard, backed byU.S. troops, deta<strong>in</strong>ed 232 people. A report from the <strong>Iraq</strong>i M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Defense claimed that morethan 400 suspects were seized <strong>in</strong> Baghdad <strong>in</strong> just one week <strong>in</strong> March with hundreds more takenfrom surround<strong>in</strong>g towns. Many <strong>of</strong> those arrested rema<strong>in</strong> under <strong>Iraq</strong>i control—where many aretortured, accord<strong>in</strong>g to human rights groups as well as the U.S. State Department. Thus the actualprison population <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is unknown, with many more thousands probably <strong>in</strong> custody above theU.S. total (which itself is unverified).U.S. Mar<strong>in</strong>e units have taken the militia strategy to a new level: by creat<strong>in</strong>g their own. In arecent sweep through Al Anbar prov<strong>in</strong>ce, the 7th Mar<strong>in</strong>es Regiment brought with them the <strong>Iraq</strong>iFreedom Guard, a 61-person unit set up by the Mar<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> January and paid $400 a month each,accord<strong>in</strong>g to a Reuters report. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the same operation, Mar<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> the 23rd Regiment wereaccompanied by 20 members <strong>of</strong> a Special Forces unit called the Freedom Fighters. The ChristianScience Monitor described them as Shiites from the southern city <strong>of</strong> Basra, with “little lovebetween them and the Sunni Arab citizens <strong>of</strong> Anbar.”In the greatest irony, U.S. forces have reached a pact with elements <strong>of</strong> Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army to have them hunt down <strong>in</strong>surgents. This is the same militia that U.S. forcesfought <strong>in</strong> lopsided battles last year dur<strong>in</strong>g which U.S. massive firepower devastated much <strong>of</strong>Sadr City <strong>in</strong> Baghdad and Najaf’s old city and killed thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Agence France-Presse, U.S. forces are us<strong>in</strong>g a Shiite tribal leader to enforcevigilante justice <strong>in</strong> Baghdad’s Dura district. One U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficer calls the leader, Sayed Malik, “thegodfather” and notes he’s received lots <strong>of</strong> public works contracts, enough to make him amillionaire. Another Sadr <strong>of</strong>ficial states that “people from [the] Sadr <strong>org</strong>anization are publiclyhunt<strong>in</strong>g down the terrorists.” This apparently <strong>in</strong>cludes the kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a Sunni cleric.The U.S. military is “rout<strong>in</strong>ely free<strong>in</strong>g dangerous crim<strong>in</strong>als <strong>in</strong> return for a promise to spy on<strong>in</strong>surgents,” accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Independent. One senior <strong>Iraq</strong>i police <strong>of</strong>ficer charged, “TheAmericans are allow<strong>in</strong>g the breakdown <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i society…. We are deal<strong>in</strong>g with an epidemic <strong>of</strong>kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g, extortion and violent crime, but even though we know the Americans monitor callson mobiles and satellite phones, which are <strong>of</strong>ten used <strong>in</strong> ransom negotiations, they will not passon any crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>telligence to us. They only want to use the <strong>in</strong>formation aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>surgents.”Despite the ruthless and destabiliz<strong>in</strong>g tactics, the <strong>in</strong>surgency is far from over. One U.S. generalrecently noted that it takes on average n<strong>in</strong>e years to defeat an <strong>in</strong>surgency. Additionally, it’s theviolence <strong>of</strong> the U.S. occupation that gives the <strong>in</strong>surgency such force. Even if the rebellion is25


conta<strong>in</strong>ed to “manageable” levels for the Pentagon, mean<strong>in</strong>g a low rate <strong>of</strong> combat deaths, thatdoes not mean the resistance will end. U.S. forces long ago lost the battle for hearts and m<strong>in</strong>ds.<strong>Iraq</strong>’s “democracy” is <strong>in</strong> trouble, leav<strong>in</strong>g many <strong>Iraq</strong>is disillusioned. With a do-noth<strong>in</strong>ggovernment ensconced <strong>in</strong> the bosom <strong>of</strong> a deadly U.S. occupation, the stage is set for furtherrebellion and repression.A.K. Gupta is a staff member <strong>of</strong> the Indypendent.26


http://zmagsite.zmag.<strong>org</strong>/Nov2005/daviespr1105.htmlThe Dirty <strong>War</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>By Nicolas J. S. DaviesZ Magaz<strong>in</strong>eNovember 2005 Volume 18 Number 11On September 8, 2005 the UN Assistance Mission for <strong>Iraq</strong> issued a human rights report, stat<strong>in</strong>gthat the govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stitutions created by the United States <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> are engaged <strong>in</strong> an <strong>org</strong>anizedcampaign <strong>of</strong> detention, torture, and extrajudicial execution, directed primarily at <strong>Iraq</strong>is whopractice the Sunni form <strong>of</strong> <strong>Is</strong>lam.The UN report expressed the greatest concern regard<strong>in</strong>g arrests by forces l<strong>in</strong>ked to the M<strong>in</strong>istry<strong>of</strong> the Interior: “Corpses appear regularly <strong>in</strong> and around Baghdad and other areas. Most bearsigns <strong>of</strong> torture and appear to be victims <strong>of</strong> extrajudicial executions.... Serious allegations <strong>of</strong>extrajudicial executions underl<strong>in</strong>e a deterioration <strong>in</strong> the situation <strong>of</strong> law and order…. Accountsconsistently po<strong>in</strong>t to the systematic use <strong>of</strong> torture dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terrogations at police stations andwith<strong>in</strong> other premises belong<strong>in</strong>g to the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> the Interior.”In this report the UN has f<strong>in</strong>ally acknowledged what a small number <strong>of</strong> journalists have beenreport<strong>in</strong>g for at least 18 months, that a brutal “dirty war” has grown out <strong>of</strong> the U.S. occupation.On March 15, 2004, the New Statesman published an article by Stephen Grey titled “Rule <strong>of</strong> the<strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong>” regard<strong>in</strong>g the murder <strong>of</strong> Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Abdullatif al-Mayah <strong>in</strong> Baghdad on January19, 2004. It quoted a senior commander at the headquarters <strong>of</strong> the U.S.-<strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>Iraq</strong>i police,“Dr. Abdullatif was becom<strong>in</strong>g more and more popular because he spoke for people on the streethere. He made some politicians quite jealous…. You can look no further than the govern<strong>in</strong>gcouncil. There are political parties <strong>in</strong> this city who are systematically kill<strong>in</strong>g people. They arepoliticians that are backed by the Americans and who arrived to <strong>Iraq</strong> from exile with a list <strong>of</strong>their enemies. They are kill<strong>in</strong>g people one by one.”On January 16, 2005 <strong>US</strong>A Today reported on the work <strong>of</strong> <strong>Is</strong>am al-Rawi, a geology pr<strong>of</strong>essorwho heads the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Association <strong>of</strong> University Lecturers. He has been catalog<strong>in</strong>g assass<strong>in</strong>ations<strong>of</strong> academics <strong>in</strong> occupied <strong>Iraq</strong> and has documented 300 <strong>of</strong> them. He was unable to identify aclear pattern to the kill<strong>in</strong>gs, except that, like al-Mayah, the victims were usually the mostrespected and popular members <strong>of</strong> their universities and their communities.On January 14, 2005 Newsweek reported on “The Salvador Option,” the proposed use <strong>of</strong> deathsquads as part <strong>of</strong> the U.S. strategy to subdue the country. It noted that some U.S. policymakersconsider this to have been effective <strong>in</strong> Central America <strong>in</strong> the 1980s. Newsweek cited InterimPrime M<strong>in</strong>ister Allawi, a former agent <strong>of</strong> both the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Mukhabarat and the CIA, as a pr<strong>in</strong>cipalproponent <strong>of</strong> this policy. A U.S. military source told Newsweek, “The Sunni population ispay<strong>in</strong>g no price for the support it is giv<strong>in</strong>g to the terrorists. From their po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> view, it is costfree.We have to change that equation.” This source was express<strong>in</strong>g precisely the rationalebeh<strong>in</strong>d the dirty wars <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America and the worst abuses <strong>of</strong> the Vietnam <strong>War</strong>. The purpose <strong>of</strong>27


such a strategy is not to identify, deta<strong>in</strong>, and kill actual resistance fighters, but rather to terrorizean entire civilian population <strong>in</strong>to submission.The exile groups who began this dirty war <strong>in</strong> the early days <strong>of</strong> the occupation have come to formthe core <strong>of</strong> successive govern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>stitutions established by the United States. Their campaign <strong>of</strong>kill<strong>in</strong>g and torture has evolved and become <strong>in</strong>stitutionalized and their victims now number <strong>in</strong> thethousands. The UN report does not address the possibility <strong>of</strong> a direct U.S. role <strong>in</strong> the campaign,but the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry units that are most frequently implicated <strong>in</strong> these abuses were formedunder U.S. supervision and work closely with U.S. advisors. The identities <strong>of</strong> their two pr<strong>in</strong>cipaladvisors only re<strong>in</strong>force these concerns. They are retired Colonel James Steele and former DEA<strong>of</strong>ficer Steven Casteel. Both are veterans <strong>of</strong> previous dirty wars.In El Salvador, between 1984 and 1986, Colonel Steele commanded the U.S. Military AdvisorGroup, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g Salvadoran forces that conducted a brutal campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st the civilianpopulation. At other stages <strong>in</strong> his career he performed similar duties dur<strong>in</strong>g illegal U.S. militaryoperations <strong>in</strong> Cambodia and Panama. After fail<strong>in</strong>g a polygraph test, he confessed to Iran-Contra<strong>in</strong>vestigators that he had also shipped weapons from El Salvador to Contra terrorists <strong>in</strong>Nicaragua, lead<strong>in</strong>g Senator Tom Hark<strong>in</strong> to block his promotion to brigadier general. Until April2005 Steele was the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal U.S. advisor to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry’s “Special PoliceCommandos,” the group most frequently l<strong>in</strong>ked to torture and summary executions <strong>in</strong> recentreports.Steven Casteel worked <strong>in</strong> Colombia with paramilitaries called Los Pepes that later jo<strong>in</strong>ed forcesto form the AUC <strong>in</strong> 1997 and who have been responsible for most <strong>of</strong> the violence aga<strong>in</strong>stcivilians <strong>in</strong> Colombia. Casteel is now credited with found<strong>in</strong>g the Special Police Commandos <strong>in</strong>his capacity as senior advisor to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry.Assign<strong>in</strong>g responsibility for atrocities to particular units or <strong>in</strong>dividuals is complicated by the dualnature <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces, which take orders both from their nom<strong>in</strong>al superiors and fromseparate cha<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> command <strong>in</strong> the factional militias that most <strong>of</strong> them belong to. Ultimateresponsibility for abuses is thus blurred by the fiction <strong>of</strong> the “government” and the militias asdist<strong>in</strong>ct entities when the same people are really <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> both all the way to the top.Reports <strong>of</strong> torture and extrajudicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs have followed the Special Police Commandos aroundthe country wherever they have been deployed, from Anbar prov<strong>in</strong>ce and Mosul s<strong>in</strong>ce October2004 to Samarra <strong>in</strong> March 2005 to areas around Baghdad s<strong>in</strong>ce May 2005. The UN reporthighlighted an <strong>in</strong>cident <strong>in</strong> Badhra on August 25, <strong>in</strong> which relatives <strong>of</strong> the victims identified theabductors as Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry forces.After Special Police Commandos were deployed <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, 14 farmers were found <strong>in</strong> a shallowgrave on May 5, 2005 with their right eyeballs removed and other signs <strong>of</strong> torture after they wereseen be<strong>in</strong>g arrested at a vegetable market. Another <strong>in</strong>cident ten days later, <strong>in</strong> which eight bodieswere found <strong>in</strong> a garbage dump, prompted Hareth al-Dhari, the secretary general <strong>of</strong> theAssociation <strong>of</strong> Muslim Scholars, to accuse the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry directly. “This is state terrorismby the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior,” he claimed. The defense m<strong>in</strong>ister responded by blam<strong>in</strong>g “terroristswear<strong>in</strong>g military uniforms.”28


In another twist, the bodies <strong>of</strong> 8 men from Sadr City were found <strong>in</strong> Yussufiah, 40 kilometersfrom their homes, dressed <strong>in</strong> army uniforms even though none were soldiers. Their killersobviously wanted their deaths to appear to have been the work <strong>of</strong> resistance forces.Then there is the work and tragic death <strong>of</strong> Yasser Salihee, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i physician turned journalist,who dared to launch an <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to abuses by the Special Police Commandos. KnightRidder posthumously published his work under the title, “Sunni men <strong>in</strong> Baghdad targeted byattackers <strong>in</strong> police uniforms” on June 27, 2005. The cautious language <strong>of</strong> the report verged onirony, but it described eyewitness accounts <strong>of</strong> numerous abductions by “large groups <strong>of</strong> mendriv<strong>in</strong>g white Toyota Land Cruisers with police mark<strong>in</strong>gs. The men were wear<strong>in</strong>g policecommando uniforms and bulletpro<strong>of</strong> vests, carry<strong>in</strong>g expensive 9-millimeter Glock pistols andus<strong>in</strong>g sophisticated radios.”Knight Ridder actually <strong>in</strong>terviewed Steven Casteel for their story. He predictably blamed“<strong>in</strong>surgents” impersonat<strong>in</strong>g commandos. As the article po<strong>in</strong>ted out, this raised “troubl<strong>in</strong>gquestions about how <strong>in</strong>surgents are gett<strong>in</strong>g expensive new police equipment. The Toyotas, whichcost more than $55,000 apiece, and Glocks, at about $500 each, are hard to come by <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, andthey’re rarely used by anyone other than Western contractors and <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces.”Faik Baqr, director <strong>of</strong> the central m<strong>org</strong>ue <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, said, “It is a very delicate subject forsociety when you are blam<strong>in</strong>g the police <strong>of</strong>ficers…. It is not an easy issue. We hear that they arecaptured by the police and then the bodies are found killed…. It’s obviously <strong>in</strong>- creas<strong>in</strong>g.”Yasser Salihee died on his way to get gas to drive his family to a swimm<strong>in</strong>g pool on his day <strong>of</strong>f.He was shot by a U.S. sniper at a “checkpo<strong>in</strong>t.” His editor, Steve Butler, has told me he has noreason to th<strong>in</strong>k Yasser’s death was connected to his work and the U.S. Army’s account <strong>of</strong> the<strong>in</strong>cident describes a “random” shoot<strong>in</strong>g based only on rules <strong>of</strong> engagement that greatly prioritizeU.S. over <strong>Iraq</strong>i lives. However, as Italian <strong>in</strong>vestigators found <strong>in</strong> the case <strong>of</strong> Nicola Calipari, U.S.accounts <strong>of</strong> such <strong>in</strong>cidents are not reliable and U.S. l<strong>in</strong>ks to the forces Salihee was <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>gcast a dark shadow over his death.F<strong>in</strong>ally, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i death squads appear to have violated a dirty war taboo—they’ve killed a U.S.journalist. Steven V<strong>in</strong>cent was an award-w<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g art critic from New York who went to <strong>Iraq</strong> as afreelance writer for National Review, the Wall Street Journal, and Harpers, and wrote a book, Inthe Red Zone, about the experiences <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is <strong>in</strong> post-<strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>Iraq</strong>. On July 29, 2005, he wrote<strong>in</strong> an op-ed piece <strong>in</strong> the New York Times that many <strong>of</strong> the police <strong>in</strong> Basra were also active <strong>in</strong> theShiite militias that had killed hundreds <strong>of</strong> Sunnis <strong>in</strong> the city. Four days later, he was abducted bya group <strong>of</strong> men <strong>in</strong> a brand new white Chevy pick-up with police mark<strong>in</strong>gs. His body was foundby the side <strong>of</strong> a road outside the city with three gunshot wounds to the chest.The Associated Press has begun to track the numbers <strong>of</strong> corpses found and, as <strong>of</strong> October 7, theyhave tallied 539 s<strong>in</strong>ce the “transitional government” took <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>in</strong> April. They are report<strong>in</strong>g thatthe majority are Sunnis, not Shiites or Kurds, and that “the count may be low s<strong>in</strong>ce one or twobodies are found almost daily and are never reported.” Perhaps the UN report and the deaths,29


particularly <strong>of</strong> journalists will spur more <strong>of</strong> the media to start report<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g thispattern <strong>of</strong> state terrorism.Nicolas J.S. Davies is a student <strong>of</strong> U.S. history and foreign policy. He lives <strong>in</strong> Miami, Florida.30


Subject: [oneheartpeacework] Tra<strong>in</strong>ed for Torture by Sheila Provencher, 23 Nov 2005Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2005 07:55:11 -0000From: "monkatheart" Reply-To: oneheartpeacework-owner@yahoogroups.comTo: oneheartpeacework@yahoogroups.comTra<strong>in</strong>ed for TortureBy Sheila Provencher [Christian Peacemaker Team member recently <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>]23 November 2005I see them almost every day, roar<strong>in</strong>g through the Baghdad streets -- black-masked youngmen, stand<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>in</strong> the backs <strong>of</strong> pick-up trucks, with their automatic weapons fir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tothe air. Sometimes the <strong>in</strong>signia on the side <strong>of</strong> the truck is a wolf, sometimes a lion,sometimes a scorpion. <strong>Iraq</strong>'s commando units.<strong>Iraq</strong>'s new security forces are supposedly the salvation <strong>of</strong> the country, the answer to the terroristbombs and constant state <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>security. But when I hear the gunshots approach and watch thepick-up trucks race through traffic, I feel cold and afraid . . . . I have listened too many times tothe stories <strong>of</strong> the men these security forces have deta<strong>in</strong>ed and <strong>in</strong>terrogated."They electrocuted me so much that my body was lifted up and thrown down, it was such strongelectricity" said *<strong>Is</strong>am, a young <strong>Iraq</strong>i who was picked up by the Scorpion Brigade on the streets<strong>of</strong> Baghdad, imprisoned and tortured <strong>in</strong> several different detention centers for more than twomonths, then f<strong>in</strong>ally released without charge. Others have shared the fact <strong>of</strong> their torture but aretoo afraid to go <strong>in</strong>to detail. Still others will never tell their story, except through the marks lefton their corpses <strong>in</strong> the pictures their families receive at the m<strong>org</strong>ue.I read the other day that the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government is downplay<strong>in</strong>g the recent report about torture by<strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces. Like the U.S. government leaders said follow<strong>in</strong>g the Abu Ghraib abusescandal, the message is that this is a case <strong>of</strong> a few bad apples, and it will soon be under control.Friends, this is just not true. The torture is widespread, and the only reason that the world hasnot heard more about it is that the torture survivors are terrified to speak out. I have heard toomany personal accounts to believe otherwise. In addition, large <strong>in</strong>ternational human rights<strong>org</strong>anizations documented this torture more than a year ago – see Human Rights Watch's report<strong>of</strong> January 2005 at www.hrw.<strong>org</strong>/reports/2005/iraq0105/From <strong>Is</strong>am's perspective, here is the reality. I am sorry but I can only share a few excerpts <strong>of</strong> hisstory, until I have permission to share it <strong>in</strong> its entirety. The fear <strong>of</strong> repercussions runs too deep.Here is what I can share:At a Scorpion Brigade detention center: The <strong>in</strong>terrogators made <strong>Is</strong>am sit on the ground and toldhim to admit to specific crimes – that he had beheaded <strong>Iraq</strong>i Police, killed <strong>Iraq</strong>i National Guardsoldiers, and raped women. He denied these charges. They clipped an electric wire to his rightwrist, and connected the other end to his left big toe. They yelled at him, threatened him that31


they would make him publicly confess on <strong>Iraq</strong>i TV, and that he would die. They whipped himwith cables on his back, and beat him with a club on his head and arms. Then they made him liedown on his stomach and beat him with plastic water pipes, while one man stepped on his head.They electrocuted him, so that "my body was lifted up and thrown down, it was such strongelectricity." When he said noth<strong>in</strong>g, they kicked him on his chest, shoulders, and stomach. Atsome po<strong>in</strong>t dur<strong>in</strong>g the first or second <strong>in</strong>terrogation, the <strong>in</strong>terrogators told him that if he did notconfess to the crimes, they would br<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> his wife and rape her <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> him.At another center, the cell had no fan, no w<strong>in</strong>dow, no water and no toilet. <strong>Is</strong>am noticed thatmany <strong>of</strong> the deta<strong>in</strong>ees were sick. One had heart disease, one had asthma, and some lostconsciousness. They were packed <strong>in</strong>to the hot room and felt that there was no air to breathe.They had no way to perform their prayers, because they had no clean space and no water withwhich to perform their ablutions. They did not have access to the Qur'an.At yet another center, deta<strong>in</strong>ees were jammed together so tightly that each man's chest touchedthe back <strong>of</strong> the man <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> him. They were not allowed to lie down or sleep. If anyonenodded <strong>of</strong>f, he would get beaten. <strong>Is</strong>am said that some <strong>of</strong> his fellow deta<strong>in</strong>ees admitted to crimesthey did not commit, because <strong>of</strong> the torture they experienced.Over time, <strong>Is</strong>am's body was gett<strong>in</strong>g severely damaged from the torture. He had many bruisesand sores. He believes that it was for this reason, as well as the fact that there was no evidenceaga<strong>in</strong>st him, that the authorities f<strong>in</strong>ally brought him to be tried <strong>in</strong> court. The judge released himafter tell<strong>in</strong>g him not to commit any more crimes, although <strong>Is</strong>am denied hav<strong>in</strong>g committed anycrimes at all.It is not only the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government that must bear culpability for this horror. The U.S.government, which supplies tra<strong>in</strong>ers and advisors for <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces, is responsible as well.For example -- James Steele, one <strong>of</strong> the U.S. military's experts on counter<strong>in</strong>surgency, is anadvisor to Adnan Thavit, the leader <strong>of</strong> the Special Police Commandos, known as one <strong>of</strong> the mostbrutal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s new forces.(1) In his previous life, James Steele led U.S. Special Forces <strong>in</strong> ElSalvador <strong>in</strong> the 1980s, aid<strong>in</strong>g a repressive government's military that killed thousands <strong>of</strong>peasants, students, and activists – anyone perceived as aid<strong>in</strong>g or support<strong>in</strong>g the guerillas.(2) Inaddition, Steve Casteel, a former top <strong>of</strong>ficial <strong>in</strong> the Drug Enforcement Adm<strong>in</strong>istration who spentyears <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America, is the senior U.S. adviser <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior, which hasoperational control over the commandos.(3) Fund<strong>in</strong>g and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for the commando groupscome from the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government, as all <strong>of</strong> them fall at least nom<strong>in</strong>ally under the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> theInterior or the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Defense.(4) And from which country does a great deal <strong>of</strong> the fund<strong>in</strong>gfor the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government come?*Name changed_______________________________________________________________1. Maass, Peter , "The Way <strong>of</strong> the Commandos," New York Times Magaz<strong>in</strong>e, May 1, 20052. Fuller, Max, "For <strong>Iraq</strong>, The Salvador Option Becomes a Reality," Global Research,http://globalresearch.ca/articles/FUL506A.html32


3. Maass, Peter, "The Way <strong>of</strong> the Commandos," New York Times Magaz<strong>in</strong>e, May 1, 20054. "Q&A: <strong>Iraq</strong>'s Militias," New York Times, June 9, 200533


http://www.dissidentvoice.<strong>org</strong>/Nov06/Amr04.htmBush Surrenders <strong>Iraq</strong> to Maliki’s <strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong>by Ahmed Amrwww.dissidentvoice.<strong>org</strong>November 4, 2006When the time eventually comes to make historic documentaries about the <strong>Iraq</strong> war, there is onescene that will leave no doubt about the dark and s<strong>in</strong>ister nature <strong>of</strong> Ge<strong>org</strong>e W. Bush. The tim<strong>in</strong>gis a week before mid-term elections. Along with his senior aides, the president is hold<strong>in</strong>g avideoconference with Nouri Al-Maliki, the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. After an extraord<strong>in</strong>ary publicfeud, the two men kiss and make up <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> the cameras. But both walk away from theencounter -- which was <strong>in</strong>itiated at the request <strong>of</strong> Maliki -- with the understand<strong>in</strong>g that the UnitedStates will abandon efforts to tackle the death squads <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.The hastily arranged meet<strong>in</strong>g was the result <strong>of</strong> a little spat between the adm<strong>in</strong>istration and the<strong>Iraq</strong>i government on how best to deal with reign <strong>of</strong> terror <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, largely attributed to Iraniantra<strong>in</strong>ed and <strong>in</strong>doctr<strong>in</strong>ated Shia militants that have <strong>in</strong>filtrated Maliki’s security forces.A week earlier, the American military had attempted to arrest a notorious death squad leader bythe name <strong>of</strong> Abu Deraa. But because the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister’s political allies are also the parties andmilitias that field the death squads, Maliki <strong>in</strong>tervened to prevent similar ‘violations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>isovereignty’ from tak<strong>in</strong>g place <strong>in</strong> the future. As the Commander In Chief <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i ArmedForces, Maliki was mak<strong>in</strong>g a power play and exercis<strong>in</strong>g his ‘right’ to protect his death squadallies from any <strong>in</strong>terference by Bush’s troops.But Maliki didn’t stop there. He demanded more American fund<strong>in</strong>g and accelerated tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>the very same <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces that moonlight as death squads. And, <strong>of</strong> course, Bush had noother option but to comply with the absurd request to provide American tax dollars to furtherenhance the crim<strong>in</strong>al capabilities <strong>of</strong> the militia-<strong>in</strong>fested police and army.There is no exaggerat<strong>in</strong>g the extent to which <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces -- especially the police -- havebecome auxiliary forces that owe their allegiances to the Shia militias and parties that eng<strong>in</strong>eeredMaliki’s rise to power. Even <strong>War</strong> Party media operatives like the Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post can no longerhide the fact that there is little that dist<strong>in</strong>guishes the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police from the Shia death squads.“The American soldiers and civilians who tra<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>is are constantly on guard aga<strong>in</strong>st thepossibility that the police might turn aga<strong>in</strong>st them. Even <strong>in</strong> the police headquarters for all <strong>of</strong>western Baghdad, one <strong>of</strong> the safest police build<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> the capital, the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g team will notremove their body armor or helmets. An Armed soldier is assigned to protect each tra<strong>in</strong>er.”(Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post, 10/31/2006)An exasperated American tra<strong>in</strong>er, John Moore, is quoted as say<strong>in</strong>g, “We don’t know who the hellwe’re teach<strong>in</strong>g: Are they police or are they militia.”34


We now have Judith Miller’s New York Times acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g that “much <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is a placewithout rules or laws, <strong>in</strong> which armed gangs, sometimes dressed as police <strong>of</strong>ficers, can come <strong>in</strong>toany house and do exactly as they please.” (Sabr<strong>in</strong>e Torernice, NYT, 10/29/2006).Of course, to get a clearer picture <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> the evil that stalks <strong>Iraq</strong>, we can’t be entirelydependent on the American media moguls who played a pivotal role <strong>in</strong> market<strong>in</strong>g this murderousventure. To measure the extent <strong>of</strong> the blank evasive space one regularly encounters <strong>in</strong> theAmerica’s ma<strong>in</strong>stream media, contrast their coverage to a recent article by Kim Sengupta,“Operation Endur<strong>in</strong>g Chaos: The Retreat <strong>of</strong> the Coalition and the Rise <strong>of</strong> the Militias” (TheIndependent, 10/31/2006).This is a shadowy struggle, which <strong>in</strong>volves tortured prisoners huddled <strong>in</strong> dungeons, murdervictims mutilated with knives and electric drills, and distraught families search<strong>in</strong>g for relationswho have been “disappeared.” <strong>Iraq</strong>’s savage sectarian war is now regarded as a greater obstacleto any semblance <strong>of</strong> peace return<strong>in</strong>g than the <strong>in</strong>surgency. Yet, ironically, the death squads are theresult <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> policy. At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> last year, with no end to the Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> sight,the Pentagon was reported to have decided to tra<strong>in</strong> Shia and Kurdish fighters to carry out“irregular missions.” The policy, exposed <strong>in</strong> the <strong>US</strong> media, was called the “Salvador Option”after the American-backed counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America more than 20 years ago, whichled to 70,000 deaths and countless <strong>in</strong>stances <strong>of</strong> human rights abuse.As the <strong>US</strong> and British policies <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> reach the last stages <strong>of</strong> unravel<strong>in</strong>g, there are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glyfrantic calls to the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, Nouri al-Maliki, from Wash<strong>in</strong>gton and London to re<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> thegovernment-sponsored death squads. The problem is that the militias, well armed andentrenched, are connected to political parties who know that Mr. Al Maliki is dependent on theirsupport.Just one little correction needs to be made to Sengupta’s account. It wasn’t the “<strong>US</strong> media” thatexposed the Salvador option, it was Seymour Hersh, the legendary journalist who broke the storyon the My Lai massacre and prison abuse at Abu Ghraib. For every new exposé, the mass mediamoguls reward Hersh with an extended exile to the wilderness <strong>of</strong> the alternative press.From the earliest days <strong>of</strong> the American occupation, rumors began to emerge that operativesrecruited from the ranks <strong>of</strong> the Badr Brigades were systematically <strong>in</strong>filtrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i SecurityForces. For those who haven’t be<strong>in</strong>g pay<strong>in</strong>g attention, Badr is an <strong>Iraq</strong>i Shia militia that wastra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> exile by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. It is the armed w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the SupremeCouncil for the <strong>Is</strong>lamic Revolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> (SCIRI), a political creature that was established andf<strong>in</strong>anced by the theocratic regime <strong>in</strong> Tehran. Aside from SCIRI operatives, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i SecurityForces recruited militia members from Moqtada Sadr’s Mahdi Army and militants from Maliki’sDawa party.The man responsible for masterm<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g the recruitment and <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> death squads <strong>in</strong>to thenew <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces was Bayan Jabr, a SCIRI leader who first appeared on the scene onEmperor Paul Bremer’s task force assigned to implement a purification program target<strong>in</strong>gBaathist military <strong>of</strong>ficers and bureaucrats35


In April 2005, Bayan Jabr was appo<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>’s transitional government. Tenthousand miles away, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Juan Cole, an expert on the Middle East from the University <strong>of</strong>Michigan, had Jabar on his radar screen. He set <strong>of</strong>f the alarm bells. “Bayan Jabar is clearly an oldtime revolutionary deeply committed to SCIRI’s paramilitary actions. I’d say there is likely to besome trepidation among <strong>Iraq</strong>i moderates about his now tak<strong>in</strong>g over Interior.” I mention JuanCole because he is exactly the k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> seasoned well <strong>in</strong>formed Middle Eastern analyst whosetalents could have been deployed to chart more rational policies <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Unfortunately, he didn’thave the neo-con seal <strong>of</strong> approval to qualify as a ma<strong>in</strong>stream pundit.Sure enough, with<strong>in</strong> one month <strong>of</strong> his appo<strong>in</strong>tment, Bayan Jabr, technically <strong>Iraq</strong>’s senior police<strong>of</strong>ficer, put his death squads out on the streets <strong>of</strong> Baghdad and started a purge <strong>of</strong> Sunni <strong>of</strong>ficers.“In May 2005, Shiite militia groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> began deposit<strong>in</strong>g corpses <strong>in</strong>to the dumps <strong>of</strong> Baghdad.The victims, overwhelm<strong>in</strong>gly Sunni, were typically handcuffed, their corpses show<strong>in</strong>g signs <strong>of</strong>torture -- broken skulls, burn marks, electric drill holes; by that October, the death toll attributedto such groups had reached 500.” (Harper’s Magaz<strong>in</strong>e, 08/06/2006.)Where is Bayan Jabr today? He’s the <strong>Iraq</strong>i f<strong>in</strong>ance m<strong>in</strong>ister and a key ally <strong>of</strong> Maliki.The latest media farce is to portray Nouri Al-Maliki as a man out to curb the violence and chaos<strong>in</strong> our Mesopotamian colony. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to this fable, The Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister is caught between <strong>Iraq</strong>and a hard place, forced to navigate a treacherous path between a desire to assert the <strong>Iraq</strong>i State’smonopoly <strong>of</strong> violence over ‘rogue’ elements <strong>in</strong> the security forces and the Shia parties thateng<strong>in</strong>eered his ascension to power.There is only one problem with this tale <strong>of</strong> Maliki’s woes. The Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister is the defactochairman <strong>of</strong> the death squads, a radical partisan leader who is out to <strong>in</strong>sure Shia supremacy <strong>in</strong> thenew <strong>Iraq</strong>. Maliki, Bayan Jabr and Moqtada Sadr are cut <strong>of</strong> the same ideological cloth. They aremen who have spent a lifetime <strong>in</strong> the quest to convert <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>in</strong>to a Shia theocracy -- by any meansnecessary.The Maliki/Bush videoconference will go down as one <strong>of</strong> the s<strong>in</strong>gle most important events thatwill shape the future <strong>of</strong> that tormented nation. It was at once a surrender ceremony and a coupd’etat. Maliki walked away with a license to cont<strong>in</strong>ue operat<strong>in</strong>g his death squads and Bush wasforced to accept the burden <strong>of</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g more rank and file assass<strong>in</strong>s.What makes the American hand so weak is Bush’s face. The president can’t very well go publicwith an announcement that <strong>Iraq</strong>’s new management is made up <strong>of</strong> the same parties and militiasthat are <strong>in</strong> command and control <strong>of</strong> the death squads. Because then he would have to expla<strong>in</strong> whythe Pentagon and CIA didn’t notice that they were build<strong>in</strong>g and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g sectarian security forces.Which <strong>in</strong> turn would lead to questions as to whether the adm<strong>in</strong>istration gave early sanction tothis army <strong>of</strong> grim reapers <strong>in</strong> the belief that they could later be controlled after complet<strong>in</strong>g theirassigned ‘Salvador Option’ chores.Los<strong>in</strong>g face is a huge deal for a guy like Bush. He is a media phenomenon created entirely out <strong>of</strong>a s<strong>in</strong>gle substance: image. So, when the day came for him to decide how to negotiate new36


arrangements with the CEO <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i death squads, his only concern was to make sure hecould walk away with his ‘Victory’ talk<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong>tact. It’s hard to imag<strong>in</strong>e that Maliki didn’tunderstand that he had Bush <strong>in</strong> a vice grip. The Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister’s aides said as much.So here we sit, one week before a pivotal mid-term election that might or might not curb thepower <strong>of</strong> the pathetic monster <strong>in</strong> the White House and Dick ‘Waterboard<strong>in</strong>g’ Cheney -- the vicepresident <strong>of</strong> torture. Even at this late hour, the vagaries <strong>of</strong> domestic politics allow this loser -- thescrawniest most <strong>in</strong>ept commander <strong>in</strong> chief <strong>in</strong> American history -- to go about mak<strong>in</strong>g all k<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong>rash promises about a secret plan for victory <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Will Americans ever wake up and smell the stench <strong>of</strong> the carnage <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>? Maybe it would help ifthe Baghdad m<strong>org</strong>ue delivered a few disfigured victims <strong>of</strong> Maliki’s death squads for publicdisplay <strong>in</strong> the Rose Garden. Let Laura go down and <strong>in</strong>spect the skulls for drill holes aftermorn<strong>in</strong>g c<strong>of</strong>fee. Imag<strong>in</strong>e if Ge<strong>org</strong>e Bush had to jog around the physical evidence <strong>of</strong> last night’s<strong>Iraq</strong>i death toll before mak<strong>in</strong>g another victory speech. Would it cause the man to reflect on themayhem he has unleashed? Probably not, but it’s worth a try.A few dead samples from the hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i victims might however effect thetender sensibilities <strong>of</strong> the American public -- a population that has been rendered complacent bythe media’s sanitized coverage and complicit by a collective lack <strong>of</strong> curiosity.Americans need visual and tangible evidence <strong>of</strong> the tragedy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. So far, the death squadsroam<strong>in</strong>g the streets <strong>of</strong> Baghdad have failed to pass the smell test -- their odor is scentless. If thestench <strong>of</strong> mutilated <strong>Iraq</strong>i corpses could <strong>in</strong>vade American nostrils, Bush would have someexpla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to do.<strong>Iraq</strong>’s victims are not real because we don’t have to step over them on the way to work. If highschool kids had to memorize the names <strong>of</strong> the hundred youngest American soldiers to die <strong>in</strong> thiswar <strong>of</strong> choice, they’d notice the other 2,700. America’s <strong>in</strong>difference to carnage <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is aunique psychosis the world wouldn’t understand. It is a collective malady <strong>in</strong>duced by legions <strong>of</strong>will<strong>in</strong>g media collaborators.Bush will encounter little resistance <strong>in</strong> synchroniz<strong>in</strong>g his ‘victory <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>’ campaign with a dealto surrender Mesopotamia to Maliki’s death squads. Because very few Americans will noticeenough to care.Ahmed Amr is the editor <strong>of</strong> NileMedia.com. He can be reached at: Montraj@aol.comhttp://www.kuc<strong>in</strong>ich.us/floor_speeches/iq_rumsfeld_letter4may.php37


Letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld from Rep. Dennis Kuc<strong>in</strong>ich (D-OH)Letter to Secretary RumsfeldSubmitted by kuc<strong>in</strong>ich.us on March 4, 2006 - 00:00. House Floor Speeches | <strong>Iraq</strong>May 4, 2006"Mr. Speaker, [on April 5] I sent the follow<strong>in</strong>g letter to Secretary Rumsfeld request<strong>in</strong>g recordsperta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to Pentagon plans to use U.S. Special Forces to advise, support, and tra<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i deathsquads:"Hon. Donald Rumsfeld,Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense,The Pentagon, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, DC.April 5, 2006Dear Secretary Rumsfeld:I am writ<strong>in</strong>g to request a copy <strong>of</strong> all records perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to Pentagon plans to use U.S. SpecialForces to advise, support and tra<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i assass<strong>in</strong>ation and kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g teams.On January 8, 2005, Newsweek magaz<strong>in</strong>e first published a report that the Pentagon had aproposal to tra<strong>in</strong> elite <strong>Iraq</strong>i squads to quell the grow<strong>in</strong>g Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgency. The proposal has beencalled the "Salvador Option," which references the U.S. military assistance program, <strong>in</strong>itiatedunder the Carter Adm<strong>in</strong>istration and subsequently pursued by the Reagan Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, thatfunded and supported "nationalist" paramilitary forces who hunted down and assass<strong>in</strong>ated rebelleaders and their supporters <strong>in</strong> El Salvador. This program <strong>in</strong> El Salvador was highly controversialand received much public backlash <strong>in</strong> the U.S., as tens <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>nocent civilians wereassass<strong>in</strong>ated and "disappeared," <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g notable members <strong>of</strong> the Catholic Church, ArchbishopOscar Romero and the four American churchwomen. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Newsweek report,Pentagon conservatives wanted to resurrect the Salvadoran program <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> because theybelieved that despite the <strong>in</strong>credible cost <strong>in</strong> human lives and human rights, it was successful <strong>in</strong>eradicat<strong>in</strong>g guerrillas.Mr. Secretary, at a news conference on January 11, 2005, you publicly stated that the idea <strong>of</strong> aSalvador option was "nonsense." Yet mount<strong>in</strong>g evidence suggests that the U.S. has <strong>in</strong> factfunded and tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>Iraq</strong>i assass<strong>in</strong>ation and kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g teams and these teams are now operat<strong>in</strong>gwith horrific success across <strong>Iraq</strong>.We know that the Pentagon received fund<strong>in</strong>g for tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i paramilitaries.About one year before the Newsweek report on the "Salvador Option," it was reported <strong>in</strong> theAmerican Prospect magaz<strong>in</strong>e on January 1, 2004 that part <strong>of</strong> $3 billion <strong>of</strong> the $87 billionEmergency Supplemental Appropriations bill to fund operations <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, signed <strong>in</strong>to law on38


November 6, 2003, was designated for the creation <strong>of</strong> a paramilitary unit manned by militiamenassociated with former <strong>Iraq</strong>i exile groups. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Prospect article, experts predictedthat creation <strong>of</strong> this paramilitary unit would "lead to a wave <strong>of</strong> extrajudicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs, not only <strong>of</strong>armed rebels but <strong>of</strong> nationalists, other opponents <strong>of</strong> the U.S. occupation and thousands <strong>of</strong> civilianBaathists." The article further described how the bulk <strong>of</strong> the $3 billion program, disguised as anAir Force classified program, would be used to "support U.S. efforts to create a lethal, andrevenge-m<strong>in</strong>ded <strong>Iraq</strong>i security force." Accord<strong>in</strong>g to one <strong>of</strong> the article's sources, John Pike, anexpert <strong>of</strong> classified military budgets at www.globalsecurity.<strong>org</strong>. "the big money would be forstand<strong>in</strong>g up an <strong>Iraq</strong>i secret police to liquidate the resistance."We know that some <strong>of</strong> the Pentagon's <strong>Iraq</strong> experts were <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the Reagan Adm<strong>in</strong>istration'sparamilitary program <strong>in</strong> El Salvador.Colonel James Steele, Counselor to the U.S. Ambassador for <strong>Iraq</strong>i Security Forces, formerly ledthe U.S. Military Advisory Group <strong>in</strong> El Salvador from 1984-1986, where he developed specialoperat<strong>in</strong>g forces at brigade level dur<strong>in</strong>g the height <strong>of</strong> the conflict. The role <strong>of</strong> these forces <strong>in</strong> ElSalvador was to attack "<strong>in</strong>surgent" leadership, their supporters, sources <strong>of</strong> supply, and basecamps. Currently Colonel Steele has been assigned to work with the new elite <strong>Iraq</strong>i counter<strong>in</strong>surgencyunit known as the Special Police Commandos, operat<strong>in</strong>g under <strong>Iraq</strong>'s InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry.Director <strong>of</strong> National Intelligence, John Negroponte, was U.S. Ambassador to <strong>Iraq</strong> from June2004 to April 2005. From 1981 to 1985, he was ambassador to Honduras where he played a keyrole <strong>in</strong> coord<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g U.S. covert aid to the Contras, anti-Sand<strong>in</strong>ista militias who targeted civilians<strong>in</strong> Nicaragua. Additionally, he oversaw the U.S. back<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a military death squad <strong>in</strong> Honduras,Battalion 3-16, which specialized <strong>in</strong> torture and assass<strong>in</strong>ation. The U.S. had similar programs <strong>of</strong>support<strong>in</strong>g paramilitary groups set up Nicaragua and Honduras as its program <strong>in</strong> El Salvador. Ina Democracy Now <strong>in</strong>terview on January 10, 2005, Allan Nairn, who broke the story about U.S.support <strong>of</strong> death squads <strong>in</strong> El Salvador, suspected that Ambassador Negroponte would mostlikely be <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the economic side <strong>of</strong> U.S. support to death squads <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.We know that a wave <strong>of</strong> abductions and executions, <strong>in</strong> the style <strong>of</strong> the death squads <strong>of</strong> ElSalvador, and with ties to an <strong>of</strong>ficial government sponsor, and to the U.S., has hit <strong>Iraq</strong>.News reports over the past 10 months strongly suggest that the U.S. has tra<strong>in</strong>ed and supportedhighly <strong>org</strong>anized <strong>Iraq</strong>i commando brigades, and that some <strong>of</strong> those brigades have operated asdeath squads, abduct<strong>in</strong>g and assass<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is. Some news highlights:May 1, 2005 -- Los Angeles Times reports that the U.S. is provid<strong>in</strong>g technical and logisticalsupport to the Maghawir (Fearless <strong>War</strong>rior) brigades, the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry's special commandos,accord<strong>in</strong>g to Major General Rasheed Flayih Mohammed. <strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities plan to <strong>in</strong>creasedeployment <strong>of</strong> the 12,000-strong Maghawir (Fearless <strong>War</strong>rior) brigades, which are composed <strong>of</strong>well-tra<strong>in</strong>ed veterans who have worked closely with U.S. forces <strong>in</strong> Najaf, Fallujah and Mosuland <strong>in</strong>clude the Wolf, Scorpion, Tiger and Thunder brigades.39


May 16-20, 2005 -- Los Angeles Times and New York Times reveal discovery <strong>of</strong> 46 bodies, all<strong>Iraq</strong>i men abducted and sla<strong>in</strong> execution-style, <strong>in</strong> various locations: float<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Tigris, dumped<strong>in</strong> ditches and garbage-strewn lots, and buried at a poultry farm.June 15, 2005 -- Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post reports that U.S. forces had knowledge <strong>of</strong> secret and illegalabductions <strong>of</strong> hundreds <strong>of</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ority Arabs <strong>in</strong> Kirkuk. The abductions were by forces led byKurdish political parties and backed by the U.S. military.June 20, 2005 -- Los Angeles Times reports that Saad Sultan, <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> Human Rights M<strong>in</strong>istrysaid that police and security forces attached to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry, thousands <strong>of</strong> whomhave been tra<strong>in</strong>ed by American <strong>in</strong>structors, are responsible for abus<strong>in</strong>g up to 60% <strong>of</strong> estimated12,000 deta<strong>in</strong>ees <strong>in</strong> prison and military compounds. He says the units have used tacticsrem<strong>in</strong>iscent <strong>of</strong> Saddam's secret <strong>in</strong>telligence squads.July 3, 2005 -- Reuters News reports that the government <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> publicly acknowledged that thenew security forces were us<strong>in</strong>g torture. Article further says that accounts are common <strong>of</strong> peoplebe<strong>in</strong>g seized by armed men <strong>in</strong> the uniforms <strong>of</strong> the police, army or special units like Baghdad'sWolf Brigade police commandos, and then disappear<strong>in</strong>g without trace or be<strong>in</strong>g found dead.July 28, 2005 -- Los Angeles Times reports that members <strong>of</strong> a California Army National Guardcompany, the Alpha Company, who were implicated <strong>in</strong> a deta<strong>in</strong>ee abuse scandal, tra<strong>in</strong>ed andconducted jo<strong>in</strong>t operations with the Wolf Brigade, a commando unit criticized for human rightsabuses. In an onl<strong>in</strong>e Alpha Company newsletter, Capta<strong>in</strong> Haviland wrote, "We have assigned2nd Platoon to help them transition, and <strong>in</strong>stall some <strong>of</strong> our 'Killer Company' aggressive tacticalspirit <strong>in</strong> them." The article further states that despite the Wolf Brigade's controversial reputationfor human rights violations, it is regarded as the gold standard for <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces by U.S.military <strong>of</strong>ficials.August 31, 2005 -- BBC reports that on the night <strong>of</strong> August 24, a large force <strong>of</strong> the VolcanoBrigade raided homes <strong>in</strong> Al-Hurriyah city <strong>in</strong> the Baghdad, kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g and then execut<strong>in</strong>g 76citizens. The victims were all shot <strong>in</strong> the head after their hands and feet had been tied up. Theysuffered the harshest forms <strong>of</strong> torture, deformation and burn<strong>in</strong>g.November 16, 2005 -- Reuters News reports the discovery <strong>of</strong> 173 malnourished men, some <strong>of</strong>whom were tortured, imprisoned <strong>in</strong> a secret jail run by Shi'ite militias tied to the InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry.November 17, 2005 -- Newsday reports that <strong>in</strong> the past year, the U.S. military has helped buildup <strong>Iraq</strong>i commandos under guidance from James Steele, a former Army Special Forces <strong>of</strong>ficerwho led U.S. counter<strong>in</strong>surgency efforts <strong>in</strong> El Salvador <strong>in</strong> the 1980s. The brigades built up overthe past year <strong>in</strong>clude the Lion Brigade, Scorpion Brigade and Volcano Brigade.February 15, 2006 -- Associated Press reports that the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry has launched a probe <strong>in</strong>todeath squad allegations.February 19, 2006 -- BBC reveals that m<strong>org</strong>ues <strong>in</strong> Baghdad receive dozens <strong>of</strong> bodies picked updaily from rivers, sewage plants, waste burial sites, farms and desert areas. Most <strong>of</strong> the bodiesare handcuffed and bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded civilians with a bullet or more <strong>in</strong> the forehead, <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g thatthey were executed. The handcuffs used on the victims are like those used by the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police.February 26, 2006 -- The Independent reports that outgo<strong>in</strong>g United Nations' human rights chief<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, John Pace, revealed that hundreds <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is are be<strong>in</strong>g tortured to death or summarilyexecuted every month <strong>in</strong> Baghdad alone by the death squads work<strong>in</strong>g from the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>Interior. He said that up to three-quarters <strong>of</strong> the corpses stacked <strong>in</strong> the Baghdad mortuary showevidence <strong>of</strong> gunshot wounds to the head or <strong>in</strong>juries caused by drill-bits or burn<strong>in</strong>g cigarettes.40


March 9, 2006 -- Los Angeles Times reports that <strong>Iraq</strong>i police <strong>of</strong>ficers who worked at the InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry's illegal prison had received American tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, and that U.S. tra<strong>in</strong>ers have also givenextensive support to 27 brigades <strong>of</strong> heavily armed commandos accused <strong>of</strong> a series <strong>of</strong> abuses,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the death <strong>of</strong> 14 Sunni Arabs who were locked <strong>in</strong> an airtight van last summer.March 10, 2006 -- Sidney Morn<strong>in</strong>g Herald reports that men wear<strong>in</strong>g the uniforms <strong>of</strong> U.S.-tra<strong>in</strong>edsecurity forces, which are controlled by the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry, abducted 50 people <strong>in</strong> a daylightraid on a security agency. Masked men who are driv<strong>in</strong>g what appear to be new governmentownedvehicles are carry<strong>in</strong>g out many <strong>of</strong> the raids.March 27, 2006 -- The Independent reports that while U.S. authorities have begun criticiz<strong>in</strong>g the<strong>Iraq</strong>i government over the "death squads," many <strong>of</strong> the paramilitary groups accused <strong>of</strong> the abuse,such as the Wolf Brigade, the Scorpion Brigade and the Special Police Commandos were set upwith the help <strong>of</strong> the American military. Furthermore, the militiamen were provided with U.S.advisers some <strong>of</strong> whom were veterans <strong>of</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> American counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency which also had ledto allegations <strong>of</strong> death squads at the time.Mr. Secretary, <strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong> this evidence <strong>of</strong> U.S. support for and the existence <strong>of</strong> death squads <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>, what is the basis for your January 11, 2005 statement, that the idea <strong>of</strong> a Salvador option <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong> is "nonsense"?I request a copy <strong>of</strong> all records perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to Pentagon plans to use U.S. Special Forces to advise,support and tra<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i assass<strong>in</strong>ation and kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g teams. I look forward to receiv<strong>in</strong>g yourresponse.S<strong>in</strong>cerely,Dennis J. Kuc<strong>in</strong>ich,Member <strong>of</strong> Congress41


Part Two:200342


http://www.newyorker.com/pr<strong>in</strong>tables/fact/031215fa_fact?fact/031215fa_factWill the counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency plan <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> repeat the mistakes <strong>of</strong> Vietnam?by SEYMOUR M. HERSHThe New Yorker<strong>Is</strong>sue <strong>of</strong> 2003-12-15Posted 2003-12-08The Bush Adm<strong>in</strong>istration has authorized a major escalation <strong>of</strong> the Special Forces covert war <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>. In <strong>in</strong>terviews over the past month, American <strong>of</strong>ficials and former <strong>of</strong>ficials said that thema<strong>in</strong> target was a hard-core group <strong>of</strong> Baathists who are believed to be beh<strong>in</strong>d much <strong>of</strong> theunderground <strong>in</strong>surgency aga<strong>in</strong>st the soldiers <strong>of</strong> the United States and its allies. A new SpecialForces group, designated Task Force 121, has been assembled from Army Delta Force members,Navy seals, and C.I.A. paramilitary operatives, with many additional personnel ordered to reportby January. Its highest priority is the neutralization <strong>of</strong> the Baathist <strong>in</strong>surgents, by capture orassass<strong>in</strong>ation.The revitalized Special Forces mission is a policy victory for Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense DonaldRumsfeld, who has struggled for two years to get the military leadership to accept the strategy <strong>of</strong>what he calls “Manhunts”—a phrase that he has used both publicly and <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternal Pentagoncommunications. Rumsfeld has had to change much <strong>of</strong> the Pentagon’s leadership to get his way.“Knock<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>f two regimes allows us to do extraord<strong>in</strong>ary th<strong>in</strong>gs,” a Pentagon adviser told me,referr<strong>in</strong>g to Afghanistan and <strong>Iraq</strong>.One step the Pentagon took was to seek active and secret help <strong>in</strong> the war aga<strong>in</strong>st the <strong>Iraq</strong>i<strong>in</strong>surgency from <strong>Is</strong>rael, America’s closest ally <strong>in</strong> the Middle East. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to American and<strong>Is</strong>raeli military and <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficials, <strong>Is</strong>raeli commandos and <strong>in</strong>telligence units have beenwork<strong>in</strong>g closely with their American counterparts at the Special Forces tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g base at FortBragg, North Carol<strong>in</strong>a, and <strong>in</strong> <strong>Is</strong>rael to help them prepare for operations <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. <strong>Is</strong>raelicommandos are expected to serve as ad-hoc advisers—aga<strong>in</strong>, <strong>in</strong> secret—when full-fieldoperations beg<strong>in</strong>. (Neither the Pentagon nor <strong>Is</strong>raeli diplomats would comment. “No one wants totalk about this,” an <strong>Is</strong>raeli <strong>of</strong>ficial told me. “It’s <strong>in</strong>cendiary. Both governments have decided atthe highest level that it is <strong>in</strong> their <strong>in</strong>terests to keep a low pr<strong>of</strong>ile on U.S.-<strong>Is</strong>raeli coöperation” on<strong>Iraq</strong>.) The critical issue, American and <strong>Is</strong>raeli <strong>of</strong>ficials agree, is <strong>in</strong>telligence. There is muchdebate about whether target<strong>in</strong>g a large number <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuals is a practical—or politicallyeffective—way to br<strong>in</strong>g about stability <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, especially given the frequent failure <strong>of</strong> Americanforces to obta<strong>in</strong> consistent and reliable <strong>in</strong>formation there.Americans <strong>in</strong> the field are try<strong>in</strong>g to solve that problem by develop<strong>in</strong>g a new source <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>formation: they plan to assemble teams drawn from the upper ranks <strong>of</strong> the old <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>telligenceservices and tra<strong>in</strong> them to penetrate the <strong>in</strong>surgency. The idea is for the <strong>in</strong>filtrators to provide<strong>in</strong>formation about <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong>surgents for the Americans to act on. A former C.I.A. stationchief described the strategy <strong>in</strong> simple terms: “U.S. shooters and <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>telligence.” He added,“There are <strong>Iraq</strong>is <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>telligence bus<strong>in</strong>ess who have a better idea, and we’re tapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to43


them. We have to resuscitate <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>telligence, hold<strong>in</strong>g our nose, and have Delta and agencyshooters break down doors and take them”—the <strong>in</strong>surgents—“out.”A former <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficial said that gett<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>side the Baathist leadership could be comparedto “fight<strong>in</strong>g your way <strong>in</strong>to a coconut—you bang away and bang away until you f<strong>in</strong>d a s<strong>of</strong>t spot,and then you can clean it out.” An American who has advised the civilian authority <strong>in</strong> Baghdadsaid, “The only way we can w<strong>in</strong> is to go unconventional. We’re go<strong>in</strong>g to have to play their game.Guerrilla versus guerrilla. Terrorism versus terrorism. We’ve got to scare the <strong>Iraq</strong>is <strong>in</strong>tosubmission.”In Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, there is now widespread agreement on one po<strong>in</strong>t: the need for a new Americanapproach to <strong>Iraq</strong>. There is also uniform criticism <strong>of</strong> the military’s current response to the grow<strong>in</strong>gAmerican casualty lists. One former Pentagon <strong>of</strong>ficial who worked extensively with the SpecialForces command, and who favors the new military <strong>in</strong>itiative, said, “We’ve got this largeconventional force sitt<strong>in</strong>g there, and gett<strong>in</strong>g their ass shot <strong>of</strong>f, and what we’re do<strong>in</strong>g iscounterproductive. We’re send<strong>in</strong>g mixed signals.” The problem with the way the U.S. has beenfight<strong>in</strong>g the Baathist leadership, he said, is “(a) we’ve got no <strong>in</strong>telligence, and (b) we’re toosqueamish to operate <strong>in</strong> this part <strong>of</strong> the world.” Referr<strong>in</strong>g to the American retaliation aga<strong>in</strong>st asuspected mortar site, the former <strong>of</strong>ficial said, “Instead <strong>of</strong> destroy<strong>in</strong>g an empty soccer field, whynot impress me by sneak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a sniper team and kill<strong>in</strong>g them while they’re sett<strong>in</strong>g up a mortar?We do need a more unconventional response, but it’s go<strong>in</strong>g to be messy.”Inside the Pentagon, it is now understood that simply br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> or kill<strong>in</strong>g Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> andhis immediate circle—those who appeared <strong>in</strong> the Bush Adm<strong>in</strong>istration’s famed “deck <strong>of</strong>cards”—will not stop the <strong>in</strong>surgency. The new Special Forces operation is aimed <strong>in</strong>stead at thebroad middle <strong>of</strong> the Baathist underground. But many <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>ficials I spoke to were skeptical <strong>of</strong>the Adm<strong>in</strong>istration’s plans. Many <strong>of</strong> them fear that the proposed operation—called “preëmptivemanhunt<strong>in</strong>g” by one Pentagon adviser—has the potential to turn <strong>in</strong>to another Phoenix Program.Phoenix was the code name for a counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency program that the U.S. adopted dur<strong>in</strong>g theVietnam <strong>War</strong>, <strong>in</strong> which Special Forces teams were sent out to capture or assass<strong>in</strong>ate Vietnamesebelieved to be work<strong>in</strong>g with or sympathetic to the Vietcong. In choos<strong>in</strong>g targets, the Americansrelied on <strong>in</strong>formation supplied by South Vietnamese Army <strong>of</strong>ficers and village chiefs. Theoperation got out <strong>of</strong> control. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>of</strong>ficial South Vietnamese statistics, Phoenix claimednearly forty-one thousand victims between 1968 and 1972; the U.S. counted more than twentythousand <strong>in</strong> the same time span. Some <strong>of</strong> those assass<strong>in</strong>ated had noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with the waraga<strong>in</strong>st America but were targeted because <strong>of</strong> private grievances. William E. Colby, the C.I.A.<strong>of</strong>ficer who took charge <strong>of</strong> the Phoenix Program <strong>in</strong> 1968 (he eventually became C.I.A. director),later acknowledged to Congress that “a lot <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs were done that should not have been done.”The former Special Forces <strong>of</strong>ficial warned that the problem with head-hunt<strong>in</strong>g is that you have tobe sure “you’re hunt<strong>in</strong>g the right heads.” Speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the now coöperative former <strong>Iraq</strong>i<strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficials, he said, “These guys have their own agenda. Will we be do<strong>in</strong>g hits ongrudges? When you set up host-nation elements”—units composed <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is, rather thanAmericans—“it’s hard not to have them go<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>f to do what they want to do. You have to keepthem on a short leash.”44


The former <strong>of</strong>ficial says that the Baathist leadership apparently relies on “face-to-facecommunications” <strong>in</strong> plann<strong>in</strong>g terrorist attacks. This makes the <strong>in</strong>surgents less vulnerable to one<strong>of</strong> the Army’s most secret Special Forces units, known as Grey Fox, which has particularexpertise <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terception and other technical means <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligence-gather<strong>in</strong>g. “These guys are toosmart to touch cell phones or radio,” the former <strong>of</strong>ficial said. “It’s all go<strong>in</strong>g to succeed or failspectacularly based on human <strong>in</strong>telligence.”A former C.I.A. <strong>of</strong>ficial with extensive Middle East experience identified one <strong>of</strong> the key playerson the new American-<strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>telligence team as Farouq Hijazi, a Saddam loyalist who served formany years as the director <strong>of</strong> external operations for the Mukhabarat, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>telligenceservice. He has been <strong>in</strong> custody s<strong>in</strong>ce late April. The C.I.A. man said that over the past fewmonths Hijazi “has cut a deal,” and American <strong>of</strong>ficials “are us<strong>in</strong>g him to reactivate the old <strong>Iraq</strong>i<strong>in</strong>telligence network.” He added, “My <strong>Iraq</strong>i friends say he will honor the deal—but only to theletter, and not to the spirit.” He said that although the Mukhabarat was a good security service,capable, <strong>in</strong> particular, <strong>of</strong> protect<strong>in</strong>g Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> from overthrow or assass<strong>in</strong>ation, it was “alousy <strong>in</strong>telligence service.”The <strong>of</strong>ficial went on, “It’s not the way we usually play ball, but if you see a couple <strong>of</strong> your guysget blown away it changes th<strong>in</strong>gs. We did the American th<strong>in</strong>gs—and we’ve been the nice guy.Now we’re go<strong>in</strong>g to be the bad guy, and be<strong>in</strong>g the bad guy works.”Told <strong>of</strong> such comments, the Pentagon adviser, who is an expert on unconventional war,expressed dismay. “There are people say<strong>in</strong>g all sorts <strong>of</strong> wild th<strong>in</strong>gs about Manhunts,” he said.“But they aren’t at the policy level. It’s not a no-holds policy, and it shouldn’t be. I’m as tough asanybody, but we’re also a democratic society, and we don’t fight terror with terror. There will bea lot <strong>of</strong> close controls—do’s and don’ts and rules <strong>of</strong> engagement.” The adviser added, “Theproblem is that we’ve not penetrated the bad guys. The Baath Party is run like a cell system. It’slike penetrat<strong>in</strong>g the Vietcong—we never could do it.”The ris<strong>in</strong>g star <strong>in</strong> Rumsfeld’s Pentagon is Stephen Cambone, the Under-Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense forIntelligence, who has been deeply <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g the new Special Forces approach.Cambone, who earned a doctorate <strong>in</strong> political science from Claremont Graduate University <strong>in</strong>1982, served as staff director for a 1998 committee, headed by Rumsfeld, that warned <strong>in</strong> itsreport <strong>of</strong> an emerg<strong>in</strong>g ballistic-missile threat to the United States and argued that <strong>in</strong>telligenceagencies should be will<strong>in</strong>g to go beyond the data at hand <strong>in</strong> their analyses. Cambone, <strong>in</strong> hisconfirmation hear<strong>in</strong>gs, <strong>in</strong> February, told the Senate that consumers <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligence assessmentsmust ask questions <strong>of</strong> the analysts—“how they arrived at those conclusions and what the sources<strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation were.” This approach was championed by Rumsfeld. It came under attack,however, when the Adm<strong>in</strong>istration’s predictions about <strong>Iraq</strong>’s weapons <strong>of</strong> mass destruction andthe potential for <strong>in</strong>surgency failed to be realized, and the Pentagon civilians were widely accused<strong>of</strong> politiciz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>telligence. (A month after the fall <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, Cambone was the first seniorPentagon <strong>of</strong>ficial to publicly claim, wrongly, as it turned out, that a captured <strong>Iraq</strong>i military truckmight be a mobile biological-weapons laboratory.)Cambone also shares Rumsfeld’s views on how to fight terrorism. They both believe that theUnited States needs to become far more proactive <strong>in</strong> combatt<strong>in</strong>g terrorism, search<strong>in</strong>g for terrorist45


leaders around the world and elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g them. And Cambone, like Rumsfeld, has beenfrustrated by the reluctance <strong>of</strong> the military leadership to embrace the manhunt<strong>in</strong>g mission. S<strong>in</strong>cehis confirmation, he has been seek<strong>in</strong>g operational authority over Special Forces. “Rumsfeld’sbeen look<strong>in</strong>g for somebody to have all the answers, and Steve is the guy,” a former high-levelPentagon <strong>of</strong>ficial told me. “He has more direct access to Rummy than anyone else.”As Cambone’s <strong>in</strong>fluence has <strong>in</strong>creased, that <strong>of</strong> Douglas Feith, the Under-Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defensefor Policy, has dim<strong>in</strong>ished. In September, 2001, Feith set up a special unit known as the Office <strong>of</strong>Special Plans. The <strong>of</strong>fice, directed by civilians who, like Feith, had neoconservative views,played a major role <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>telligence and plann<strong>in</strong>g lead<strong>in</strong>g up to the March <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.“There is f<strong>in</strong>ger-po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g go<strong>in</strong>g on,” a prom<strong>in</strong>ent Republican lobbyist expla<strong>in</strong>ed. “And theneocons are <strong>in</strong> retreat.”One <strong>of</strong> the key planners <strong>of</strong> the Special Forces <strong>of</strong>fensive is Lieutenant General William (Jerry)Boyk<strong>in</strong>, Cambone’s military assistant. After a meet<strong>in</strong>g with Rumsfeld early last summer—theygot along “like two old warriors,” the Pentagon consultant said—Boyk<strong>in</strong> postponed hisretirement, which had been planned for June, and took the Pentagon job, which brought him athird star. In that post, the Pentagon adviser told me, Boyk<strong>in</strong> has been “an important piece” <strong>of</strong> theplanned escalation. In October, the Los Angeles Times reported that Boyk<strong>in</strong>, while giv<strong>in</strong>gSunday-morn<strong>in</strong>g talks <strong>in</strong> uniform to church groups, had repeatedly equated the Muslim worldwith Satan. Last June, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the paper, he told a congregation <strong>in</strong> Oregon that “Satan wantsto destroy this nation, he wants to destroy us as a nation, and he wants to destroy us as aChristian army.” Boyk<strong>in</strong> praised President Bush as a “man who prays <strong>in</strong> the Oval Office,” anddeclared that Bush was “not elected” President but “appo<strong>in</strong>ted by God.” The Muslim world hatesAmerica, he said, “because we are a nation <strong>of</strong> believers.”There were calls <strong>in</strong> the press and from Congress for Boyk<strong>in</strong>’s dismissal, but Rumsfeld made itclear that he wanted to keep his man <strong>in</strong> the job. Initially, he responded to the Times report byprais<strong>in</strong>g the General’s “outstand<strong>in</strong>g record” and tell<strong>in</strong>g journalists that he had neither seen thetext <strong>of</strong> Boyk<strong>in</strong>’s statements nor watched the videotape that had been made <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> hispresentations. “There are a lot <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs that are said by people <strong>in</strong> the military, or <strong>in</strong> civilian life,or <strong>in</strong> the Congress, or <strong>in</strong> the executive branch that are their views,” he said. “We’re a free people.And that’s the wonderful th<strong>in</strong>g about our country.” He added, with regard to the tape, “I justsimply can’t comment on what he said, because I haven’t seen it.” Four days later, Rumsfeld saidthat he had viewed the tape. “It had a lot <strong>of</strong> very difficult-to-understand words with subtitleswhich I was not able to verify,” he said at a news conference, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>of</strong>ficial transcript.“So I rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>expert”—the transcript notes that he “chuckles” at that moment—“on preciselywhat he said.” Boyk<strong>in</strong>’s comments are now under <strong>of</strong>ficial review.Boyk<strong>in</strong> has been <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> other controversies as well. He was the Army combat commander<strong>in</strong> Mogadishu <strong>in</strong> 1993, when eighteen Americans were sla<strong>in</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the disastrous mission madefamous by Mark Bowden’s book “Black Hawk Down.” Earlier that year, Boyk<strong>in</strong>, a colonel at thetime, led an eight-man Delta Force that was assigned to help a Colombian police unit track downthe notorious drug dealer Pablo Escobar. Boyk<strong>in</strong>’s team was barred by law from provid<strong>in</strong>g anylethal assistance without Presidential approval, but there was suspicion <strong>in</strong> the Pentagon that itwas plann<strong>in</strong>g to take part <strong>in</strong> the assass<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> Escobar, with the support <strong>of</strong> American Embassy46


<strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>in</strong> Colombia. The book “Kill<strong>in</strong>g Pablo,” an account, also by Mark Bowden, <strong>of</strong> the huntfor Escobar, describes how senior <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>in</strong> the Pentagon’s cha<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> command becameconv<strong>in</strong>ced that Boyk<strong>in</strong>, with the knowledge <strong>of</strong> his Special Forces superiors, had exceeded hisauthority and <strong>in</strong>tended to violate the law. They wanted Boyk<strong>in</strong>’s unit pulled out. It wasn’t.Escobar was shot dead on the ro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> a barrio apartment build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Medellín. The Colombianpolice were credited with gett<strong>in</strong>g their man, but, Bowden wrote, “with<strong>in</strong> the special opscommunity . . . Pablo’s death was regarded as a successful mission for Delta, and legend has itthat its operators were <strong>in</strong> on the kill.”“That’s what those guys did,” a retired general who monitored Boyk<strong>in</strong>’s operations <strong>in</strong> Colombiatold me. “I’ve seen pictures <strong>of</strong> Escobar’s body that you don’t get from a long-range telescopelens. They were taken by guys on the assault team.” (Bush Adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>in</strong> the WhiteHouse, the State Department, and the Pentagon, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g General Boyk<strong>in</strong>, did not respond torequests for comment.)Morris Busby, who was the American Ambassador to Colombia <strong>in</strong> 1993 (he is now retired),vigorously defended Boyk<strong>in</strong>. “I th<strong>in</strong>k the world <strong>of</strong> Jerry Boyk<strong>in</strong>, and have the utmost respect forhim. I’ve known him for fifteen years and spent hours and hours with the guy, and never heardhim mention religion or God.” The retired general also praised Boyk<strong>in</strong> as “one <strong>of</strong> those guysyou’d love to have <strong>in</strong> a war because he’s not afraid to die.” But, he added, “when you get to threestars you’ve got to th<strong>in</strong>k through what you’re do<strong>in</strong>g.” Referr<strong>in</strong>g to Boyk<strong>in</strong> and others <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>the Special Forces plann<strong>in</strong>g, he added, “These guys are go<strong>in</strong>g to get a bunch <strong>of</strong> guys killed andthen give them a bunch <strong>of</strong> medals.”The American-<strong>Is</strong>raeli liaison on <strong>Iraq</strong> amounts to a tutorial on how to dismantle an <strong>in</strong>surgency.One former <strong>Is</strong>raeli military-<strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficer summarized the core lesson this way: “How to dotargeted kill<strong>in</strong>g, which is very relevant to the success <strong>of</strong> the war, and what the United States isgo<strong>in</strong>g to have to do.” He told me that the Americans were be<strong>in</strong>g urged to emulate the <strong>Is</strong>raeliArmy’s small commando units, known as Mist’aravim, which operate undercover <strong>in</strong>side theWest Bank and Gaza Strip. “They can approach a house and pounce,” the former <strong>of</strong>ficer said. Inthe <strong>Is</strong>raeli view, he added, the Special Forces units must learn “how to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a network <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>formants.” Such a network, he said, has made it possible for <strong>Is</strong>rael to penetrate the West Bankand Gaza Strip <strong>org</strong>anizations controlled by groups such as Hamas, and to assass<strong>in</strong>ate or capturepotential suicide bombers along with many <strong>of</strong> the people who recruit and tra<strong>in</strong> them.On the other hand, the former <strong>of</strong>ficer said, “<strong>Is</strong>rael has, <strong>in</strong> many ways, been too successful, andhas killed or captured so many mid-rank<strong>in</strong>g facilitators on the operational level <strong>in</strong> the West Bankthat Hamas now consists largely <strong>of</strong> isolated cells that carry out terrorist attacks aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Is</strong>rael ontheir own.” He went on, “There is no central control over many <strong>of</strong> the suicide bombers. We’retry<strong>in</strong>g to tell the Americans that they don’t want to elim<strong>in</strong>ate the center. The key is not to havefreelancers out there.”Many regional experts, Americans and others, are conv<strong>in</strong>ced that the Baathists are still firmly <strong>in</strong>charge <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency, although they are thought to have little direct connection with SaddamHusse<strong>in</strong>. An American military analyst who works with the American-led Coalition ProvisionalAuthority <strong>in</strong> Baghdad told me he has concluded that “mid-rank<strong>in</strong>g Baathists who were muzzled47


y the patrimonial nature <strong>of</strong> Saddam’s system have now, with the disappearance <strong>of</strong> the highrank<strong>in</strong>gmembers, risen to control the <strong>in</strong>surgency.” He added that after the American attack andseveral weeks “<strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g like deer <strong>in</strong> headlights,” these Baathists had become <strong>org</strong>anized, and weredirect<strong>in</strong>g and lead<strong>in</strong>g operations aga<strong>in</strong>st Americans. Dur<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>terview <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, a seniorArab diplomat noted, “We do not believe that the resistance is loyal to Saddam. Yes, theBaathists have re<strong>org</strong>anized, not for political reasons but because <strong>of</strong> the terrible decisions madeby Jerry Bremer”—the director <strong>of</strong> the C.P.A. “The <strong>Iraq</strong>is really want to make you pay the price,”the diplomat said. “Kill<strong>in</strong>g Saddam will not end it.”Similarly, a Middle Eastern bus<strong>in</strong>essman who has advised senior Bush Adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>of</strong>ficialstold me that the re<strong>org</strong>anized Baath Party is “extremely active, work<strong>in</strong>g underground withpermanent <strong>in</strong>ternal communications. And without Saddam.” Baath party leaders, he added,expect Saddam to issue a public statement <strong>of</strong> self-criticism, “tell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> his mistakes and hisexcesses,” <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g his reliance on his sons.There is disagreement, <strong>in</strong>evitably, on the extent <strong>of</strong> Baathist control. The former <strong>Is</strong>raeli military<strong>in</strong>telligence<strong>of</strong>ficer said, “Most <strong>of</strong> the firepower comes from the Baathists, and they know wherethe weapons are kept. But many <strong>of</strong> the shooters are ethnic and tribal. <strong>Iraq</strong> is very factionalizednow, and with<strong>in</strong> the Sunni community factionalism goes deep.” He added, “Unless you settlethis, any effort at reconstruction <strong>in</strong> the center is hopeless.”The American military analyst agreed that the current emphasis on Baathist control “overlooksthe nationalist and tribal angle.” For example, he said, the anti-coalition forces <strong>in</strong> Falluja, a majorcenter <strong>of</strong> opposition, are “driven primarily by the sheikhs and mosques, <strong>Is</strong>lam, clerics, andnationalism.” The region, he went on, conta<strong>in</strong>s “tens <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> unemployed former military<strong>of</strong>ficers and enlistees who hang around the c<strong>of</strong>fee shops and restaurants <strong>of</strong> their relatives; theyplot, plan, and give and receive <strong>in</strong>structions; at night they go out on their missions.”This military analyst, like many <strong>of</strong>ficials I spoke to, also raised questions about the military’smore conventional tactics—the aggressive program, code-named Iron Hammer, <strong>of</strong> bomb<strong>in</strong>gs,nighttime raids, and mass arrests aimed at trouble spots <strong>in</strong> Sunni-dom<strong>in</strong>ated central <strong>Iraq</strong>. The<strong>in</strong>surgents, he told me, had already developed a response. “Their S.O.P.”—standard operat<strong>in</strong>gprocedure—“now is to go further out, or even to other towns, so that American retribution doesnot fall on their locale. Instead, the Americans take it out on the city where the <strong>in</strong>cidenthappened, and <strong>in</strong> the process they succeed <strong>in</strong> mak<strong>in</strong>g more enemies.”The brazen <strong>Iraq</strong>i attacks on two separate American convoys <strong>in</strong> Samarra, on November 30th,provided further evidence <strong>of</strong> the diversity <strong>of</strong> the opposition to the occupation. Samarra has beena center <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tense anti-Saddam feel<strong>in</strong>gs, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Ahmed S. Hashim, an expert on terrorismwho is a pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> strategic studies at the U.S. Naval <strong>War</strong> College. In an essay published <strong>in</strong>August by the Middle East Institute, Hashim wrote, “Many Samarra natives—who had servedwith dist<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>in</strong> the Baath Party and the armed forces—were purged or executed dur<strong>in</strong>g thecourse <strong>of</strong> the three decades <strong>of</strong> rule by Saddam and his cronies from the rival town <strong>of</strong> Tikrit.” Hewent on, “The type <strong>of</strong> U.S. force structure <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>—heavy armored and mechanized units—andthe psychological disposition <strong>of</strong> these forces which have been <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> for months is simply notconducive to the successful wag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency warfare.”48


The majority <strong>of</strong> the Bush Adm<strong>in</strong>istration’s manhunt<strong>in</strong>g missions rema<strong>in</strong> classified, but oneearlier mission, <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, had mixed results at best. Last November, an Al Qaeda leadernamed Qaed Salim S<strong>in</strong>an al-Harethi was killed when an unmanned Predator reconnaissanceaircraft fired a Hellfire missile at his automobile <strong>in</strong> Yemen. Five passengers <strong>in</strong> the automobilewere also killed, and it was subsequently reported that two previous Predator missions <strong>in</strong> Yemenhad been called <strong>of</strong>f at the last moment when it was learned that the occupants <strong>of</strong> suspect vehicleswere local Bedou<strong>in</strong>s, and not Al Qaeda members.S<strong>in</strong>ce then, an adviser to the Special Forces command has told me, <strong>in</strong>fight<strong>in</strong>g among the varioussenior military commands has made it difficult for Special Forces teams on alert to takeimmediate advantage <strong>of</strong> time-sensitive <strong>in</strong>telligence. Rumsfeld repeatedly criticized Air ForceGeneral Charles Holland, a four-star Special Forces commander who has just retired, for hisreluctance to authorize commando raids without specific, or “actionable,” <strong>in</strong>telligence. Rumsfeldhas also made a systematic effort to appo<strong>in</strong>t Special Forces advocates to the top military jobs.Another former Special Forces commander, Army General Peter Schoomaker, was brought out<strong>of</strong> retirement <strong>in</strong> July and named Army Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff. The new civilian Assistant Secretary forSpecial Operations <strong>in</strong> the Pentagon is Thomas O’Connell, an Army veteran who served <strong>in</strong> thePhoenix program <strong>in</strong> Vietnam, and who, <strong>in</strong> the early eighties, ran Grey Fox, the Army’s secretcommando unit.Early <strong>in</strong> November, the Times reported the existence <strong>of</strong> Task Force 121, and said that it wasauthorized to take action throughout the region, if necessary, <strong>in</strong> pursuit <strong>of</strong> Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>,Osama b<strong>in</strong> Laden, and other terrorists. (The task force is commanded by Air Force BrigadierGeneral Lyle Koenig, an experienced Special Forces helicopter pilot.) At that po<strong>in</strong>t, the formerSpecial Forces <strong>of</strong>ficial told me, the troops were “chas<strong>in</strong>g the deck <strong>of</strong> cards. Their job was to f<strong>in</strong>dSaddam, period.” Other Special Forces, <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan, were target<strong>in</strong>g what is known as theA.Q.S.L., the Al Qaeda Senior Leadership List.The task force’s search for Saddam was, from the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, daunt<strong>in</strong>g. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Scott Ritter,a former United Nations weapons <strong>in</strong>spector, it may have been fatally flawed as well. From 1994to 1998, Ritter directed a special U.N. unit that eavesdropped on many <strong>of</strong> Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>’sprivate telephone communications. “The high-pr<strong>of</strong>ile guys around Saddam were the murafaq<strong>in</strong>,his most loyal companions, who could stand next to him carry<strong>in</strong>g a gun,” Ritter told me. “Butnow he’s gone to a different tier—the tribes. He has released the men from his most sensitiveunits and let them go back to their tribes, and we don’t know where they are. The manifests <strong>of</strong>those units are gone; they’ve all been destroyed.” Ritter added, “Guys like Farouq Hijazi candeliver some <strong>of</strong> the Baath Party cells, and he knows where some <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>telligence people are.But he can’t get us <strong>in</strong>to the tribal hierarchy.” The task force, <strong>in</strong> any event, has shifted its focusfrom the hunt for Saddam as it is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly distracted by the spread<strong>in</strong>g guerrilla war.In addition to the Special Forces <strong>in</strong>itiative, the military is also explor<strong>in</strong>g other approaches tosuppress<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgency. The Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post reported last week that the Americanauthorities <strong>in</strong> Baghdad had agreed, with some reluctance, to the formation <strong>of</strong> an <strong>Iraq</strong>i-ledcounter-terrorism militia composed <strong>of</strong> troops from the nation’s five largest political parties. Theparamilitary unit, totall<strong>in</strong>g some eight hundred troops or so, would “identify and pursue49


<strong>in</strong>surgents” who had eluded arrest, the newspaper said. The group’s <strong>in</strong>itial missions would bemonitored and approved by American commanders, but eventually it would operate<strong>in</strong>dependently.Task Force 121’s next major problem may prove to be Iran. There is a debate go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong>side theAdm<strong>in</strong>istration about American and <strong>Is</strong>raeli <strong>in</strong>telligence that suggests that the Shiite-dom<strong>in</strong>atedIranian government may be actively aid<strong>in</strong>g the Sunni-led <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>—“pull<strong>in</strong>g the str<strong>in</strong>gson the puppet,” as one former <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficial put it. Many <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>telligence community areskeptical <strong>of</strong> this analysis—the Pentagon adviser compared it to “the Chalabi stuff,” referr<strong>in</strong>g tonow discredited prewar <strong>in</strong>telligence on W.M.D. supplied by <strong>Iraq</strong>i defectors. But I was told byseveral <strong>of</strong>ficials that the <strong>in</strong>telligence was considered to be highly reliable by civilians <strong>in</strong> theDefense Department. A former <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficial said that one possible response underconsideration was for the United States to tra<strong>in</strong> and equip an <strong>Iraq</strong>i force capable <strong>of</strong> stag<strong>in</strong>g crossborderraids. The American goal, he said, would be to “make the cost <strong>of</strong> support<strong>in</strong>g the Baathistsso dear that the Iranians would back <strong>of</strong>f,” add<strong>in</strong>g, “If it beg<strong>in</strong>s to look like another Iran-<strong>Iraq</strong> war,that’s another story.”The requirement that America’s Special Forces units operate <strong>in</strong> secrecy, a former senior coalitionadviser <strong>in</strong> Baghdad told me, has provided an additional <strong>in</strong>centive for <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g their presence <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>. The Special Forces <strong>in</strong>-country numbers are not generally <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> troop totals. Bush andRumsfeld have <strong>in</strong>sisted that more American troops are not needed, but that position waschallenged by many senior military <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>in</strong> private conversations with me. “You need morepeople,” the former adviser, a retired admiral, said. “But you can’t add them, because Rummy’staken a position. So you <strong>in</strong>vent a force that won’t be counted.”At present, there is no legislation that requires the President to notify Congress beforeauthoriz<strong>in</strong>g an overseas Special Forces mission. The Special Forces have been expandedenormously <strong>in</strong> the Bush Adm<strong>in</strong>istration. The 2004 Pentagon budget provides more thansix and a half billion dollars for their activities—a thirty-four-per-cent <strong>in</strong>crease over2003. A recent congressional study put the number <strong>of</strong> active and reserve Special Forcestroops at forty-seven thousand, and has suggested that the appropriate House and Senatecommittees needed to debate the “proper overall role” <strong>of</strong> Special Forces <strong>in</strong> the global waron terrorism.The former <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficial depicted the Delta and seal teams as “force multipliers”—smallunits that can do the work <strong>of</strong> much larger ones and thereby <strong>in</strong>crease the power <strong>of</strong> the operation asa whole. He also implicitly recognized that such operations would become more and morecommon; when Special Forces target the Baathists, he said, “it’s technically notassass<strong>in</strong>ation—it’s normal combat operations.”50


Part Three:200451


http://www.counterpunch.<strong>org</strong>/hassan06042004.htmlAmbassador to <strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong>: Who is John Negroponte?By GHALI HASSANCounterpunchJune 4, 2004The White House has appo<strong>in</strong>ted Mr. John Dimitris Negroponte to be United States ambassadorto <strong>Iraq</strong>. He will preside over the largest embassy <strong>in</strong> the world, and housed <strong>in</strong> the Republic Palace(mislead<strong>in</strong>gly named Saddam's Palace by the U.S. occupation). He will be protected by highconcrete walls, barbed wires and more than 150,000 occupation force, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g severalthousands <strong>of</strong> foreign mercenaries armed to the teeth with the most violent tools. Mr. Negroponteis Greek-American diplomat. He is currently lead<strong>in</strong>g the diplomatic war aga<strong>in</strong>st the people <strong>of</strong><strong>Iraq</strong> as the U.S. envoy at the United Nations (UN) <strong>in</strong> New York. Negroponte is Jewish. A friend<strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> expressed his deep concern to me recently: " to appo<strong>in</strong>t a Jew as ambassador to the Arabcountry that has been devastated because <strong>of</strong> the will <strong>of</strong> a cabal <strong>of</strong> Jewish neocons headed byWolfowitz Bush is just an accessory -, is like try<strong>in</strong>g to put <strong>of</strong>f a fire us<strong>in</strong>g buckets <strong>of</strong>gasol<strong>in</strong>e".Mr. Negroponte has served as U.S. Ambassador to Honduras from 1981-1985; a period dur<strong>in</strong>gwhich the U.S. military aid to Honduras grew from $5 million to nearly $100 million, and morethan $200 million <strong>in</strong> economic aid, mak<strong>in</strong>g Honduras the largest aid recipient <strong>in</strong> the region.Honduras was the launch<strong>in</strong>g pad from which the Reagan adm<strong>in</strong>istration runs its violent "war onterror" <strong>in</strong> Central American. The U.S-backed atrocities and terror were condemned by theInternational World Court <strong>in</strong> the Hague (1). Like most <strong>of</strong> his colleagues <strong>in</strong> the Bushadm<strong>in</strong>istration, Mr. Negroponte is a "recycled reaganites".At the time Mr. Negroponte was <strong>in</strong> Honduras, Honduras was a military dictatorship. Kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g,rape, torture and executions <strong>of</strong> dissidents was rampant. The military top and middle ranks wereU.S-tra<strong>in</strong>ed at the School <strong>of</strong> the Americas (SOA), the Harvard version <strong>of</strong> the CIA, based <strong>in</strong> FortBenn<strong>in</strong>g, Ge<strong>org</strong>ia. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Human Rights Watch, graduates <strong>of</strong> the SOA are responsible forthe worst human rights abuses and torture <strong>of</strong> dissidents <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America. Some <strong>of</strong> its 60,000graduates are notorious Manuel Noriega and Omar Torrijos <strong>of</strong> Panama, Leopoldo Galtieri andRoberto Viola <strong>of</strong> Argent<strong>in</strong>a, Juan Velasco Alvarado <strong>of</strong> Peru, Guillermo Rodriguez <strong>of</strong> Ecuador,Hugo Banzer Suarez <strong>of</strong> Bolivia and Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, Honduras security police chiefand later Honduran top military commander.In Honduras the army <strong>in</strong>telligence unit, Battalion 3-16, which was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs, rape,torture and kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> suspected dissidents. In 1995 Gary Cohn and G<strong>in</strong>ger Thompson <strong>of</strong> TheBaltimore Sun unearthed massive and substantiated evidence from various sources po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g thef<strong>in</strong>ger at Mr. Negroponte knowledge <strong>of</strong> the crimes. The reporters also found that hundreds <strong>of</strong>Hondurans "were kidnapped, tortured and killed <strong>in</strong> the 1980s by a secret army unit tra<strong>in</strong>ed andsupported by the CIA"(2). Reliable evidence from the Inter-American Commission on HumanRights <strong>in</strong> Honduras alleged that Negroponte oversaw the expansion <strong>of</strong> U.S tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g camp and52


military base on Honduran territory, where <strong>US</strong>-tra<strong>in</strong>ed Contras terrorists, and where the militarysecretly deta<strong>in</strong>ed, tortured and executed Honduran suspected dissidents.Dur<strong>in</strong>g his years <strong>in</strong> Honduras, Negroponte acquired a reputation, justified, as an old-fashionedimperialist, and devoted to Realpolitik (3). Mr. Negroponte will br<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Iraq</strong> his version <strong>of</strong>"democracy" à la Lat<strong>in</strong> America, where the people vote for one <strong>of</strong> two candidates every halfdecade, <strong>in</strong> which civilian leaders have to obey U.S-controlled militaries or face dismissal bymilitary force. Mr. Negroponte will f<strong>in</strong>d the <strong>Iraq</strong>i soil fertile for his version <strong>of</strong> democracy andhuman rights. The U.S. adm<strong>in</strong>istration turn bl<strong>in</strong>d eye to violations <strong>of</strong> human rights by their owntroops and mercenaries. Nazi's methods <strong>of</strong> torture, sexual abuses and murder <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i prisonersby the racist soldiers <strong>of</strong> the occupy<strong>in</strong>g forces are <strong>in</strong> use immediately after the <strong>in</strong>vasion andoccupation <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>.The occupy<strong>in</strong>g powers also ignores the crim<strong>in</strong>al activities <strong>of</strong> four militia thugs, which accord<strong>in</strong>gto exile <strong>Iraq</strong>is have murdered many <strong>Iraq</strong>i academics and <strong>in</strong>tellectuals. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i-born novelist andartist Haifa Zangana wrote <strong>in</strong> the Guardian <strong>of</strong> London: "the peshmergas <strong>of</strong> the two Kurdishparties; the Badr brigade <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Council for <strong>Is</strong>lamic Revolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>; AhmedChalabi's troops; and the ex-Ba'athist Mukhabarats under Iyad Alawi's national accord. Thesemilitias are run by members <strong>of</strong> the IGC and no one can touch them"(4). The occupy<strong>in</strong>g powershave not put an end to these violent crimes.Recently, Mr. Negroponte talked about: "real dialogue between our military commanders, thenew <strong>Iraq</strong>i government and, I th<strong>in</strong>k, the United States mission as well". He said: "the Americanmilitary is go<strong>in</strong>g to have the freedom to act <strong>in</strong> their self-defence, and they are go<strong>in</strong>g to be free tooperate <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> as they best see fit". Negroponte st<strong>in</strong>t at the UN was to shield <strong>Is</strong>rael crimesaga<strong>in</strong>st the Palest<strong>in</strong>ians, and to coerce smaller nations at the Security Council exercis<strong>in</strong>g thethreat <strong>of</strong> U.S. power.Negroponte diplomatic responsibilities were appall<strong>in</strong>g. Democracy and human rights are not onNegroponte preferred menu. Negroponte will be serv<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>of</strong> U.S. tyranny and U.S.Corporations <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Negroponte will br<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Iraq</strong> the economic disasters <strong>in</strong>flicted on the people<strong>of</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America by the U.S. and U.S-backed corporations. Negroponte is not suitable to serve <strong>in</strong>the current political environment <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.[1]. Noam Chomsky, Terror and Just Response, www.chomsky.<strong>in</strong>fo/articles/20020702.[2]. Gary Cohn & G<strong>in</strong>ger Thompson, Former envoy to Honduras says he did what he could, TheBaltimore Sun, December 15, 1995.[3]. Stephen K<strong>in</strong>zer, Our Man <strong>in</strong> Honduras, The New York Review <strong>of</strong> Books, 48(14), September2001.[4]. Haifa Zangana, The Enemy with<strong>in</strong>, The Guardian, 10 April 2004.Ghali Hassan is <strong>in</strong> the Science and Mathematics Education Centre, Curt<strong>in</strong> University,Perth, Western Australia. Hassan@exchange.curt<strong>in</strong>.edu.au53


http://www.alternet.<strong>org</strong>/waroniraq/18967/Here Come the <strong>Death</strong> Squad VeteransAlternetBy Louis Nevaer, Pacific News ServicePosted on June 16, 2004If Josao Miguel Pizarro has his way, he will recruit 30,000 Chileans as mercenaries to protectAmerican companies under Pentagon contract to rebuild <strong>Iraq</strong>. And undoubtedly, with<strong>in</strong> thoseranks will be former members <strong>of</strong> death squads that tortured and murdered civilians whendictatorships ruled <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America."There is no comparison with what they can earn <strong>in</strong> the active military or work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> civilianjobs, and what we <strong>of</strong>fer," José Miguel Pizarro, Chile's lead<strong>in</strong>g recruiter for <strong>in</strong>ternationalsecurity firms, says. "This is an opportunity that few <strong>in</strong> Chile can afford to pass up."Pizarro's firm, Servicios Integrales, was contracted by Blackwater <strong>US</strong>A to recruit the firstbatch <strong>of</strong> Chileans <strong>in</strong> November 2003. By May 2004 he had placed 5,200 men who, afterone week <strong>of</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Santiago, head to North Carol<strong>in</strong>a for orientation with Blackwater,the private security firm that made headl<strong>in</strong>es when four <strong>of</strong> its employees where killed <strong>in</strong>Falluja, their bodies mutilated and hung from a bridge. After tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, Blackwater fliesthe men to Kuwait City to await their assignments <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.As democratic governments were voted <strong>in</strong>to <strong>of</strong>fice throughout Lat<strong>in</strong> America <strong>in</strong> the 1990s, Lat<strong>in</strong>militaries were downsized. Thousands <strong>of</strong> military <strong>of</strong>ficers lost their jobs. "This is a way <strong>of</strong>cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g our military careers," Carlos Wamgnet, 30, expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> a phone <strong>in</strong>terview fromKuwait while await<strong>in</strong>g his assignment <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. "In civilian life <strong>in</strong> Chile I was mak<strong>in</strong>g $1,800 amonth. Here I can earn a year's pay <strong>in</strong> six weeks. It's worth the risks."At 30, Wamgnet is too young to have participated <strong>in</strong> any crime <strong>of</strong> the P<strong>in</strong>ochet regime. But notall the Chileans <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> are guiltless. Newspapers <strong>in</strong> Chile have estimated that approximately 37Chileans <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> are seasoned veterans <strong>of</strong> the P<strong>in</strong>ochet era. Government <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>in</strong> Santiago arealarmed that men who enjoy amnesty <strong>in</strong> Chile -- provided they rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> "retirement" from theirpast military activities -- are now <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.In an <strong>in</strong>terview with the Santiago-based daily newspaper La Tercera, Chilean M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong>Defense Dr. Michelle Bachelet stated that Chilean "mercenaries for American firms do<strong>in</strong>gbus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>" may be subject to "arrest or detention <strong>in</strong> third countries," a reference to recentarrests <strong>in</strong> Spa<strong>in</strong> and Mexico <strong>of</strong> South Americans with war-crimes pasts. South American mediareport that Chileans have requested travel from Chile to the United States and then directly to theMiddle East, to bypass Mexico and the European Union. The thousands <strong>of</strong> Chileans <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> havebeen nicknamed "the pengu<strong>in</strong>s" by American and South African soldiers for hire, a referenceboth to Chile's proximity to the South Pole and the fact that many Chilean mercenaries are <strong>of</strong>mixed race.54


Not everyone <strong>in</strong> Chile is opposed to the presence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>of</strong> former Chilean army members. "It istrue that the majority [<strong>of</strong> Chilean recruits] see this as an opportunity to earn money," La Terceracolumnist Mauricio Aguirre wrote."But it is also an opportunity for our soldiers to provethemselves on the ground, and to put to use the skills for which they tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the Armed Forcesover the years.""Blackwater <strong>US</strong>A has sent recruiters to Chile, Peru, Argent<strong>in</strong>a, Colombia and Guatemala for onespecific reason alone," said an <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>in</strong> Kuwait who requested anonymity. "Allthese countries experienced dirty warsâ€_ and they have military men well-tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>gwith <strong>in</strong>ternal subversives. They are well-versed <strong>in</strong> extract<strong>in</strong>g confessions from prisoners."As the security situation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> deteriorated <strong>in</strong> the spr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> 2004, more "dedicated recruit<strong>in</strong>g"began.Though Chile is <strong>in</strong> vigorous debate about the role <strong>of</strong> military servicemen becom<strong>in</strong>g hired guns <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>, <strong>in</strong> Argent<strong>in</strong>a there is virtual silence. Several Argent<strong>in</strong>e mercenaries have made their way tothe United States to meet with American security firms before head<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Iraq</strong>. "No one wants todiscuss what is becom<strong>in</strong>g clear," says Mario Podestá, 51, an <strong>in</strong>dependent Argent<strong>in</strong>e journalist."I know <strong>of</strong> seven military <strong>of</strong>ficers responsible for disappear<strong>in</strong>g opponents <strong>of</strong> the dictatorship"who are now <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Dur<strong>in</strong>g Argent<strong>in</strong>a's "dirty wars," opponents <strong>of</strong> the military regime were"disappeared" (abducted), tortured and then killed.Podesta spoke to this reporter <strong>in</strong> early April. He was <strong>in</strong> Jordan prepar<strong>in</strong>g to travel by road toBaghdad, along with Mariana Verà nica Cabrera, 28, an Argent<strong>in</strong>e camerawoman. "I wantto f<strong>in</strong>d these men," he said <strong>of</strong> the Argent<strong>in</strong>e 'dirty war' crim<strong>in</strong>als he had identified as be<strong>in</strong>gmercenaries <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. It was not to be.Podesta and Cabrera were killed, along with their <strong>Iraq</strong>i driver, <strong>in</strong> an automobile accident beforereach<strong>in</strong>g Baghdad.Louis Nevaer is an author and economist whose most recent book, "NAFTA'S Second Decade"(South-Western Educational Publish<strong>in</strong>g, 2004), exam<strong>in</strong>es the political economy <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternationaldevelopment and trade.© 2006 Independent Media Institute. All rights reserved.View this story onl<strong>in</strong>e at: http://www.alternet.<strong>org</strong>/story/18967/55


Global Terror by Secret <strong>US</strong> <strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong>:Gulfstream executive jets and hooded <strong>US</strong> agentsBy Henk Ruyssenaars – FPF – the Netherlands07/10/04207.44.245.159/article7069.htm“ The two prisoners have their clothes cut from their bodies by scissors, without their hand-andfoot cuffs be<strong>in</strong>g loosened. The naked and cha<strong>in</strong>ed prisoners have a suppository <strong>of</strong> unknown k<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>serted <strong>in</strong>to their anus, and diapers are put on them. They are forcibly dressed <strong>in</strong> dark overalls.Their hands and feet are cha<strong>in</strong>ed to a specially designed harness. On the plane, both men arebl<strong>in</strong>dfolded and hooded… the plane takes <strong>of</strong>f at 21.49 and sets course towards Egypt.”Amsterdam – 13-10-2004 -- Three years ago, on October 1, 2001, President Bush made areference to the arrests <strong>in</strong> foreign countries, <strong>in</strong> a speech at the headquarters <strong>of</strong> the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA)* <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton.He was quoted <strong>in</strong> the Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post <strong>in</strong> November 2001 – as say<strong>in</strong>g “that the American peoplearen't go<strong>in</strong>g to see exactly what's tak<strong>in</strong>g place on their TV screens,” but he added that “slowly,but surely,” progress was be<strong>in</strong>g made.“You see, we've said to people around the world: 'This could happen to you, this could haveeasily have taken place on your soil, so you need to take threats seriously, as well,” Bush said.“We're beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to share <strong>in</strong>telligence amongst our nations. We're f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g out members <strong>of</strong> theQaeda <strong>org</strong>anization, who they are, where they th<strong>in</strong>k they can hide. And we're slowly, but surely,br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g them to justice.”It is known that s<strong>in</strong>ce Sept. 11, <strong>in</strong>telligence shar<strong>in</strong>g and cooperation/collaboration among foreignservices worldwide has flourished. The grow<strong>in</strong>g number <strong>of</strong> foreign detentions, part <strong>of</strong> the“unseen” war on terror that President Bush has frequently alluded to, shows the degree <strong>of</strong>cooperation other nations are quietly provid<strong>in</strong>g to the U.S. effort to crush al Qaeda.Seymour Hersh has warned <strong>in</strong> his recent talks at Berkeley about this secret <strong>US</strong> military unit(there are more / HR) The <strong>Iraq</strong> war is not w<strong>in</strong>nable” Hersh said: “My government has a secretunit that has been 'disappear<strong>in</strong>g' people s<strong>in</strong>ce December 2001. Rumsfeld decided after 9/11 thathe could not wait. The president signed a secret document. There's a team <strong>of</strong> people, they fly <strong>in</strong>unmarked planes, they fly <strong>in</strong> Gulfstreams*, they have their own choppers, they don't carryAmerican passports, and they just grab people.” [end quote]56


Secret <strong>US</strong> Gulfstream jets and Swedish Quisl<strong>in</strong>gsAs an former correspondent cover<strong>in</strong>g Scand<strong>in</strong>avia, and know<strong>in</strong>g the Swedish language, one canread <strong>in</strong> swedish newspapers how this man hunt works <strong>in</strong> reality. The overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>humanity,when the government and police <strong>in</strong> this country <strong>of</strong> 'Sex, S<strong>in</strong> and Smörgåsbord' – <strong>in</strong> a blatantcrime aga<strong>in</strong>st their own laws and humanity – help <strong>US</strong> secret agents from Force 121* to carry outan expulsion and forces two victims aboard one a <strong>US</strong> Gulfstream on a Swedish airport, isoutrageous.In a documentary by Swedish TV 4, called “The broken promise”, on 17 May2004, it was shown that “the expulsion <strong>of</strong> two men – ordered by the Cab<strong>in</strong>et – to Egypt on 18December 2001, was carried out by hooded <strong>US</strong> agents. The plane booked by the SwedishSecurity Police – (SÄPO/Säkerhetspolisen/HR)– was canceled when another plane – N379P – a“Gulfstream” executive jet, was supplied by a firm* on the east coast <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong>A, which worksexclusively for the the <strong>US</strong> Defense Department.Supposed Terrorist? Torture!The two men, Muhammed Al Zery and Ahmed Agiza, were alleged to have had connected toterrorist groups – both had been <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> islamic movements <strong>in</strong> Egypt. The SwedishMigration Board decided that both needed protection and granted them asylum.However, the Swedish Security Police (SÄPO), <strong>in</strong> the post 11 September 2001 climate, decidedto respond to a <strong>US</strong> request for their removal to Egypt where they could be questioned at will andby agencies whose reputation for us<strong>in</strong>g ill-treatment and torture was well established.At 11.45 am on 18 December 2001 the Swedish cab<strong>in</strong>et agreed – on the basis <strong>of</strong> SÄPO'srecommendation and “<strong>in</strong>formation from Egypt” – that the men should be expelled.. At 16.48Ahmed Agiza was apprehended <strong>in</strong> Karlstad, on the way home from a course <strong>in</strong> Swedish and afew m<strong>in</strong>utes later Muhammed Al Zery <strong>in</strong> a shop <strong>in</strong> Stockholm.They were driven to Bromma airport [normally for <strong>in</strong>land flights / HR] <strong>in</strong> Stockholm where thespecial jet, N379P*, has landed. They are taken to a room where a group <strong>of</strong> men <strong>in</strong> pla<strong>in</strong> clothesfrom the plane are wait<strong>in</strong>g– “they have their faces hooded”.Then: “The two prisoners have their clothes cut from their bodies by scissors, without their handandfoot cuffs be<strong>in</strong>g loosened. The naked and cha<strong>in</strong>ed prisoners have a suppository <strong>of</strong> unknownk<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong>serted <strong>in</strong>to their anus, and diapers are put on them. They are forcibly dressed <strong>in</strong> darkoveralls. Their hands and feet are cha<strong>in</strong>ed to a specially designed harness. On the plane, bothmen are bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded and hooded… the plane takes <strong>of</strong>f at 21.49 and sets course towards Egypt”. [and torture/HR ]It is quite clear that all the people responsible for this k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> actions <strong>in</strong> Sweden, the <strong>US</strong> <strong>of</strong>course, and all other collaborat<strong>in</strong>g countries – like the Netherlands* – have committed – and are57


committ<strong>in</strong>g – crimes aga<strong>in</strong>st humanity, for which they soon must be made to stand trial, like <strong>in</strong>my country where court hear<strong>in</strong>gs have started with Dutch war crim<strong>in</strong>als.*<strong>Crime</strong>s aga<strong>in</strong>st humanity: <strong>US</strong> Task Force 121Task Force 121 is a classic example <strong>of</strong> the United State's 'Jo<strong>in</strong>t Task Force' concept <strong>of</strong>conduct<strong>in</strong>g Special Operations. TF121 is a multiservice force commanded by an Air ForceBrigadier General. The spearhead <strong>of</strong> the force is a forty-man team that is most likely made up <strong>of</strong>operators from Delta, Devgroup and the CIA's paramilitary units (many <strong>of</strong> whom are ex Deltaand Devgroup anyway).Other Special Operations contributions will <strong>in</strong>clude Air Force Combat Controllers and SpecialOperations aircraft*. It is also not unlikely that operators from Coalition nations [the 'so called'Coalition <strong>of</strong> the Will<strong>in</strong>g/Kill<strong>in</strong>g- HR] (particularly the British and Australian SAS and Poland'sGROM) are <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> TF121.The team operates with the support <strong>of</strong> a much larger conventional force when required, and iscovered by the <strong>US</strong> '<strong>Death</strong> Squad Protection Act'*<strong>US</strong> '<strong>Death</strong> Squad Protection Act'*In the 29th <strong>of</strong> June 1995, #4 issue <strong>of</strong> the 'Intelligence Newsletter', there already was a story onthe future threat <strong>of</strong> this k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> 'United States global Gestapo': 'Covert Unit Alive and Kick<strong>in</strong>g.':The U.S. military's “'Black' Special Operations Unit, once known as the Intelligence SupportActivity (ISA) is now operat<strong>in</strong>g across the world under a different name and could even see itsbudget and powers <strong>in</strong>crease significantly as sharper emphasis is put on special operations andHUMINT <strong>in</strong> the post-Cold <strong>War</strong> period.”The unit's mission rema<strong>in</strong>s focussed on counter-terrorism and … it is becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> counter-proliferation, economic espionage and <strong>in</strong>formation warfare… ISA'ssuccessor is also likely to be asked to provide crucial <strong>in</strong>telligence if the Pentagon needs to backup its counter-proliferation strategy with <strong>in</strong>terdiction and preemptive strikes. The unit is said tobe already provid<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>telligence on black markets <strong>in</strong> nuclear and bio/chemical weapons by<strong>in</strong>filtrat<strong>in</strong>g agents <strong>in</strong>to gangs deal<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> such activity.”Shades Of VietnamIn Berkeley, a moved and angry Seymour Hersh told the auditorium: “It's shades <strong>of</strong> Vietnamaga<strong>in</strong>, folks: body counts,” And he also said “My parents were immigrants, they came herebecause America meant someth<strong>in</strong>g?the Statue <strong>of</strong> Liberty and all that stuff, because Americaalways was this bastion <strong>of</strong> morality and <strong>in</strong>tegrity and a place for a fresh start.And it's right <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> us, not hidden, that they've taken this away from us.”One can only agree with Hersh, that the suffer<strong>in</strong>g, and damage, done to so many people, <strong>in</strong> somany countries, by the United States governments and their ilk, will take generations to repair.58


If ever possible…FOOTNOTES:Seymour Hersh – Url. full story: www.<strong>in</strong>formationclear<strong>in</strong>ghouse.<strong>in</strong>fo/video1021.htmInclud<strong>in</strong>g webcast: Seymour Hersh, 1 hour 22 m<strong>in</strong>utes.<strong>US</strong> '<strong>Death</strong> Squad Protection Act' Url.: t<strong>in</strong>yurl.com/6xdfwSecret Task Force 121 – Url.: t<strong>in</strong>yurl.com/6pzpoSweden-expulsion-Url.: www.statewatch.<strong>org</strong>/news/'Black' Gulfstream jet N379P : t<strong>in</strong>yurl.com/6gswg (picture)It is supposed to be owned by:PREMIERE EXECUTIVE TRANSPORT SERVICES INC 339 WASHINGTON ST STE 202,DEDHAM, MASSACH<strong>US</strong>ETTS, <strong>US</strong>A<strong>US</strong> companies that <strong>of</strong>ten flies/operate the plane: Aero Contractor Ltd Johnson County Airport –Smithfield, North Carol<strong>in</strong>a, <strong>US</strong>ASTEVENS EXPRESS LEASING, INC. – 8130 COUNTRY VILLAGE, DRIVE S101,CORDOVA, Tennesee, <strong>US</strong>AFrench source: another 'Black Jet: t<strong>in</strong>yurl.com/7x22nDutch war crim<strong>in</strong>als court hear<strong>in</strong>g: t<strong>in</strong>yurl.com/662ppFEMA and Concentrationcamps: t<strong>in</strong>yurl.com/63huaMilitary Intelligence – Special Operations: Url.: t<strong>in</strong>yurl.com/5pe6gThe DIA and the military services ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a large number <strong>of</strong> military attachés and a muchsmaller network <strong>of</strong> clandest<strong>in</strong>e case <strong>of</strong>ficers to satisfy foreign <strong>in</strong>telligence requirements. TheDefense HUMINT Service became operational October 1, 1995, to consolidate the human<strong>in</strong>telligence (HUMINT) capabilities <strong>of</strong> the DIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force.[t<strong>in</strong>yurl.com/5xapq]FOREIGN PRESS FOUNDATION t<strong>in</strong>yurl.com/3crhn Editor : Henk Ruyssenaarst<strong>in</strong>yurl.com/2ghoh The Netherlands FPF (at)Chello.nl59


The Dutch author has this far worked abroad for 4 decades for <strong>in</strong>ternational media, as foreigncorrespondent, <strong>of</strong> which 10 years – also dur<strong>in</strong>g Gulf <strong>War</strong> I – <strong>in</strong> the Arab World and the MiddleEast.Ma<strong>in</strong> Index >> Spies R <strong>US</strong> Index60


Part Four:200561


http://www.globalsecurity.<strong>org</strong>/<strong>org</strong>/news/2005/050110-iraqi-squads.htmU.S. denies creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i 'death squads'In-Depth CoverageBy Pamela HessUPIJanuary 10, 2005A Pentagon spokesman Monday denied reports the U.S. military is tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g "death squads" totarget <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Newsweek magaz<strong>in</strong>e reported Saturday on the effort <strong>in</strong> its latest issue."The U.S. military does not take part <strong>in</strong> or tra<strong>in</strong> other forces to undertake illegal actions,assass<strong>in</strong>ations or torture. All tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and advis<strong>in</strong>g our Special Operations forces conduct with<strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces is done <strong>in</strong> full compliance with the laws <strong>of</strong> war," said a Pentagonspokesman."The leadership <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is a legitimate military target. U.S., Coalition and <strong>Iraq</strong>isecurity forces will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to capture or kill the command-and-control elements <strong>of</strong> the<strong>in</strong>surgency as a legitimate military tactic. S<strong>in</strong>ce 9-11, the U.S. government has made clear a goalto capture or kill those guilty <strong>of</strong> terrorist acts and we will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to do so, governed by the laws<strong>of</strong> war."The U.S. military's plan for <strong>Iraq</strong>i security from the start has been to create an <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forceto police the country. The experience <strong>of</strong> the last 18 months has shown it to be imperative: Thevery presence <strong>of</strong> occupation forces <strong>in</strong>flames the <strong>in</strong>surgency and public op<strong>in</strong>ion. The only viableway <strong>of</strong> stopp<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgent forces is to have <strong>Iraq</strong>i-tra<strong>in</strong>ed forces target them, a senior U.S.military <strong>of</strong>ficial said.Human rights <strong>org</strong>anizations were quick to denounce such plans. "Experience from countries suchas Colombia, Sudan and Russia <strong>in</strong> Chechnya shows that 'death squads' and paramilitary groupscreated to combat <strong>in</strong>surgencies take on a life <strong>of</strong> their own and are <strong>of</strong>ten difficult to re<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>,"Human Rights Watch said <strong>in</strong> the statement Monday. "Once established, it is difficult to preventthem from kill<strong>in</strong>g whomever they want for whatever reasons they want, open<strong>in</strong>g up thepossibility that civilians will be targeted because <strong>of</strong> personal or political vendettas <strong>in</strong> violation <strong>of</strong>the Geneva Conventions."The statement quoted Kenneth Roth, executive director, as say<strong>in</strong>g, "If this plan is real, thePentagon will rue the day it dreamed it up. They are creat<strong>in</strong>g a monster that could someday killthe very <strong>Iraq</strong>i democracy they say they want to build."62


The <strong>org</strong>anization said U.S. and <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces have been legally arrest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgent leaders orkill<strong>in</strong>g them when they fight back. However, they noted, "deliberately target<strong>in</strong>g civilians orexecut<strong>in</strong>g combatants <strong>in</strong> custody would be a war crime."One <strong>of</strong> the primary lessons U.S. forces have learned <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, particularly over the last six months,is that non-local <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces are <strong>of</strong>ten best able to target <strong>in</strong>surgents embedded <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> areas,because they are not compromised by tribal alliances or by fear for their families' safety.Br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces from one area to operate <strong>in</strong> another has paid dividends, particularly alongthe Syrian border where some <strong>of</strong> the worst violence is seen, and where smugglers and fighters --<strong>Iraq</strong>i and foreign -- cross the border.One unit <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s former Special Forces, <strong>org</strong>anized under an <strong>Iraq</strong>i general who <strong>of</strong>fered hisservices to the 1st Mar<strong>in</strong>e Division, has been especially effective <strong>in</strong> lawless Husayba, accord<strong>in</strong>gto a senior military <strong>of</strong>ficial.The Newsweek report says tra<strong>in</strong>ed Shiite and Kurdish soldiers would be used aga<strong>in</strong>st the rebels.A senior military <strong>of</strong>ficial said Sunni soldiers, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those <strong>in</strong> the 600-man Special Forces unit,would also be used.The <strong>of</strong>ficials bristled at the term "death squads," which suggests the <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces will be sentaga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>nocent targets <strong>in</strong> a scorched-earth policy to rout the rebels, the senior <strong>of</strong>ficialcompla<strong>in</strong>ed. That is not the <strong>in</strong>tention, he said.Another <strong>of</strong>ficial said the new forces would be ak<strong>in</strong> to the United States' secret Delta Force, ateam <strong>of</strong> Special Forces soldiers especially tra<strong>in</strong>ed for counter-terror operations.Delta Force was created <strong>in</strong> October 1977 <strong>in</strong> direct response to worldwide terrorist <strong>in</strong>cidents. Itspecializes <strong>in</strong> hostage rescue, barricade operations and reconnaissance, accord<strong>in</strong>g toGlobalSecurity.<strong>org</strong>.Newsweek noted the presence <strong>of</strong> now <strong>Iraq</strong>i Ambassador John Negroponte who served <strong>in</strong>Honduras <strong>in</strong> the 1980s. <strong>Death</strong> squads with connections to the United States governmentoperat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Nicaragua and El Salvador sometimes used Honduras as a home base.63


http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6814001/site/newsweek/Dickey: <strong>Iraq</strong>, Salvador and <strong>Death</strong>-Squad Democracy. Are there parallels between ElSalvador <strong>in</strong> the ‘80s and <strong>Iraq</strong> today? Maybe. But the ‘lessons learned’ by Wash<strong>in</strong>gton arethe wrong onesWEB-EXCL<strong>US</strong>IVE COMMENTARYBy Christopher DickeyNewsweekJan 11, 2005Jan. 11 - Among the many tools used to build and defend pro-American democracies, murder isamong the trickiest. But murder—yes, let’s <strong>in</strong>sist on that word—is also quite common <strong>in</strong> theannals <strong>of</strong> nation-build<strong>in</strong>g, at least <strong>in</strong> my experience, and sometimes it’s been very effective. Nowwe hear that some <strong>of</strong> the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration’s strategists are talk<strong>in</strong>g about what they call “TheSalvador Option”, which seems to imply “death squads” (as the murderers were called <strong>in</strong> ElSalvador and Guatemala) or “hit teams” (as they’ve been called <strong>in</strong> <strong>Is</strong>rael).Hav<strong>in</strong>g watched the slaughter <strong>in</strong> El Salvador first hand dur<strong>in</strong>g the early 1980s, hav<strong>in</strong>g lost manyfriends and acqua<strong>in</strong>tances to the butchers there—among them nuns, priests and an archbishopwho will someday be sa<strong>in</strong>ted—and hav<strong>in</strong>g been targeted myself, I have someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a personal<strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> this notion. I’m not about to f<strong>org</strong>et the bodies ly<strong>in</strong>g unclaimed <strong>in</strong> the streets, thefamilies <strong>of</strong> the victims too afraid to pick them up lest they become targets as well. When I heartalk <strong>of</strong> a Salvador Option, I can’t help but th<strong>in</strong>k about El Playón, a wasteland <strong>of</strong> volcanic rockthat was one <strong>of</strong> the killers’ favorite dump<strong>in</strong>g grounds. I’ve never f<strong>org</strong>otten the sick-sweet stench<strong>of</strong> carnal refuse there, the mutilated corpses half-devoured by mongrels and buzzards, the holloweyes <strong>of</strong> a human skull peer<strong>in</strong>g up through the loose-piled rocks, the hair fallen away from thebone like a gruesome halo.Still, I’m prepared to admit that build<strong>in</strong>g friendly democracies sometimes has to be a coldbloodedbus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong> the shadowland <strong>of</strong> moral grays that is the real world. The Reaganadm<strong>in</strong>istration was just do<strong>in</strong>g—or, more <strong>of</strong>ten, allow<strong>in</strong>g to be done—whatever it took to defeat alargely Communist <strong>in</strong>surgency. I’m even prepared to believe that Arena, the political partyfounded by the late death squad leader, Roberto D’Aubuisson, has long s<strong>in</strong>ce cleaned up its act.Salvadoran voters returned Arena to power last year for the third time s<strong>in</strong>ce 1992. Its presidentialcandidate, Tony Saca, beat former guerrilla leader Shafik Handal by a landslide. Would ElPlayón’s voters have made a difference? Well, we’ll never know.The question <strong>of</strong> the moment is not the state <strong>of</strong> play <strong>in</strong> El Salvador, however, it’s the disaster <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>. The Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration has a dismal record learn<strong>in</strong>g the wrong lessons from the wrongparadigms when it comes to <strong>Iraq</strong>. This was not the liberation <strong>of</strong> France, nor the occupation <strong>of</strong>Germany or Japan, and America’s war on terrorists is not the same as <strong>Is</strong>rael’s war with thePalest<strong>in</strong>ians. So, let’s take a real close look at what we’re talk<strong>in</strong>g about here when we discuss theSalvador Option.64


For starters, what’s been written about the NEWSWEEK report by Michael Hirsh and JohnBarry goes far beyond what the story says. It doesn’t suggest for a m<strong>in</strong>ute, as the BBC reported,that the Pentagon is look<strong>in</strong>g to create “paramilitary” death squads. It’s about the possible tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> elite units to snatch or kill very specific <strong>in</strong>surgent leaders.In fact, the policy could be a formalization <strong>of</strong> what's already tak<strong>in</strong>g place. “We are, <strong>of</strong> course,already target<strong>in</strong>g enemy cadres for elim<strong>in</strong>ation whether by capture or death <strong>in</strong> various places<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Afghanistan and <strong>Iraq</strong>,” says Patrick Lang, former chief <strong>of</strong> Middle East analysis for theU.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Lang, so many people <strong>in</strong> the Special OperationsForces have been caught up <strong>in</strong> efforts to do just that, there’s actually a shortage <strong>of</strong> Green Beretsto do what they’re most needed for: tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g regular <strong>Iraq</strong>i troops. “Surely,” says Lang, “no oneexcept the Jihadis th<strong>in</strong>ks that we should not be hunt<strong>in</strong>g enemy leaders and key personnel.”But that’s not the problem, quite. What those <strong>of</strong> us <strong>in</strong> El Salvador learned was that Americanpolicy might call for surgical action, but once the local troops are <strong>in</strong>volved, they’re as likely touse a cha<strong>in</strong>-saw as a scalpel. And that, too, can serve American ends. In almost any counter<strong>in</strong>surgency,the basic message the government or the occupiers tries to get across to thepopulation is brutally simple: “We can protect you from the guerrillas, but the guerrillas can’tprotect you from us, and you’ve got to choose sides.” Sometimes you can w<strong>in</strong> the population’shearts and m<strong>in</strong>ds; sometimes you just have to make them more frightened <strong>of</strong> you than they are <strong>of</strong>the <strong>in</strong>surgents.“That was part <strong>of</strong> the th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d Fallujah,” says a well-<strong>in</strong>formed Coalition <strong>of</strong>ficial, referr<strong>in</strong>gto the ferocious <strong>of</strong>fensive that re-took the city <strong>in</strong> November. “We have only one <strong>of</strong> the tools s<strong>of</strong>ar. That is, ‘You can’t protect your people from us.’ In Fallujah they had a little Salafi state.Well, that’s gone now.” The city rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> ru<strong>in</strong>s; at least 50 American soldiers lost their lives,as well as hundreds, perhaps thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgents and civilians. It was a mighty tough lessonto teach. In terms <strong>of</strong> toe-to-toe urban combat, “that was the heaviest fight<strong>in</strong>g the U.S. has been<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce 1968,” says the same <strong>of</strong>ficial. Yet the Americans have not managed to protectthe <strong>Iraq</strong>i citizenry from terror and <strong>in</strong>timidation by the guerrillas. “That’s not someth<strong>in</strong>g we’regood at,” says the <strong>of</strong>ficial.His remarks were echoed by a senior U.S. embassy <strong>of</strong>ficer, who said the Americans just can’tbeg<strong>in</strong> to out-<strong>in</strong>timidate the guerrillas. “It’s a lesson we can’t teach,” says the embassy <strong>of</strong>ficial.“We’re not capable <strong>of</strong> that.” Grabb<strong>in</strong>g here and there for analogies, this guy started talk<strong>in</strong>g aboutwhat the late Syrian President Hafez Assad did to Sunni fundamentalists holed up <strong>in</strong> the city <strong>of</strong>Hama <strong>in</strong> 1982. Assad flattened a large section <strong>of</strong> the town. “Short <strong>of</strong> ‘Hama rules,’” the <strong>of</strong>ficialasked rhetorically, “what do you do?”In <strong>Iraq</strong>, <strong>in</strong> fact, as <strong>in</strong> many other places where the United States has tried to tra<strong>in</strong> ethical armiesto fight dirty wars, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i troops are tacitly expected to do what American troops won’t. Afundamental purpose <strong>of</strong> the upcom<strong>in</strong>g elections on January 30 is to create democratic legitimacyfor whatever extreme measures the newly <strong>org</strong>anized military decides to take.Because we’re talk<strong>in</strong>g about the supposed Salvador Option, I figured I’d get back <strong>in</strong> touch withJoaquín Villalobos, El Salvador’s most brilliant guerrilla leader. Now at Oxford, he favored the65


<strong>Iraq</strong> war <strong>in</strong> 2003, but is dumbfounded by the direction the conflict has taken. Villalobos wasdryly analytical, as ever. “The problem <strong>of</strong> repression and its possible effectiveness correspondsto five basic elements: proportionality, the scope <strong>of</strong> the conflict, time, a context that favors amultiplier effect or not, and the ability to control what you’re do<strong>in</strong>g.” If so, a helluva lot moref<strong>in</strong>e tun<strong>in</strong>g is needed than we’re likely to see <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> any time soon. “If the generals th<strong>in</strong>k thatwith the hatred aga<strong>in</strong>st the United States that exists <strong>in</strong> the region, with the divisions <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>isociety, with Syria, Iran and others around, start<strong>in</strong>g a dirty war is someth<strong>in</strong>g that will give theman edge, they are totally and absolutely lost and desperate,” says Villalobos. “Invad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>without a post-war plan created chaos, subsequent mistakes converted the chaos <strong>in</strong>to <strong>org</strong>anizedresistance, and if they keep blunder<strong>in</strong>g ahead bl<strong>in</strong>dly, they’ll convert the resistance <strong>in</strong>to a realcivil war.”A U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficial <strong>in</strong> Baghdad agrees. “We’re bleed<strong>in</strong>g from so many self-<strong>in</strong>flicted wounds,” he toldme the other day. The Salvador Option would be just one more.66


http://www.counterpunch.<strong>org</strong>/hersh01272005.htmlThe Military is Nowhere; the Press is Nowhere; the Congress is Nowhere...We've Been Taken Over By a CultBy SEYMOUR HERSHCounterpunchJanuary 27, 2005Editors' Note: This is a transcript <strong>of</strong> remarks by Seymour Hersh at the Stephen Wise FreeSynagogue <strong>in</strong> New York.About what's go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> the President is that as virtuous as I feel, you know, at TheNew Yorker, writ<strong>in</strong>g an alternative history more or less <strong>of</strong> what's been go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> the last threeyears, Ge<strong>org</strong>e Bush feels just as virtuous <strong>in</strong> what he is do<strong>in</strong>g. He is absolutely committed -- Idon't know whether he th<strong>in</strong>ks he's do<strong>in</strong>g God's will or what his father didn't do, or whether it'ssome mandate from -- you know, I just don't know, but Ge<strong>org</strong>e Bush th<strong>in</strong>ks this is the rightth<strong>in</strong>g. He is go<strong>in</strong>g to cont<strong>in</strong>ue do<strong>in</strong>g what he has been do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. He's go<strong>in</strong>g to expand it, Ith<strong>in</strong>k, if he can. I th<strong>in</strong>k that the number <strong>of</strong> body bags that come back will make no difference tohim. The body bags are roll<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>. It makes no difference to him, because he will see it as a pricehe has to pay to put America where he th<strong>in</strong>ks it should be. So, he's <strong>in</strong>ured <strong>in</strong> a very strange wayto people like me, to the politicians, most <strong>of</strong> them who are too cowardly anyway to do much. So,the day-to-day anxiety that all <strong>of</strong> us have, and believe me, though he got 58 million votes, many<strong>of</strong> people who voted for him weren't vot<strong>in</strong>g for cont<strong>in</strong>ued warfare, but I th<strong>in</strong>k that's what we'rego<strong>in</strong>g to have.It's hard to predict the future. And it's sort <strong>of</strong> silly to, but the question is: How do you go to him?How do you get at him? What can you do to maybe move him <strong>of</strong>f the course that he sees asvirtuous and he sees as absolutely appropriate? All <strong>of</strong> us -- you have to -- I can't beg<strong>in</strong> toexaggerate how frighten<strong>in</strong>g the position is -- we're <strong>in</strong> right now, because most <strong>of</strong> you don'tunderstand, because the press has not done a very good job. The Senate Intelligence Committee,the new bill that was just passed, provoked by the 9/11 committee actually, is a little bit <strong>of</strong> akabuki dance, I guess is what I want to say, <strong>in</strong> that what it really does is it consolidates an awfullot <strong>of</strong> power <strong>in</strong> the Pentagon -- by statute now. It gives Rumsfeld the right to do an awful lot <strong>of</strong>th<strong>in</strong>gs he has been want<strong>in</strong>g to do, and that is basically manhunt<strong>in</strong>g and kill<strong>in</strong>g them before theykill us, as Peter said. "They did it to us. We've got to do it to them." That is the attitude that -- atthe very top <strong>of</strong> our government exists. And so, I'll just tell you a couple <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>gs that drive menuts. We can -- you know, there's not much more to go on with.I th<strong>in</strong>k there's a way out <strong>of</strong> it, maybe. I can tell you one th<strong>in</strong>g. Let's all f<strong>org</strong>et this word"<strong>in</strong>surgency". It's one <strong>of</strong> the most mislead<strong>in</strong>g words <strong>of</strong> all. Insurgency assumes that we had goneto <strong>Iraq</strong> and won the war and a group <strong>of</strong> disgruntled people began to operate aga<strong>in</strong>st us and wethen had to do counter-action aga<strong>in</strong>st them. That would be an <strong>in</strong>surgency. We are fight<strong>in</strong>g thepeople we started the war aga<strong>in</strong>st. We are fight<strong>in</strong>g the Ba'athists plus nationalists. We arefight<strong>in</strong>g the very people that started -- they only choose to fight <strong>in</strong> different time spans than wewant them to, <strong>in</strong> different places. We took Baghdad easily. It wasn't because be won. We took67


Baghdad because they pulled back and let us take it and decided to fight a war that had been preplannedthat they're very actively fight<strong>in</strong>g. The frighten<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g about it is, we have no<strong>in</strong>telligence. Maybe it's -- it's -- it is frighten<strong>in</strong>g, we have no <strong>in</strong>telligence about what they'redo<strong>in</strong>g. A year-and-a-half ago, we're up aga<strong>in</strong>st two and three-man teams. We estimated the cellsoperat<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st us were two and three people, that we could not penetrate. As <strong>of</strong> now, we stilldon't know what's com<strong>in</strong>g next. There are 10, 15-man groups. They have terrificcommunications. Somebody told me, it's -- somebody <strong>in</strong> the system, an <strong>of</strong>ficer -- and by the way,the good part <strong>of</strong> it is, more and more people are available to somebody like me.There's a lot <strong>of</strong> anxiety <strong>in</strong>side the -- you know, our pr<strong>of</strong>essional military and our <strong>in</strong>telligencepeople. Many <strong>of</strong> them respect the Constitution and the Bill <strong>of</strong> Rights as much as anybody here,and <strong>in</strong>dividual freedom. So, they do -- there's a tremendous sense <strong>of</strong> fear. These are punitivepeople. One <strong>of</strong> the ways -- one <strong>of</strong> the th<strong>in</strong>gs that you could say is, the amaz<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g is we arebeen taken over basically by a cult, eight or n<strong>in</strong>e neo-conservatives have somehow grabbed thegovernment. Just how and why and how they did it so efficiently, will have to wait for muchlater historians and better documentation than we have now, but they managed to overcome thebureaucracy and the Congress, and the press, with the greatest <strong>of</strong> ease. It does say someth<strong>in</strong>gabout how fragile our Democracy is. You do have to wonder what a Democracy is when it comesdown to a few men <strong>in</strong> the Pentagon and a few men <strong>in</strong> the White House hav<strong>in</strong>g their way. Whatthey have done is neutralize the C.I.A. because there were people there <strong>in</strong>side -- the real goal <strong>of</strong>what Goss has done was not attack the operational people, but the <strong>in</strong>telligence people. Therewere people -- serious senior analysts who disagree with the White House, with Cheney,basically, that's what I mean by White House, and Rumsfeld on a lot <strong>of</strong> issues, as somebody said,the goal <strong>in</strong> the last month has been to separate the apostates from the true believers. That's what'shappen<strong>in</strong>g. The real target has been "dim<strong>in</strong>ish the agency." I'm writ<strong>in</strong>g about all <strong>of</strong> this soon, so Idon't want to overdo it, but there's been a tremendous sea change <strong>in</strong> the government. Aconcentration <strong>of</strong> power.On the other hand, the facts -- there are some facts. We can't w<strong>in</strong> this war. We can do what he'sdo<strong>in</strong>g. We can bomb them <strong>in</strong>to the stone ages. Here's the other horrify<strong>in</strong>g, sort <strong>of</strong> spectacular factthat we don't really appreciate. S<strong>in</strong>ce we <strong>in</strong>stalled our puppet government, this man, Allawi, whowas a member <strong>of</strong> the Mukabarat, the secret police <strong>of</strong> Saddam, long before he became a critic, andis basically Saddam-lite. Before we <strong>in</strong>stalled him, s<strong>in</strong>ce we have <strong>in</strong>stalled him on June 28, July,August, September, October, November, every month, one th<strong>in</strong>g happened: the number <strong>of</strong>sorties, bomb<strong>in</strong>g raids by one plane, and the number <strong>of</strong> tonnage dropped has grownexponentially each month. We are systematically bomb<strong>in</strong>g that country. There are no embeddedjournalists at Doha, the Air Force base I th<strong>in</strong>k we're operat<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong>. No embedded journalists atthe aircraft carrier, Harry Truman. That's the aircraft carrier that I th<strong>in</strong>k is do<strong>in</strong>g many <strong>of</strong> theoperational fights. There's no air defense, It's simply a turkey shoot. They come and hit what theywant. We know noth<strong>in</strong>g. We don't ask. We're not told. We know noth<strong>in</strong>g about the extent <strong>of</strong>bomb<strong>in</strong>g. So if they're go<strong>in</strong>g to carry out an election and if they're go<strong>in</strong>g to succeed, bomb<strong>in</strong>g isgo<strong>in</strong>g to be key to it, which means that what happened <strong>in</strong> Fallujah, essentially <strong>Iraq</strong> -- some <strong>of</strong>you remember Vietnam -- <strong>Iraq</strong> is be<strong>in</strong>g turn <strong>in</strong>to a "free-fire zone" right <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> us. Hiteveryth<strong>in</strong>g, kill everyth<strong>in</strong>g. I have a friend <strong>in</strong> the Air Force, a Colonel, who had the awful task <strong>of</strong>be<strong>in</strong>g an urban bomb<strong>in</strong>g planner, plann<strong>in</strong>g urban bomb<strong>in</strong>g, to make urban bomb<strong>in</strong>g be asunobtrusive as possible. I th<strong>in</strong>k it was three weeks ago today, three weeks ago Sunday after68


Fallujah I called him at home. I'm one <strong>of</strong> the people -- I don't call people at work. I call them athome, and he has one <strong>of</strong> those caller I.D.'s, and he picked up the phone and he said, "Welcome toStal<strong>in</strong>grad." We know what we're do<strong>in</strong>g. This is deliberate. It's be<strong>in</strong>g done. They're not tell<strong>in</strong>g us.They're not talk<strong>in</strong>g about it.We have a President that -- and a Secretary <strong>of</strong> State that, when a trooper -- when a reporter orjournalist asked -- actually a trooper, a soldier, asked about lack <strong>of</strong> equipment, stumbled throughan answer and the President then gets up and says, "Yes, they should all have good equipmentand we're go<strong>in</strong>g to do it," as if somehow he wasn't <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the process. Words mean noth<strong>in</strong>g-- noth<strong>in</strong>g to Ge<strong>org</strong>e Bush. They are just utterances. They have no mean<strong>in</strong>g. Bush can say aga<strong>in</strong>and aga<strong>in</strong>, "well, we don't do torture." We know what happened. We know about Abu Ghraib.We know, we see anecdotally. We all understand <strong>in</strong> some pr<strong>of</strong>ound way because so much hascome out <strong>in</strong> the last few weeks, the I.C.R.C. The ACLU put out more papers, this is not anisolated <strong>in</strong>cident what's happened with the seven kids and the horrible photographs, LynndieEngland. That's <strong>in</strong>to the not the issue is. They're fall guys. Of course, they did wrong. But youknow, when we send kids to fight, one <strong>of</strong> the th<strong>in</strong>gs that we do when we send our children to waris the <strong>of</strong>ficers become <strong>in</strong> loco parentis. That means their job <strong>in</strong> the military is to protect thesekids, not only from gett<strong>in</strong>g bullets and be<strong>in</strong>g blown up, but also there is noth<strong>in</strong>g as stupid as a 20or 22-year-old kid with a weapon <strong>in</strong> a war zone. Protect them from themselves. The spectacle <strong>of</strong>these people do<strong>in</strong>g those antics night after night, for three and a half months only stopped whenone <strong>of</strong> their own soldiers turned them <strong>in</strong> tells you all you need to know, how many <strong>of</strong>ficers knew.I can just give you a timel<strong>in</strong>e that will tell you all you need to know. Abu Ghraib was reported <strong>in</strong>January <strong>of</strong> 2004 this year. In May, I and CBS earlier also wrote an awful lot about what wasgo<strong>in</strong>g on there. At that po<strong>in</strong>t, between January and May, our government did noth<strong>in</strong>g. AlthoughRumsfeld later acknowledged that he was briefed by the middle <strong>of</strong> January on it and told thePresident. In those three-and-a-half months before it became public, was there any systematiceffort to do anyth<strong>in</strong>g other than to prosecute seven "bad seeds", enlisted kids, reservists fromWest Virg<strong>in</strong>ia and the unit they were <strong>in</strong>, by the way, Military Police. The answer is, Ha! Theywere basically a bunch <strong>of</strong> kids who were taught on traffic control, sent to <strong>Iraq</strong>, put <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> aprison. They knew noth<strong>in</strong>g. It doesn't excuse them from do<strong>in</strong>g dumb th<strong>in</strong>gs. But there is anotherframework. We're not see<strong>in</strong>g it. They've gotten away with it.So here's the upside <strong>of</strong> the horrible story, if there is an upside. I can tell you the upside <strong>in</strong> a funnyway, <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>direct way. It comes from a Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post piece this week. A young boy, aMar<strong>in</strong>e, 25-year-old from somewhere <strong>in</strong> Maryland died. There was a funeral <strong>in</strong> the Post, afuneral <strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton, and the Post did a little story about it. They quoted -- his name wasHodak. His father was quoted. He had written to a letter <strong>in</strong> the local newspaper <strong>in</strong> SouthernVirg<strong>in</strong>ia. He had said about his son, he wrote a letter just describ<strong>in</strong>g what it was like after his sondied. He said, "Today everyth<strong>in</strong>g seems strange. Laundry is gett<strong>in</strong>g done. I walked my dog. I atebreakfast. Somehow I'm still breath<strong>in</strong>g and my heart is still beat<strong>in</strong>g. My son lies <strong>in</strong> a casket half aworld away."There's go<strong>in</strong>g to be -- you know, when I did My Lai -- I tell this story a lot. When I did the MyLai story, more than a generation ago, it was 35 years ago, so almost two. When I did My Lai,one <strong>of</strong> the th<strong>in</strong>gs that I discovered was that they had -- for some <strong>of</strong> you, most <strong>of</strong> you remember,but basically a group <strong>of</strong> American soldiers -- the analogy is so much like today. Then as now, our69


soldiers don't see enemies <strong>in</strong> a battlefield, they just walk on m<strong>in</strong>es or they get shot by snipers,because it's always hidden. There's <strong>in</strong>evitable anger and rage and you dehumanize the people.We have done that with enormous success <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. They're "rag-heads". They're less than human.The casualty count -- as <strong>in</strong> Sudan, equally as bad. Stagger<strong>in</strong>g numbers that we're kill<strong>in</strong>g. In anycase, you know, it's -- <strong>in</strong> this case, these -- a group <strong>of</strong> soldiers <strong>in</strong> 1968 went <strong>in</strong>to a village. Theyhad been <strong>in</strong> Vietnam for three months and lost about 10% <strong>of</strong> their people, maybe 10 or 15 toaccidents, kill<strong>in</strong>gs and bomb<strong>in</strong>gs, and they ended up -- they thought they would meet the enemyand there were 550 women, children and old men and they executed them all. It took a day. Theystopped <strong>in</strong> the middle and they had lunch. One <strong>of</strong> the kids who had done a lot <strong>of</strong> shoot<strong>in</strong>g. TheBlack and Hispanic soldiers, about 40 <strong>of</strong> them, there were about 90 men <strong>in</strong> the unit -- the Blacksand Hispanics shot <strong>in</strong> the air. They wouldn't shoot <strong>in</strong>to the ditch. They collected people <strong>in</strong> threeditches and just began to shoot them. The Blacks and Hispanics shot up <strong>in</strong> the air, but the mostlyWhite, lower middle class, the kids who jo<strong>in</strong> the Army Reserve today and National Guardlook<strong>in</strong>g for extra dollars, those k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> kids did the kill<strong>in</strong>g. One <strong>of</strong> them was a man named PaulMedlow, who did an awful lot <strong>of</strong> shoot<strong>in</strong>g. The next day, there was a moment -- one <strong>of</strong> the th<strong>in</strong>gsthat everybody remembered, the kids who were there, one <strong>of</strong> the mothers at the bottom <strong>of</strong> a ditchhad taken a child, a boy, about two, and got him under her stomach <strong>in</strong> such a way that he wasn'tkilled. When they were sitt<strong>in</strong>g hav<strong>in</strong>g the K rations -- that's what they called them -- MRE's now-- the kid somehow crawled up through the [<strong>in</strong>audible] scream<strong>in</strong>g louder and he began -- andCalley, the famous Lieutenant Calley, the Lynndie England <strong>of</strong> that tragedy, told Medlow: Killhim, "Plug him," he said. And Medlow somehow, who had done an awful lot as I say, 200bullets, couldn't do it so Calley ran up as everybody watched, with his carb<strong>in</strong>e. Officers had asmaller weapon, a rifle, and shot him <strong>in</strong> the back <strong>of</strong> the head. The next morn<strong>in</strong>g, Medlow steppedon a m<strong>in</strong>e and he had his foot blown <strong>of</strong>f. He was be<strong>in</strong>g medevac'd out. As he was be<strong>in</strong>gmedevac'd out, he cursed and everybody remembered, one <strong>of</strong> the chill<strong>in</strong>g l<strong>in</strong>es, he said, "God haspunished me, and he's go<strong>in</strong>g to punish you, too."So a year-and-a-half later, I'm do<strong>in</strong>g this story. And I hear about Medlow. I called his mother up.He lived <strong>in</strong> New Goshen, Indiana. I said, "I'm com<strong>in</strong>g to see you. I don't remember where I was,I th<strong>in</strong>k it was Wash<strong>in</strong>gton State. I flew over there and to get there, you had to go to - I th<strong>in</strong>kIndianapolis and then to Terre Haute, rent a car and drive down <strong>in</strong>to the Southern Indiana, thislittle farm. It was a scene out <strong>of</strong> Norman Rockwell's. Some <strong>of</strong> you remember the NormanRockwell pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>gs. It's a chicken farm. The mother is 50, but she looks 80. Gristled, old. Wayold - hard scrabble life, no man around. I said I'm here to see your son, and she said, okay. He's<strong>in</strong> there. He knows you're com<strong>in</strong>g. Then she said, one <strong>of</strong> these great -- she said to me, "I gavethem a good boy. And they sent me back a murderer." So you go on 35 years. I'm do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> TheNew Yorker, the Abu Ghraib stories. I th<strong>in</strong>k I did three <strong>in</strong> three weeks. If some <strong>of</strong> you knowabout The New Yorker, that's unbelievable. But <strong>in</strong> the middle <strong>of</strong> all <strong>of</strong> this, I get a call from amother <strong>in</strong> the East coast, Northeast, work<strong>in</strong>g class, lower middle class, very religious, Catholicfamily. She said, I have to talk to you. I go see her. I drive somewhere, fly somewhere, and herstory is simply this. She had a daughter that was <strong>in</strong> the military police unit that was at AbuGhraib. And the whole unit had come back <strong>in</strong> March, <strong>of</strong> -- The sequence is: they get there <strong>in</strong> thefall <strong>of</strong> 2003. Their reported after do<strong>in</strong>g their games <strong>in</strong> the January <strong>of</strong> 2004. In March she is senthome. Noth<strong>in</strong>g is public yet. The daughter is sent home. The whole unit is sent home. She comeshome a different person. She had been married. She was young. She went <strong>in</strong>to the Reserves, Ith<strong>in</strong>k it was the Army Reserves to get money, not for college or for -- you know, these -- some <strong>of</strong>70


these people worked as night clerks <strong>in</strong> pizza shops <strong>in</strong> West Virg<strong>in</strong>ia. This not -- this is not verysophisticated. She came back and she left her husband. She just had been married before. She lefther husband, moved out <strong>of</strong> the house, moved out <strong>of</strong> the city, moved out to another home, anotherapartment <strong>in</strong> another city and began work<strong>in</strong>g a different job. And moved away from everybody.Then over -- as the spr<strong>in</strong>g went on, she would go every weekend, this daughter, and everyweekend she would go to a tattoo shop and get large black tattoos put on her, over <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly --over her body, the back, the arms, the legs, and her mother was frantic. What's go<strong>in</strong>g on? ComesAbu Ghraib, and she reads the stories, and she sees it. And she says to her daughter, "Were youthere?" She goes to the apartment. The daughter slams the door. The mother then goes -- thedaughter had come home -- before she had gone to <strong>Iraq</strong>, the mother had given her a portablecomputer. One <strong>of</strong> the computers that had a DVD <strong>in</strong> it, with the idea be<strong>in</strong>g that when she wasthere, she could watch movies, you know, while she was overseas, sort <strong>of</strong> a -- I hadn't thoughtabout it, a great idea. Turns out a lot <strong>of</strong> people do it. She had given her a portable computer, andwhen the kid came back she had returned it, one <strong>of</strong> the th<strong>in</strong>gs, and the mother then said I wentand looked at the computer. She knows -- she doesn't know about depression. She doesn't knowabout Freud. She just said, I was just -- I was just go<strong>in</strong>g to clean it up, she said. I had decided touse it aga<strong>in</strong>. She wouldn't say anyth<strong>in</strong>g more why she went to look at it after Abu Ghraib. Sheopened it up, and sure enough there was a file marked "<strong>Iraq</strong>". She hit the button. Out came 100photographs. They were photographs that became -- one <strong>of</strong> them was published. We publishedone, just one <strong>in</strong> The New Yorker. It was about an Arab. This is someth<strong>in</strong>g no mother should seeand daughter should see too. It was the Arab man lean<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st bars, the prisoner naked, twodogs, two shepherds, remember, on each side <strong>of</strong> him. The New Yorker published it, a prettylarge photograph. What we didn't publish was the sequence showed the dogs did bite the man --pretty hard. A lot <strong>of</strong> blood. So she saw that and she called me, and away we go. There's anotherstory.For me, it's just another story, but out <strong>of</strong> this comes a core <strong>of</strong> -- you know, we all deal <strong>in</strong> "macro"<strong>in</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton. On the macro, we're hopeless. We're nowhere. The press is nowhere. Thecongress is nowhere. The military is nowhere. Every four-star General I know is say<strong>in</strong>g, "Who isgo<strong>in</strong>g to tell them we have no clothes?" Nobody is go<strong>in</strong>g to do it. Everybody is afraid to tellRumsfeld anyth<strong>in</strong>g. That's just the way it is. It's a system built on fear. It's not lack <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity,it's more pr<strong>of</strong>ound than that. Because there is <strong>in</strong>dividual <strong>in</strong>tegrity. It's a system that's completelybeen taken over -- by cultists. Anyway, what's go<strong>in</strong>g to happen, I th<strong>in</strong>k, as the casualties mountand these stories get around, and the mothers see the cost and the fathers see the cost, as the kidscome home. And the wounded ones come back, and there's wards that you will never hear about.That's wards -- you know about the terrible catastrophic <strong>in</strong>juries, but you don't know about thevegetables. There's ward after ward <strong>of</strong> vegetables because the bra<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>juries are so enormous. Asyou maybe read last week, there was a new study <strong>in</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the medical journals that the number<strong>of</strong> survivors are greater with catastrophic <strong>in</strong>juries because <strong>of</strong> their better medical treatment andthe better armor they have. So you get more extreme <strong>in</strong>juries to extremities. We're go<strong>in</strong>g to learnmore and I th<strong>in</strong>k you're go<strong>in</strong>g to see, it's go<strong>in</strong>g to -- it's -- I'm try<strong>in</strong>g to be optimistic. We're go<strong>in</strong>gto see a bottom swell<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>in</strong>side the ranks. You're beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to see it. What happened withthe soldiers ask<strong>in</strong>g those questions, you may see more <strong>of</strong> that. I'm not suggest<strong>in</strong>g we're go<strong>in</strong>g tohave mut<strong>in</strong>ies, but I'm go<strong>in</strong>g to suggest you're go<strong>in</strong>g to see more dissatisfaction be<strong>in</strong>g expressed.Maybe that will do it. Another salvation may be the economy. It's go<strong>in</strong>g to go very bad, folks.You know, if you have not sold your stocks and bought property <strong>in</strong> Italy, you better do it quick.71


And the third th<strong>in</strong>g is Europe -- Europe is not go<strong>in</strong>g to tolerate us much longer. The rage there isenormous. I'm talk<strong>in</strong>g about our old-fashioned allies. We could see someth<strong>in</strong>g there, collectiveaction aga<strong>in</strong>st us. Certa<strong>in</strong>ly, nobody -- it's go<strong>in</strong>g to be an awful lot <strong>of</strong> danc<strong>in</strong>g on our graves asthe dollar goes bad and everybody stops buy<strong>in</strong>g our bonds, our credit -- our -- we're spend<strong>in</strong>g $2billion a day to float the debt, and one <strong>of</strong> these days, the Japanese and the Russians, everybody isgo<strong>in</strong>g to start buy<strong>in</strong>g oil <strong>in</strong> Euros <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> dollars. We're go<strong>in</strong>g to see enormous panic here. Buthe could get through that. That will be another year, and the damage he's go<strong>in</strong>g to do betweenthen and now is enormous. We're go<strong>in</strong>g to have some very bad months ahead.Seymour Hersh's latest book is Cha<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> Command: The Road to Abu Ghraib.72


http://nyc.<strong>in</strong>dymedia.<strong>org</strong>/newswire/display/147880/<strong>in</strong>dex.phphttp://www.<strong>in</strong>dypendent.<strong>org</strong>/http://www.<strong>in</strong>dypendent.<strong>org</strong>/?p=356Let A Thousand Militias Bloomby A. K. Gupta21 Apr 2005In devis<strong>in</strong>g a strategy to defeat <strong>Iraq</strong>'s <strong>in</strong>surgents, the Pentagon may be ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the upper hand butat the cost <strong>of</strong> push<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong> toward civil war. A report by the Wall Street Journal from Feb. 16revealed that "pop-up militias" are proliferat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Not only is the U.S. aware <strong>of</strong> theseillegal militias, but the Pentagon is arm<strong>in</strong>g, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and fund<strong>in</strong>g them for use them <strong>in</strong> counter<strong>in</strong>surgencyoperations. Most disturb<strong>in</strong>g, one militia <strong>in</strong> particular - the "special policecommandos" - is be<strong>in</strong>g used throughout <strong>Iraq</strong> and has been s<strong>in</strong>gled out by a U.S. general asconduct<strong>in</strong>g death squad strikes known as the "Salvador option."Greg Jaffe, the Journal reporter, identified at least six such militias. Yet these militias owe theirallegiance not to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i people or state, but to their self-appo<strong>in</strong>ted leaders and associatedpoliticians such as <strong>in</strong>terim Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Iyad Allawi. Even the commander <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces <strong>in</strong>the Middle East, Gen. John P. Abizaid, admitted to Congress on March 1 that such militias are"destabiliz<strong>in</strong>g."Of these militias, at least three are l<strong>in</strong>ked to Allawi. Jaffe writes, "First came the MuthanaBrigade, a unit formed by the order <strong>of</strong> Allawi." The second is the Defenders <strong>of</strong> Khadamiya,referr<strong>in</strong>g to a Shiite shr<strong>in</strong>e on the outskirts <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, which appears to be "closely aligned withprom<strong>in</strong>ent Shiite cleric Husse<strong>in</strong> al Sadr," who ran on Allawi's ticket <strong>in</strong> the January elections.The leader <strong>of</strong> the special police commandos, Gen. Adnan Thavit, participated <strong>in</strong> the disastrous1996 coup aga<strong>in</strong>st Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> that Allawi coord<strong>in</strong>ated. Thavit was jailed and subsequentlyreleased shortly before the 2003 U.S. <strong>in</strong>vasion. He is also the uncle <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s <strong>in</strong>terim m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong>the <strong>in</strong>terior, under which the commandos operate.New Boss = Old BossA recent Human Rights Watch study on torture <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> noted that Al-Nahdhah, a <strong>Iraq</strong><strong>in</strong>ewspaper, reported on June 21 that the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry "appo<strong>in</strong>ted a new security adviser toassist <strong>in</strong> the establishment <strong>of</strong> a new general security directorate [GSD] modeled on the erstwhileGeneral Security Directorate" one <strong>of</strong> the agencies <strong>of</strong> the Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> government dissolvedby the CPA <strong>in</strong> May 2003." That security advisor was "Major General 'Adnan Thabet al-Samarra'i." (Like most Arabic words, Thavit's name is translated <strong>in</strong>to English with variousspell<strong>in</strong>gs.)Jane's Intelligence Digest commented at the time that the GSD, "will <strong>in</strong>clude former members <strong>of</strong>Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>'s feared security services, collectively known as the Mukhabarat. These former73


Ba'athists and Saddam loyalists will be expected to hunt down their colleagues currently<strong>org</strong>aniz<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgency."Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, who heads the mammoth U.S. effort to create <strong>Iraq</strong>'s myriad securityforces, called the commandos "a horse to back." And Petraeus has done so by provid<strong>in</strong>g it with"money to fix up its base and buy vehicles, ammunition, radios and more weapons."The special police commandos have also received special treatment from the U.S. occupation. AState Department report to Congress from Jan. 5 noted that at the request <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>the Interior, "billet<strong>in</strong>g space" was provided for 1,500 commandos <strong>in</strong> the Baghdad Public SafetyAcademy.Bigger than the BritishIn terms <strong>of</strong> numbers, a column by David Ignatius <strong>in</strong> the Feb. 25 Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post notes thatThavit "commands a force <strong>of</strong> about 10,000 men," which would make them larger than the Britishmilitary. The commandos have been used extensively, first last October <strong>in</strong> the assault on Samarathat was called a "model" for how to retake a city from <strong>in</strong>surgents (but which is stilled roiled byregular attacks). The commandos have also become a fixture <strong>in</strong> major cities such as Ramadi andMosul. In Ramadi, The Stars and Stripes describes the commandos as "the <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces that mightsoon be responsible for security <strong>in</strong> the city."A report <strong>in</strong> Dec. 25 issue <strong>of</strong> The Advisor - a Pentagon publication with the tagl<strong>in</strong>e "<strong>Iraq</strong>'sOfficial Weekly Command Information Reporter" - stated that the "Special Police Commandoshave been deployed all over <strong>Iraq</strong> to hunt down <strong>in</strong>surgents."This "hunt" seems to <strong>in</strong>clude death squad operations. Retired Gen. Wayne Down<strong>in</strong>g, the formerhead <strong>of</strong> all U.S. special operations forces, appeared on NBC's Today show on Jan. 10 to discuss aNewsweek report about the Salvador option. The reference is to the extensive use <strong>of</strong> deathsquads by El Salvador's military dur<strong>in</strong>g its war aga<strong>in</strong>st the left <strong>in</strong> the 1980s. Down<strong>in</strong>g called it a"very valid tactic" that has been employed "s<strong>in</strong>ce we started the war back <strong>in</strong> March <strong>of</strong> 2003."Down<strong>in</strong>g added, "We have special police commandos now <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces which conductthese k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> strike operations."At the highest levels, White House <strong>of</strong>ficials consider the special police commandos as thelead<strong>in</strong>g edge aga<strong>in</strong>st the <strong>in</strong>surgency. In hear<strong>in</strong>gs before the Senate on Feb. 16, Secretary <strong>of</strong>Defense Donald Rumsfeld said the commandos are among "forces that are go<strong>in</strong>g to have thegreatest leverage on suppress<strong>in</strong>g and elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgency."By all accounts, the <strong>in</strong>surgency is still very active, conduct<strong>in</strong>g up to 60 strikes a day. But one key<strong>in</strong>dicator <strong>of</strong> its effectiveness - U.S. combat deaths - shows a marked decl<strong>in</strong>e s<strong>in</strong>ce the raz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>Fallujah last November. In that month, some 126 U.S. troops died <strong>in</strong> combat, more than four perday on average. By March, combat deaths had decl<strong>in</strong>ed by more than 75 percent.Sweep<strong>in</strong>g countless thousands <strong>of</strong> Sunni Arab males <strong>of</strong>f the streets has had an effect. The prisonpopulation under U.S. control alone has exploded to over 10,000. The <strong>in</strong>surgents have responded74


y shift<strong>in</strong>g their targets, concentrat<strong>in</strong>g attacks more on <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces and they have<strong>in</strong>tensified economic sabotage, crippl<strong>in</strong>g the electrical and petroleum <strong>in</strong>frastructure.U.S. Mar<strong>in</strong>es units have taken the militia strategy to a new level: by creat<strong>in</strong>g their own. In arecent sweep through Al Anbar prov<strong>in</strong>ce, the heartland <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency, The 7th Mar<strong>in</strong>esRegiment brought with the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Freedom Guard, a 61-man unit set up <strong>in</strong> January and paid $400a month each, accord<strong>in</strong>g to a Reuters report. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the same operation, Mar<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> the 23rdRegiment were accompanied by 20 members <strong>of</strong> a special forces unit called the FreedomFighters. The Christian Science Monitor described them as Shiites from the southern city <strong>of</strong>Basra, with "little love between them and the Sunni Arab citizens <strong>of</strong> Anbar."Despite be<strong>in</strong>g squeezed, no one is predict<strong>in</strong>g an end to the <strong>in</strong>surgency. One U.S. general recentlynoted that it takes on average n<strong>in</strong>e years to defeat an <strong>in</strong>surgency. Even if the rebellion isconta<strong>in</strong>ed to "manageable" levels for the Pentagon, mean<strong>in</strong>g a low rate <strong>of</strong> combat deaths, thatdoes not mean the resistance will end. U.S. forces long ago lost the battle for hearts and m<strong>in</strong>ds.75


http://www.democracynow.<strong>org</strong>/article.pl?sid=05/04/21/1418219U.S. Fund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i Militias Led by Baathists As Part <strong>of</strong> Counter-InsurgencyOperationDemocracy Now!Thursday, April 21st, 2005We talk to Arun Gupta <strong>of</strong> The Indypendent on the proliferation <strong>of</strong> illegal militias <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. TheU.S. government is not only aware <strong>of</strong> these militias but is arm<strong>in</strong>g, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and fund<strong>in</strong>g them foruse <strong>in</strong> their counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency operations. [<strong>in</strong>cludes rush transcript]We are jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> our studio by Arun Gupta who has been report<strong>in</strong>g on the proliferation <strong>of</strong>militias <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Arun is an editor with the New York City Independent Media Center'snewspaper, The Indypendent.He writes <strong>in</strong> his article, "Let A Thousand Militias Bloom" that the U.S. government is not onlyaware <strong>of</strong> these illegal militias but is arm<strong>in</strong>g, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and fund<strong>in</strong>g them for use <strong>in</strong> their counter<strong>in</strong>surgencyoperations. His article will be <strong>in</strong> the May issue <strong>of</strong> Z magaz<strong>in</strong>e.The article beg<strong>in</strong>s:In devis<strong>in</strong>g a strategy to defeat <strong>Iraq</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>surgents, the Pentagon may be ga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the upper handbut at the cost <strong>of</strong> push<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong> toward civil war. A report by the Wall Street Journal from Feb. 16revealed that “pop-up militias” are proliferat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Not only is the U.S. aware <strong>of</strong> theseillegal militias, but the Pentagon is arm<strong>in</strong>g, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and fund<strong>in</strong>g them for use them <strong>in</strong> counter<strong>in</strong>surgencyoperations.Most disturb<strong>in</strong>g, one militia <strong>in</strong> particular – the “special police commandos” – is be<strong>in</strong>g usedthroughout <strong>Iraq</strong> and has been s<strong>in</strong>gled out by a U.S. general as conduct<strong>in</strong>g death squad strikesknown as the “Salvador option.”Greg Jaffe, the Journal reporter, identified at least six such militias. Yet these militias owe theirallegiance not to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i people or state, but to their self-appo<strong>in</strong>ted leaders and associatedpoliticians such as <strong>in</strong>terim Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister Iyad Allawi. Even the commander <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces <strong>in</strong>the Middle East, Gen. John P. Abizaid, admitted to Congress on March 1 that such militias are“destabiliz<strong>in</strong>g.”Of these militias, at least three are l<strong>in</strong>ked to Allawi. Jaffe writes, “First came the MuthanaBrigade, a unit formed by the order <strong>of</strong>… Allawi.” The second is the Defenders <strong>of</strong> Khadamiya,referr<strong>in</strong>g to a Shiite shr<strong>in</strong>e on the outskirts <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, which appears to be “closely alignedwith prom<strong>in</strong>ent Shiite cleric Husse<strong>in</strong> al Sadr,” who ran on Allawi’s ticket <strong>in</strong> the Januaryelections.76


* Arun Gupta, former editor <strong>of</strong> The Guardian, one <strong>of</strong> the most respected <strong>in</strong>dependentnewspapers <strong>in</strong> recent U.S. history. He is currently an editor with the New York City IndependentMedia Center's newspaper, The Indypendent.AMY GOODMAN: Well, f<strong>in</strong>ally, we're jo<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the studio by Arun Gupta, who has beenreport<strong>in</strong>g on the proliferation <strong>of</strong> militias <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Arun is an editor with the New York CityIndependent Media Center's newspaper, The Indypendent. He writes <strong>in</strong> his article that the U.S.government is not only aware <strong>of</strong> these illegal militias, but is arm<strong>in</strong>g, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and fund<strong>in</strong>g themfor use <strong>in</strong> their counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency operations. His article will be <strong>in</strong> the May issue <strong>of</strong> Z magaz<strong>in</strong>e.And we welcome you to Democracy Now!ARUN GUPTA: Thank you.AMY GOODMAN: Talk about what’s happen<strong>in</strong>g.ARUN GUPTA: Well, these militias, which the government, the U.S. government is referr<strong>in</strong>g toas pop-up militias first came to prom<strong>in</strong>ence a couple <strong>of</strong> months ago <strong>in</strong> a report <strong>in</strong> the Wall StreetJournal. This Journal reporter Greg Jaffe noted that these militias are appear<strong>in</strong>g all over <strong>Iraq</strong>.And he was <strong>in</strong>terview<strong>in</strong>g various members <strong>of</strong> a General Petraeus's staff. General Petraeus is theU.S. general and head <strong>of</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g all security services <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. And it was presented as like, gee,all these militias are start<strong>in</strong>g to appear all over Baghdad, militias with names like the MuthanaBrigade, the Defenders <strong>of</strong> Khadamiya, and the special police commandos. And Petraeus's staffwas <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> fund<strong>in</strong>g and support<strong>in</strong>g these, but what it really appears to be turn<strong>in</strong>g out thatthese have been set up <strong>in</strong> secret with the U.S. government's knowledge all along and that <strong>in</strong> many<strong>in</strong>stances these militias are actually ex-Ba'athists, many <strong>of</strong> the thugs who served under SaddamHusse<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> his notorious <strong>in</strong>telligence services, and they are be<strong>in</strong>g deployed extensivelythroughout <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>in</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency operations. They have also been implicated <strong>in</strong> death squadoperations known as the “Salvador option,” and they also appear to be us<strong>in</strong>g torture extensivelythroughout <strong>Iraq</strong>, so it's a very unseemly situation. What essentially the U.S. is try<strong>in</strong>g to do isprivatize, is outsource these militias and provide itself with cover, but the whole time it's actuallyfund<strong>in</strong>g and creat<strong>in</strong>g these militias apparently.JUAN GONZALEZ: Now, your article seems to <strong>in</strong>dicate also that the militias have been hav<strong>in</strong>gsome effect on the resistance <strong>in</strong> that the actual -- just by count<strong>in</strong>g the toll <strong>of</strong> American soldiers,that there's been a reduction <strong>in</strong> recent months <strong>of</strong> the actual number <strong>of</strong> American soldiers killed.Could you talk about that?ARUN GUPTA: Yes. The peek number <strong>of</strong> U.S. soldiers killed <strong>in</strong> combat was last November,dur<strong>in</strong>g the sack<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Fallujah. 126 U.S. soldiers died <strong>in</strong> combat. By this past March, it had fallenby 75%. So, go<strong>in</strong>g on that and U.S. casualties, <strong>in</strong> general, it appears that there is some success.They're us<strong>in</strong>g these militias extensively <strong>in</strong> the so-called Sunni Triangle area: Baghdad, Mosul,Samarra, Tikrit, Ramadi. And what it appears to be, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Jane's Intelligence Digest isthat they're us<strong>in</strong>g ex-Ba'athists to hunt down their former colleagues who are direct<strong>in</strong>g much <strong>of</strong>the <strong>in</strong>surgency. So they're -- the U.S. is say<strong>in</strong>g, like, well, these are a bunch <strong>of</strong> Ba'athist deadenders<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency, but at the same time they're us<strong>in</strong>g the ex-Ba'athists themselves, whothey said they were free<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong> from, to hunt down <strong>in</strong>surgents. But they are also just round<strong>in</strong>g77


people up willy-nilly, and there appears, like I said, to be extensive use <strong>of</strong> torture, much <strong>of</strong> itcom<strong>in</strong>g from this TV show that is now appear<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>Iraq</strong> called, Terror: The Grip <strong>of</strong> Justice.There have been many accounts <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong> the media, where a number <strong>of</strong> times a week on thistelevision station set up by the Pentagon, Al-<strong>Iraq</strong>iya, they parade <strong>in</strong>surgents before the TV. Andthese reports are all not<strong>in</strong>g that the suspects have swollen faces, bruised, that they're very cowed.And they're also admitt<strong>in</strong>g to the most absurd charges, that they are participat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> gay <strong>org</strong>ies,that they get drunk <strong>in</strong>side mosques, that they're pedophiles engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> rape, that they practicebehead<strong>in</strong>gs by cutt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>f the head <strong>of</strong> sheep. And the <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g is, one commentator noted,it's the exact same tactic Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> used under his government <strong>of</strong> air<strong>in</strong>g televisedconfessions.And there’s one Ba'athist <strong>in</strong> particular who is at very much the center <strong>of</strong> this. It's a GeneralAdnan Thavit, who was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the 1996 coup aga<strong>in</strong>st Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> that the former<strong>in</strong>terim prime m<strong>in</strong>ister who just resigned, Iyad Allawi, headed up. And this character Thavitkeeps popp<strong>in</strong>g up all over the place. He is the head <strong>of</strong> the special police commandos, which aresaid to number ten to eleven thousand, which would actually make them the second largestsecurity force <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, larger than the British. He was also the source for this raid a few weeksago on this <strong>in</strong>surgent camp on Lake Tharthar, that turned out to be bogus pretty much. A reporterwent there and found that there were all these <strong>in</strong>surgents still there, even though Thavit wassay<strong>in</strong>g someth<strong>in</strong>g like 85 <strong>in</strong>surgents were killed. He is also now <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> this dispute overwhat's go<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>in</strong> this town south <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, claim<strong>in</strong>g there wasn't any kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g and nowthere's reports <strong>of</strong> these bodies be<strong>in</strong>g dragged out <strong>of</strong> the river. And the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry a couple<strong>of</strong> days ago even said he was assass<strong>in</strong>ated, and then retracted the report the same day. He is avery shady character, and the U.S. general staff under Petraeus notes that he's very powerful, andthat if he is removed, he could take his militias with him, this huge force. And right now, there'sa power struggle go<strong>in</strong>g on. Donald Rumsfeld flew <strong>in</strong>to Baghdad last week and warned the newgovernment not to purge these Ba'athists. This largely escaped the notice <strong>of</strong> many <strong>in</strong> the media.And Talabani, who is the new president, has said that, no, we are go<strong>in</strong>g to purge them, and wewant to use our militias.AMY GOODMAN: Arun Gupta, we want to thank you very much for be<strong>in</strong>g with us. If peoplewant to read this article, where can they go on the web?ARUN GUPTA: They can go to Z magaz<strong>in</strong>e. They can also go to the New York City IndyMediaCenter, nyc.<strong>in</strong>dymedia.<strong>org</strong> where it will be appear<strong>in</strong>g.AMY GOODMAN: Thank you so much. The piece is called, “Let a Thousand Militias Bloom.”78


From Iran-Contra To <strong>Iraq</strong>The NationBy David CornMay 7, 2005The Ge<strong>org</strong>e W. Bush presidency has been one long rehab session for the Iran-contra scoundrels<strong>of</strong> the Reagan-Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration. Many <strong>in</strong>famous veterans <strong>of</strong> the foreign policy connivance <strong>of</strong>the Reagan days have found a home <strong>in</strong> Bush II. Elliott Abrams--who pleaded guilty tomislead<strong>in</strong>g Congress regard<strong>in</strong>g the Reagan adm<strong>in</strong>istration's secret support <strong>of</strong> the contra rebelsfight<strong>in</strong>g the Sand<strong>in</strong>ista government <strong>of</strong> Nicaragua--was hired as a staffmember <strong>of</strong> Ge<strong>org</strong>e W.Bush's National Security Council and placed <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> democracy promotion. Retired AdmiralJohn Po<strong>in</strong>dexter--who was Reagan's national security adviser, who supervised Oliver Northdur<strong>in</strong>g the Iran-contra days, and who was convicted <strong>of</strong> several Iran-contra crimes before theconvictions were overturned on a legal technicality--was reta<strong>in</strong>ed by the Pentagon to search forterrorists us<strong>in</strong>g computerized Big Brother technology. John Negroponte--who as ambassador toHonduras <strong>in</strong> the early 1980s was the on-the-ground overseer <strong>of</strong> pro-contra operations there--wasrecruited by Bush to be UN ambassador, then ambassador to <strong>Iraq</strong>, and, most recently, the firstdirector <strong>of</strong> national <strong>in</strong>telligence. Otto Reich--who mounted an arguably illegal pro-contrapropaganda effort when he was a Reagan <strong>of</strong>ficial--was appo<strong>in</strong>ted by Bush to be <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong>Lat<strong>in</strong> American policy at the State Department. Now comes the news that another Iran-contraalum--a fellow who failed a polygraph test dur<strong>in</strong>g the Iran-contra <strong>in</strong>vestigation--is play<strong>in</strong>g acritical role <strong>in</strong> Bush's war <strong>in</strong> terrorism.James Steele was recently featured <strong>in</strong> a New York Times Magaz<strong>in</strong>e story as a top adviser to<strong>Iraq</strong>'s "most fearsome counter<strong>in</strong>surgency force," an outfit called the Special Police Commandosthat numbers about 5000 troops. The article, by Peter Maass, noted that Steele "honed his tacticslead<strong>in</strong>g a Special Forces mission <strong>in</strong> El Salvador dur<strong>in</strong>g that country's brutal civil war <strong>in</strong> the1980s." And, as Maass rem<strong>in</strong>ded his readers, that civil war resulted <strong>in</strong> the deaths <strong>of</strong> 70,000people, mostly civilians, and "[m]ost <strong>of</strong> the kill<strong>in</strong>g and tortur<strong>in</strong>g was done by the army and rightw<strong>in</strong>gdeath squads affiliated with it." The army that did all that kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> El Salvador wassupported by the United States and <strong>US</strong> military <strong>of</strong>ficials such as Steele, who was head <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong>military assistance group <strong>in</strong> El Salvador for two years <strong>in</strong> the mid-1980s. (A 1993 UN truthcommission, which exam<strong>in</strong>ed 22,000 atrocities that occurred dur<strong>in</strong>g the twelve-year civil war <strong>in</strong>El Salvador, attributed 85 percent <strong>of</strong> the abuses to the <strong>US</strong>-backed El Salvador military and itsdeath-squad allies.)Maass reported that the Special Forces advisers <strong>in</strong> El Salvador led by Steele "tra<strong>in</strong>ed front-l<strong>in</strong>ebattalions that were accused <strong>of</strong> significant human rights abuses." But he neglected to mentionthat Steele ran afoul <strong>of</strong> the Iran-contra <strong>in</strong>vestigators for not be<strong>in</strong>g honest about his role <strong>in</strong> thecovert and illegal contra-support operation.After the Iran-contra story broke <strong>in</strong> 1986, Steele was questioned by Iran-contra <strong>in</strong>vestigators,who had good reason to seek <strong>in</strong>formation from him. The secret contra-supply network managedby Oliver North had flown weapons and supplies to the contras out <strong>of</strong> Illopongo Air Base <strong>in</strong> ElSalvador. Steele claimed that he had observed the North network <strong>in</strong> action but that he had never79


assisted it. The evidence didn't support this assertion. For one, North had given Steele a specialcod<strong>in</strong>g device that allowed encrypted communications to be sent securely over telephone l<strong>in</strong>es.Why did Steele need this device if he had noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with the operation? And for a time Steelepassed this device to Felix Rodriguez, one <strong>of</strong> North's key operatives <strong>in</strong> El Salvador. Furthermore,Congressional <strong>in</strong>vestigators discovered evidence <strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g that aviation fuel given to ElSalvador under a <strong>US</strong> military aid program that Steele supervised was illegally sold to the Northnetwork. (The Reagan adm<strong>in</strong>istration refused to respond to congressional <strong>in</strong>quiries about this oildeal.) And accord<strong>in</strong>g to the accounts <strong>of</strong> others, Steele had made sure that the North network'splanes, used to ferry weapons to the contras, could come and go from Illopongo.When questioned by the Iran-contra <strong>in</strong>dependent counsel, Steele ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed that he had limitedhis actions to provid<strong>in</strong>g humanitarian assistance to the contras--an act that would not haveviolated the prohibition passed by Congress on supply<strong>in</strong>g the contras with weapons. But, as<strong>in</strong>dependent counsel Lawrence Walsh later po<strong>in</strong>ted out <strong>in</strong> his book, Firewall, a lie-detectorexam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong>dicated Steel "was not be<strong>in</strong>g truthful." Steele's name had also turned up <strong>in</strong> theprivate notebooks <strong>in</strong> which North kept track <strong>of</strong> his various Iran-contra operations. As Walshwrote, "Confronted with the results <strong>of</strong> the lie-detector test and North's notebook, Steele admittednot only his participation <strong>in</strong> the [clandest<strong>in</strong>e] arms deliveries [to the contras] but also his earlydiscussions <strong>of</strong> these activities with Donald Gregg [the national security adviser to Vice PresidentGe<strong>org</strong>e Bush] and the U.S. ambassador to El Salvador, Edw<strong>in</strong> G. Corr."Walsh's description suggested that Steele tried to lie his way past <strong>in</strong>vestigators as part <strong>of</strong> a largercover-up. At the time <strong>of</strong> the scandal, a significant question was how much Donald Gregg knewabout the operation <strong>in</strong> El Salvador, for Gregg's connection to the secret, law-skirt<strong>in</strong>g contrasupportnetwork implicated Vice President Bush, who was runn<strong>in</strong>g for president and claim<strong>in</strong>g hehad been out <strong>of</strong> the loop on the Iran-contra affair. (Ge<strong>org</strong>e H.W. Bush's own diaries--which hewithheld for several years and did not release until after he had lost his 1992 bid for reelection aspresident--prove that despite his claim <strong>of</strong> ignorance he knew about the Iran-contra affair before itbecame public.) Steele had played the good soldier--that is, he did not tell the truth and kept hismouth shut as long as he could.Steele escaped <strong>in</strong>dictment and his flunk<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the polygraph exam was not revealed until Walsh'sbook came out <strong>in</strong> 1997. But he did have to pay for his participation <strong>in</strong> the North's contra scheme.In 1988, the Pentagon sent to the Senate a list <strong>of</strong> 50 Army colonels who were up for promotion tobrigadier general. An a list <strong>of</strong> proposed promotions to full colonel submitted at the same time<strong>in</strong>cluded Lt. Colonel Robert Earl, a North deputy who assisted the contra supply effort andparticipated <strong>in</strong> the destruction <strong>of</strong> records after the Iran-contra scandal exploded. Usually suchpromotions fly though the Senate with no debate. But aides work<strong>in</strong>g for Senator Tom Hark<strong>in</strong>, aDemocrat from Iowa, noticed Steele's and Earl's names on these lists, and Hark<strong>in</strong> blocked thesetwo promotions. "There is no way any <strong>of</strong> these people is go<strong>in</strong>g to get a promotion" without acongressional <strong>in</strong>quiry, Hark<strong>in</strong> told The Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post. The Army claimed that it had foundthat Steele had committed noth<strong>in</strong>g wrong. Obviously, it had not looked hard enough, for, asWalsh later determ<strong>in</strong>ed, Steele had not told the truth.But mislead<strong>in</strong>g congressional and <strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>in</strong>vestigators didn't fully derail Steele's career. Heis once more advis<strong>in</strong>g a military unit with a questionable human rights record. Let's hope that if80


his actions this time around become <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest to government <strong>in</strong>vestigators he is truthful whenthey come knock<strong>in</strong>g.Copyright © 2005 The Nation81


For <strong>Iraq</strong>, "The Salvador Option" Becomes Realityby Max Fullerwww.globalresearch.ca, 2 June 2005, 9 pagesThe URL <strong>of</strong> this article is: http://globalresearch.ca/articles/FUL506A.htmlAbstractThe follow<strong>in</strong>g article exam<strong>in</strong>es evidence that the 'Salvador Option' for <strong>Iraq</strong> has beenongo<strong>in</strong>g for some time and attempts to say what such an option will mean. It paysparticular attention to the role <strong>of</strong> the Special Police Commandos, consider<strong>in</strong>g both thebackground <strong>of</strong> their <strong>US</strong> liaisons and their deployment <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. The article also looks at theevidence for death-squad style massacres <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and draws attention to the almostcomplete absence <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation. As such, the article represents an <strong>in</strong>itial effort tocompile and exam<strong>in</strong>e some <strong>of</strong> these mass kill<strong>in</strong>gs and is <strong>in</strong>tended to spur others <strong>in</strong>t<strong>of</strong>urther look<strong>in</strong>g at the evidence. F<strong>in</strong>ally, the article turns away from the notion thatsectarianism is a sufficient explanation for the violence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, locat<strong>in</strong>g it structurally atthe hands <strong>of</strong> the state as part <strong>of</strong> the ongo<strong>in</strong>g economic subjugation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Mount<strong>in</strong>g evidence <strong>in</strong>dicates that the ‘Salvador Option’ mooted for <strong>Iraq</strong> is already proceed<strong>in</strong>g atfull throttle.On 8 January this year, Newsweek published an article that claimed the <strong>US</strong> government wasconsider<strong>in</strong>g a ‘Salvador Option’ to combat the <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>(http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6802629/site/newsweek/ ). The Salvador Option is a reference tothe military assistance programme <strong>of</strong> the 1980s, <strong>in</strong>itiated under Jimmy Carter and subsequentlypursued by the Reagan adm<strong>in</strong>istration, <strong>in</strong> which the <strong>US</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>ed and materially supported theSalvadoran military <strong>in</strong> its counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency campaign aga<strong>in</strong>st popularly supported FMLNguerrillas. The Newsweek article was widely cited <strong>in</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong>stream media but the allegationswere rapidly dismissed by Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defence Donald Rumsfeld. Though the reportsmentioned human-rights violations, they generally made little <strong>of</strong> the fact that it was the veryunits that <strong>US</strong> military advisors had <strong>in</strong>structed that were frequently responsible for the mostunspeakable crimes* and that there was at times a clear correlation between fresh bouts <strong>of</strong>tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and subsequent atrocities (see Noam Chomsky, ‘The Crucifixion <strong>of</strong>Salvador’,http://www.zmag.<strong>org</strong>/chomsky/sam/sam-2-02.html ).In an earlier <strong>in</strong>terview on 10 January, retired General Wayne Down<strong>in</strong>g, former head <strong>of</strong> all <strong>US</strong>special operations forces, took a very different l<strong>in</strong>e, stat<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>US</strong>-backed special units had been‘conduct<strong>in</strong>g strikes’ aga<strong>in</strong>st leaders <strong>of</strong> the so-called <strong>in</strong>surgency s<strong>in</strong>ce March 2003 (cited <strong>in</strong>‘Phoenix Ris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>’ by Stephen Shalom,http://www.zmag.<strong>org</strong>/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=7227 ). However, Down<strong>in</strong>g was carefulto say that implement<strong>in</strong>g a Salvadoran strategy would add an extra ‘type’ <strong>of</strong> unit to theoccupation’s arsenal. What neither the press, Donald Rumsfeld, nor General Down<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>tedout was that the Salvador Option was already well underway <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, and far more literally than82


might have been imag<strong>in</strong>ed.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to an article recently published <strong>in</strong> New York Times Magaz<strong>in</strong>e, <strong>in</strong> September 2004Counsellor to the <strong>US</strong> Ambassador for <strong>Iraq</strong>i Security Forces James Steele was assigned to workwith a new elite <strong>Iraq</strong>i counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency unit known as the Special Police Commandos, formedunder the operational control <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>’s Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry (‘The Way <strong>of</strong> the Commandos’, PeterMaass, http://psychoanalystsopposewar.<strong>org</strong>/resources_files/TheWay_<strong>of</strong>_the_Commandos.html ).From 1984 to 1986 then Col. Steele had led the <strong>US</strong> Military Advisory Group <strong>in</strong> El Salvador,where he was responsible for develop<strong>in</strong>g special operat<strong>in</strong>g forces at brigade level dur<strong>in</strong>g theheight <strong>of</strong> the conflict. These forces, composed <strong>of</strong> the most brutal soldiers available, replicated thek<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> small-unit operations with which Steele was familiar from his service <strong>in</strong> Vietnam. Ratherthan focus<strong>in</strong>g on seiz<strong>in</strong>g terra<strong>in</strong>, their role was to attack ‘<strong>in</strong>surgent’ leadership, their supporters,sources <strong>of</strong> supply and base camps. In the case <strong>of</strong> the 4th Brigade, such tactics ensured that a 20-man force was able to account for 60% <strong>of</strong> the total casualties <strong>in</strong>flicted by the unit (Manwar<strong>in</strong>g,El Salvador at <strong>War</strong>, 1988, p 306-8). In military circles it was the use <strong>of</strong> such tactics that madethe difference <strong>in</strong> ultimately defeat<strong>in</strong>g the guerrillas; for others, such as the Catholic priest DanielSantiago, the presence <strong>of</strong> people like Steele contributed to another sort <strong>of</strong> difference:People are not just killed by death squads <strong>in</strong> El Salvador –– they are decapitated and then theirheads are placed on pikes and used to dot the landscape. Men are not just disemboweled by theSalvadoran Treasury Police; their severed genitalia are stuffed <strong>in</strong>to their mouths. Salvadoranwomen are not just raped by the National Guard; their wombs are cut from their bodies and usedto cover their faces. It is not enough to kill children; they are dragged over barbed wire until theflesh falls from their bones, while parents are forced to watch. (Cited by Chomsky, op cit.)The Police Commandos are <strong>in</strong> large part the bra<strong>in</strong>child <strong>of</strong> another <strong>US</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>surgencyveteran, Steven Casteel, a former top DEA man who has been act<strong>in</strong>g as the senior advisor <strong>in</strong> theM<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> the Interior. Casteel was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the hunt for Colombia’s notorious coca<strong>in</strong>e baronPablo Escobar, dur<strong>in</strong>g which the DEA collaborated with a paramilitary <strong>org</strong>anization known asLos Pepes, which later transformed itself <strong>in</strong>to the AUC, an umbrella <strong>org</strong>anization cover<strong>in</strong>g all <strong>of</strong>Colombia’s paramilitary death squads (http://coca<strong>in</strong>e.<strong>org</strong>/colombia/pablo-escobar.html ;http://www.ciponl<strong>in</strong>e.<strong>org</strong>/colombia/040105isac.htm ).Like Colombia’s death squads, <strong>Iraq</strong>’s Police Commandos deliberately cultivate a frighten<strong>in</strong>gparamilitary image. Dur<strong>in</strong>g raids they wear balaclavas and black leather gloves and openly<strong>in</strong>timidate and brutalize suspects, even <strong>in</strong> the presence <strong>of</strong> foreign journalists (see the report byPeter Maass’s). Significantly, many <strong>of</strong> the Commandos, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g their leader, are SunniMuslims.Evidence <strong>of</strong> MassacresIn the last few weeks, with the discovery <strong>of</strong> several mass graves <strong>in</strong> and around Baghdad,evidence <strong>of</strong> multiple extra-judicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs has started to become much more visible, but, <strong>in</strong> fact,83


even a cursory review <strong>of</strong> such archives as the one compiled by <strong>Iraq</strong> Body Count(http://www.iraqbodycount.net /) reveals that mass executions have been tak<strong>in</strong>g place commonly<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> over at least the last six months. What is particularly strik<strong>in</strong>g is that many <strong>of</strong> thosekill<strong>in</strong>gs have taken place s<strong>in</strong>ce the Police Commandos became operationally active and <strong>of</strong>tencorrespond with areas where they have been deployed.The clearest correlation is <strong>in</strong> Mosul, where the Police Commandos began operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> lateOctober(http://www.strykernews.com/archives/2004/10/29/special_iraqi_police_commandos_cont<strong>in</strong>ue_operations.html ). In mid-November it was reported that <strong>in</strong>surgents were conduct<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>of</strong>fensiveand had managed to drive most <strong>of</strong> the (regular) police from the city. There followed what wasdescribed as a jo<strong>in</strong>t counter-<strong>of</strong>fensive by <strong>US</strong> forces and Police Commandos. The PoliceCommandos conducted raids <strong>in</strong>side the old quarter start<strong>in</strong>g on 16 November <strong>in</strong> which dozens <strong>of</strong>suspects were arrested. Dur<strong>in</strong>g one such raid on a mosque and a tea shop, deta<strong>in</strong>ees, bl<strong>in</strong>dfoldedand with their hands tied beh<strong>in</strong>d their backs, were seen be<strong>in</strong>g taken away by commandos(http://www.smh.com.au/news/After-Saddam/<strong>Iraq</strong>i-soldiers-found-murdered-<strong>in</strong>-Mosul/2004/11/21/1100972263000.html ). In the weeks and months that followed over 150bodies appeared (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4105009.stm ), <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>in</strong> batches andfrequently hav<strong>in</strong>g obviously been executed, usually with a bullet to the head (eg.http://www.middle-east-onl<strong>in</strong>e.com/english/iraq/?id=12147 ).The victims are repeatedly stated to have belonged mostly to the security forces, with‘<strong>in</strong>surgents’ blamed for conduct<strong>in</strong>g a campaign <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>timidation. Yet, most <strong>of</strong> the bodies weredressed <strong>in</strong> civilian clothes with little <strong>in</strong> the way <strong>of</strong> identification. In the few <strong>in</strong>stances <strong>in</strong> whichpositive identifications have been reported, these are based on flimsy evidence. For <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>in</strong>the case <strong>of</strong> n<strong>in</strong>e victims described as soldiers that had been shot <strong>in</strong> the head, a <strong>US</strong> armylieutenant simply stated that a ‘unit recently moved to one <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong> bases’ had ‘some guysmiss<strong>in</strong>g’ (http://www.smh.com.au/news/After-Saddam/<strong>Iraq</strong>i-soldiers-found-murdered-<strong>in</strong>-Mosul/2004/11/21/1100972263000.html ); photographs <strong>of</strong> the victims showed them wear<strong>in</strong>gcivilian clothes. A blatant case <strong>of</strong> dis<strong>in</strong>formation regards a group <strong>of</strong> 31 bodies ‘discovered’ bythe Police Commandos <strong>in</strong> March 2005 scattered around a cemetery <strong>in</strong> western Mosul. Thebodies, described by an Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry spokesman as belong<strong>in</strong>g to civilians, police <strong>of</strong>ficers andarmy soldiers, were said to have been the victims <strong>of</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle policeman, Shoqayer Fareed Sheet,who confessed to these and numerous other kill<strong>in</strong>gs on a special television show conceived byfounder <strong>of</strong> the Police Commandos Adnan Thavit, called Terrorism <strong>in</strong> the Hands <strong>of</strong> Justice(http://www.wash<strong>in</strong>gtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23448-2005Mar10.html ). Not only does thisprogramme break every conceivable moral and legal standard, but it is notorious for parad<strong>in</strong>gobviously tortured deta<strong>in</strong>ees who are <strong>of</strong>ten forced to confess to be<strong>in</strong>g homosexuals orpaedophiles as well as murderers. (http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:OkQ0b9q9QbkJ:uniraq.<strong>org</strong>/documents/ArabicRegionalNews22 March2005.doc+quds+press&hl=en&client=safari)Given the extreme paucity <strong>of</strong> evidence, the lack <strong>of</strong> secure identification and the dis<strong>in</strong>formation84


put out by the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry, there is at least a strong possibility that many, if not all, <strong>of</strong> theextra-judicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Mosul have been carried out by the Police Commandos.Police Commandos Directly AccusedA similar, thought less complete pattern is emerg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> other areas where the Commandos havebeen operat<strong>in</strong>g, notably Samarra, where bodies were recently found <strong>in</strong> nearby Lake Tharthar(http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=41936 ). However, the strongest case is currentlystart<strong>in</strong>g to emerge <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, where a wave <strong>of</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>gs over the last few weeks has resulted <strong>in</strong>accusations be<strong>in</strong>g made directly aga<strong>in</strong>st the state security forces and specifically aga<strong>in</strong>st thePolice Commandos. The accusations revolve around three dist<strong>in</strong>ct massacres. On 5 May ashallow mass grave was discovered <strong>in</strong> the Kasra-Wa-Atash <strong>in</strong>dustrial area conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 14 bodies.The victims, all young men, had been bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded, their hands tied beh<strong>in</strong>d their backs and theyhad been executed with shots to the head. The bodies also revealed such torture marks as brokenskulls, burn<strong>in</strong>g, beat<strong>in</strong>gs and right eyeballs removed. In this case family members were able toidentify the bodies; the victims were Sunni farmers on their way to market. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to PhilSh<strong>in</strong>er <strong>of</strong> the British-based Public Interest Lawyers, the men had been arrested when <strong>Iraq</strong>isecurity forces raided the vegetable market(http://www.guardian.co.uk/<strong>in</strong>ternational/story/0,,1488096,00.html ,http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=760368 ).Less than two weeks later on 15 May, 15 more bodies were discovered at two sites <strong>in</strong> westernBaghdad. Eight <strong>of</strong> the victims were found In the Al-Shaab area, while a further seven werediscovered beh<strong>in</strong>d a mosque <strong>in</strong> Ore district(http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/Story.aspx?Language=en&DSNO=733276 ). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to theChicago Tribune, ‘some had been bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded, most were found with their hands bound and allhad been shot <strong>in</strong> the head’ (http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0505170030may17,0,3795261.story?coll=chi-newsop<strong>in</strong>ionperspective-utl ). The Association <strong>of</strong>Muslim Scholars quickly responded to the wave <strong>of</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>gs, accus<strong>in</strong>g soldiers and InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry commandos <strong>of</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g ‘arrested imams and the guardians <strong>of</strong> some mosques, torturedand killed them, then got rid <strong>of</strong> their bodies <strong>in</strong> a garbage dump <strong>in</strong> the Shaab district’(http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=238784&area=/break<strong>in</strong>g_news/break<strong>in</strong>g_news__<strong>in</strong>ternational_news/ ). ‘This is state terrorism by the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior’ said Hareth al-Dhari,secretary general <strong>of</strong> the Association (http://news.ft.com/cms/s/47613c82-c804-11d9-9765-00000e2511c8.html ). Whilst al-Dhari also blamed the Badr brigades associated with the rul<strong>in</strong>gShia coalition, the emphasis <strong>of</strong> his denunciation was quickly shifted <strong>in</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong>stream press tore<strong>in</strong>force only this aspect <strong>of</strong> the accusation and the notion <strong>of</strong> sectarian tit-for-tat violence (eghttp://newswww.bbc.net.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4569103.stm ). The <strong>Iraq</strong>i government’sriposte to the Association’s accusations was predictably <strong>in</strong>sidious, with the new defence m<strong>in</strong>isterblam<strong>in</strong>g terrorists wear<strong>in</strong>g military uniforms(http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0505170030may17,0,3795261.story?coll=chi-newsop<strong>in</strong>ionperspective-utl ). However, it shouldcome as little surprise to discover that at the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> May the government had announced an85


imm<strong>in</strong>ent counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency crackdown, which they said was likely to unleash well-tra<strong>in</strong>edcommandos <strong>in</strong> Baghdad and other trouble spots(http://www.<strong>in</strong>formationclear<strong>in</strong>ghouse.<strong>in</strong>fo/article8725.htm ).Wider Evidence <strong>of</strong> MassacresWith such accusations be<strong>in</strong>g made specifically aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>US</strong>-tra<strong>in</strong>ed counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency forces it isworth briefly mention<strong>in</strong>g some <strong>of</strong> the other massacres that have occurred <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> over recentmonths. In October 2004 some 49 bodies were discovered on a remote road about 50km south <strong>of</strong>Baquba. The victims, who wore civilian clothes, had all been shot <strong>in</strong> the head. The InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry announced that they were <strong>of</strong>f-duty soldiers. Some accounts by police said the rebelswere dressed <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i military uniforms, although details were far from clear(http://sfgate.com/cgib<strong>in</strong>/article.cgi?file=/news/archive/2004/10/24/<strong>in</strong>ternational0921EDT0440.DTL;http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,136419,00.html ).Similarly, <strong>in</strong> March <strong>of</strong> this year 26 bodies were discovered at Rumana, near Qaim, close to theSyrian border. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry, most <strong>of</strong> the victims were members <strong>of</strong> a rapidresponse team. The victims had been bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded, handcuffed and shot <strong>in</strong> the head. The bodies,which once aga<strong>in</strong> were dressed <strong>in</strong> civilian clothes, were found <strong>in</strong> an area where the <strong>US</strong> army hadbeen conduct<strong>in</strong>g Operation River Blitz, a mar<strong>in</strong>e-led assault on <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong> the Euphrates Rivervalley (http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,136419,00.html ;http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/03/09/iraq.ma<strong>in</strong>/ ).To further muddy the waters, the bodies <strong>of</strong> eight men from Sadr City were found <strong>in</strong> Yussufiah,40km south <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, on 9 May this year. The victims, who had been tortured, then executedwith a bullet to the back <strong>of</strong> the neck, were found wear<strong>in</strong>g army uniforms, but relatives identifiedthem as civilians. Army capta<strong>in</strong> Ahmed Husse<strong>in</strong> suggested that the killers wanted people tobelieve they had executed soldiers (http://www.news24.com/News24/World/<strong>Iraq</strong>/0,,2-10-1460_1701988,00.html ).There are other similar cases <strong>of</strong> mass kill<strong>in</strong>gs, as well as many more <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g smaller numbers<strong>of</strong> bodies far too numerous to mention. Nonetheless, it is worth emphasis<strong>in</strong>g the many bodies(more than 100) gradually be<strong>in</strong>g dredged up from the River Tigris, especially around Suwayra,south <strong>of</strong> Baghdad. The bodies began to be noticed <strong>in</strong> late February <strong>of</strong> this year, surfac<strong>in</strong>g at therate <strong>of</strong> one or two a day, but began to <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> frequency <strong>in</strong> April; some <strong>of</strong> the victims, whowere mostly men but <strong>in</strong>cluded some women and children, were bound, others shot or beheaded.In April, president Talabani claimed the victims had been kidnapped by <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong> the village<strong>of</strong> Mada<strong>in</strong>, but, <strong>in</strong> fact, those identified to date hailed from a wide radius and could not beaccounted for by a s<strong>in</strong>gle episode <strong>of</strong> kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g. Police <strong>in</strong> Suwayra have stated that many <strong>of</strong> thevictims are likely to have been stopped at impromptu checkpo<strong>in</strong>ts by masked men, while someSunnis say that the victims may <strong>in</strong>clude people deta<strong>in</strong>ed by the police(http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-86


<strong>in</strong>/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/04/22/MNG45CDDBQ1.DTL ).In light <strong>of</strong> these bodies <strong>in</strong> the Tigris, it may be significant to note a strange report on the websiteJihad Unspun <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> soldiers dump<strong>in</strong>g body bags from helicopters <strong>in</strong> the Diali River <strong>in</strong> eastern<strong>Iraq</strong> dur<strong>in</strong>g the early hours <strong>of</strong> the morn<strong>in</strong>g. The writer argues that the bags held the corpses <strong>of</strong>American soldiers or foreign mercenaries that the army wished to conceal from publicknowledge(http://www.jihadunspun.com/<strong>in</strong>theatre_<strong>in</strong>ternal.php?article=100552&list=/home.php& ). Thisimplausible theory leaves a very large question mark over the identity <strong>of</strong> bodies that the <strong>US</strong> armywishes to conceal and recalls the report submitted to the Brussels Tribunal, ‘Tarmiya: the SilentAgony’. This account conta<strong>in</strong>s first hand testimony from an agricultural worker who survived anattempted execution by a team <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> special forces. He and a colleague were abducted from thefarm where they worked, then taken to a secluded grove where their throats were cut. They wereleft for dead, but miraculously, one <strong>of</strong> them survived (http://www.brusselstribunal.<strong>org</strong> /). Whilstthis account lacks corroboration and has rema<strong>in</strong>ed anonymous to protect the identities <strong>of</strong> those<strong>in</strong>volved, it rema<strong>in</strong>s a conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g description <strong>of</strong> the k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> long-range ‘reconnaissance’missions that people like James Steele were conduct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Vietnam.Modell<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>War</strong>Whilst much <strong>of</strong> the violence across <strong>Iraq</strong> appears chaotic, some l<strong>in</strong>es are start<strong>in</strong>g to emerge thatfollow the pattern and the logic <strong>of</strong> other counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency wars. In El Salvador, when the warf<strong>in</strong>ally came to an end, it became clear that the majority <strong>of</strong> its victims had been participants <strong>in</strong>progressive social movements as well as peasants who had been perceived as sympathis<strong>in</strong>g withor support<strong>in</strong>g the guerrillas. The object <strong>of</strong> the war was not to defeat an ideologically motivatedrebellion, it was to prevent the possibility <strong>of</strong> progressive social change and to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> thecountry with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>US</strong> economic orbit <strong>in</strong> its traditional tributary role.The same can be said <strong>of</strong> Colombia at present, where the long current phase <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternalconflict <strong>in</strong> which thousands <strong>of</strong> social activists have been murdered has butted seamlessly with thecountry’s exposure to economic liberalisation. In short, legitimate social demands are violentlysuppressed <strong>in</strong> favour <strong>of</strong> allow<strong>in</strong>g foreign capital to extract super pr<strong>of</strong>its from Colombia’s richnatural resources and sell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>f its public assets for the same purpose. Much <strong>of</strong> the conflict takesplace with<strong>in</strong> the realm <strong>of</strong> so-called ‘civil society’, where progressive leaders are excluded orelim<strong>in</strong>ated, whilst those who are prepared to throw <strong>in</strong> their lot with predatory foreign capital arerewarded and extolled.In <strong>Iraq</strong> the war comes <strong>in</strong> two phases. The first phase is complete: the destruction <strong>of</strong> the exist<strong>in</strong>gstate, which did not comply with the <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>of</strong> British and American capital. The second phaseconsists <strong>of</strong> build<strong>in</strong>g a new state tied to those <strong>in</strong>terests and smash<strong>in</strong>g every dissent<strong>in</strong>g sector <strong>of</strong>society. Openly, this <strong>in</strong>volves apply<strong>in</strong>g the same sort <strong>of</strong> economic shock therapy that has done somuch damage <strong>in</strong> swathes <strong>of</strong> the Third World and Eastern Europe. Covertly, it means<strong>in</strong>timidat<strong>in</strong>g, kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g and murder<strong>in</strong>g opposition voices.87


The economic assault on <strong>Iraq</strong> is well underway. Visible unemployment stands at around thecatastrophic level <strong>of</strong> 28%, large parts <strong>of</strong> the state sector have already been sold <strong>of</strong>f and wageshave fallen (<strong>of</strong>ten to less than half <strong>of</strong> their pre-war levels), thanks <strong>in</strong> part to the <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong>thousands <strong>of</strong> cheap workers from Pakistan, India and the Philipp<strong>in</strong>es. These workers are <strong>of</strong>tentricked <strong>in</strong>to com<strong>in</strong>g and stripped <strong>of</strong> their passports, effectively work<strong>in</strong>g as slaves <strong>in</strong> order toundercut accustomed <strong>Iraq</strong>i liv<strong>in</strong>g standards. Reconstruction projects are given almost exclusivelyto foreign (ma<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>US</strong>) companies, who pay a flat rate <strong>of</strong> 15% tax with no limits to repatriation<strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>its, while <strong>Iraq</strong>’s state-owned companies are excluded(http://www.antiwar.com/orig/shumway.php?articleid=3005 ). In the countryside, <strong>Iraq</strong>i farmersare now obliged to buy a licence to grow genetically modified seed and are prohibited fromresow<strong>in</strong>g the seed developed by their ancestors <strong>in</strong> the cradle <strong>of</strong> civilisation(http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/KHA501A.html ).The covert assault has also begun. Attacks on workers and trade unionists are becom<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly common (http://www.iraqitradeunions.<strong>org</strong>/archives/000200.html ) and it is<strong>in</strong>structive that the railway workers union, <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>dustry that has been slated for privatisation,seems to have been particularly targeted, with <strong>US</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istrators on the ground threaten<strong>in</strong>g tobr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Indian workers (http://www.iraqitradeunions.<strong>org</strong>/archives/000117.html ). Whilst theIFTU, the dom<strong>in</strong>ant, state-sanctioned new trade-union umbrella <strong>org</strong>anisation, may have endorsedthe occupation, the Federation <strong>of</strong> Workers Councils and Unions <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> (FWCUI) has not; <strong>in</strong> anycase, ord<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>Iraq</strong>i workers will f<strong>in</strong>d themselves <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly at odds with the puppetgovernment as they try to defend even rudimentary liv<strong>in</strong>g standards. Industrial action is alreadywidespread <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, though little reported <strong>in</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong>stream press.An even more frighten<strong>in</strong>g picture is emerg<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the sector <strong>of</strong> higher education, where, s<strong>in</strong>cethe beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the occupation, some 200 <strong>Iraq</strong>i academics have been murdered, while controland <strong>in</strong>timidation has become systematic. Many <strong>of</strong> the victims worked <strong>in</strong> the social sciences,where overlap with progressive social movements is unavoidable(http://www.newstatesman.com/200409060018 ).Unfortunately, <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> it is almost impossible to securely attribute any <strong>of</strong> the host <strong>of</strong>assass<strong>in</strong>ations and extra-judicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs, while the <strong>US</strong>-UK propaganda campaign has left manyall too will<strong>in</strong>g to believe <strong>in</strong> such bugbears as Al-Zarqawi (see Michel Chossudovsky’s article‘Who is Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi?’ (http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO405B.html ).What we do know, however, is that hundreds <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is are be<strong>in</strong>g murdered and thatparamilitary hit squads <strong>of</strong> the proxy government <strong>org</strong>anized by <strong>US</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>ers with a fulsomepedigree <strong>in</strong> state terrorism are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly be<strong>in</strong>g associated with them.In the context <strong>of</strong> a country where good <strong>in</strong>formation is extremely scarce, dis<strong>in</strong>formation and blackpropaganda are endemic and <strong>in</strong>dependent journalists and monitors are deliberately elim<strong>in</strong>ated, itis vital to be able to model the situation <strong>in</strong> order to understand it and, hopefully, be effective.There are two pr<strong>in</strong>ciple dimensions to such modell<strong>in</strong>g. In the first, <strong>Iraq</strong> has frequently beencompared to Vietnam. The similarity is that the <strong>US</strong> has well over 100,000 soldiers on the ground.88


However, the analogy is mislead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> that <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> conflict with a populous enemy state, as NorthVietnam was, ended quickly. As a model, El Salvador is not wholly accurate either. In ElSalvador <strong>US</strong> ‘advisors’ were few <strong>in</strong> number and prohibited from tak<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>in</strong> combat.Nevertheless, it is towards this model that the <strong>US</strong> is attempt<strong>in</strong>g to move, hop<strong>in</strong>g to farm out thesordid bus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>of</strong> occupation to <strong>Iraq</strong>i auxiliaries. But, <strong>in</strong> many ways it is contemporaryColombia that <strong>of</strong>fers the closest analogy: not for the disposition <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> forces, but because herethe same process <strong>of</strong> asset-stripp<strong>in</strong>g, impoverishment and conquistador-like plunder<strong>in</strong>g is bothdeeply entrenched and ongo<strong>in</strong>g. It is here that is to be found that clearest pattern for the assaultson academics, <strong>in</strong>dependent trade unionists and peasant <strong>org</strong>anisations that will <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glycharacterise <strong>Iraq</strong> for those prepared to look beyond the fireworks. This is the second dimensionthat any model must address, but <strong>in</strong> essence the pattern is repeated time after time <strong>in</strong> everyimperialist so-called counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency war; for beh<strong>in</strong>d each and every one lurks the reality <strong>of</strong>exploitation and class war, and, as successive imperialist powers have shown, the bottom l<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>combat<strong>in</strong>g the hopes and dreams <strong>of</strong> ord<strong>in</strong>ary people is to resort to spread<strong>in</strong>g terror through theapplication <strong>of</strong> extreme violence. In <strong>Iraq</strong>, the Salvador Option may mean return<strong>in</strong>g home to f<strong>in</strong>dyour entire family seated at table with their own severed heads served to them and a bowl <strong>of</strong>blood for relish.*One <strong>of</strong> the worst atrocities was committed <strong>in</strong> December 1981 at the village <strong>of</strong> El Mozote <strong>in</strong> thedepartment <strong>of</strong> Moraz‡‡n by the Atlacatl Battalion, an elite counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency force tra<strong>in</strong>ed by<strong>US</strong> advisors and regarded as one <strong>of</strong> El Salvador’s best fight<strong>in</strong>g units. Over 200 men, women andchildren (the entire village) were systematically tortured and murdered over the course <strong>of</strong> a day(http://www.usip.<strong>org</strong>/library/tc/doc/reports/el_salvador/tc_es_03151993_casesC.html )._______________________Max Fuller has worked for some years as a member <strong>of</strong> the Colombia Solidarity Campaign <strong>in</strong> theUK and has read extensively on <strong>US</strong> policy and Lat<strong>in</strong> America. He is the author <strong>of</strong> several reportspublished <strong>in</strong> the Bullet<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Colombia Solidarity Campaign.***********************To become a Member <strong>of</strong> Global ResearchThe Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) at www.globalresearch.ca grants permission tocross-post orig<strong>in</strong>al Global Research articles <strong>in</strong> their entirety, or any portions there<strong>of</strong>, oncommunity <strong>in</strong>ternet sites, as long as the text & title are not modified. The source must beacknowledged and an active URL hyperl<strong>in</strong>k address <strong>of</strong> the orig<strong>in</strong>al CRG article must be<strong>in</strong>dicated. The author's copyright note must be displayed. For publication <strong>of</strong> Global Researcharticles <strong>in</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>t or other forms <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g commercial <strong>in</strong>ternet sites, contact:crgeditor@yahoo.comwww.globalresearch.ca conta<strong>in</strong>s copyrighted material the use <strong>of</strong> which has not always beenspecifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are mak<strong>in</strong>g such material available to our89


eaders under the provisions <strong>of</strong> "fair use" <strong>in</strong> an effort to advance a better understand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>political, economic and social issues. The material on this site is distributed without pr<strong>of</strong>it tothose who have expressed a prior <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> receiv<strong>in</strong>g it for research and educational purposes. Ifyou wish to use copyrighted material for purposes other than "fair use" you must requestpermission from the copyright owner.Disclaimer: The views expressed <strong>in</strong> this article are the sole responsibility <strong>of</strong> the author and donot necessarily reflect those <strong>of</strong> the Centre for Research on Globalization.To express your op<strong>in</strong>ion on this article, jo<strong>in</strong> the discussion at Global Research's News andDiscussion ForumFor media <strong>in</strong>quiries: crgeditor@yahoo.com© Copyright Max Fuller Global Research 2005.90


http://nytimes.com/cfr/<strong>in</strong>ternational/slot2_060905.html?pagewanted=pr<strong>in</strong>tQ&A: <strong>Iraq</strong>'s MilitiasNew York TimesJune 9, 2005by Lionel Beehner, staff writerWhat's the status <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s various militia groups?Despite repeated U.S. requests for them to disband, <strong>Iraq</strong>'s various ethnic and sectarian militiascont<strong>in</strong>ue to exist, and <strong>in</strong> some cases, are on a path to be<strong>in</strong>g recognized as part <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s securityapparatus. On June 8, for example, <strong>Iraq</strong>i President Jalal Talabani praised an Iran-tra<strong>in</strong>ed Shiitemilitia known as the Badr Organization and the Kurdish peshmerga security force. The cont<strong>in</strong>uedoperation <strong>of</strong> these militias raises fears among experts that security responsibilities <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> will<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly be enforced not by a unified, U.S.-tra<strong>in</strong>ed army, but by a diverse group <strong>of</strong>potentially feud<strong>in</strong>g militias that could deepen the nation's sectarian divisions.What are the various militia groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>?They vary, experts say. There are a grow<strong>in</strong>g number <strong>of</strong> small, homegrown, paramilitary-stylebrigades be<strong>in</strong>g formed by local tribes, religious leaders, and political parties. Some battle <strong>Iraq</strong>'slargely Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgency alongside <strong>of</strong>ficial Interior and Defense m<strong>in</strong>istry troops; others operatewithout <strong>of</strong>ficial assistance or sanction. The larger, more established militias, such as the BadrOrganization and peshmerga, are tied to <strong>Iraq</strong>'s lead<strong>in</strong>g political parties, <strong>org</strong>anized along sectarianl<strong>in</strong>es, and enforce order <strong>in</strong> their respective regions. The relationship <strong>of</strong> these groups to the<strong>of</strong>ficial U.S.-tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces is variable and complex.Who are the peshmerga?They are a Kurdish liberation army whose name translates literally to "those who face death."Elements <strong>of</strong> the force, whose roots stretch back to the 1920s, fought aga<strong>in</strong>st Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>dur<strong>in</strong>g the Iran-<strong>Iraq</strong> war and provided military backup dur<strong>in</strong>g the U.S.-led coalition's oust<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 2003. The peshmerga is now believed to comprise some 100,000 troops, andserves as the primary security force for the Kurdistan Regional Government <strong>in</strong> northern <strong>Iraq</strong>.<strong>Iraq</strong>'s Kurds have repeatedly <strong>in</strong>sisted that the peshmerga rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>tact as a fight<strong>in</strong>g force as acondition <strong>of</strong> their rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g loyal to Baghdad <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> seek<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>dependent state. Kurdish<strong>of</strong>ficials have also requested that <strong>Iraq</strong>'s <strong>in</strong>terim government security forces operate <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>iKurdistan only with the prior permission <strong>of</strong> the Kurdistan Regional Government.What is the Badr Organization?It is the Iranian-tra<strong>in</strong>ed w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Council for the <strong>Is</strong>lamic Revolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> (SCIRI),the largest Shiite party <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the U.S.-led occupation government's crackdown onmilitia groups <strong>in</strong> 2003, the 10,000-strong militia changed its name from the Badr Brigade to the91


Badr Organization <strong>of</strong> Reconstruction and Development and pledged to disarm. The group,however, has reportedly rema<strong>in</strong>ed armed, and today operates ma<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong> Shiite-controlledsouthern <strong>Iraq</strong>, where a number <strong>of</strong> regional governments are dom<strong>in</strong>ated by SCIRI representatives.One <strong>of</strong> Badr's recent <strong>of</strong>fshoots is a feared, elite commando unit l<strong>in</strong>ked to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry called the Wolf Brigade. Sunni leaders have recently accused the Badr Organization <strong>of</strong>revenge kill<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st Sunni clerics and unlawful kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs.What other Shiite militia groups are there?Among them:* The Mahdi Army.Loyal to the young, anti-U.S. cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, this group <strong>of</strong>thousands <strong>of</strong> armed loyalists fought U.S. forces for much <strong>of</strong> last year before agree<strong>in</strong>g to anOctober 2004 ceasefire. Recent news reports suggest the militia, which controls much <strong>of</strong> SadrCity, a Baghdad slum <strong>of</strong> some 2.5 million Shiites, may be regroup<strong>in</strong>g and rearm<strong>in</strong>g itself.Muqtada al-Sadr has refused to participate directly <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government, though some <strong>of</strong> hisfollowers were elected to seats on the <strong>Iraq</strong>i National Assembly.* Defenders <strong>of</strong> Khadamiya. This group is comprised <strong>of</strong> roughly 120 loyalists to Husse<strong>in</strong> al-Sadr, a distant relative <strong>of</strong> Muqtada al-Sadr and a Shiite cleric who ran on former Prime M<strong>in</strong>isterAyad Allawi's ticket <strong>in</strong> the January 30 elections. The brigade was formed to guard a shr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>northern Baghdad popular among Shiites, and is one <strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong> similar local forces that haveemerged.What is the Wolf Brigade?The most feared and effective commando unit <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, experts say. Formed last October by aformer three-star Shiite general and SCIRI member who goes by the nom de guerre Abu Walid,the Wolf Brigade is composed <strong>of</strong> roughly 2,000 fighters, mostly young, poor Shiites from SadrCity. Members <strong>of</strong> the group reportedly earn as much as 700,000 <strong>Iraq</strong>i d<strong>in</strong>ars, or $400, per month,a large sum <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i terms. They dress <strong>in</strong> garb--olive uniform and red beret--redolent <strong>of</strong> SaddamHusse<strong>in</strong>'s elite guard; their logo is a menac<strong>in</strong>g-look<strong>in</strong>g wolf.How did the Wolf Brigade earn its reputation?Last December, the Wolf Brigade--backed up by the <strong>Iraq</strong>i army and U.S. military--achievednotoriety after launch<strong>in</strong>g a series <strong>of</strong> counter<strong>in</strong>surgency operations <strong>in</strong> Mosul, a Sunni strongholdnorthwest <strong>of</strong> Baghdad. Their popularity was further buoyed by the success <strong>of</strong> Terrorism <strong>in</strong> theGrip <strong>of</strong> Justice, a primetime show on U.S.-funded Al <strong>Iraq</strong>iya television that features live<strong>in</strong>terrogations <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>surgents by commandos. In one recent show, Abu Walid questionedaround 30 shabbily dressed suspects, some clutch<strong>in</strong>g photos <strong>of</strong> their victims, wait<strong>in</strong>g to confesstheir crimes.<strong>Is</strong> the brigade controversial?Yes. Some <strong>Iraq</strong>is accuse the Wolf Brigade <strong>of</strong> target<strong>in</strong>g Palest<strong>in</strong>ian refugees <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, us<strong>in</strong>g tortureto extract confessions from prisoners, and slay<strong>in</strong>g six Sunni clerics. Walid denies the charges,92


which have raised sectarian tensions. Human-rights groups also accuse creators <strong>of</strong> thecounterterrorism television show <strong>of</strong> violat<strong>in</strong>g the Geneva Conventions by publicly humiliat<strong>in</strong>gthe deta<strong>in</strong>ees. Among Shiites, however, there are patriotic songs devoted to the group. Thebrigade's fierceness has given it a mythical aura: <strong>Iraq</strong>i parents reportedly warn their childrenabout the "wolves."Are there other commando units?A grow<strong>in</strong>g number <strong>of</strong> counterterrorism commando units are cropp<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, experts say.Many <strong>of</strong> them are modeled after the Wolf Brigade, with names like the Tiger, Snake, or Scorpionbrigades, and operate out <strong>of</strong> makeshift quarters like a bombed-out bunker, a former girls' school,and an aircraft hangar, news reports say. It's not clear if these groups are under the aegis <strong>of</strong> theInterior M<strong>in</strong>istry.Are there any Sunni-led commando units?Yes. At least one counter<strong>in</strong>surgency unit is headed by a former <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>'sBaath Party. The Special Police Commandos, like the Wolf Brigade, have a reputation forbrutality, but the group is also considered one <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s most effective and well-discipl<strong>in</strong>edcounter<strong>in</strong>surgency units. It was formed last September by General Adnan Thavit, a 63-year-oldSunni and former <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Air Force who was thrown <strong>in</strong> prison for plott<strong>in</strong>ga coup aga<strong>in</strong>st Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1996. Armed by the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government, the brigade has heavyammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, and AK-47 assault rifles. Most <strong>of</strong> its 5,000 members arehand-selected by Thavit and are former members <strong>of</strong> Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>'s elite Republican Guard.Experts say they have been an effective fight<strong>in</strong>g force because they are well-tra<strong>in</strong>ed, know thelay <strong>of</strong> the land, and can gather quality <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>in</strong> places like the Sunni triangle because <strong>of</strong>their close ties to neighborhood clans. In a May New York Times Magaz<strong>in</strong>e article on theSpecial Police Commandos, Peter Maass wrote, "The <strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> the commandos <strong>in</strong>to thesecurity forces staunches one flow <strong>of</strong> experienced fighters <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>in</strong>surgency."Are the militia sanctioned by <strong>Iraq</strong>'s government?Some are, but not all. Though largely autonomous, commando units like the Wolf Brigade areused <strong>in</strong> conjunction with <strong>Iraq</strong>'s army and police forces, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g special-ops units like the 36thCommando Battalion and 40th Brigade. Their fund<strong>in</strong>g and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g come from the <strong>Iraq</strong>igovernment. Nom<strong>in</strong>al control <strong>of</strong> these brigades falls under the m<strong>in</strong>istries <strong>of</strong> Interior and Defense.The peshmerga, on the other hand, are under Kurdish authority. The extent <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficialgovernment support for the Badr Organization is unclear, but may be grow<strong>in</strong>g. (<strong>Iraq</strong>'s InteriorM<strong>in</strong>ister Bayan Jabr is himself a former high-rank<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficial <strong>in</strong> the Badr Brigades.) Thegovernment is not believed to support the Mahdi Army and other private militia groups thatoppose the government's authority.Why does the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government support some militias?Part <strong>of</strong> the reason, experts say, is to fill <strong>in</strong> the security gaps left by the local police and army,who have a reputation for <strong>in</strong>effectiveness and corruption. Their use also reflects a clear strategy93


y the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government to "get tough" on <strong>in</strong>surgents, says Kenneth Katzman, senior Middle Eastanalyst for the Congressional Research Service. "[These groups] are will<strong>in</strong>g to use brutalmethods and have emerged because <strong>Iraq</strong>'s security forces are not com<strong>in</strong>g along as expected," hesays.What is the U.S. view <strong>of</strong> the militias?In the past, the U.S. government has said it opposes the use <strong>of</strong> unsanctioned militias. But on June8, Sean McCormack, a State Department spokesman, told reporters that the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government'sgrow<strong>in</strong>g use <strong>of</strong> militias "is an <strong>Iraq</strong>i issue that they will decide and that they will deal with." Lastyear, the U.S. military fought alongside the Wolf Brigade and other commando units <strong>in</strong>counter<strong>in</strong>surgency operations <strong>in</strong> Mosul and Samarra. Some experts credit the U.S. military withgiv<strong>in</strong>g assistance to commando units <strong>in</strong> the form <strong>of</strong> money, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, and equipment. "Our policy[<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>] is to equip those who are the most effective fighters," says Thomas X. Hammes, aformer Mar<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong>ficer and counter<strong>in</strong>surgency expert. "[These commando units] may be amarriage <strong>of</strong> convenience and ultimately may be absorbed <strong>in</strong>to the army or disbanded."What risks do the militia and commando units pose?Some experts question their allegiance to the national government, because they are generallydrawn exclusively from sectarian or ethnic communities, whether Sunni, Shiite, or Kurd. In <strong>Iraq</strong>,as anywhere, <strong>in</strong>creased sectarian tension can result when members <strong>of</strong> one ethnic group orcommunity are charged with polic<strong>in</strong>g and arrest<strong>in</strong>g another. "There's a concern that what they'recreat<strong>in</strong>g [are] armed militia[s] with no loyalty to the national government," Hammes says. "Ith<strong>in</strong>k it's better to go with an <strong>org</strong>anized national army, because otherwise you get militia[s], andthat's a first step toward a civil war." Some experts also predict ris<strong>in</strong>g tensions between <strong>Iraq</strong>iarmy <strong>of</strong>ficers and leaders <strong>of</strong> semi-sanctioned militia. Others fear that a Shiite-led InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry may seek to purge its ranks <strong>of</strong> Sunnis, which could prompt them to jo<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency.94


http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F7071EFE3A5A0C778EDDAC0894DE404482New York Times ArchivesTHE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ; In Shadows, Armed Groups Propel <strong>Iraq</strong> TowardChaosBy DEXTER FILKINS; JOHN F. BURNS, QAIS MIZHER, KHALID AL-ANSARY AND ALIADEEB CONTRIBUTED REPORTING FROM BAGHDAD FOR THIS ARTICLE, ANDDAVID ROHDE FROM NEW YORK. (NYT); Foreign DeskMay 24, 2006DISPLAYING ABSTRACT - Even <strong>in</strong> a country beset by murder and death, the 16th Brigaderepresented a new frontier. The brigade, a 1,000-man force set up by <strong>Iraq</strong>'s M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Defense<strong>in</strong> early 2005, was charged with guard<strong>in</strong>g a stretch <strong>of</strong> oil pipel<strong>in</strong>e that ran through the southernBaghdad neighborhood <strong>of</strong> Dawra. ...95


http://www.wsws.<strong>org</strong>/articles/2005/jul2005/iraq-j01.shtmlJournalist killed after <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>US</strong>-backed death squads <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>World Socialist Web SiteBy James Cogan1 July 2005Use this version to pr<strong>in</strong>t | Send this l<strong>in</strong>k by email | Email the authorOn June 24, Yasser Salihee, an <strong>Iraq</strong>i special correspondent for the news agency Knight Ridder,was killed by a s<strong>in</strong>gle bullet to the head as he approached a checkpo<strong>in</strong>t that had been thrown upnear his home <strong>in</strong> western Baghdad by <strong>US</strong> and <strong>Iraq</strong>i troops. It is believed that the shot was firedby an American sniper. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to eyewitnesses, no warn<strong>in</strong>g shots were fired.The <strong>US</strong> military has announced it is conduct<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to Salihee’s kill<strong>in</strong>g. KnightRidder has already declared, however, that “there’s no reason to th<strong>in</strong>k that the shoot<strong>in</strong>g hadanyth<strong>in</strong>g to do with his report<strong>in</strong>g work”. In fact, his last assignment gives reason to suspect thatit was.Over the past month, Salihee had been gather<strong>in</strong>g evidence that <strong>US</strong>-backed <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces have beencarry<strong>in</strong>g out extra-judicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> alleged members and supporters <strong>of</strong> the anti-occupationresistance. His <strong>in</strong>vestigation followed a feature <strong>in</strong> the New York Times magaz<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> May,detail<strong>in</strong>g how the <strong>US</strong> military had modeled the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry police commandos, knownas the Wolf Brigade, on the death squads unleashed <strong>in</strong> the 1980s to crush the left-w<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> El Salvador.The Wolf Brigade was recruited by <strong>US</strong> operatives and the <strong>US</strong>-<strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>in</strong>terim governmentheaded by Iyad Allawi dur<strong>in</strong>g 2004. A majority <strong>of</strong> its <strong>of</strong>ficers and personnel served <strong>in</strong> SaddamHusse<strong>in</strong>’s special forces and Republican Guard—veterans <strong>of</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>gs, torture and repression. Theunit has been used aga<strong>in</strong>st the resistance <strong>in</strong> rebellious cities such as Mosul and Samarra, and,over the past six weeks, has played a prom<strong>in</strong>ent role <strong>in</strong> the massive crackdown ordered by the<strong>Iraq</strong>i government <strong>in</strong> Baghdad codenamed “Operation Lightn<strong>in</strong>g”.On June 27, Knight Ridder published the results <strong>of</strong> its <strong>in</strong>quiry <strong>in</strong> an article jo<strong>in</strong>tly written bySalihee and correspondent Tom Lasseter. The journalists “found more than 30 examples <strong>in</strong> lessthan a week” <strong>of</strong> corpses turn<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>in</strong> Baghdad m<strong>org</strong>ues <strong>of</strong> people who were last seen be<strong>in</strong>gdeta<strong>in</strong>ed by the police commandos.The men, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the central Baghdad m<strong>org</strong>ue director Faik Baqr, had “been killed <strong>in</strong> amethodical fashion”. The article reported: “Their hands had been tied or handcuffed beh<strong>in</strong>d theirbacks, their eyes were bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded and they appeared to have been tortured. In most cases, thedead men looked as if they’d been whipped with a cord, subjected to electric shocks or beatenwith a blunt object and shot to death, <strong>of</strong>ten with s<strong>in</strong>gle bullets to their heads.”96


A grocer <strong>in</strong> west Baghdad told Salihee that he had been deta<strong>in</strong>ed by police with a man namedAnwar Jassim on May 13. “When we were <strong>in</strong> detention, they put bl<strong>in</strong>dfolds and handcuffs on us.On the second day the soldiers were say<strong>in</strong>g ‘He’s dead’. Later we found out it was Anwar.”Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the medical reports at the Yarmuk m<strong>org</strong>ue where police dumped his body, Jassimhad a “bullet wound <strong>in</strong> the back <strong>of</strong> his head and cuts and bruises on his abdomen, back andneck.”Police commandos reportedly told the m<strong>org</strong>ue director to leave the corpse “so that dogs could eatit, because he’s terrorist and he deserves it”.In a second case, a brigadier-general <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry related that his brother hadbeen deta<strong>in</strong>ed dur<strong>in</strong>g a raid on May 14, <strong>in</strong> a work<strong>in</strong>g class Sunni suburb <strong>in</strong> Baghdad’s west. Hisbody was found the next day bear<strong>in</strong>g signs <strong>of</strong> torture. Witnesses told the general that theabductors “came <strong>in</strong> white police Toyota Land Cruisers, wore police commando uniforms, flakvests and helmets” and were armed with 9mm Glock pistols.Glock sidearms are used by many <strong>US</strong> law enforcement agencies and have been supplied to <strong>Iraq</strong>isecurity forces by the <strong>US</strong> military.The article also cited a third case. The body <strong>of</strong> Saadi Khalif was brought to Yarmuk m<strong>org</strong>ue bypolice commandos several days after he was taken from his home by police on June 10. Saadi’sbrother told Knight Ridder: “The doctor told us he was choked and tortured before they shot him.He looked like he had been dragged by a car.”An article <strong>in</strong> the British F<strong>in</strong>ancial Times on June 29 provided further evidence <strong>of</strong> policecommando atrocities. Mustafa Mohammed Ali, from the western Baghdad suburb <strong>of</strong> AbuGhraib, told the newspaper he was deta<strong>in</strong>ed by the Wolf Brigade on May 22, dur<strong>in</strong>g the build-upto Operation Lightn<strong>in</strong>g. He alleged that he was held for 26 days.The article reported: “He spent the first day <strong>in</strong> a barbed wire enclosure with hundreds <strong>of</strong> otherdeta<strong>in</strong>ees, without food, water or toilet facilities... On the fourth day, the <strong>in</strong>terrogations began.Mr Ali says Wolf Brigade commandos attached electrical wires to his ear and his genitals, andgenerated a current with a hand-cranked military telephone.”Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the figures given to the F<strong>in</strong>ancial Times, only 22 <strong>of</strong> the 474 people seized fromtheir homes dur<strong>in</strong>g the Wolf Brigade sweep <strong>in</strong> the Abu Ghraib area are still be<strong>in</strong>g held. Thosereleased allege they suffered systematic abuse. “Mass detentions and <strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ate torture seemto be the ma<strong>in</strong> tools deployed to crush an <strong>in</strong>surgency that could last ‘five, six, eight, 10, 12 years’accord<strong>in</strong>g to Donald Rumsfeld, <strong>US</strong> defence secretary,” the newspaper commented.In light <strong>of</strong> the evidence gathered by Salihee, significant discrepancies <strong>in</strong> the <strong>of</strong>ficial figures forOperation Lightn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Baghdad raise further concerns about the fate <strong>of</strong> deta<strong>in</strong>ees. In early June,the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government reported that 1,200 had been deta<strong>in</strong>ed. Just days later on June 6, this wasrevised downward to just 887, with no explanation. Some <strong>of</strong> the deaths referred to <strong>in</strong> the KnightRidder article co<strong>in</strong>cide with this period.97


Suspicions <strong>of</strong> wholesale kill<strong>in</strong>gsThe revelations about the conduct <strong>of</strong> the Wolf Brigade lend credibility to the claims made byMax Fuller, <strong>in</strong> a feature headl<strong>in</strong>ed “For <strong>Iraq</strong>, ‘The Salvador Option’ Becomes Reality” andpublished by the Centre for Research on Globalisation.Over the past n<strong>in</strong>e months, a terrify<strong>in</strong>g new development <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> has been the discovery <strong>of</strong>dozens <strong>of</strong> bodies dumped <strong>in</strong> rubbish heaps, rivers or abandoned build<strong>in</strong>gs. In most cases, thepeople had suffered torture and mutilation before be<strong>in</strong>g killed by a s<strong>in</strong>gle shot to the head. The<strong>US</strong> military has consistently reported that the victims were members <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i army or police.The media has universally reported the mass kill<strong>in</strong>gs as the work <strong>of</strong> anti-occupation terrorists.Fuller noted, however: “What is particularly strik<strong>in</strong>g is that many <strong>of</strong> those kill<strong>in</strong>gs have takenplace s<strong>in</strong>ce the police commandos became operationally active and <strong>of</strong>ten correspond with areaswhere they have been deployed.”In Mosul, for example, dozens <strong>of</strong> men were deta<strong>in</strong>ed by the commandos last November, as part<strong>of</strong> a <strong>US</strong>-led operation to br<strong>in</strong>g the city back under occupation control. Over the follow<strong>in</strong>g weeks,more than 150 tortured and executed bodies were found. In Samarra, dozens <strong>of</strong> bodies appeared<strong>in</strong> nearby Lake Thartar <strong>in</strong> the wake <strong>of</strong> operations by the commandos <strong>in</strong> that city.From February through to late April, more than 100 bodies were recovered from the Tigris Riversouth <strong>of</strong> Baghdad—one <strong>of</strong> the most rebellious areas <strong>of</strong> the country. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i government<strong>in</strong>itially claimed they were villagers who had been kidnapped by <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong> the village <strong>of</strong>Maidan. This has s<strong>in</strong>ce been discredited. The victims are from a range <strong>of</strong> towns and villages,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Kut <strong>in</strong> the north and Basra <strong>in</strong> the south. Police <strong>in</strong> the area told the San FranciscoChronicle that many <strong>of</strong> the dead had been “motorists pass<strong>in</strong>g through the area when stopped bymasked men bear<strong>in</strong>g Kalashnikov rifles at impromptu checkpo<strong>in</strong>ts”.Other kill<strong>in</strong>gs have been discovered <strong>in</strong> Baquaba and the Syrian border town <strong>of</strong> Qaim <strong>in</strong> theaftermath <strong>of</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency operations by <strong>US</strong> forces and their <strong>Iraq</strong>i allies. Fuller also notedthe suspicions surround<strong>in</strong>g the assass<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> well over 200 university academics, most <strong>of</strong>whom were opponents <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong> occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Dozens <strong>of</strong> bodies have been found over the past two months <strong>in</strong> Baghdad. In May, theAssociation <strong>of</strong> Muslim Scholars (AMS)—the ma<strong>in</strong> public Sunni <strong>org</strong>anisation opposed to theoccupation—directly accused the Wolf Brigade <strong>of</strong> hav<strong>in</strong>g “arrested imams and the guardians <strong>of</strong>some mosques, tortured and killed them, and then got rid <strong>of</strong> their bodies <strong>in</strong> a garbage dump <strong>in</strong>Shaab district” <strong>of</strong> Baghdad. AMS secretary general Hareth al-Dhari declared at the time: “This isstate terrorism by the M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> the Interior.”The very existence <strong>of</strong> the Wolf Brigade underscores the crim<strong>in</strong>ality <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong> occupation and theutter fraud <strong>of</strong> the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration claims to be br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g “liberation” and “democracy” to<strong>Iraq</strong>. Many <strong>of</strong> the commandos would have been <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> murder and torture on behalf <strong>of</strong>Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>’s regime. The American military deliberately recruited them <strong>in</strong> order to make98


use <strong>of</strong> their experience <strong>in</strong> mass repression and has directly modeled their operations on those <strong>of</strong>right-w<strong>in</strong>g death squads <strong>in</strong> Central America.The ma<strong>in</strong> <strong>US</strong> advisor to the Wolf Brigade from the time <strong>of</strong> its formation until April 2005 wasJames Steele. Steele’s own biography, promot<strong>in</strong>g him for the <strong>US</strong> lecture circuit, states that “hecommanded the <strong>US</strong> military group <strong>in</strong> El Salvador dur<strong>in</strong>g the height <strong>of</strong> the guerilla war” and “wascredited with tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and equipp<strong>in</strong>g what was acknowledged to be the best counter-terroristforce <strong>in</strong> the region”. In a 12-year campaign <strong>of</strong> murder and repression, the Salvadoran units,tra<strong>in</strong>ed and advised by people like Steele, killed over 70,000 people.In his speech on June 28, Ge<strong>org</strong>e Bush declared his adm<strong>in</strong>istration was work<strong>in</strong>g with the <strong>Iraq</strong>i<strong>in</strong>terior and defence m<strong>in</strong>istries to “improve their capabilities to coord<strong>in</strong>ate anti-terroristoperations” and “develop their command and control structures”. The evidence is beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g toemerge that this means pay<strong>in</strong>g and equipp<strong>in</strong>g former Baathist killers to terrorise, torture andmurder <strong>Iraq</strong>is who are believed to have l<strong>in</strong>ks to the popular resistance, which an unnamed <strong>US</strong>analyst estimated for the June 27 edition <strong>of</strong> Newsweek had “as many as 400,000 auxiliaries andsupport personnel”.The kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> journalists seek<strong>in</strong>g to document or expose allegations <strong>of</strong> state-<strong>org</strong>anised murderhas accompanied every dirty war aga<strong>in</strong>st a civilian population. S<strong>in</strong>ce the <strong>US</strong> occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>began, dozens <strong>of</strong> reporters, cameramen and other media workers have been killed by Americanledforces <strong>in</strong> suspicious circumstances that were never <strong>in</strong>dependently <strong>in</strong>vestigated.Two more <strong>Iraq</strong>i journalists have been killed <strong>in</strong> the days s<strong>in</strong>ce Yasser Salihee’s death. On June 26,Maha Ibrahim, a news editor with a television station operated by the anti-occupation <strong>Iraq</strong>i<strong>Is</strong>lamic Party, was shot dead when <strong>US</strong> troops opened fire on her car as she and her husbanddrove to work. Two days later, Ahmad Wail Bakri, a program director for <strong>Iraq</strong>i al-Sharqiyatelevision was killed by American troops as he reportedly tried to drive around a traffic accident<strong>in</strong> Baghdad.See Also:Wash<strong>in</strong>gton <strong>in</strong> crisis over opposition to <strong>Iraq</strong> war[28 June 2005]<strong>US</strong> imprisons <strong>Iraq</strong>i journalists without charges[7 May 2005]<strong>Iraq</strong>: Reporters Without Borders condemns <strong>US</strong> report on kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> journalists[27 November 2004]99


http://www.tompa<strong>in</strong>e.com/articles/20051118/our_monsters_<strong>in</strong>_iraq.phpOur Monsters In <strong>Iraq</strong>Robert DreyfussNovember 18, 2005It is time to start wav<strong>in</strong>g the bloody shirt. There is no longer any doubt that the men that theUnited States has <strong>in</strong>stalled <strong>in</strong> power <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> are monsters. Not only that, but they are monstersarmed, tra<strong>in</strong>ed and supported by Ge<strong>org</strong>e W. Bush's adm<strong>in</strong>istration. The very same Bushadm<strong>in</strong>istration that defends torture <strong>of</strong> captives <strong>in</strong> the so-called <strong>War</strong> on Terrorism is us<strong>in</strong>g150,000 U.S. troops to support a regime <strong>in</strong> Baghdad for which torture, assass<strong>in</strong>ation and otherwar crimes are rout<strong>in</strong>e.So far, it appears that the facts are these: that <strong>Iraq</strong>'s <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry, whose top <strong>of</strong>ficials, strikeforces and police commando units (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the so-called Wolf Brigade) are controlled byparamilitary units from Shiite militias, ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed a medieval torture chamber; that <strong>in</strong>side thatfacility, hundreds <strong>of</strong> mostly Sunni Arab men were bestialized, with electric drills skewer<strong>in</strong>g theirbones, with their sk<strong>in</strong>s flayed <strong>of</strong>f, and more; that rov<strong>in</strong>g units <strong>of</strong> death-squad commandos arekill<strong>in</strong>g countless other Sunni Arab men <strong>in</strong> order to terrorize the <strong>Iraq</strong>i opposition. Even theWash<strong>in</strong>gton Post, that last-ditch defender <strong>of</strong> America's illegal and unprovoked assault on <strong>Iraq</strong>,says:Scandal over the secret prison has forced the seven-month-old Shiite-led government to confrontgrow<strong>in</strong>g charges <strong>of</strong> mass illegal detentions, torture and kill<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Sunni men. Members <strong>of</strong> theSunni m<strong>in</strong>ority, locked <strong>in</strong> a struggle with the Shiite majority over the division <strong>of</strong> power <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>,say men dressed <strong>in</strong> Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry uniforms have repeatedly rounded up Sunni men fromneighborhoods and towns. Bodies <strong>of</strong> scores <strong>of</strong> them have been found dumped by roadsides or <strong>in</strong>gullies.The New York Times reports that the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister isn't all that upset about the torturecenter. Bayan Jabr, "speak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the prison <strong>in</strong> an angry sarcastic tone, said, 'There has been muchexaggeration about this issue.' And he added, "Nobody was beheaded.'" So, apparently notbehead<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>nocents is the standard <strong>of</strong> justice <strong>in</strong> the New <strong>Iraq</strong>. And, apparently there may bedozens, scores or hundreds <strong>of</strong> similar facilities.This is not a surprise.Nearly two years ago, writ<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the American Prospect, I wrote the follow<strong>in</strong>g: "The Prospecthas learned that part <strong>of</strong> a secret $3 billion <strong>in</strong> new funds --- tucked away <strong>in</strong> the $87 billion <strong>Iraq</strong>appropriation that Congress approved <strong>in</strong> early November --- will go toward the creation <strong>of</strong> aparamilitary unit manned by militiamen associated with former <strong>Iraq</strong>i exile groups...The bulk <strong>of</strong>the covert money will support U.S. efforts to create a lethal, and revenge-m<strong>in</strong>ded, <strong>Iraq</strong>i securityforce." Except for a parallel story by Sy Hersh <strong>in</strong> the New Yorker, the story was ignored.Over the past two years, writ<strong>in</strong>g for TomPa<strong>in</strong>e.com, I have repeatedly written about Shiite deathsquads and about abuses by the paramilitary Badr Brigade, the secret army tra<strong>in</strong>ed and run by100


Iran's Revolutionary Guards. <strong>Iraq</strong>i Sunnis and opposition leaders, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Aiham Al Sammarae(as I wrote for TomPa<strong>in</strong>e ) have charged that the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government has been runn<strong>in</strong>gassass<strong>in</strong>ation teams. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, have been killed already, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g twoattorneys for those accused <strong>in</strong> the kangaroo court set up to convict Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> and otherformer <strong>Iraq</strong>i government <strong>of</strong>ficials. The Post suggests that the prison uncovered <strong>in</strong> Baghdad was a"secret torture center run with the help <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligence agents from neighbor<strong>in</strong>g Iran." Read thataga<strong>in</strong>: <strong>in</strong>telligence agents from Iran.Last week I had a chill<strong>in</strong>g encounter with one <strong>of</strong> the monsters responsible for the Murder Inc.units run by Badr and by the Supreme Council for the <strong>Is</strong>lamic Revolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> (SCIRI). At aWash<strong>in</strong>gton th<strong>in</strong>k tank, I met Adel Abdul Mahdi, <strong>Iraq</strong>'s so-called deputy president and a SCIRI<strong>of</strong>ficial. When I asked Mahdi about reports that <strong>Iraq</strong>i police and <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry squads werecarry<strong>in</strong>g out assass<strong>in</strong>ations and other illegal acts, he didn't deny it --- but, he said, such acts weremerely a reaction to the terrorism <strong>of</strong> the resistance. "There is terrorism on only one side," he said."Inappropriate acts by the other side, by the police --- this is someth<strong>in</strong>g else. This is a reaction."As far as civilian casualties <strong>in</strong> Sunni towns, he had this to say: "You can't fight terrorism withoutattack<strong>in</strong>g some popular areas."I also asked him about the Badr Brigade, the Iranian-backed paramilitary force that is the ma<strong>in</strong>domestic army propp<strong>in</strong>g up Abdul Mahdi's Shiite coalition, he said "they are disarmed," which ispatently absurd. He added: "They participate fully <strong>in</strong> the political process."Abdul Mahdi had this to say about Fallujah, the city that was obliterated by the U.S. armedforces a year ago. "It is one <strong>of</strong> the most peaceful areas <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. I don't know whether the peopleare happy or not. But it is one <strong>of</strong> the most peaceful cities."Make no mistake. The gangsters now runn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong> are our creatures.Earlier this week, I was speak<strong>in</strong>g with someone who was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the pre-2003 war plann<strong>in</strong>geffort vis-àà-vis <strong>Iraq</strong>. As I mentioned <strong>in</strong> TPM Cafe , he told me that some <strong>of</strong> his colleaguesrealized that the New <strong>Iraq</strong> would probably be taken over not by Ahmed Chalabi, but by the Shiitefundamentalists. Those radical-right parties (along with the Kurds) were the real forces that tookpart <strong>in</strong> Chalabi's INC bloc. And the United States consciously supported the toppl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Saddamknow<strong>in</strong>g that radical Shiites would be the chief beneficiaries. This was not an <strong>in</strong>telligencefailure. We knew it. This was an explicit decision by the neocon-dom<strong>in</strong>ated cabal to replaceSaddam with Shiite crazies. Now, we see that those crazies are runn<strong>in</strong>g Saddam-like tortureprisons where they use electric drills and flay the sk<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong>f Sunni captives.The military <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is scrambl<strong>in</strong>g to limit the damage from the stunn<strong>in</strong>g revelation about the menwho are runn<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong> today. We toppled Saddam --- and <strong>in</strong> his place we've <strong>in</strong>stalled a hundredm<strong>in</strong>i-Saddams.Robert Dreyfuss is the author <strong>of</strong> Devil's Game: How the United States Helped UnleashFundamentalist <strong>Is</strong>lam (Henry Holt/Metropolitan Books, 2005). Dreyfuss is a freelance writerbased <strong>in</strong> Alexandria, Va., who specializes <strong>in</strong> politics and national security issues. He is acontribut<strong>in</strong>g editor at The Nation, a contribut<strong>in</strong>g writer at Mother Jones, a senior correspondent101


for The American Prospect, and a frequent contributor to Roll<strong>in</strong>g Stone.He can be reached at hiswebsite: www.robertdreyfuss.com._________________________________________________102


http://www.<strong>in</strong>formationclear<strong>in</strong>ghouse.<strong>in</strong>fo/article11180.htm"Rid<strong>in</strong>g with the Bad Boys": The rise <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i death squadsInformation Clear<strong>in</strong>g HouseBy Mike Whitney11/30/05The New York Times confirmed today that the "<strong>Iraq</strong>i (security) forces are carry<strong>in</strong>g outexecutions <strong>in</strong> predom<strong>in</strong>antly Sunnis neighborhoods." Hundreds <strong>of</strong> men have been takenfrom taken from their homes by men <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i uniforms and either "found dead <strong>in</strong> ditchesor fields, with bullet holes to their temples, acid burns to their sk<strong>in</strong>, and holes <strong>in</strong> theirbodies apparently made by electrical drills. Many have simply vanished". (Dexter Filk<strong>in</strong>s,"Sunnis accuse <strong>Iraq</strong>i Military <strong>of</strong> Kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs and Slay<strong>in</strong>gs" NY Times)The Times merely reiterates what has been echo<strong>in</strong>g through <strong>in</strong>ternet for some time now,that the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry is us<strong>in</strong>g lethal force to undercut the Sunni-led resistanceand terrorize the public. The plan was first uncovered <strong>in</strong> an article by Seymour Hersh <strong>in</strong>January 2005. Hersh reported that the Pentagon was <strong>in</strong>tend<strong>in</strong>g to trigger "The SalvadorOption"; a strategy which <strong>in</strong>volves the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> "death squads" to execute a bloodysecret war aga<strong>in</strong>st "alleged" <strong>in</strong>surgents."Do you remember the right-w<strong>in</strong>g execution squads <strong>in</strong> El Salvador?" one <strong>of</strong>ficial askedHersh. "We founded them and we f<strong>in</strong>anced them. The objective now is to recruit locals <strong>in</strong>any area we want."Then he added om<strong>in</strong>ously, "We’re go<strong>in</strong>g to be rid<strong>in</strong>g with the bad boys."The authorization for the death squads comes straight from the Oval Office. Accord<strong>in</strong>g toChris Floyd, "Through a series <strong>of</strong> secret executive orders, Ge<strong>org</strong>e W. Bush has givenRumsfeld the authority to turn the entire world <strong>in</strong>to a 'global free-fire zone’’. (ChrisFloyd, Darkness Visible: The Pentagon plan to foment terrorism is now <strong>in</strong> Operation)Floyd’s observations are consistent with what we already know <strong>of</strong> Rumsfeld’s<strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> oversee<strong>in</strong>g the development <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i security apparatus. Follow<strong>in</strong>g thepresidential elections <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, Rumsfeld paid a surprise visit on the newly-appo<strong>in</strong>ted al-Jaafari to discourage any changes <strong>in</strong> the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry where American agents weretra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i goons <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>e art <strong>of</strong> torture and assass<strong>in</strong>ation.Comment<strong>in</strong>g to BBC, Rumsfeld issued a clear "hands <strong>of</strong>f" warn<strong>in</strong>g to al-Jaafari: "Itsimportant that the new government be attentive to the competence <strong>of</strong> the people <strong>in</strong> them<strong>in</strong>istries and that they avoid unnecessary turbulence." He said it was important for the103


security forces to cont<strong>in</strong>ue build<strong>in</strong>g their strength because <strong>US</strong> forces were not go<strong>in</strong>g to bethere forever.The genocidal attacks reported by the New York Times are the predictable upshot <strong>of</strong> aprocess that was <strong>in</strong>itiated by the Pentagon to destroy the <strong>Iraq</strong>i resistance through violencealone. As yet, there has been no effort to engage <strong>in</strong> dialogue with members <strong>of</strong> theresistance. This suggests that the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration still believes that the dilemma theyface can be resolved without a political solution.There can be no political solution without direct negotiations with the <strong>Iraq</strong>i resistance.The smoke-and-mirrors phantom that the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration mistakes for democracyhas noth<strong>in</strong>g to do with the serious formation <strong>of</strong> a legitimate <strong>Iraq</strong>i government. Vot<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>itself, does not signify democracy unless there is broad acceptance among the manyfactions <strong>in</strong> the society. The massive demonstration <strong>of</strong> daily violence <strong>in</strong>dicates a clearrejection <strong>of</strong> the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> the state. This can only be decided by elim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g thefactors that prop up the puppet regime (the occupation) and engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a politicalprocess free from outside coercion.The death squads are <strong>in</strong> fact just one part <strong>of</strong> a three-pronged strategy to crush theresistance and establish <strong>Iraq</strong> as a corporate-colony <strong>of</strong> American energy giants. The otherphase <strong>of</strong> the operation <strong>in</strong>volves the systematic decimation <strong>of</strong> Sunni cities.In the last few months the <strong>US</strong> military has carried out numerous assaults on Sunni citiesto break the resistance and destroy its ability to wage war. In consecutive operations, theoccupation forces have followed the same ruthless pattern <strong>of</strong> wanton destruction andcollective punishment they perfected <strong>in</strong> their siege <strong>of</strong> Falluja. Ghali Hassan’s shock<strong>in</strong>garticle, "<strong>Iraq</strong>: A Crim<strong>in</strong>al Process" (Global Research) is an <strong>in</strong>valuable resource for thosewho really want to grasp the breadth <strong>of</strong> the war crimes be<strong>in</strong>g perpetrated <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Hassan says:"Just before the U.S. forces attacked al Qaim last 29 August, a thriv<strong>in</strong>g town <strong>of</strong> 150,000people <strong>in</strong> western <strong>Iraq</strong>, they cordoned it <strong>of</strong>f, cut electricity, water and food supplies. Thenthey <strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ately and disproportionately blanketed the town, from the ground andfrom the air, with artillery shells, cluster bombs and napalm bombs with the fullknowledge that civilians, particularly women and children, would be killed.When it was all over, the U.S. Mar<strong>in</strong>es entered the city to fight (with air cover) those whowere still alive. Humanitarian aides and medical supplies were prevented from enter<strong>in</strong>gthe town, <strong>in</strong> gross violations <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational law and the Geneva Conventions. This cycle<strong>of</strong> crim<strong>in</strong>al process to legitimize the colonization <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is depicted by the Bush-Blairaxis as the "political process" towards "democracy."104


The slaughter and destruction <strong>in</strong> western <strong>Iraq</strong> are not simply isolated <strong>in</strong>cidents that arekept from the media. They are, <strong>in</strong> fact, a pattern <strong>of</strong> willful devastation <strong>of</strong> city after cityexecuted by the Defense Dept. to break the back <strong>of</strong> the resistance by decimat<strong>in</strong>g thecivilian enclaves where they draw their support. The results have meant "scores <strong>of</strong>casualties due to '<strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ate bomb<strong>in</strong>g’ by <strong>US</strong> forces. Parallel<strong>in</strong>g the atrocitiescommitted <strong>in</strong> other towns and cities, all <strong>of</strong> which savagely attacked and destroyed theentire population <strong>of</strong> Tal Afar are now 'ethnically cleansed’ refugees". (G. Hassan)The death squads and the <strong>in</strong>tentional destruction <strong>of</strong> the Sunni heartland comprise the firsttwo parts <strong>of</strong> the three-pronged strategy to defeat the <strong>Iraq</strong>i resistance. The f<strong>in</strong>al leg on thestool is the propaganda war that is be<strong>in</strong>g directed aga<strong>in</strong>st the American people to concealthe details <strong>of</strong> the military’s war crimes. The arrest or liquidation <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependentjournalists report<strong>in</strong>g from the front has allowed the Pentagon’s "embedded" legions toshape a narrative <strong>of</strong> benign <strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> the name <strong>of</strong> fight<strong>in</strong>g terrorism. Accord<strong>in</strong>g tothe Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post not one <strong>of</strong> the more then one thousand prisoners captured <strong>in</strong> TalAfar was a foreign fighter. This should put to rest the Pentagon’s spurious claim thatSunni cities are "Al Qaida strongholds."American media now functions as an annex <strong>of</strong> the <strong>War</strong> Department. The news isfashioned to meet the policy objectives <strong>of</strong> the state and its constituents. The war thatappears on TV stations across America, where <strong>US</strong> soldiers are dutifully usher<strong>in</strong>g abackwards Muslim nation towards democracy and free enterprise, bears no resemblanceto the gruesome realities <strong>of</strong> the colonial war that is devastat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i society.The media’s performance <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> has been the most successful part <strong>of</strong> the entirecampaign. It cont<strong>in</strong>ues to embellish, obfuscate or divert attention from the clear facts <strong>of</strong>America’s crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>volvement.The media has unfail<strong>in</strong>gly provided the ever-shift<strong>in</strong>g rationale for the ongo<strong>in</strong>g occupationand cont<strong>in</strong>ued to mobilize public support for the most unpopular war <strong>in</strong> Americanhistory. Its embedded propagandists have been more vital to the war-effort than laserguidedtechnology, cluster-bombs or detention centers.The Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration’s three-pronged strategy for <strong>Iraq</strong> precludes a political solutionbecause it is designed as a model for future wars. The Wash<strong>in</strong>gton warlords and theirboardroom constituents have no <strong>in</strong>tention <strong>of</strong> negotiat<strong>in</strong>g the terms <strong>of</strong> global rule; that isthe exclusive duty <strong>of</strong> the White House mandar<strong>in</strong>s.Negotiation and diplomacy are signs <strong>of</strong> weakness. The adm<strong>in</strong>istration will rema<strong>in</strong> faithfulto its right-w<strong>in</strong>g mandate; conceal<strong>in</strong>g its real goals beh<strong>in</strong>d the smokescreen <strong>of</strong>withdrawal, while rul<strong>in</strong>g accord<strong>in</strong>g to its basic precepts <strong>of</strong> force and deception.Copyright Mike Whitney105


http://www.democracynow.<strong>org</strong>/article.pl?sid=05/12/01/1526201<strong>Is</strong> the U.S. <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong> to Fight the Insurgency?Democracy Now!Thursday, December 1st, 2005In what the White House billed as a major policy address, President Bush outl<strong>in</strong>ed theadm<strong>in</strong>istration's <strong>Iraq</strong> war strategy. Bush aga<strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>ked a withdrawal <strong>of</strong> U.S. troops toimprovements <strong>in</strong> the capability <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces. We speak with <strong>in</strong>dependent journalistArun Gupta about the presence <strong>Iraq</strong>i death squads and the U.S. tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces.[<strong>in</strong>cludes rush transcript]President Bush sought to overcome mount<strong>in</strong>g criticism <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong> war Wednesday <strong>in</strong> what theWhite House billed as a major address outl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the adm<strong>in</strong>istration's strategy.In a 45-m<strong>in</strong>ute speech before the <strong>US</strong> Naval Academy, Bush aga<strong>in</strong> rejected a timetable for thewithdrawal <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> troops and recounted improvements made by <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces. The speechwas the first <strong>of</strong> a series <strong>of</strong> four Bush plans to give before the December 15th parliamentaryelections. The president yesterday reiterated that <strong>Iraq</strong>i troops will eventually take over from <strong>US</strong>forces <strong>in</strong> fight<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgency.President Bush, November 30"Our goals are to tra<strong>in</strong> enough <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces so they can carry the fight and this will take timeand patience and it is worth the time and it is worth the effort because <strong>Iraq</strong>is and Americansshare a common enemy and when that enemy is defeated <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, Americans will be safer here athome. And as <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces stand up then coalition forces can stand down and when ourmission <strong>of</strong> defeat<strong>in</strong>g the terrorist is complete our troops can come home to a proud nation."Bush has repeatedly l<strong>in</strong>ked a U.S. withdrawal to improvements <strong>in</strong> the capability <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces.But the ma<strong>in</strong>stream media has recently detailed the existence <strong>of</strong> death squads with<strong>in</strong> the largelyShiite police and special commandos.Operat<strong>in</strong>g through or with the <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces, these militias have abducted, tortured andexecuted hundreds, perhaps thousands, <strong>of</strong> Sunnis. The New York Times reported Tuesday"Some Sunni males have been found dead <strong>in</strong> ditches and fields, with bullet holes <strong>in</strong> theirtemples, acid burns on their sk<strong>in</strong>, and holes <strong>in</strong> their bodies apparently made by electric drills.Many have simply vanished."At a Pentagon press conference on Tuesday, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wasquestioned about the death squads.Pentagon press conference, November 29Q: Mr. Secretary, are you concerned over -- and <strong>in</strong> fact, is the United States look<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>togrow<strong>in</strong>g reports <strong>of</strong> uniformed death squads <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> perhaps assass<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g and tortur<strong>in</strong>g hundreds<strong>of</strong> Sunnis? And if that's true, what would that say about stability <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>?106


SEC. RUMSFELD: I'm not go<strong>in</strong>g to comment on hypothetical questions. I've not seenreports that hundreds are be<strong>in</strong>g killed by rov<strong>in</strong>g death squads at all. We know for a fact that it's aviolent country. We know for a fact that there have been various militias. We know that therehave been some militias that have been Iran-oriented. We also know there's been some militias <strong>in</strong>the north that have been very helpful. The Peshmerga have been very constructive <strong>in</strong> whatthey've done. But I'm not go<strong>in</strong>g to get <strong>in</strong>to speculation like that.Q: But, sir, that's not a hypothetical, I don't believe. The Sunnis themselves are charg<strong>in</strong>g thathundreds have been assass<strong>in</strong>ated, people shot <strong>in</strong> the head, found <strong>in</strong> alleys.SEC. RUMSFELD: What you're talk<strong>in</strong>g about are unverified -- to my knowledge, at least --unverified comments. I just don't have any data from the field that I could comment on <strong>in</strong> aspecific way.While the story only recently made front-page news, it actually first appeared <strong>in</strong> the press oversix months ago. Investigative journalist Arun Gupta was one <strong>of</strong> the first to report on the presence<strong>of</strong> death squads <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> back <strong>in</strong> April <strong>of</strong> this year. We <strong>in</strong>terviewed him at the time, he jo<strong>in</strong>s usaga<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> our firehouse studios. Arun is an editor with New York City Independent MediaCenter's newspaper, The Indypendent.* Arun Gupta, <strong>in</strong>vestigative journalist who writes frequently for Z Magaz<strong>in</strong>e, Left Turn andthe Indypendent newspaper <strong>in</strong> New York. He is an editor at the Indypendent and a former editorat the Guardian weekly <strong>in</strong> New York.R<strong>US</strong>H TRANSCRIPTThis transcript is available free <strong>of</strong> charge. However, donations help us provide closed caption<strong>in</strong>gfor the deaf and hard <strong>of</strong> hear<strong>in</strong>g on our TV broadcast. Thank you for your generous contribution.Donate - $25, $50, $100, more...JUAN GONZALEZ: The President yesterday reiterated that <strong>Iraq</strong>i troops will eventually takeover from U.S. forces fight<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgency.PRESIDENT B<strong>US</strong>H: Our goal is to tra<strong>in</strong> enough <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces so they can carry the fight, andthis will take time and patience. And it's worth the time. And it's worth the effort, because <strong>Iraq</strong>isand Americans share a common enemy. And when that enemy is defeated <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, Americanswill be safer here at home. And as the <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces stand up, coalition forces can standdown. And when our mission <strong>of</strong> defeat<strong>in</strong>g the terrorists <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is complete, our troops will returnhome to a proud nation.AMY GOODMAN: President Bush repeatedly l<strong>in</strong>ked U.S. withdrawal to improvements <strong>in</strong> thecapability <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces, but the ma<strong>in</strong>stream media has recently detailed the existence <strong>of</strong>death squads with<strong>in</strong> the largely Shiite police and special commandos operat<strong>in</strong>g through or withthe <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces. These militias have abducted, tortured, and executed hundreds, perhapsthousands, <strong>of</strong> Sunnis. The New York Times reported Tuesday, quote, “Some Sunni males havebeen found dead <strong>in</strong> ditches and fields with bullet holes <strong>in</strong> their temples, acid burns on their sk<strong>in</strong>,holes <strong>in</strong> their bodies, apparently made by electric drills. Many have simply vanished,” the paper107


said. At a Pentagon news conference Tuesday, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld wasquestioned about the death squads.REPORTER: Mr. Secretary, are you concerned over – and, <strong>in</strong> fact, is the United Stateslook<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to grow<strong>in</strong>g reports <strong>of</strong> uniformed death squads <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, perhaps assass<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g andtortur<strong>in</strong>g hundreds <strong>of</strong> Sunnis? And if that's true, what would that say about stability <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>?DONALD RUMSFELD: I’m not go<strong>in</strong>g to comment on hypothetical questions. I've not seenreports that hundreds are be<strong>in</strong>g killed by rov<strong>in</strong>g death squads at all. We know for a fact that it’s aviolent country. We know for a fact that there have been various militias. We know that therehave been some militias that have been Iran-oriented. We also know there's been a – somemilitias <strong>in</strong> the north that have been very helpful. The Peshmurga have been very constructive <strong>in</strong>what they’ve done. But I'm not go<strong>in</strong>g to get <strong>in</strong>to speculation like that.REPORTER: But sir, that’s not a hypothetical, I don't believe. The Sunnis themselves arecharg<strong>in</strong>g that hundreds have been assass<strong>in</strong>ated, people shot <strong>in</strong> the head, found <strong>in</strong> alleys.DONALD RUMSFELD: What you're talk<strong>in</strong>g about are unverified -- to my knowledge, atleast -- unverified comments. I just don't have any data from the field that I can comment on <strong>in</strong> aspecific way. Do you General?GENERAL PACE: I do not, sir, although I do know that the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government has said thatthey are go<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>vestigate those k<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> allegations.DONALD RUMSFELD: And they should. That's a good th<strong>in</strong>g. Look, it's a sovereigncountry. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i government exists. There's also a political campaign tak<strong>in</strong>g place. And weought to be aware <strong>of</strong> that, that there are go<strong>in</strong>g to be a lot <strong>of</strong> charges and countercharges andallegations, and they may very well be timed -- as they are <strong>in</strong> every country <strong>in</strong> the world that hasa free political system -- they may timed <strong>in</strong> a way to seek advantage. We also will f<strong>in</strong>d that <strong>in</strong>some cases that there will be <strong>in</strong>vestigations and that they will prove to have been valid. I justdon't know. I can only talk about what I know. That’s life.AMY GOODMAN: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at his news conference on Tuesday.While the story only recently made front page news, we first reported on it six months ago.Investigative journalist Arun Gupta was one <strong>of</strong> the first to report on the presence <strong>of</strong> death squads<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> back <strong>in</strong> April. We <strong>in</strong>terviewed him at the time. He jo<strong>in</strong>s us <strong>in</strong> the studio now. Arun iseditor <strong>of</strong> the New York City Independent Media Center’s newspaper, The Indypendent.Welcome to Democracy Now!ARUN GUPTA: Thank you, Amy.AMY GOODMAN: So, lay out what you're see<strong>in</strong>g right now <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.ARUN GUPTA: What you're see<strong>in</strong>g is, I th<strong>in</strong>k, really the fruition <strong>of</strong> U.S. strategy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. ThePentagon has spent over $10 billion to try to stand up <strong>Iraq</strong>i military forces, and it's been acomplete disaster. So what they're try<strong>in</strong>g to do is they’re turn<strong>in</strong>g to death squads to fight the108


<strong>in</strong>surgency. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces, the military forces, the army, they really don't stand and fight; andeven when they do, they depend on tremendous U.S. logistical support to carry out anyoperation. So, they really can't operate on their own.But there are these militias that Donald Rumsfeld was talk<strong>in</strong>g about; but, <strong>of</strong> course, what hedoesn’t want to talk about is that the U.S. set up these militias. They funded them. They armedthem. They tra<strong>in</strong>ed them. And a lot <strong>of</strong> this came out <strong>in</strong> the Pentagon's own reports, Pentagon’sgenerals talk<strong>in</strong>g about how great they were over a year ago, how they really took the fight to theresistance. And so, what's been go<strong>in</strong>g on is that the U.S. has set these up.And there's been a certa<strong>in</strong> conflict. In April, when the Shiite government took control, theystarted fir<strong>in</strong>g a lot <strong>of</strong> the commanders who were basically ex-Baathists, and they started br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> their own guys, especially from the Badr Brigade. And a lot <strong>of</strong> these are concentrated <strong>in</strong> what'sknown as special police commandos, and they have all sorts <strong>of</strong> various brigades, one called theWolf Brigade, the Scorpion Brigade, the Lion Brigade, another called the Fearless <strong>War</strong>riors. Andthey sound like death squads. And they are death squads. They go around with masks. They'reconduct<strong>in</strong>g these raids, especially throughout Baghdad.And the U.S. is say<strong>in</strong>g, ‘Well, you know, who knows who's do<strong>in</strong>g this?’ But when twentyvehicles pull up with a hundred troops <strong>in</strong> them, and reporters are recount<strong>in</strong>g -- the New YorkTimes article also recounts this -- they're show<strong>in</strong>g up with sophisticated communicationsequipment. They're show<strong>in</strong>g up with these expensive Glocks, n<strong>in</strong>e-millimeter Glocks that weresupplied by the U.S. government. They have the <strong>in</strong>signia, the uniforms <strong>of</strong> the special policecommandos. And these -- In Baghdad there's a very strict curfew that’s <strong>in</strong> place every s<strong>in</strong>glenight. Yet how can these large convoys <strong>of</strong> vehicles be go<strong>in</strong>g around?And so, they conduct these roundups, and <strong>in</strong> many areas it's largely Sunni Arab males. And thenthey're disappeared. They're tak<strong>in</strong>g them to this network <strong>of</strong> secret prisons. One <strong>of</strong> the th<strong>in</strong>gsthat’s come out is that there's this absolutely vast network <strong>of</strong> prisons throughout <strong>Iraq</strong>. In a nation<strong>of</strong> 27 million, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government has 1,100 prisons.AMY GOODMAN: Outside the U.S. prisons?ARUN GUPTA: And this is – Yes, this is <strong>in</strong> addition to the U.S. prisons. Officially, the <strong>Iraq</strong>igovernment says they only have about 12-13,000 deta<strong>in</strong>ees. But that really stra<strong>in</strong>s credibility.That's only 11 prisoners per facility, whereas the -- what really set this all <strong>of</strong>f was the uncover<strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> a secret detention center with<strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry build<strong>in</strong>g where they found approximately170 men. Another <strong>Iraq</strong>i male spoke extensively to Reuters where he was kept <strong>in</strong> a build<strong>in</strong>g with800 men. The BBC just published a report and photographs <strong>of</strong> another prison that they wereallowed to enter, which showed a room so crowded that the prisoners could barely sit down. Sonobody knows even really how many prisoners are be<strong>in</strong>g held by the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government.And what's been happen<strong>in</strong>g is that they're be<strong>in</strong>g -- you're f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g all these men be<strong>in</strong>g seized,primarily it looks like Sunni Arab males who are though to form the core <strong>of</strong> the armed resistance,and then bodies are turn<strong>in</strong>g up weeks, months later, <strong>of</strong>ten two or three governances away. Sothey’re seized <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, for <strong>in</strong>stance, and then these 20-30 bodies will turn up on the Iranian109


order. And that part <strong>of</strong> the area is completely controlled by Shiite militias. The Sunni resistancehas very little presence down there.JUAN GONZALEZ: Now, when you mentioned these death squads, you mentioned the BadrBrigades. Now, Moqtada al-Sadr has been an opponent <strong>of</strong> the U.S. occupation --ARUN GUPTA: Yes.JUAN GONZALEZ: And he’s been hunted at several times by U.S. forces. Are you say<strong>in</strong>g thatthere’s at the same time ongo<strong>in</strong>g cooperation by some <strong>of</strong> his people with --?ARUN GUPTA: Well, the Badr Brigade is l<strong>in</strong>ked to the Supreme Council for <strong>Is</strong>lamic Revolution<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> which is based <strong>in</strong> -- which was based <strong>in</strong> Iran. Al-Sadr's forces are dist<strong>in</strong>ct: the MahdiArmy. And <strong>in</strong> the words <strong>of</strong> one high-rank<strong>in</strong>g U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficial who spoke to the L.A. Times, he saidthat the Badr Brigade has special commandos and the Mahdi Army has the police at Baghdad.And he said, quote: “Everybody's got their own death squads.” Now, this is a high-rank<strong>in</strong>g U.S.military <strong>of</strong>ficial, and this is admitted by also <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>of</strong>ficials.AMY GOODMAN: We only have a m<strong>in</strong>ute to go, Arun. But the issue <strong>of</strong> U.S. military advisorsto these death squads?ARUN GUPTA: Yes. There are two advisors, <strong>in</strong> particular. One is named Steve Castillo. He wasa high-rank<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficer with the Drug Enforcement Agency throughout Lat<strong>in</strong>America, and he was actually <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry until the handover <strong>of</strong> sovereigntyon June 20, 2004. And the other is Jim Steele who was <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> Special Forces, a team <strong>of</strong> 55Special Forces <strong>in</strong> El Salvador dur<strong>in</strong>g that brutal counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency war, where they tra<strong>in</strong>ed ElSalvadoran forces and oversaw a very brutal counter<strong>in</strong>surgency war, where tens <strong>of</strong> thousandswere killed by death squads. And both <strong>of</strong> these are operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry. So the ideathat this is go<strong>in</strong>g on without U.S. knowledge, it's really -- it's just -- it's plausible deniability iswhat they’re try<strong>in</strong>g to do.AMY GOODMAN: Arun Gupta, I want to thank you for be<strong>in</strong>g with us. Arun is with TheIndypendent, the newspaper <strong>of</strong> the New York IndyMedia Center. Your web site wheredocuments will be at?ARUN GUPTA: Yes, there'll be the reports over the last six month that we’ve been publish<strong>in</strong>gthat are available at nyc.<strong>in</strong>dymedia.<strong>org</strong>.AMY GOODMAN: And, <strong>of</strong> course, you can go to our web site at DemocracyNow.<strong>org</strong>, wherewe will l<strong>in</strong>k to the New York IndyMedia center.www.democracynow.<strong>org</strong>110


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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4719252.stmStory from BBC NEWSPublished: 2006/02/16 13:39:26 GMT<strong>Iraq</strong> 'death squad caught <strong>in</strong> act'<strong>Iraq</strong> has launched an <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to claims by the <strong>US</strong> military that an <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry"death squad" has been target<strong>in</strong>g Sunni Arab <strong>Iraq</strong>is.The probe comes after a <strong>US</strong> general revealed the arrest <strong>of</strong> 22 policemen allegedly on a mission tokill a Sunni."We have found one <strong>of</strong> the death squads. They are part <strong>of</strong> the police force," <strong>US</strong> Maj Gen JosephPeterson said.Sunnis have long accused <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces <strong>of</strong> operat<strong>in</strong>g death squads - but the claims have never beensubstantiated.<strong>Iraq</strong>i deputy <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister Maj Gen Husse<strong>in</strong> Kamal said his m<strong>in</strong>istry had set up an <strong>in</strong>quiry.For a very long time we have been talk<strong>in</strong>g about such violations... that there are squadsthat raid houses and arrest people who are found later executed <strong>in</strong> different parts <strong>of</strong> the capitalNasser al-Ani<strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>Is</strong>lamic Party"The <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister has formed an <strong>in</strong>vestigation committee to learn more about the Sunniperson and those 22 men, particularly whether they work for the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry or claim tobelong to the m<strong>in</strong>istry," he told the Associated Press news agency.Hundreds <strong>of</strong> Sunni Arab <strong>Iraq</strong>is have been found dead s<strong>in</strong>ce the 2003 war <strong>in</strong> what appear to havebeen extra-judicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs.On Wednesday, the bodies <strong>of</strong> four unidentified men were found <strong>in</strong> Baghdad's Shia district <strong>of</strong>Shula. They had been handcuffed, bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded and shot <strong>in</strong> the head.<strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>surgents have also <strong>of</strong>ten used a similar tactic aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Iraq</strong>is work<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>in</strong>ternationalforces or the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government.Deta<strong>in</strong>edGen Peterson, who is <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police, told the Chicago Tribune onWednesday that <strong>US</strong> forces had stumbled across the first evidence <strong>of</strong> death squads with<strong>in</strong> the<strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry.The 22 <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry traffic policemen, dressed <strong>in</strong> police commando uniforms, were arrested<strong>in</strong> late January at an <strong>Iraq</strong>i army checkpo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> northern Baghdad and asked what they were do<strong>in</strong>g.112


They told soldiers they were tak<strong>in</strong>g a Sunni man away to be shot dead."The amaz<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g is... they tell you exactly what they're go<strong>in</strong>g to do," Gen Peterson said.MilitiasGen Peterson said <strong>US</strong> forces were hold<strong>in</strong>g four <strong>of</strong> the men at the Abu Ghraib prison and that the18 other men were be<strong>in</strong>g deta<strong>in</strong>ed at an <strong>Iraq</strong>i jail.The Sunni man, who was accused <strong>of</strong> murder, is also be<strong>in</strong>g deta<strong>in</strong>ed.Subsequent <strong>in</strong>vestigations found the four men <strong>in</strong> <strong>US</strong> custody are l<strong>in</strong>ked to the Badr Organisation,the armed militia <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s ma<strong>in</strong> Shia parties, the Supreme Council for the <strong>Is</strong>lamicRevolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.I th<strong>in</strong>k there are many people <strong>in</strong>side the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>in</strong>volved with these deaths <strong>org</strong>iv<strong>in</strong>g the uniforms <strong>of</strong> colleagues to crim<strong>in</strong>als<strong>Iraq</strong>i Human Rights M<strong>in</strong>ister Narm<strong>in</strong> UthmanBut Gen Peterson said he was conv<strong>in</strong>ced <strong>Iraq</strong>i Interior M<strong>in</strong>ster Bayan Jabr, a member <strong>of</strong> Sciri,had no knowledge <strong>of</strong> or <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the death squads."Who are these guys? That's what the m<strong>in</strong>ister is try<strong>in</strong>g to f<strong>in</strong>d out," he said."They are discredit<strong>in</strong>g him and his <strong>org</strong>anisation. He wants to f<strong>in</strong>d these guys. He does notsupport them."But Gen Peterson said he believed other death squads were operat<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i securityforces."It's an issue <strong>of</strong> loyalties, <strong>of</strong> allegiance," he said. "If you're still wear<strong>in</strong>g your Badr T-shirt underyour uniform, that's a problem."'Official help'<strong>Iraq</strong>i Human Rights M<strong>in</strong>ister Narm<strong>in</strong> Uthman said she believed lower-level <strong>of</strong>ficials werehelp<strong>in</strong>g the death squads."These <strong>of</strong>ficials are help<strong>in</strong>g the crim<strong>in</strong>als by <strong>in</strong>form<strong>in</strong>g them on where targeted people are go<strong>in</strong>gor where people are liv<strong>in</strong>g," she told AP.A spokesman for the country's ma<strong>in</strong> Sunni Arab party, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>Is</strong>lamic Party, backed the launch<strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>vestigation.113


"For a very long time we have been talk<strong>in</strong>g about such violations and we have been tell<strong>in</strong>g the<strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficials that there are squads that raid houses and arrest people who are foundlater executed <strong>in</strong> different parts <strong>of</strong> the capital," Nasser al-Ani said.© BBC MMVI114


http://www.countercurrents.<strong>org</strong>/iraq-ruder240206.htm<strong>Death</strong>-Squad “Democracy” In <strong>Iraq</strong>By Eric Ruder24 February, 2006Socialist WorkerThe U.S. <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> was supposed to br<strong>in</strong>g freedom and democracy. But a str<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> newrevelations have exposed the violent reality <strong>of</strong> life under U.S. occupation.In mid-February, <strong>Iraq</strong>’s Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry announced that it was launch<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>of</strong>ficial<strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to reports that death squads target<strong>in</strong>g Sunni Muslims are operat<strong>in</strong>g from with<strong>in</strong> itsown police forces.Several days earlier, the release <strong>of</strong> a video <strong>of</strong> British soldiers savagely beat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i youth madeheadl<strong>in</strong>es around the world. So did the publication <strong>of</strong> previously unseen photographs <strong>of</strong> tortureand abuse carried out by U.S. troops at Abu Ghraib prison <strong>in</strong> 2003.The mount<strong>in</strong>g evidence <strong>of</strong> atrocities suffered by <strong>Iraq</strong>is has re<strong>in</strong>forced the bitterness many feeltoward U.S. and British occupation forces. “If coalition troops are protect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong> from terrorism,who is protect<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>is from coalition troops?” wondered Firas Al-Atraqchi <strong>in</strong> Egypt’s Al-Ahram Weekly.The allegations about death squads are not new. Members <strong>of</strong> the Sunni m<strong>in</strong>ority have soundedthe alarm for months about reports <strong>of</strong> uniformed <strong>Iraq</strong>i police raid<strong>in</strong>g homes and leav<strong>in</strong>g withloved ones--who would turn up days or weeks later, handcuffed and shot <strong>in</strong> the head.“Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry special forces deta<strong>in</strong>ed my brother and four cous<strong>in</strong>s two weeks ago from [theSunni] al-Aqsa Mosque <strong>in</strong> northern Baghdad’s Shula neighbourhood," security guard Ayad AliMahdi told the Associated Press <strong>in</strong> mid-February. “After two days, their bodies were found <strong>in</strong> apickup truck on a highway. It was horrific. Their bodies were tortured and mutilated by drills andan oxyacetylene welder.”Previously, <strong>Iraq</strong>’s Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry dismissed allegations that Shiite militias were operat<strong>in</strong>gaga<strong>in</strong>st Sunni targets from with<strong>in</strong> the ranks <strong>of</strong> the police. But <strong>in</strong> early February, irrefutableevidence surfaced after U.S. troops stopped a 22-member death squad at a Baghdad checkpo<strong>in</strong>t,and the men freely admitted they were on their way to execute a Sunni prisoner.“The amaz<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g is...they tell you exactly what they’re go<strong>in</strong>g to do,” said Major Gen. JosephPeterson, the U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> the civilian police tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g teams <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Four <strong>of</strong> the men are known to be loyal to the Badr Brigade, a feared militia known for itssectarian violence aga<strong>in</strong>st Sunnis, which has l<strong>in</strong>ks to the Supreme Council for the <strong>Is</strong>lamicRevolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> (SCIRI), one <strong>of</strong> the lead<strong>in</strong>g Shiite parties <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. The head <strong>of</strong> the Interior115


M<strong>in</strong>istry is Bayan Jabr, a SCIRI party member, and few people believe that he will crack downon Badr Brigade members.Sunni leaders estimate that death squads have murdered some 1,600 Sunnis so far. This scale <strong>of</strong>kill<strong>in</strong>g by paramilitary groups couldn’t take place without tacit, if not outright <strong>of</strong>ficial, support.That means from the U.S., too. In early 2005, Pentagon war planners around Defense SecretaryDonald Rumsfeld talked <strong>of</strong> pursu<strong>in</strong>g the “Salvador option”--outsourc<strong>in</strong>g the work <strong>of</strong> crack<strong>in</strong>gdown on Sunni resistance fighters to Shiite and Kurdish paramilitary forces, as the U.S. diddur<strong>in</strong>g its secret wars on left-w<strong>in</strong>g movements <strong>in</strong> Central America. Now we have evidence thatthe “Salvador option” is <strong>in</strong> full sw<strong>in</strong>g.For the first couple years <strong>of</strong> the occupation, British troops enjoyed a reputation for compassion,compared to their U.S. counterparts. But anger at their presence has been grow<strong>in</strong>g--especiallys<strong>in</strong>ce a full-scale British tank assault on an <strong>Iraq</strong>i police station to free two British soldiers, whowere apprehended and deta<strong>in</strong>ed after they were discovered disguised as resistance fighters.Now, tensions are at a break<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t follow<strong>in</strong>g the air<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a videotape show<strong>in</strong>g a sicken<strong>in</strong>gassault by British troops on several <strong>Iraq</strong>i youths after a January 2004 demonstration to demandjobs.British troops killed six and <strong>in</strong>jured 11 when they used live ammunition to quell the upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>Amarah two years ago. But the tape show<strong>in</strong>g the beat<strong>in</strong>gs just surfaced.At one po<strong>in</strong>t, a soldier throws one <strong>of</strong> the prisoners on the floor, while another delivers 10 savageblows with a baton. Then a third soldier b<strong>in</strong>ds the boy’s wrists, and another strikes him on theback with a baton--at which po<strong>in</strong>t the boys goes limp, and a pool <strong>of</strong> blood forms around his head.In the background, a British soldier can be heard egg<strong>in</strong>g on those committ<strong>in</strong>g the atrocities:“You’re gonna get it. Yes, naughty little boys! You little fuckers, you little fuckers. Die! Ha,ha!”Bassem Shaker is one <strong>of</strong> the boys shown on the tape. “I was one <strong>of</strong> 250 unemployed peopledemonstrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the street <strong>in</strong> 2004,” said Shaker, who came forward after the tape was aired.“But when we reached the governor’s <strong>of</strong>fice, we were surprised by the presence <strong>of</strong> the Britishforces. We started throw<strong>in</strong>g stones at them because we believed they were beh<strong>in</strong>d our misery.”After the video surfaces, more than 1,000 people marched on the British consulate <strong>in</strong> Basra <strong>in</strong> anangry demonstration. Prov<strong>in</strong>cial <strong>of</strong>ficials announced that they were sever<strong>in</strong>g ties with Britishauthorities and ceas<strong>in</strong>g jo<strong>in</strong>t patrols with British troops--who number 8,500 and are based <strong>in</strong>Basra.When the first photographs <strong>of</strong> abuse <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i deta<strong>in</strong>ees at Abu Ghraib made world headl<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong>2004, U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficials fought to keep hundreds <strong>of</strong> the most gruesome images hidden from view.But several <strong>of</strong> these photos and some video clips were leaked to an Australian television station,which aired them <strong>in</strong> mid-February.116


One photo showed what appeared to be cigarette burns on a man’s buttocks. A video cliprevealed a group <strong>of</strong> hooded, naked men who were forced to stand together and masturbate. Oneparticularly grisly image shows a corpse that seems to have a section torn from its head, whileanother features a man whose arms are covered <strong>in</strong> purple bruises.“The new pictures reignited the long-runn<strong>in</strong>g pa<strong>in</strong> that started with the occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>,” <strong>Iraq</strong>iteacher Hanan Adeeb told a reporter. “It angered me deeply, stabbed me <strong>in</strong> the heart to see mypeople pay<strong>in</strong>g for no reasonable reason. What hurts me more is for the world to see us tortured <strong>in</strong>this way without bl<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g an eye. When I see this, I understand why people th<strong>in</strong>k the only way toget <strong>Iraq</strong> out <strong>of</strong> this dilemma is to send the Americans away--no matter how.”At a time when U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficials and media pundits condemn angry protests through the Arab worldaga<strong>in</strong>st anti-Muslim cartoons published <strong>in</strong> newspapers around the world, the atrocities committedby U.S. and British troops are a stark rem<strong>in</strong>der <strong>of</strong> why this anger exists <strong>in</strong> the first place.117


http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/iraq/3662963.html<strong>Death</strong> squad probe launched <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>Bodies <strong>of</strong> a dozen more people found; 25 others die <strong>in</strong> violence across countryAssociated PressFeb. 16, 2006BAGHDAD, <strong>Iraq</strong> — The Shiite-dom<strong>in</strong>ated Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry announced an <strong>in</strong>vestigation today<strong>in</strong>to claims <strong>of</strong> death squads <strong>in</strong> its ranks as police found a dozen more bodies, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g thenumber <strong>of</strong> apparent victims <strong>of</strong> sectarian reprisal kill<strong>in</strong>gs here to at least 30 this week.The probe was announced after U.S. military <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>in</strong>dicated there was evidence to supportthe allegation <strong>of</strong> death squads. The 12 men found today had been bound and shot <strong>in</strong> the headexecution-style.At least 27 other people were killed <strong>in</strong> violence across <strong>Iraq</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g three tribal sheiks sla<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>a drive-by shoot<strong>in</strong>g. Three supporters <strong>of</strong> anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr died <strong>in</strong> a mortarbarrage, and gunmen killed two owners <strong>of</strong> a convenience store that sold beer. <strong>Is</strong>lamic extremists<strong>of</strong>ten target shops sell<strong>in</strong>g alcohol or DVDs deemed pornographic.Sunni Arabs have been compla<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for months that kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs and murder by Shiite-ledcommandos operated by the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry are driv<strong>in</strong>g many Sunnis <strong>in</strong>to the ranks <strong>of</strong> the<strong>in</strong>surgents. Shiites <strong>in</strong>sist that they must reta<strong>in</strong> control <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces <strong>in</strong> the nextgovernment.In the death squad case, <strong>Iraq</strong>i security <strong>of</strong>ficials said the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry probe would focus on as<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>in</strong>cident <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g 22 <strong>Iraq</strong>i policemen who U.S. authorities said were deta<strong>in</strong>ed last monthbefore they were able to kill a Sunni Arab man north <strong>of</strong> Baghdad."They were dressed as <strong>Iraq</strong>i highway patrolmen but only four <strong>of</strong> those <strong>in</strong>dividuals were plann<strong>in</strong>gto conduct a kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g and subsequent murder <strong>of</strong> a Sunni <strong>in</strong>dividual," Maj. Gen. Rick Lynchtold reporters today.Maj. Gen. Joseph Peterson, who commands the civilian police tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g teams <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, gave aslightly different version to the Chicago Tribune for a story today about the death squad.Peterson said the 22 men were wear<strong>in</strong>g police commando uniforms but turned out to beemployed by the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry as highway patrol <strong>of</strong>ficers. He said four were believed to ber<strong>in</strong>gleaders while the 18 others were likely follow<strong>in</strong>g orders. All were picked up at a checkpo<strong>in</strong>t."We cont<strong>in</strong>ue to believe that there's more <strong>of</strong> these out there," he said.But Lynch said this could have been an isolated <strong>in</strong>cident."We have no <strong>in</strong>dication they have done this <strong>in</strong> the past," he said. "All we know this is an isolated<strong>in</strong>cident. We are not say<strong>in</strong>g it couldn't have happened (previously), but we are not aware <strong>of</strong> it."118


Maj. Gen. Husse<strong>in</strong> Kamal, who announced the <strong>in</strong>vestigation, said the four policemen identifiedby Peterson as r<strong>in</strong>gleaders had been transferred to the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib prison <strong>in</strong> westernBaghdad and the rest were held <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i jails.Kamal, <strong>Iraq</strong>'s deputy <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> domestic <strong>in</strong>telligence, h<strong>in</strong>ted that the scope <strong>of</strong>the probe could go beyond the 22 policemen arrested last month."After <strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities were <strong>in</strong>formed by the Americans about the so-called commando forcesengag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> assass<strong>in</strong>ations, the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister immediately formed an <strong>in</strong>vestigation committeeto uncover what has actually happened," Kamal said.The U.S. military has been fight<strong>in</strong>g a tough battle to rebuild a legitimate <strong>Iraq</strong>i security force thatit hopes will eventually replace American-led coalition forces and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> order throughout thecountry.There is no shortage <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is, particularly <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, who say family members have beenkidnapped and killed by men wear<strong>in</strong>g police uniforms."Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry special forces deta<strong>in</strong>ed my brother and four cous<strong>in</strong>s two weeks ago from(Sunni Arab) al-Aqsa Mosque <strong>in</strong> northern Baghdad's Shula neighborhood," 24-year-old securityguard Ayad Ali Mahdi said."After two days, their bodies were found <strong>in</strong> pickup truck on a highway. It was horrific. Theirbodies were tortured and mutilated by drills and an oxyacetylene welder," Mahdi said.The relative <strong>of</strong> another victim described how two dozen men wear<strong>in</strong>g security forces uniformsbroke <strong>in</strong>to his northern Baghdad home last month, pushed his plead<strong>in</strong>g wife aside and draggedout his two brothers, the only men at home at the time."We contacted many police stations search<strong>in</strong>g for them but couldn't f<strong>in</strong>d any trace. After n<strong>in</strong>e or10 days, we heard 36 dead bodies were found near (the southern <strong>Iraq</strong>i city <strong>of</strong>) Kut, and I foundmy brothers among them," said Sunni Arab taxi driver Youssef Abdul-Karim, 35."They were bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded, handcuffed and severely tortured. One <strong>of</strong> my brothers had drill wounds<strong>in</strong> his head, while the other was shot <strong>in</strong> the head and chest."A Sunni Arab political group, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>Is</strong>lamic Party, welcomed the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry<strong>in</strong>vestigation and said perpetrators should be brought to justice.<strong>Iraq</strong>'s human rights m<strong>in</strong>ister, Nerm<strong>in</strong>e Othman, said Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficials have been beh<strong>in</strong>dnumerous execution-like murders, either by tak<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>in</strong> the roundups and kill<strong>in</strong>gs or provid<strong>in</strong>gpolice uniforms, <strong>in</strong>formation on potential victims and weapons to culprits.119


http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-02-16-iraq-death-squads_x.htm<strong>Iraq</strong>i cops face abuse probeBy Rick Jervis<strong>US</strong>A TODAYFebruary 17, 2006BAGHDAD — <strong>Iraq</strong>'s government is tak<strong>in</strong>g action to root out renegade police and security<strong>of</strong>ficials who may be operat<strong>in</strong>g death squads and abus<strong>in</strong>g deta<strong>in</strong>ees, the U.S. commander <strong>in</strong>charge <strong>of</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i police said.<strong>Iraq</strong>'s government is tak<strong>in</strong>g action to root out renegade police and security <strong>of</strong>ficials who may beoperat<strong>in</strong>g death squads and abus<strong>in</strong>g deta<strong>in</strong>ees, the U.S. commander <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>ipolice said.The <strong>in</strong>vestigations, however, won't slow the pace <strong>of</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i police who are be<strong>in</strong>g groomedto assume the primary role <strong>of</strong> provid<strong>in</strong>g security <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Peterson said.<strong>Iraq</strong>'s government is "not tolerat<strong>in</strong>g" the abuses, Peterson said. "It's occurr<strong>in</strong>g, but they're do<strong>in</strong>gsometh<strong>in</strong>g about it."<strong>Iraq</strong>'s Shiite-dom<strong>in</strong>ated government has been dogged by allegations that its security forces areabus<strong>in</strong>g deta<strong>in</strong>ees and runn<strong>in</strong>g death squads aimed mostly at Sunnis. Sunni Arabs dom<strong>in</strong>ated thegovernment for decades <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and now form the backbone <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency."The government is push<strong>in</strong>g hard toward a civil war," Khalaf al-Ilyan, a lead<strong>in</strong>g Sunni politician,told reporters this month after the bodies <strong>of</strong> 14 Sunni men were found <strong>in</strong> the back <strong>of</strong> a truck <strong>in</strong>northern Baghdad. Al-Ilyan said the men had been seized at a Sunni mosque by uniformedgunmen.The Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry said Thursday that it is sett<strong>in</strong>g up a committee to <strong>in</strong>vestigate the recentarrests <strong>of</strong> 22 highway patrolmen who were captured last month allegedly on their way to executea prisoner. The men were <strong>in</strong> the uniforms <strong>of</strong> police commandos.Eighteen <strong>of</strong> the men are be<strong>in</strong>g held <strong>in</strong> an <strong>Iraq</strong>i jail. Four <strong>of</strong> them, believed to be the r<strong>in</strong>gleaders,were transferred to the U.S. prison at Abu Ghraib, Peterson said.Other developments <strong>in</strong>clude:• <strong>Iraq</strong>i police said Wednesday that they found four bodies <strong>in</strong> the Shuala district <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, theirhands cuffed beh<strong>in</strong>d their backs and show<strong>in</strong>g signs <strong>of</strong> torture.• Last week, Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister Bayan Jabr ordered an <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to human rights abuses atthe m<strong>in</strong>istry, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the discovery <strong>of</strong> bodies found at the Rustumiya sewage plant <strong>in</strong> southern120


Baghdad, the 14 Sunnis seized from their mosque and later killed and the abduction <strong>of</strong> the mayor<strong>of</strong> Mahmoudiya, south <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, Peterson said."We cont<strong>in</strong>ue to believe there are more <strong>of</strong> these out there," Peterson said <strong>of</strong> death squads. "Andthe m<strong>in</strong>ister's focused on try<strong>in</strong>g to capture them."Stamp<strong>in</strong>g out abuses will be a top priority for the next government, said Basam Ridha, an aide toPrime M<strong>in</strong>ister Ibrahim al-Jaafari."We've learned from the process and are tak<strong>in</strong>g extra measures," Ridha said.Al-Jaafari was elected by the rul<strong>in</strong>g Shiite coalition to serve another term as prime m<strong>in</strong>ister.Negotiations are underway to form a government follow<strong>in</strong>g December elections.The U.S. military said it is also work<strong>in</strong>g to address the issue <strong>of</strong> abuses.<strong>Iraq</strong>i police cadets go<strong>in</strong>g through the required 10-week tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g course receive 32 hours <strong>of</strong>human rights and rule-<strong>of</strong>-law tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, Peterson said."Our perspective is we're try<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>stitute the rule <strong>of</strong> law," Peterson said dur<strong>in</strong>g a recent<strong>in</strong>terview. "We're tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g a culture here."The U.S. military will f<strong>in</strong>ish tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the target number <strong>of</strong> 200,000 policemen and InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficials by the end <strong>of</strong> the year, Peterson said. About 84,000 are tra<strong>in</strong>ed now.The U.S. military also plans to add an extra 2,000 American military advisers to the 1,500currently supervis<strong>in</strong>g and assess<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>'s police force.121


http://www.truthout.<strong>org</strong>/cgi-b<strong>in</strong>/artman/exec/view.cgi/47/17875Police Tied to <strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong>By Solomon MooreThe Los Angeles TimesTuesday 21 February 2006<strong>US</strong> military <strong>of</strong>ficials say they suspect <strong>Iraq</strong>'s highway patrol, staffed largely by Shiites, isdeeply <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> torture and kill<strong>in</strong>gs.Baghdad - A 1,500-member <strong>Iraq</strong>i police force with close ties to Shiite militia groups hasemerged as a focus <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong>to suspected death squads work<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the country'sInterior M<strong>in</strong>istry.<strong>Iraq</strong>'s national highway patrol was established largely to stave <strong>of</strong>f <strong>in</strong>surgent attacks onroadways. But U.S. military <strong>of</strong>ficials, <strong>in</strong>terviewed over the last several days, say they suspect thepatrol <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g deeply <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> illegal detentions, torture and extrajudicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs.The <strong>of</strong>ficials said that <strong>in</strong> recent months the U.S. has withdrawn f<strong>in</strong>ancial and advisory supportfrom the patrol <strong>in</strong> an effort to distance the American tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g effort from what they perceived tobe a renegade force."We don't tra<strong>in</strong> them, we don't give them equipment, we don't conduct site visits over there.They are just bad, crim<strong>in</strong>al people," said a high-rank<strong>in</strong>g U.S. military <strong>of</strong>ficer who advises theInterior M<strong>in</strong>istry. The <strong>of</strong>ficer was one <strong>of</strong> three who each spoke on condition <strong>of</strong> anonymity,say<strong>in</strong>g they wanted to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> relationships with <strong>Iraq</strong>i police <strong>of</strong>ficials and avoid retaliation byU.S. military superiors.Last month, <strong>Iraq</strong>i army soldiers stopped a 22-member squad <strong>of</strong> uniformed highway patrol<strong>of</strong>ficers at a nighttime checkpo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> northern Baghdad and discovered a man <strong>in</strong> their custodywho told them the police planned to kill him. His contention was supported by confessions <strong>of</strong><strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>in</strong> the squad, U.S. advisors said.U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficials have called 2006 "the year <strong>of</strong> the police" and have placed a renewed emphasison tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficers. The Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration repeatedly has said the development <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'ssecurity forces must occur before withdrawal <strong>of</strong> U.S. troops can beg<strong>in</strong>.The U.S. military works closely with <strong>Iraq</strong>i army units, conduct<strong>in</strong>g jo<strong>in</strong>t operations and shar<strong>in</strong>gspace on some military bases. By contrast, police forces have evolved far more <strong>in</strong>dependently <strong>in</strong>approximately 11,000 stations and outposts around the nation.The result is a motley conglomeration <strong>of</strong> agencies under the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry with overlapp<strong>in</strong>gjurisdictions and poorly def<strong>in</strong>ed functions.122


"You've got the facilities protection service, the public order brigades, the commandos, thehighway patrol, the regular police, the traffic police, patrol <strong>of</strong>ficers," said a second U.S. military<strong>of</strong>ficial."Who knows who they all are? Nobody controls them but the m<strong>in</strong>ister," the <strong>of</strong>ficer said,referr<strong>in</strong>g to Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister Bayan Jabr.Jabr, a Shiite with close ties to the Badr Brigade, a paramilitary group, has been at the center<strong>of</strong> allegations <strong>of</strong> abuse at the hands <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces. The m<strong>in</strong>ister's notoriety rose last yearas the bodies <strong>of</strong> hundreds <strong>of</strong> men - mostly Sunni Arabs - started appear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> sewage treatmentplants, garbage dumps and desert rav<strong>in</strong>es. Most <strong>of</strong> the bodies showed signs <strong>of</strong> torture andexecution-style kill<strong>in</strong>gs. Many families <strong>of</strong> the deceased said their k<strong>in</strong> had last been seen <strong>in</strong> theback <strong>of</strong> a police vehicle.The Shiites, who constitute about 60% <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i population, were severely repressed underSaddam Husse<strong>in</strong>'s regime, which favored the Sunni m<strong>in</strong>ority. The Shiites came to power <strong>in</strong> thewake <strong>of</strong> the U.S.-led <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>of</strong> March 2003. A Sunni-led <strong>in</strong>surgency has carried out acampaign <strong>of</strong> bomb<strong>in</strong>gs and assass<strong>in</strong>ations aga<strong>in</strong>st the government.Over the last two years, Shiite militias with<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s security forces have been accused <strong>of</strong>stag<strong>in</strong>g reprisals for the Sunni attacks. Lead<strong>in</strong>g Sunni figures have blamed the reprisals on Jabr.Sunni political parties have made his removal from <strong>of</strong>fice a key issue <strong>in</strong> negotiations overwhether they will take part <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s Shiite-led government.In a recent <strong>in</strong>terview, Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Peterson, who is lead<strong>in</strong>g the multibillion-dollareffort to tra<strong>in</strong> and equip <strong>Iraq</strong>'s police forces, vigorously defended the m<strong>in</strong>ister and said he washeartened by Jabr's pledge to <strong>in</strong>vestigate the abuse fully."<strong>Death</strong> squads - they're a real issue," said Peterson. "I can tell you, we caught our first deathsquad," he said, referr<strong>in</strong>g to the unit that was apprehended last month. "The m<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> Interior iselated that we caught them," he added.Peterson said U.S. and Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficials were <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g the highway patrol squadto determ<strong>in</strong>e "where these guys came from and how they were <strong>org</strong>anized and who was lead<strong>in</strong>gthem and what was their purpose."Army Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, a U.S. military spokesman, said that the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry waslead<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to the suspected death squad.Ali Husse<strong>in</strong> Kamal, the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry's <strong>in</strong>telligence chief, said <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>terview Sunday that<strong>in</strong>vestigators were also try<strong>in</strong>g to determ<strong>in</strong>e whether the <strong>Iraq</strong>i general <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> the highwaypatrol was l<strong>in</strong>ked to the squad."If we f<strong>in</strong>d that these allegations that he is <strong>in</strong>volved are true, we will be tak<strong>in</strong>g very firmmeasures aga<strong>in</strong>st him," Kamal said. "But generally speak<strong>in</strong>g, high-rank<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficers are usuallyignorant <strong>of</strong> what their lower-rank<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficers are do<strong>in</strong>g."123


U.S. personnel who have been tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i police <strong>of</strong>ficers said they long had suspected thehighway patrol <strong>of</strong> conduct<strong>in</strong>g illegal raids and kill<strong>in</strong>gs but had little oversight <strong>of</strong> the force.The black-garbed highway patrol <strong>of</strong>ficers rarely attend U.S.-f<strong>in</strong>anced police academies aimedat improv<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism and sensitivity to human rights with<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s security forces, policetra<strong>in</strong>ers said, and have refused to share <strong>in</strong>formation about their activities.U.S. police advisors said the highway patrol was almost entirely Shiite and <strong>in</strong>cluded a core <strong>of</strong>400 to 800 Badr militia members who make up the patrol's 4th Company, which was created lastyear."The 4th Company is filled by people with unconventional militia ties," said the U.S. military<strong>of</strong>ficer who advises the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry. "M<strong>in</strong>ister Jabr is very supportive <strong>of</strong> them. The general<strong>in</strong> charge [<strong>of</strong> the highway patrol] is very supportive <strong>of</strong> them."After the suspected death squad was stopped last month, U.S. police advisors said, fourmembers <strong>of</strong> the squad confessed to several sectarian kill<strong>in</strong>gs.The highway patrol <strong>of</strong>ficers were asked, " 'Who are you do<strong>in</strong>g this for?' " said a third U.S.military <strong>of</strong>ficer who is <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i troops and has knowledge <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terrogations<strong>of</strong> the suspected death squad. "And they're tell<strong>in</strong>g us, 'Jabr.' " The rest <strong>of</strong> the squad, said theadvisor, has been released.Sunni Arab leaders compla<strong>in</strong> that an earlier <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to alleged police abuse has yet toshow results.In November, a U.S. Army unit discovered a secret detention and torture facility run by police<strong>of</strong>ficers affiliated with the Badr militia. In all, 169 people had been deta<strong>in</strong>ed at the secret prison,and photos showed that some <strong>in</strong>mates had been severely beaten and malnourished.Jabr pledged to <strong>in</strong>vestigate the orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> the detention facility and the possible existence <strong>of</strong>other secret prisons, even as he downplayed the abuse that had taken place there."OK, there were signs <strong>of</strong> torture … but there were no kill<strong>in</strong>gs and no behead<strong>in</strong>gs, as somehave said," Jabr told reporters <strong>in</strong> November.But <strong>in</strong>mates at the bunker compiled a list <strong>of</strong> 18 deta<strong>in</strong>ees who they said had been tortured todeath.Two U.S. Embassy <strong>of</strong>ficials said Monday that <strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities were conduct<strong>in</strong>g visits <strong>of</strong>Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry jails and prisons, but decl<strong>in</strong>ed to release details about the facilities.Kamal, the m<strong>in</strong>istry's <strong>in</strong>telligence chief, said <strong>of</strong> the detention probe, "we are still <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>gthis, but it is better if we do this quietly, without any media."124


Peterson, the U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i police tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, said that so far, no other secretprisons had been discovered. U.S. <strong>of</strong>ficials were try<strong>in</strong>g to help the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry centralizeand upgrade its detention system, he said, so that it would be more transparent and acceptable by<strong>in</strong>ternational standards."I've seen all the reports that say there are secret prisons out there," Peterson said. "So whereare they? We have not found them. We have gone out there and looked for them. Can they exist?Well, the bunker existed, so yeah, they can exist. <strong>Is</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>istry try<strong>in</strong>g to f<strong>in</strong>d these th<strong>in</strong>gs? Well,yes, they are."125


http://www.agrnews.<strong>org</strong>/?section=archives&cat_id=15&article_id=338<strong>US</strong> troops arrest <strong>Iraq</strong> police death squadBy Simon FreemanAsheville Global ReportNo. 371, February 23 - March 1, 2006Feb. 16- An <strong>in</strong>quiry has been launched <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>in</strong>filtration <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s police by militiaforces after a 22-member death squad was caught red-handed at a checkpo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> Baghdad.Guards stopped the men — all wear<strong>in</strong>g police uniforms — as they tried to cross aroadblock <strong>in</strong> the north <strong>of</strong> the capital. When questioned, they freely admitted they were ontheir way to execute a Sunni Muslim prisoner.Maj. Gen. Joseph Peterson, who commands the civilian police tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g teams <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, toldreporters that the men were employed by the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior as highway patrol<strong>of</strong>ficers."The amaz<strong>in</strong>g th<strong>in</strong>g is... they tell you exactly what they're go<strong>in</strong>g to do," he said.Four <strong>of</strong> the men are believed to have l<strong>in</strong>ks to the Badr brigades — the armed w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> theSupreme Council for the <strong>Is</strong>lamic Revolution (SCIRI), one <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s ma<strong>in</strong> Shia parties.They are be<strong>in</strong>g held at the <strong>US</strong> detention facility at Abu Ghraib. The others are <strong>in</strong> an <strong>Iraq</strong>ijail. The Sunni man, who is accused <strong>of</strong> murder, is also be<strong>in</strong>g held <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i custody.Peterson said he believed that there were other sectarian death squads operat<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong>the security forces. "We cont<strong>in</strong>ue to believe that there's more <strong>of</strong> these out there," he said.He said that he was certa<strong>in</strong> that Bayan Jabr, the Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister who is a member <strong>of</strong>SCIRI, had no knowledge <strong>of</strong> the death squads. "They are discredit<strong>in</strong>g him and his<strong>org</strong>anization. He wants to f<strong>in</strong>d these guys. He does not support them," he said.Maj. Gen. Husse<strong>in</strong> Kamal, <strong>Iraq</strong>'s deputy <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister, responded to the report byorder<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>vestigation. As the <strong>in</strong>quiry was announced, police discovered the bodies <strong>of</strong>a dozen executed men <strong>in</strong> the predom<strong>in</strong>antly Shia Muslim suburb <strong>of</strong> Shula."We have been <strong>in</strong>formed about this and the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister has formed an <strong>in</strong>vestigationcommittee to learn more about the Sunni person and those 22 men, particularly whetherthey work for the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry or claim to belong to the m<strong>in</strong>istry," Kamal told theAssociated Press.Allegations <strong>of</strong> death squads target<strong>in</strong>g Sunnis from with<strong>in</strong> the Shia-dom<strong>in</strong>ated ranks <strong>of</strong> thepolice have been circulat<strong>in</strong>g s<strong>in</strong>ce May last year. Bodies <strong>of</strong> Sunnis seized from their126


homes or mosques by men <strong>in</strong> uniform regularly turn up <strong>in</strong> land fills around Baghdad,bound, gagged and bear<strong>in</strong>g execution-style gunshot <strong>in</strong>juries.On the other side <strong>of</strong> the sectarian divide, there is also evidence <strong>of</strong> Shia Muslims be<strong>in</strong>gsystematically massacred by Sunni extremists <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, Diyala prov<strong>in</strong>ce and mixedareas to the south <strong>of</strong> the capital.Executions are also regularly reported <strong>in</strong> the southern city <strong>of</strong> Basra, where British troopspatrol. Maj. Alex Wilson, a senior British <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g police <strong>in</strong> Basra,said that he believed death squads "masquerad<strong>in</strong>g" as police or members <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>teriorm<strong>in</strong>istry, were responsible for more than 140 kill<strong>in</strong>gs between November and January.He told the Associated Press that this was double the number killed <strong>in</strong> the previous sixmonths. "We are do<strong>in</strong>g our best to counter the death squads. We want to take them <strong>of</strong>f thestreet," he said.Nerm<strong>in</strong>e Othman, the human rights m<strong>in</strong>ister, said that she believed lower-level <strong>in</strong>teriorm<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficials were us<strong>in</strong>g crim<strong>in</strong>als to kill <strong>Iraq</strong>is."I th<strong>in</strong>k there are many people <strong>in</strong>side the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>in</strong>volved with these deaths <strong>org</strong>iv<strong>in</strong>g the uniforms <strong>of</strong> colleagues to crim<strong>in</strong>als," she said. "These <strong>of</strong>ficials are help<strong>in</strong>g thecrim<strong>in</strong>als by <strong>in</strong>form<strong>in</strong>g them on where targeted people are go<strong>in</strong>g or where people areliv<strong>in</strong>g. They are help<strong>in</strong>g them <strong>in</strong> different ways."The Sunni <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>Is</strong>lamic Party praised the <strong>in</strong>vestigation and said perpetrators should bebrought to justice."S<strong>in</strong>ce a very long time, we have been talk<strong>in</strong>g about such violations and we have beentell<strong>in</strong>g the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficials that there are squads that raid houses and arrestpeople who are found later executed <strong>in</strong> different parts <strong>of</strong> the capital," said Nasser al-Ani<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>Is</strong>lamic party.Source: Times (UK)127


http://signs-<strong>of</strong>-the-times.<strong>org</strong>/signs/editorialsU.S. <strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong> #9Baghdad bomb kills 22 - But Who <strong>Is</strong> to Blame?Signs <strong>of</strong> the TimesEditorial: Baghdad bomb kills 22 - But Who <strong>Is</strong> to Blame?By Joe Qu<strong>in</strong>n21/02/2006In what has tragically become a commonplace event, today yet another car bomb exploded <strong>in</strong>Baghdad. The UK Guardian reports:Baghdad bomb kills 22 At least 22 people were killed and 28 wounded when a car bombexploded <strong>in</strong> a busy outdoor market <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i city <strong>of</strong> Baghdad today. <strong>Iraq</strong>i police said the bombexploded at 4.45pm local time <strong>in</strong> Dora, a south-west district <strong>of</strong> the city. It is believed the attackwas aimed at a police patrol but missed its target. The <strong>in</strong>jured were taken to hospital where asource said the death toll could be much higher. Dora is one <strong>of</strong> the most dangerous parts <strong>of</strong>Baghdad, with car and roadside bomb<strong>in</strong>gs occurr<strong>in</strong>g daily s<strong>in</strong>ce a Sunni-dom<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong>surgencybegan <strong>in</strong> the summer <strong>of</strong> 2003.Notice that a "Baghdad bomb" killed at least 22 <strong>Iraq</strong>i civilians today, and that "car and roadsidebomb<strong>in</strong>gs occur almost daily". In read<strong>in</strong>g this account, you could be f<strong>org</strong>iven for com<strong>in</strong>g awaywith the impression that "Baghdad bombs" have a life <strong>of</strong> their own and need no help from anyhuman agency to wreak their bloody carnage. Perhaps that problem is that no one ever seems tobe claim responsibility for these attacks, and journalists and commentators are just as mystifiedabout which "<strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>surgent group" could possibly want to kill their own neighbors - the verymembers <strong>of</strong> their support base that they rely on to resist the American occupation.The fact is that these type <strong>of</strong> anonymous bomb<strong>in</strong>gs are not new. All over the world over the pasthalf century (and longer) bombs have been explod<strong>in</strong>g and kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>nocent civilians, leav<strong>in</strong>g theirfriends and families not only traumatised, but completely confused as to why such violence wascommitted aga<strong>in</strong>st them. For example, <strong>in</strong> 1998, 29 civilians, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g 9 children and a womanpregnant with tw<strong>in</strong>s, were killed when a car bomb exploded on a busy shopp<strong>in</strong>g area <strong>in</strong> the town<strong>of</strong> Omagh <strong>in</strong> Northern Ireland. It was the worst s<strong>in</strong>gle atrocity <strong>in</strong> 30 years <strong>of</strong> conflict <strong>in</strong> NorthernIreland. Now one might expect that, <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g with the l<strong>in</strong>es along which the conflict had beenfought for 800 years, a very large majority, if not all, <strong>of</strong> the victims would be from one side <strong>of</strong>the community or the other. But the strange th<strong>in</strong>g about the Omagh bomb<strong>in</strong>g was that the deadwere almost equally distributed between the Irish Catholic and British protestant populations.Not only that, but a warn<strong>in</strong>g that was telephoned to police 40 m<strong>in</strong>utes before the bomb detonatedconta<strong>in</strong>ed apparently <strong>in</strong>correct <strong>in</strong>formation about where the bomb was, and led police to'evacuate' civilians towards the bomb rather than away from it. In do<strong>in</strong>g so, maximum bloodshedwas assured. The bomb<strong>in</strong>g came at a time when the 'peace process' was <strong>in</strong> full sw<strong>in</strong>g and effortswere be<strong>in</strong>g made by the warr<strong>in</strong>g parties to come to some form <strong>of</strong> f<strong>in</strong>al resolution. In the end, thebomb<strong>in</strong>g was placed at the door <strong>of</strong> a shadowy dissident Republican outfit called 'the Real IRA', a128


moniker that sounds about as unauthentic as those given to the <strong>in</strong>famous 'previously unknown<strong>Is</strong>lamic groups' like 'Al-Qaeda <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'. A naive patsy took the fall after a ridiculous sham <strong>of</strong> ajury-less trial and a conviction that was based on evidence from two discredited witnesses andstatements by the accused that were extracted under police pressure. Condemnation subsequentlyfell on the Irish Republican movement <strong>in</strong> general, much to the hidden glee <strong>of</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> members <strong>of</strong>the British establishment who are secretly tasked with encourag<strong>in</strong>g conflict by any means and atall costs.<strong>War</strong> = pr<strong>of</strong>it and control after allThe idea that Western 'Democratic' governments would actually encourage violence andbloodshed aga<strong>in</strong>st their own populations is extremely difficult for the average person to consideras even remotely possible. Yet there sits the evidence. Gett<strong>in</strong>g back to today's bomb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>Baghdad; such events will cont<strong>in</strong>ue to confuse and bemuse us and ultimately force us to switch<strong>of</strong>f, or worse, switch on to government propaganda, until we f<strong>in</strong>ally open our m<strong>in</strong>ds to the realitythat is daily become more and more undeniable. John Kam<strong>in</strong>ski has already detailed that reality,at least <strong>in</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> the many "car bomb<strong>in</strong>gs" <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>:Sick Strategies For Senseless SlaughterThe murderous fools are not try<strong>in</strong>g to end the war; they're try<strong>in</strong>g to keep it go<strong>in</strong>g as long as theycan By John Kam<strong>in</strong>ski skylax@comcast.net 5-24-05 The cat is out <strong>of</strong> the bag now. It happenedquite by accident, as most revelations do. And it is seen by most <strong>of</strong> the world as the mostrevolt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the American/<strong>Is</strong>raeli atrocities <strong>in</strong> the past few years, although it's hard to prioritizethat claim because <strong>of</strong> the level and frequency <strong>of</strong> barbaric acts that are committed on a regularbasis by those affluent automatons who call themselves the good guys. Yet everyone but thecomatose American populace —— bl<strong>in</strong>ded by its Orwellian media and stupefied by its dementeddiet <strong>of</strong> physical and mental poisons —— can see it.So permit me to spell it out for those cowardly people who say they're liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the freest countryon Earth, but absolutely refuse <strong>in</strong> their silent ignorance to see the blood they're spill<strong>in</strong>g. Nocountry that condones deliberate torture for any reason can ever be trusted. The first h<strong>in</strong>t came <strong>in</strong>Imad Khadduri's "A warn<strong>in</strong>g to car drivers" written <strong>in</strong> Arabic and posted on www.albasrah.neton May 11. The dispatch was quickly picked up by two <strong>of</strong> the most realistic and reliable newssites on the Web, www.uruknet.<strong>in</strong>fo, which I try to read every day, and www.globalresearch.ca,which I try to read every week, s<strong>in</strong>ce it <strong>of</strong>fers less break<strong>in</strong>g and more analytical news.I consider these two sites essential to keep<strong>in</strong>g up with the real news <strong>of</strong> the world, and highlyrecommend that you monitor them, too. Khadduri recounted a scam that opens up a clearw<strong>in</strong>dow to see<strong>in</strong>g who is perpetrat<strong>in</strong>g all this <strong>in</strong>explicable violence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Beyond the Americanattempt to pacify an outraged and abused nation through demonic destruction, and beyond the<strong>Iraq</strong>i attempt to resist this totalitarian takeover by a foreign conqueror, there are more thannumerous acts <strong>of</strong> violence that simply can't be understood by straightforward explanations. Imean, when a mosque blows up and Americans blame <strong>Is</strong>lamic terrorists, whether Sunni or Shiite,it makes no sense. Muslims never blow up their own houses <strong>of</strong> worship.129


Or when reporters sympathetic to either the <strong>Iraq</strong>i cause <strong>of</strong> freedom, or even just generalpr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational justice, are suddenly assass<strong>in</strong>ated and the blame is placed on <strong>of</strong>tenimag<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>Is</strong>lamic extremists whose perspective is supported by these writers, how can anyonebelieve that Muslims did it, even thought this is what the Zionist American press and governmentcont<strong>in</strong>ue to <strong>in</strong>sist. So who’s do<strong>in</strong>g all these demented deeds? As if we didn’t know ....Khadduri’s report went like this: "A few days ago, an American manned check po<strong>in</strong>t confiscatedthe driver license <strong>of</strong> a driver and told him to report to an American military camp near Baghdadairport for <strong>in</strong>terrogation and <strong>in</strong> order to retrieve his license. The next day, the driver did visit thecamp and he was allowed <strong>in</strong> the camp with his car. He was admitted to a room for an<strong>in</strong>terrogation that lasted half an hour. At the end <strong>of</strong> the session, the American <strong>in</strong>terrogator toldhim: ‘OK, there is noth<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st you, but you do know that <strong>Iraq</strong> is now sovereign and is <strong>in</strong>charge <strong>of</strong> its own affairs. Hence, we have forwarded your papers and license to al-Kadhimiapolice station for process<strong>in</strong>g. Therefore, go there with this clearance to reclaim your license. Atthe police station, ask for Lt. Hussa<strong>in</strong> Mohammed, who is wait<strong>in</strong>g for you now. Go there nowquickly, before he leaves his shift work".The driver did leave <strong>in</strong> a hurry, but was soon alarmed with a feel<strong>in</strong>g that his car was driv<strong>in</strong>g as ifcarry<strong>in</strong>g a heavy load, and he also became suspicious <strong>of</strong> a low fly<strong>in</strong>g helicopter that kepthover<strong>in</strong>g overhead, as if trail<strong>in</strong>g him. He stopped the car and <strong>in</strong>spected it carefully. He foundnearly 100 kilograms <strong>of</strong> explosives hidden <strong>in</strong> the back seat and along the two back doors. Theonly feasible explanation for this <strong>in</strong>cident is that the car was <strong>in</strong>deed booby trapped by theAmericans and <strong>in</strong>tended for the al-Khadimiya Shiite district <strong>of</strong> Baghdad. The helicopter wasmonitor<strong>in</strong>g his movement and witness<strong>in</strong>g the anticipated "hideous attack by foreign elements".The same scenario was repeated <strong>in</strong> Mosul, <strong>in</strong> the north <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. A car was confiscated along withthe driver’s license. He did follow up on the matter and f<strong>in</strong>ally reclaimed his car but was told togo to a police station to reclaim his license. Fortunately for him, the car broke down on the wayto the police station. The <strong>in</strong>spect<strong>in</strong>g car mechanic discovered that the spare tire was fully ladenwith explosives." If this were the only example <strong>of</strong> this type I heard, I might have let it pass asjust a story. But it wasn’t. There was also the sorry tale <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i man who saw Americansoldiers plant a bomb which shortly thereafter exploded, and when he said so out loud for all tohear, he was hauled away, never to be seen aga<strong>in</strong>. This story was reported on arguably the mostauthentic and rivet<strong>in</strong>g source <strong>of</strong> news from <strong>Iraq</strong>, the heart-rend<strong>in</strong>g "Baghdad Burn<strong>in</strong>g: Girl Blogfrom <strong>Iraq</strong>," which is compiled by someone known only as Riverbend or <strong>Iraq</strong>i Girl. Aga<strong>in</strong>,recommended read<strong>in</strong>g.She recounts,"The last two weeks have been violent .... The number <strong>of</strong> explosions <strong>in</strong> Baghdadalone is frighten<strong>in</strong>g. There have also been several assass<strong>in</strong>ations —— bodies be<strong>in</strong>g found hereand there. It's somewhat disturb<strong>in</strong>g to know that corpses are turn<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>in</strong> the most unexpectedplaces. Many people will tell you it's not wise to eat river fish anymore because they have beennourished on the human rema<strong>in</strong>s be<strong>in</strong>g dumped <strong>in</strong>to the river. That thought alone has given memore than one sleepless night.It is almost as if Baghdad has turned <strong>in</strong>to a giant graveyard. The latest corpses were those <strong>of</strong>some Sunni and Shia clerics —— several <strong>of</strong> them well-known. People are be<strong>in</strong>g patient and130


there is a general consensus that these kill<strong>in</strong>gs are be<strong>in</strong>g done to provoke civil war. Alsoworrisome is the fact that we are hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> people be<strong>in</strong>g rounded up by security forces (<strong>Iraq</strong>i)and then be<strong>in</strong>g found dead days later —— apparently when the new <strong>Iraq</strong>i government recentlydecided to re<strong>in</strong>state the death penalty, they had someth<strong>in</strong>g else <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d.But back to the explosions. One <strong>of</strong> the larger blasts was <strong>in</strong> an area called Ma'moun, which is amiddle class area located <strong>in</strong> west Baghdad. It’s a relatively calm residential area with shops thatprovide the basics and a bit more. It happened <strong>in</strong> the morn<strong>in</strong>g, as the shops were open<strong>in</strong>g up fortheir daily bus<strong>in</strong>ess and it occurred right <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> a butcher’s shop. Immediately after, we heardthat a man liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a house <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> the blast site was hauled <strong>of</strong>f by the Americans because itwas said that after the bomb went <strong>of</strong>f, he sniped an <strong>Iraq</strong>i National Guardsman. I didn’t th<strong>in</strong>kmuch about the story —— noth<strong>in</strong>g about it stood out: an explosion and a sniper —— hardly ananomaly. The <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g news started circulat<strong>in</strong>g a couple <strong>of</strong> days later. People from the areaclaim that the man was taken away not because he shot anyone, but because he knew too muchabout the bomb. Rumor has it that he saw an American patrol pass<strong>in</strong>g through the area andpaus<strong>in</strong>g at the bomb site m<strong>in</strong>utes before the explosion. Soon after they drove away, the bombwent <strong>of</strong>f and chaos ensued. He ran out <strong>of</strong> his house scream<strong>in</strong>g to the neighbors and bystandersthat the Americans had either planted the bomb or seen the bomb and done noth<strong>in</strong>g about it. Hewas promptly taken away.The bombs are mysterious. Some <strong>of</strong> them explode <strong>in</strong> the midst <strong>of</strong> National Guard and nearAmerican troops or <strong>Iraq</strong>i Police and others explode near mosques, churches, and shops or <strong>in</strong> themiddle <strong>of</strong> sougs.One th<strong>in</strong>g that surprises us about the news reports <strong>of</strong> these bombs is that they are <strong>in</strong>evitablyl<strong>in</strong>ked to suicide bombers. The reality is that some <strong>of</strong> these bombs are not suicide bombs ——they are car bombs that are either be<strong>in</strong>g remotely detonated or maybe time bombs. All we knowis that the techniques differ and apparently so do the <strong>in</strong>tentions. Some will tell you they areresistance. Some say Chalabi and his thugs are responsible for a number <strong>of</strong> them. Others blameIran and the SCIRI militia Badir. In any case, they are terrify<strong>in</strong>g. If you're close enough, the firstsound is a that <strong>of</strong> an earsplitt<strong>in</strong>g blast and the sounds that follow are <strong>of</strong> a ra<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> glass, shrapneland other sharp th<strong>in</strong>gs. Then the wails beg<strong>in</strong> —— the shrill mechanical wails <strong>of</strong> an occasionalambulance comb<strong>in</strong>ed with the wail <strong>of</strong> car alarms from neighbor<strong>in</strong>g vehicles…… and f<strong>in</strong>ally thewail <strong>of</strong> people try<strong>in</strong>g to sort out their dead and dy<strong>in</strong>g from the debris.Then there was this one. On May 13, 2005, a 64 years old <strong>Iraq</strong>i farmer, Haj Haidar Abu Sijjad,took his tomato load <strong>in</strong> his pickup truck from Hilla to Baghdad, accompanied by Ali, his 11years old grandson. They were stopped at an American check po<strong>in</strong>t and were asked to dismount.An American soldier climbed on the back <strong>of</strong> the pickup truck, followed by another a few m<strong>in</strong>uteslater, and thoroughly <strong>in</strong>spected the tomato filled plastic conta<strong>in</strong>ers for about 10 m<strong>in</strong>utes. HajHaidar and his grandson were then allowed to proceed to Baghdad. A m<strong>in</strong>ute later, his grandsontold him that he saw one <strong>of</strong> the American soldiers putt<strong>in</strong>g a grey melon size object <strong>in</strong> the backamong the tomato conta<strong>in</strong>ers. The Haj immediately slammed on the brakes and stopped the car atthe side <strong>of</strong> the road, at a relatively far distance from the check po<strong>in</strong>t. He found a time bomb withthe clock tick<strong>in</strong>g tucked among his tomatoes. He immediately recognized it, as he was an exarmysoldier. Panick<strong>in</strong>g, he grabbed his grandson and ran away from the car. Then, realiz<strong>in</strong>g that131


the car was his only means <strong>of</strong> work, he went back, took the bomb and carried it <strong>in</strong> fear. He threwit <strong>in</strong> a deep ditch by the side <strong>of</strong> the road that was dug by <strong>Iraq</strong>i soldiers <strong>in</strong> preparation for the war,two years ago. Upon return<strong>in</strong>g from Baghdad, he found out that the bomb had <strong>in</strong>deed exploded,kill<strong>in</strong>g three sheep and <strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g their shepherd <strong>in</strong> his head. He thanked God for giv<strong>in</strong>g him thecourage to go back and remove the bomb, and for the luck <strong>in</strong> that the American soldiers did notnotice his sudden stop at a distance and his gett<strong>in</strong>g rid <strong>of</strong> the bomb. "They <strong>in</strong>tended it to explode<strong>in</strong> Baghdad and claim that it is the work <strong>of</strong> the 'terrorists', or '<strong>in</strong>surgents' or who call themselvesthe 'Resistance'. I decided to expose them and asked your reporter to take me to Baghdad to tellyou the story. They are to be exposed as they now want to sow strife <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and ta<strong>in</strong>t theResistance after fail<strong>in</strong>g to defeat it militarily. Do not f<strong>org</strong>et to mention my name. I fear nobodybut God, as I am a follower <strong>of</strong> Muqtada al-Sadir."The background and admission <strong>of</strong> guilt for such satanic shenanigans was clearly outl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>Frank Morales' piece on globalresearch.ca: "The Provocateur State: <strong>Is</strong> the CIA Beh<strong>in</strong>d the <strong>Iraq</strong>i'Insurgents' —— and Global Terrorism," by Frank Morales clearly demonstrates how DonaldRumsfeld said he was go<strong>in</strong>g to do exactly what these three sorry episodes show he actually did.Morales writes: Back <strong>in</strong> 2002, follow<strong>in</strong>g the trauma <strong>of</strong> 9-11, Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense Donald H.Rumsfeld predicted there would be more terrorist attacks aga<strong>in</strong>st the American people andcivilization at large. How could he be so sure <strong>of</strong> that? Perhaps because these attacks would be<strong>in</strong>stigated on the order <strong>of</strong> the Honorable Mr. Rumsfeld. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Los Angeles Timesmilitary analyst William Ark<strong>in</strong>, writ<strong>in</strong>g Oct. 27, 2002, Rumsfeld set out to create a secret army,"a super-Intelligence Support Activity" network that would "br<strong>in</strong>g together CIA and militarycovert action, <strong>in</strong>formation warfare, <strong>in</strong>telligence, and cover and deception," to stir the pot <strong>of</strong>spiral<strong>in</strong>g global violence.We never got the full story on those ghastly behead<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Nick Berg and others. Nor have weever understood who killed the American mercenaries <strong>in</strong> Fallujah that eventually precipitatedone <strong>of</strong> the great slaughters <strong>in</strong> history.Nor have we ever been able to discern if Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is actually a real person or justanother b<strong>in</strong> Ladenesque boogeyman.Nor if the al-Qaeda website which claims responsibility for various atrocities is not really run bythe CIA.Provok<strong>in</strong>g this type <strong>of</strong> violence also further conceals the s<strong>in</strong>ister genocide the <strong>Is</strong>raelis cont<strong>in</strong>ue toperpetrate on the hapless Palest<strong>in</strong>ians, which is exactly its po<strong>in</strong>t, as is the entire <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion anddestruction, and as was the <strong>in</strong>side job mass murder on 9/11 <strong>in</strong> New York City.The purpose <strong>of</strong> all these despicable acts is to conceal what the <strong>Is</strong>raelis and the Americans havebeen do<strong>in</strong>g all along to the entire Arab world, namely enslav<strong>in</strong>g and destroy<strong>in</strong>g it. There is notnow nor ever was an Arab terror threat. That was all <strong>in</strong>vented by Rothschild, Rockefeller,Kiss<strong>in</strong>ger, Brzez<strong>in</strong>ski, Bush, Cheney, Sharon, Zakheim, Perle, Wolfowitz, Feith, Abrams and<strong>War</strong>ren Buffett. These people are all traitors to not only their countries but to humanity <strong>in</strong>general, and should all be slammed and RICOed <strong>in</strong>to Guantanamo immediately. And so should132


the government <strong>of</strong>ficials, media lackeys, and ord<strong>in</strong>ary citizens who, by their complicity or theirignorance, support them.The ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> understand<strong>in</strong>g these deliberate provocations to prevent peace is to understandhow the American capitalist system, now hijacked by billionaires with no trace <strong>of</strong> conscience,thrives on war and pr<strong>of</strong>its from the misery <strong>of</strong> others. The neocon murder menace has been formonths ratchet<strong>in</strong>g up the hyperbole about why we need to <strong>in</strong>vade Iran —— which some predictwill happen <strong>in</strong> June —— and just this week, rumors <strong>of</strong> troop movements <strong>in</strong> the Caribbean andlockdowns at Florida military bases appear to augur an imm<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>of</strong> oil-produc<strong>in</strong>gVenezuela. The overall plan is to create hell on Earth, and we are succeed<strong>in</strong>g.By our silent complicity and cowardly reluctance to oppose and stop this homicidal behavior <strong>in</strong>the name <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it, we are all accessories to mass murder and the destruction <strong>of</strong> human society,not to even mention the ext<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual human freedom and the God-given right to besafe and secure <strong>in</strong> the homes <strong>of</strong> our choice. So now that you know, what are you go<strong>in</strong>g to doabout it? You know if you do noth<strong>in</strong>g, these same th<strong>in</strong>gs will one day happen to you.133


http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1175055,00.htmlWhy <strong>Iraq</strong>'s Police Are a Menace:Critics say Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister has turned the U.S.-tra<strong>in</strong>ed force <strong>in</strong>to Shi'ite shock troopsTime.comBy CHRISTOPHER ALLBRITTON/BAGHDADMonday, Mar. 20, 2006The bodies began to show up early last week. On Monday, 34 corpses were found. In thedarkness <strong>of</strong> Tuesday morn<strong>in</strong>g, 15 more men, between the ages <strong>of</strong> 22 and 40 were found <strong>in</strong> theback <strong>of</strong> a pickup truck <strong>in</strong> the al-Khadra district <strong>of</strong> western Baghdad. They had been hanged. Bydaybreak, 40 more bodies were found around the city, most bear<strong>in</strong>g signs <strong>of</strong> torture before themen were killed execution-style. The most gruesome discovery was an 18-by-24-foot mass grave<strong>in</strong> the Shi'ite slum <strong>of</strong> Kamaliyah <strong>in</strong> east Baghdad conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the bodies <strong>of</strong> 29 men, clad only <strong>in</strong>their underwear with their hands bound and their mouths covered with tape. Local residents onlyfound it because the ground was ooz<strong>in</strong>g blood. In all, 87 bodies were found over two days <strong>in</strong>Baghdad.The grisly discovery was horrible enough, the latest and perhaps most chill<strong>in</strong>g sign that <strong>Iraq</strong> isdescend<strong>in</strong>g further <strong>in</strong>to butchery — and quite possibly civil war. But almost as disturb<strong>in</strong>g is thegrow<strong>in</strong>g evidence that the massacres and others like it are be<strong>in</strong>g tolerated and even abetted by<strong>Iraq</strong>'s Shi'ite-dom<strong>in</strong>ated police forces, overseen by <strong>Iraq</strong>'s Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister, Bayan Jabr. On hiswatch, sectarian militias have swelled the ranks <strong>of</strong> the police units and, Sunnis charge, used theirpositions to carry out revenge kill<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st Sunnis. While allow<strong>in</strong>g an Iranian-tra<strong>in</strong>ed militiato take over the m<strong>in</strong>istry, critics say, Jabr has authorized the targeted assass<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> Sunni menand stymied <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong>to Interior-run death squads. Despite numerous attempts to contactthem, neither Jabr nor Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry spokesmen responded to requests for comment on thisarticle.Jabr's and his forces' grow<strong>in</strong>g reputation for brutality comes at a particularly <strong>in</strong>opportunemoment for the Bush Adm<strong>in</strong>istration, which would like to hand over security responsibilities tothose same police units as quickly as possible. That has raised the dist<strong>in</strong>ct and disturb<strong>in</strong>gpossibility that the U.S. is <strong>in</strong> fact tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and arm<strong>in</strong>g one side <strong>in</strong> a conflict seem<strong>in</strong>g to growworse by the day. "Militias are the <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>of</strong> civil war," U.S. ambassador ZalmayKhalilzad told TIME recently. Khalilzad has been publicly critical <strong>of</strong> Jabr and warned that thenew security m<strong>in</strong>istries under the next, permanent <strong>Iraq</strong>i government should be run by competentpeople who have no ties to militias and who are "non-sectarian." Further U.S. support fortra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the police and army, he said, depends on it.But ever s<strong>in</strong>ce Jabr was appo<strong>in</strong>ted Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister after the January 2005 election brought areligious Sh'ite coalition to power, Sunnis allege, he began remak<strong>in</strong>g the paramilitary NationalPolice <strong>in</strong>to Shi'ite shock troops. A member <strong>of</strong> the Iranian-backed Supreme Council for the<strong>Is</strong>lamic Revolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> (SCIRI), Jabr fled to Iran <strong>in</strong> the 1970s to avoid Saddam's crackdown.Jerry Burke, a former civilian senior police advisor to the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry, said Jabr's134


experience with Saddam's government has left him bitter and distrustful <strong>of</strong> anyone he suspectshas ties to the previous regime. That would most certa<strong>in</strong>ly <strong>in</strong>clude the former members <strong>of</strong>Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>'s Special Forces and Republican Guards which <strong>in</strong>itially made up the bulk <strong>of</strong> theNational Police when Jabr took charge.To help facilitate his transformation <strong>of</strong> the police forces, Jabr made sure to enlist the help <strong>of</strong>SCIRI's armed w<strong>in</strong>g, the Badr Organization. Members <strong>of</strong> the militia have been a grow<strong>in</strong>gpresence <strong>in</strong> the National Police, which now consists <strong>of</strong> n<strong>in</strong>e brigades, with about 17,500members divided between the Special Police Commandos, the Public Order brigades and amechanized brigade, which will soon be transferred to the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Defense. "Leadership <strong>in</strong>the commando positions has been turned over to Badr," said Matt Sherman, a former CPAadvisor to the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry. "And new recruits are mostly Badr."Indeed, outside the m<strong>in</strong>istry headquarters, banners proclaim<strong>in</strong>g solidarity with Imam Husse<strong>in</strong>,one <strong>of</strong> Shi'ites' holiest figures, snap <strong>in</strong> the spr<strong>in</strong>g breeze alongside — and sometimes <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong>— <strong>Iraq</strong>i flags. Most <strong>of</strong> the guards' beards are <strong>in</strong>variably cut <strong>in</strong> the close-cropped Iranian style,mak<strong>in</strong>g them stand out <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, where beards are less common.Like so many th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> right now, it wasn't supposed to be this way. As far back asDecember 2003, David Gompert, the former National Security Advisor for the CoalitionProvisional Authority, realized the dangers sectarian militias posed to <strong>Iraq</strong>'s stability. And <strong>in</strong> thewan<strong>in</strong>g days <strong>of</strong> the Coalition Provisional Authority, American viceroy L. Paul "Jerry" Bremerissued Order 91, which was <strong>in</strong>tended to demobilize or <strong>in</strong>tegrate n<strong>in</strong>e militias total<strong>in</strong>g about100,000 men <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces. But the Kurdish pesh merga and the armed w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>SCIRI, the Badr Organization, still exist today because the order was never completely orcompetently carried out.For that, Gompert puts the blame squarely on the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government, then under Iyad Allawi, aswell as the American embassy. With the U.S. military engaged <strong>in</strong> several major operations <strong>in</strong>2004 and the government transition<strong>in</strong>g from the CPA to a more traditional diplomatic presencewith the arrival <strong>of</strong> U.S. ambassador John Negroponte at the end <strong>of</strong> June, Gompert says, neitherAllawi nor the U.S made the re<strong>in</strong>tegration program a priority. Job tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g programs run byAllawi's Labor M<strong>in</strong>istry were cancelled over personal feuds and pension programs and otheraspects <strong>of</strong> the program <strong>of</strong> DDR — "demilitarization, demobilization and re<strong>in</strong>tegration" — werebounced around from one command to another.Mak<strong>in</strong>g matters worse has been the fact that the police — unlike the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Army, which is stillunder U.S. command and supervision — were practically ignored almost from the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>the occupation, says Burke. And what supervision the National Police did get came from U.S.military <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficers, not civilian police advisors.This grave oversight, which stemmed from the military's unfamiliarity with civilian policemethods and its unwill<strong>in</strong>gness to learn, has led to numerous abuses and little accountability. TheU.S. State Department, <strong>in</strong> a report released two weeks ago, documented numerous <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>in</strong>2005, dat<strong>in</strong>g back to early May when Jabr was first appo<strong>in</strong>ted Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister, where Sunni135


men were killed execution-style by Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry police or Shi'ite militias. In each case, Jabrordered an <strong>in</strong>vestigation, and <strong>in</strong> each case the <strong>in</strong>vestigation had yet to report any f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs.Thanks <strong>in</strong> part to the Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister's "nonfeasance," said Burke, the former Interior M<strong>in</strong>istryadviser, Jabr was at least <strong>in</strong>directly responsible for the deaths <strong>of</strong> hundreds <strong>of</strong> military-age Sunnimen whose bodies have turned up at the sewage plant <strong>in</strong> southeast Baghdad s<strong>in</strong>ce late December.Men <strong>in</strong> police uniforms and vehicles rout<strong>in</strong>ely travel through the city <strong>in</strong> daylight hours withbodies <strong>in</strong> the back <strong>of</strong> trucks for disposal at the sewage plant, he said. Prisoners <strong>of</strong>ten disappear,Burke said, because they're picked up at night and no one has an accurate account <strong>of</strong> who isarrested and where they are taken. "The Special Police Commandos," he said, us<strong>in</strong>g their oldname, "are most def<strong>in</strong>itely out <strong>of</strong> control."So black is the reputation <strong>of</strong> the National Police, that after the Feb. 22 bomb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Askariyashr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> Samarra, many Sunnis said the perpetrators were Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry troops who werelook<strong>in</strong>g for a pretext to start a civil war. Their fears were further fueled <strong>in</strong> the bloody two daysafter the attack, when <strong>Iraq</strong> became a sectarian slaughterhouse. Instead <strong>of</strong> protect<strong>in</strong>g citizens fromeach other, National Police units stood by as Shi'ite rioters — and rival militiamen from Moqtadaal-Sadr's Mahdi Army — stormed Sunni mosques and swarmed over Sunni neighborhoods,accord<strong>in</strong>g to numerous reports, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g some confirmed by U.S. Gen. Ge<strong>org</strong>e Casey,commander <strong>of</strong> American forces <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.The American efforts to try and help stem the deadly sectarianism will likely do little good —and <strong>in</strong> some respects may well exacerbate the problem. Instead <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the number <strong>of</strong>civilian advisors to <strong>Iraq</strong>'s local police forces, a spokeswoman for the Mult<strong>in</strong>ational SecurityTransition Command-<strong>Iraq</strong> (MNSTC-I) said more U.S. military police and military personnel willbe assigned to tra<strong>in</strong> them. The Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) are the model that willbe followed. "The SPTTs have been very successful <strong>in</strong> their efforts," the spokeswoman said. Nochange is planned for the oversight program on the National Police.Gompert notes, "I remember say<strong>in</strong>g, 'If there is go<strong>in</strong>g to be a civil war, it's go<strong>in</strong>g to be foughtbetween Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgents and Shi'ite militias." And as long as Jabr is runn<strong>in</strong>g the InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry and its police forces, there is little doubt which <strong>of</strong> the two <strong>in</strong> such a conflict will havethe law — and American tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g — on its side.136


http://www.globalecho.<strong>org</strong>/view_article.php?aid=6884<strong>US</strong> military tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>Iraq</strong> government death squadsBy David SprattGlobal Eco20th March, 2006On February 26, Andrew Buncombe and Patrick Cockburn reported <strong>in</strong> the BritishIndependent: “Hundreds <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is are be<strong>in</strong>g tortured to death or summarily executedevery month <strong>in</strong> Baghdad alone by death squads work<strong>in</strong>g from the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> the Interior,the United Nations' outgo<strong>in</strong>g human rights chief <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> has revealed.“John Pace, who left Baghdad two weeks ago, told the Independent on Sunday that up to threequarters<strong>of</strong> the corpses stacked <strong>in</strong> the city's mortuary show evidence <strong>of</strong> gunshot wounds to thehead or <strong>in</strong>juries caused by drill-bits or burn<strong>in</strong>g cigarettes. Much <strong>of</strong> the kill<strong>in</strong>g, he said, wascarried out by Shia Muslim groups under the control <strong>of</strong> the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> the Interior... Pace saidthe Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry was 'act<strong>in</strong>g as a rogue element with<strong>in</strong> the government’. It is controlled bythe ma<strong>in</strong> Shia party, the Supreme Council for <strong>Is</strong>lamic Revolution <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> (Sciri); the <strong>in</strong>teriorm<strong>in</strong>ister, Bayan Jabr, is a former leader <strong>of</strong> Sciri's Badr Brigade militia, which is one <strong>of</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong>groups accused <strong>of</strong> carry<strong>in</strong>g out sectarian kill<strong>in</strong>gs.“Not only counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency units such as the Wolf Brigade, the Scorpions and the Tigers, butthe commandos and even the highway patrol police have been accused <strong>of</strong> act<strong>in</strong>g as deathsquads.”Pace's comments lifted the lid on one <strong>of</strong> the horrible secrets <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> today — death squadsoperat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> are not, as many journalists, commentators and <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>of</strong>ficials claim, simplyprivate militias operat<strong>in</strong>g separately from the government but are forces directly under thecontrol <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry, which is funded by the occupation forces and advised by<strong>US</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency experts well-practised <strong>in</strong> the use <strong>of</strong> death squads — from the CIA'sOperation Phoenix dur<strong>in</strong>g the Vietnam <strong>War</strong> to the <strong>US</strong>-backed and tra<strong>in</strong>ed death squads <strong>of</strong>Honduras and El Salvador <strong>in</strong> the 1980s.The promises <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong> government to “disband the militias” is a distraction because at leastsome the death squads under question are under the command <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry, not<strong>in</strong>dependent <strong>of</strong> it.The Special Police Commandos (SPC) is an elite <strong>Iraq</strong>i counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency unit, formed <strong>in</strong>August 2004 under the operational control <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry by Falah al Naqib (believedby many to have been a major CIA “asset”), then <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister under the <strong>in</strong>terim government<strong>of</strong> Iyad Allawi.After their formation, <strong>US</strong> Lieutenant-General David Petraeus, the <strong>US</strong> military commander <strong>in</strong>charge <strong>of</strong> tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and arm<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces, visited the SPC tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g camp and137


decided that the commandos would receive whatever arms, ammunition and supplies theyrequired, and assigned Steve Casteel to work with them. Casteel is the senior <strong>US</strong> adviser to<strong>Iraq</strong>’s M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior. He is a former top <strong>of</strong>ficial <strong>in</strong> the <strong>US</strong> Drug EnforcementAdm<strong>in</strong>istration who spent much <strong>of</strong> his pr<strong>of</strong>essional life immersed <strong>in</strong> the drug wars <strong>of</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong>America, work<strong>in</strong>g alongside local forces <strong>in</strong> Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.The SPC is advised by James Steele, counsellor to the <strong>US</strong> ambassador for <strong>Iraq</strong>i Security Forcesand one <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong> military's top experts on counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency. Steele honed his tactics lead<strong>in</strong>g a<strong>US</strong> Army Special Forces mission <strong>in</strong> El Salvador dur<strong>in</strong>g that country's brutal civil war <strong>in</strong> the1980s.The SPC, along with <strong>US</strong> advisers and elite troops, have been <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>surgencyoperations especially <strong>in</strong> the Sunni triangle towns <strong>of</strong> Samarra, Baqubah, Fallujah and Ramadi.In Mosul, the police commandos began operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> late October 2004. The police commandosconducted raids <strong>in</strong>side the city’s old quarter start<strong>in</strong>g on November 16, 2004, <strong>in</strong> which dozens <strong>of</strong>suspects were arrested. Dur<strong>in</strong>g one such raid on a mosque and a tea shop, deta<strong>in</strong>ees, bl<strong>in</strong>dfoldedand with their hands tied beh<strong>in</strong>d their backs, were seen be<strong>in</strong>g taken away by commandos. In theweeks and months that followed over 150 bodies appeared, <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>in</strong> batches and frequentlyhav<strong>in</strong>g obviously been executed, usually with a bullet to the head.This case, and evidence for other SPC death squad operations, especially <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, up to May2005, are documented by Max Fuller <strong>in</strong> his article “For <strong>Iraq</strong>, 'The Salvador Option’ BecomesReality”, available at .Fuller writes that the case <strong>of</strong> the 10 bricklayers suffocated <strong>in</strong> the back <strong>of</strong> a police van last July10, to his knowledge and at the time <strong>of</strong> his writ<strong>in</strong>g, the only case <strong>in</strong> which members <strong>of</strong> thesecurity forces have been securely identified, with a survivor who had feigned death able toprovide first-hand testimony. The unit responsible was the Wolf Brigade.This commando unit, specifically named by Pace as a death squad, is one component <strong>of</strong> the<strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry's Special Police Commandos. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to a June 9 <strong>US</strong> Council for ForeignRelations report, the Wolf Brigade is the “most feared and effective commando unit <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>,experts say. Formed last October by a former three-star Shiite general and SCIRI member whogoes by the nom de guerre Abu Walid, the Wolf Brigade is composed <strong>of</strong> roughly 2000 fighters,mostly young, poor Shiites from Sadr City.”Abu Walid is likely General Rashid Flayyih, a Shiite who held senior <strong>in</strong>telligence posts underSaddam Husse<strong>in</strong> and was <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> the suppression <strong>of</strong> the Shia upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Nasiriya follow<strong>in</strong>gthe 1990-91 Gulf <strong>War</strong>.The Wolf Brigade is responsible for runn<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry detention and torture chambers,as documented by a report <strong>in</strong> the July 3 London Observer.The February 21 Los Angeles Times reported that a “1500-member <strong>Iraq</strong>i police force with closeties to Shiite militia groups has emerged as a focus <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong>to suspected death squads138


work<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the country's <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry. <strong>Iraq</strong>'s national highway patrol was establishedlargely to stave <strong>of</strong>f <strong>in</strong>surgent attacks on roadways. But <strong>US</strong> military <strong>of</strong>ficials, <strong>in</strong>terviewed over thelast several days, say they suspect the patrol <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g deeply <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> illegal detentions,torture and extrajudicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs.”But then comes the plausible deniability: “We don't tra<strong>in</strong> them, we don't give them equipment,we don't conduct site visits over there. They are just bad, crim<strong>in</strong>al people”, the LA Timesreported a high-rank<strong>in</strong>g <strong>US</strong> military <strong>of</strong>ficer who advises the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry as say<strong>in</strong>g.And then came the admission: “The <strong>of</strong>ficials said that <strong>in</strong> recent months the <strong>US</strong> has withdrawnf<strong>in</strong>ancial and advisory support from the patrol <strong>in</strong> an effort to distance the American tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>geffort from what they perceived to be a renegade force.”At the same time, occupation and <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>of</strong>ficials were still peddl<strong>in</strong>g the l<strong>in</strong>e that the kill<strong>in</strong>gs werebe<strong>in</strong>g carried out by militias “outside” <strong>of</strong> government control, even though most <strong>of</strong> those militiasbelong to parties now <strong>in</strong> the government, such as SCIRI and Dawa.Typical <strong>of</strong> the sp<strong>in</strong>-doctors was <strong>Iraq</strong>i human rights m<strong>in</strong>ister Nerm<strong>in</strong>e Othman, who said shebelieved lower-level <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficials were assist<strong>in</strong>g crim<strong>in</strong>als <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>is:“I th<strong>in</strong>k there are many people <strong>in</strong>side the <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>in</strong>volved with these deaths or giv<strong>in</strong>gthe uniforms <strong>of</strong> colleagues to crim<strong>in</strong>als... These <strong>of</strong>ficials are help<strong>in</strong>g the crim<strong>in</strong>als by <strong>in</strong>form<strong>in</strong>gthem on where targeted people are go<strong>in</strong>g or where people are liv<strong>in</strong>g. They are help<strong>in</strong>g them <strong>in</strong>different ways.”Fuller concludes: “Clearly the purpose <strong>of</strong> stat<strong>in</strong>g or imply<strong>in</strong>g that unaccountable militias arebeh<strong>in</strong>d the extrajudicial executions and/or that sectarian rivalries, especially Shia control <strong>of</strong> the<strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry ... are to blame, is to distance the <strong>US</strong> from the almost unth<strong>in</strong>kable ongo<strong>in</strong>gcrimes aga<strong>in</strong>st humanity.“Comparable dis<strong>in</strong>formation strategies have been employed <strong>in</strong> every counter<strong>in</strong>surgency conflictwith which the <strong>US</strong> has been <strong>in</strong>volved; it is known as establish<strong>in</strong>g ‘plausible deniability'. Forexample, <strong>in</strong> Colombia, where the <strong>US</strong> has been deeply <strong>in</strong>volved for decades, paramilitary deathsquads are <strong>in</strong>variably described <strong>in</strong> the media as a third force <strong>in</strong> the armed conflict, despite thefact that their victims are typically civilian opponents <strong>of</strong> the government, their members aredrawn directly from serv<strong>in</strong>g members <strong>of</strong> the armed forces and they are only able to operate withthe active complicity <strong>of</strong> the army (Human Rights Watch: The 'Sixth Division’). In reality, theyfunction as part <strong>of</strong> a shadow state, which exists to implement policies that must rema<strong>in</strong>unaccountable.”source: http://www.greenleft.<strong>org</strong>.au/back/2006/661/661p14.htm139


http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/<strong>in</strong>ternational/middleeast/26cndiraq.html?hp&ex=1143435600&en=11f970a707b1fe09&ei=5094&partner=homepage30 Beheaded Bodies Found; <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong> BlamedNew York TimesMarch 27, 2006By JEFFREY GETTLEMANBAGHDAD, <strong>Iraq</strong>, March 26 — The bodies <strong>of</strong> 30 beheaded men were found on a ma<strong>in</strong> highwaynear Baquba this even<strong>in</strong>g, provid<strong>in</strong>g more evidence that the death squads <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> are becom<strong>in</strong>gout <strong>of</strong> control.Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficials said a driver discovered the bodies heaped <strong>in</strong> a pile next to a highwaythat l<strong>in</strong>ks Baghdad to Baquba, a volatile city northeast <strong>of</strong> the capital that has been wracked bysectarian and <strong>in</strong>surgent violence.<strong>Iraq</strong>i army troops were wait<strong>in</strong>g tonight for American support before ventur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>in</strong>surgent<strong>in</strong>festedarea to retrieve them."It's too dangerous for us to go <strong>in</strong> there alone," an <strong>Iraq</strong>i Army commander, Tass<strong>in</strong> Tawfik, said.Earlier <strong>in</strong> the day, the corpses <strong>of</strong> 10 other men, all bound, bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded and shot, were discovered<strong>in</strong> Baghdad, add<strong>in</strong>g to the hundreds <strong>of</strong> bodies that have recently surfaced on Baghdad's streets.The widespread suspicion is that Shiite death squads are aim<strong>in</strong>g at Sunni Arab civilians <strong>in</strong> awave <strong>of</strong> sectarian revenge. The death squads are thought to be connected to Shiite militias andShiite-controlled police forces. They seem to be the response to a bomb<strong>in</strong>g campaign that haskilled hundreds <strong>of</strong> Shiite civilians and destroyed a number <strong>of</strong> Shiite mosques, most notably therevered golden-domed Askariya Shr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> Samarra last month.That attack lifted the lid on simmer<strong>in</strong>g tensions between Shiites, who make up the majority <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>, and Sunni Arabs, who used to hold power under Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>. Most <strong>of</strong> the big terrorattacks, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g suicide bombs, are thought to be the work <strong>of</strong> Sunni Arab <strong>in</strong>surgents. Now, itseems, Sunni Arab civilians are pay<strong>in</strong>g the price.But it is not at all clear who killed the 30 men found beheaded this even<strong>in</strong>g. The area where theywere discovered is mostly Sunni Arab and controlled by Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgents. It would be verydifficult for Shiite death squads to operate there. Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficials said they did not haveenough <strong>in</strong>formation tonight to identify the victims.Elsewhere today, a Kurdish writer was sentenced to a year and a half <strong>in</strong> jail for criticiz<strong>in</strong>gKurdish leaders. The writer, Kamal Karim, had published articles on a Kurdish Web siteaccus<strong>in</strong>g one <strong>of</strong> the most powerful men <strong>in</strong> Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani, <strong>of</strong> corruption.140


Mr. Karim was orig<strong>in</strong>ally sentenced to 30 years for defam<strong>in</strong>g Mr. Barzani but he was retried. Ajudge said he was giv<strong>in</strong>g Mr. Karim a lenient sentence because he is an academic.Also today, a mortar shell narrowly missed the home <strong>of</strong> the militant Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr. Mr. Sadr immediately blamed American forces for the shell<strong>in</strong>g."Either they overlook these attacks or they do it themselves," Mr. Sadr said <strong>in</strong> a statement.The mortar wounded a child and a guard, but it did not harm Mr. Sadr.141


http://www.commondreams.<strong>org</strong>/views06/0422-20.htm<strong>Iraq</strong> Three Years after “Liberation”By Stephen ZunesCommonDreams.<strong>org</strong>April 22, 2006Three years after U.S. forces captured Baghdad, <strong>Iraq</strong>is are suffer<strong>in</strong>g from unprecedentedviolence and misery. Although Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> was <strong>in</strong>deed one <strong>of</strong> the world's mostbrutal tyrants, the no-fly zones and arms embargo <strong>in</strong> place for more than a dozen yearsprior to his ouster had severely weakened his capacity to do violence aga<strong>in</strong>st his ownpeople. Today, the level <strong>of</strong> violent deaths is not only far higher than dur<strong>in</strong>g his f<strong>in</strong>al years<strong>in</strong> power, but the sheer randomness <strong>of</strong> the violence has left millions <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is <strong>in</strong> a state <strong>of</strong>perpetual terror. At least 30,000 <strong>Iraq</strong>i civilians have died, most <strong>of</strong> them at the hands <strong>of</strong>U.S. forces but <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly from terrorist groups and <strong>Iraq</strong>i government death squads.Thousands more soldiers and police have also been killed. Violent crime, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gkidnapp<strong>in</strong>g, rape, and armed robbery, is at record levels. There is a proliferation <strong>of</strong> smallarms, and private militias are grow<strong>in</strong>g rapidly. A Lebanon-type multifaceted civil war,only on a much wider and deadlier scale, grows more likely with time.Over 50,000 <strong>Iraq</strong>is have been imprisoned by U.S. forces s<strong>in</strong>ce the <strong>in</strong>vasion, but only 1.5% <strong>of</strong>them have been convicted <strong>of</strong> any crime. Currently, U.S. forces hold 15,000 to 18,000 <strong>Iraq</strong>iprisoners, more than were imprisoned under Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>. Amnesty International and otherhuman rights groups have cited U.S. forces with widespread violations <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternationalhumanitarian law, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g torture and other abuses <strong>of</strong> prisoners.It is not just the fear <strong>of</strong> arrest and torture that have worsened s<strong>in</strong>ce the U.S. conquest <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> threeyears ago. Although the destruction <strong>of</strong> the civilian <strong>in</strong>frastructure dur<strong>in</strong>g the heavy U.S.-ledbomb<strong>in</strong>g campaign <strong>in</strong> 1991 comb<strong>in</strong>ed with the subsequent economic sanctions led to enormoussuffer<strong>in</strong>g among ord<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>Iraq</strong>is, the United Nations' Oil-for-Food program, despite the abuses,did substantially improve the quality <strong>of</strong> life <strong>in</strong> the years preced<strong>in</strong>g the U.S. <strong>in</strong>vasion. Now,deaths from malnutrition and preventable diseases, particularly among children, are aga<strong>in</strong> on the<strong>in</strong>crease. The supply <strong>of</strong> dr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g water, reliability <strong>of</strong> electricity, and effectiveness <strong>of</strong> sewagedisposal are all worse than before the <strong>in</strong>vasion.As much as half <strong>of</strong> the labor force is unemployed, and the cost <strong>of</strong> liv<strong>in</strong>g has skyrocketed. Themedian <strong>in</strong>come <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is has decl<strong>in</strong>ed by more than half. The UN's World Food Program (WFP)reports that the <strong>Iraq</strong>i people suffer from “significant countrywide shortages <strong>of</strong> rice, sugar, milk,and <strong>in</strong>fant formula,” and the WFP documents approximately 400,000 <strong>Iraq</strong>i children suffer<strong>in</strong>gfrom “dangerous deficiencies <strong>of</strong> prote<strong>in</strong>.” Oil production, the country's chief source <strong>of</strong> revenue,is less than half <strong>of</strong> what it was before the <strong>in</strong>vasion. And despite Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration promises to<strong>in</strong>fuse billions <strong>of</strong> dollars worth <strong>of</strong> foreign aid to rebuild the country's civilian <strong>in</strong>frastructure, onlya small fraction <strong>of</strong> these ventures have been completed, and most projects have been cancelled.142


Close to one million <strong>Iraq</strong>is, most <strong>of</strong> them from the vital, educated middle class, have left thecountry to avoid the violence and hardship brought on as a result <strong>of</strong> the U.S. <strong>in</strong>vasion.Despite all this, a Harris poll at the end <strong>of</strong> December showed that a majority <strong>of</strong> Americansbelieve the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration's claims that <strong>Iraq</strong>is are better <strong>of</strong>f now than they were underSaddam Husse<strong>in</strong>. Most <strong>Iraq</strong>is polled say just the opposite.President Bush and his supporters still <strong>in</strong>sist that <strong>Iraq</strong> is supposed to be a model for democracythat other countries <strong>in</strong> the region should try to emulate. In reality, the U.S. conquest andoccupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> have, <strong>in</strong> the eyes <strong>of</strong> many Muslims worldwide, given democracy a bad name<strong>in</strong> the same way that the Soviets gave socialism a bad name through their conquest andoccupation <strong>of</strong> Afghanistan. Democracy has become synonymous with war, chaos, dom<strong>in</strong>ation bya foreign power, and massive human suffer<strong>in</strong>g. As a result, anti-American sentiment <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> isgrow<strong>in</strong>g.Amaz<strong>in</strong>gly, supporters <strong>of</strong> Bush policy cannot quite understand why this is the case. For example,Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration adviser Daniel Pipes, a lead<strong>in</strong>g proponent <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>vasion, expressed hisdisappo<strong>in</strong>tment at “the <strong>in</strong>gratitude <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>is for the extraord<strong>in</strong>ary favor we gave them” by<strong>in</strong>vad<strong>in</strong>g and occupy<strong>in</strong>g their country.The Costs to the United StatesOne <strong>of</strong> the major sources <strong>of</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g anti-American sentiment has been the Pentagon's counter<strong>in</strong>surgency<strong>of</strong>fensives, which have resulted <strong>in</strong> the deaths <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>nocent civilians.Though small-unit operations have been curtailed, air strikes have been <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g. From the use<strong>of</strong> heavy weaponry and phosphorous bombs aga<strong>in</strong>st population centers <strong>in</strong> Fallujah to massivesweeps round<strong>in</strong>g up thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>nocent men, many <strong>of</strong> which have been subjected to torture atthe hands <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces, the United States is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly seen as an occupier, not a liberator. In<strong>Iraq</strong>'s tribal society, where the ethic <strong>of</strong> vengeance is still widespread, every civilian casualty atthe hands <strong>of</strong> U.S. soldiers potentially adds to the recruitment pool <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency, whosehighly mobile cadres can easily slip away and resume operations <strong>in</strong> another locale or afterAmerican troops move on.That the war has led to a growth <strong>of</strong> anti-American extremism throughout the Arab and <strong>Is</strong>lamicworld is no longer seriously questioned, as reports by U.S. <strong>in</strong>telligence agencies and the StateDepartment have confirmed. Resentment also seethes from the disruption <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s economy,primarily through policies that have resulted <strong>in</strong> record unemployment, leav<strong>in</strong>g nearly half thepopulation without jobs. This economic devastation is a result not only <strong>of</strong> the commercial chaosstemm<strong>in</strong>g from the <strong>in</strong>vasion but also <strong>of</strong> Wash<strong>in</strong>gton's decisions to elim<strong>in</strong>ate tens <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>i government jobs, privatize public enterprises, give preference to foreign nationals forreconstruction efforts, and open <strong>Iraq</strong> to foreign mult<strong>in</strong>ationals aga<strong>in</strong>st which local enterprisescannot compete.The <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>War</strong> has already cost the United States $500 billion, which is more <strong>in</strong> current dollarsthan the entire Vietnam <strong>War</strong>. Ongo<strong>in</strong>g costs are close to $10 billion per month. With the vastmajority <strong>of</strong> this money go<strong>in</strong>g to support the war, little is left to nurture civil society <strong>in</strong>stitutions,143


to tra<strong>in</strong> legislators, or to help build democracy. Despite this, there is still a clear bipartisanconsensus to keep robb<strong>in</strong>g the treasury to support President Bush's desperate effort to controlthat oil-rich country. Not a s<strong>in</strong>gle senator voted aga<strong>in</strong>st the president's most recent request tokeep fund<strong>in</strong>g the war, and there were only 71 negative votes <strong>in</strong> the 435-member House <strong>of</strong>Representatives. Democrats, like Republicans, appear determ<strong>in</strong>ed to force American taxpayers tokeep pay<strong>in</strong>g for the death and destruction be<strong>in</strong>g wrought upon <strong>Iraq</strong>.The Nature <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i GovernmentIn recent months, Wash<strong>in</strong>gton has begun to realize that several rul<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficials retrieved fromexile by U.S. forces <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>'s prime m<strong>in</strong>ister are <strong>in</strong>competent religious fanaticsclosely allied with hard-l<strong>in</strong>e Iranian clerics. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i government is isolated with<strong>in</strong> the U.S.-fortified Green Zone <strong>in</strong> Baghdad and is so weak and divided that it can barely be consideredfunctional. Corruption is rampant.Three years after the <strong>in</strong>vasion, the Pentagon acknowledges that <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces are still “largelydependent” on American combat troops for logistics, supplies, and support. Indeed, not a s<strong>in</strong>gle<strong>Iraq</strong>i unit is yet capable <strong>of</strong> fully <strong>in</strong>dependent operations.Wash<strong>in</strong>gton's goal may be reasonable, but U.S. pressure on <strong>Iraq</strong>i leaders to form a more<strong>in</strong>clusive government and to replace Ibrahim al-Jaafari has created enormous resentment and iswidely viewed as arrogant neocolonial <strong>in</strong>terference. Furthermore, there is little to suggest thatany <strong>of</strong> Jaafari's likely replacements would be any better.Human rights abuses are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g, as hundreds <strong>of</strong> civilians, mostly Sunni Arab males, arekilled every month by government death squads. Murders from these death squads rival even theviolence perpetrated by terrorist <strong>in</strong>surgents, who have primarily targeted Shiite Arab civilians.Last month, Amnesty International reported that “not only has the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government failed toprovide m<strong>in</strong>imal protection for its citizens, it has pursued a policy <strong>of</strong> round<strong>in</strong>g up and tortur<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>nocent men and women. Its failure to punish those who have committed torture has added tothe breakdown <strong>of</strong> the rule <strong>of</strong> law.”In the autonomous Kurdish region <strong>in</strong> northern <strong>Iraq</strong>, the rul<strong>in</strong>g U.S.-backed coalition <strong>of</strong> twonationalist parties with sizable armed militias is not much better. Corruption is widespread, andopposition activists are rout<strong>in</strong>ely beaten, tortured, and killed. Kurdish-born Austrian lawyer andpr<strong>of</strong>essor Kamal Sayid Qadir has reported that “Kurdish parties transformed <strong>Iraq</strong>i Kurdistan <strong>in</strong>toa fortress for oppression, theft <strong>of</strong> public funds, and serious abuses <strong>of</strong> human rights like murder,torture, amputation <strong>of</strong> ears and noses, and rape.” These “privileges and ga<strong>in</strong>s achieved s<strong>in</strong>ce1991 by the Kurdish parties were impossible without direct American back<strong>in</strong>g and support,” headded. For his efforts to alert the <strong>in</strong>ternational community about abuses by the U.S.-backedKurdish government, he was sentence to a year and a half <strong>in</strong> prison.Given the dismal post-Saddam record <strong>of</strong> human rights abuses, it is questionable whetherAmericans should be dy<strong>in</strong>g to prop up either the central government <strong>in</strong> Baghdad or the Kurdishgovernment <strong>in</strong> the North. Cont<strong>in</strong>ued U.S. tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and fund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i police and military forceswill likely encourage even more anti-Americanism both <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and throughout the Middle East.144


Neither Republicans nor Democrats seem bothered by the death squads and torture. For example,House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi has further sullied her previous reputation as a defender<strong>of</strong> human rights by support<strong>in</strong>g billions <strong>of</strong> dollars <strong>in</strong> additional fund<strong>in</strong>g for <strong>Iraq</strong>i and U.S. forces,enabl<strong>in</strong>g them to cont<strong>in</strong>ue engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> human rights abuses.Grow<strong>in</strong>g Questions at HomeLarge segments <strong>of</strong> the American public still embrace many <strong>of</strong> the justifications for the <strong>in</strong>vasion<strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> that have long s<strong>in</strong>ce been proven false. For example, accord<strong>in</strong>g to a Harris Poll at the end<strong>of</strong> December 2005, 41% <strong>of</strong> adult Americans believe that Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> had “strong l<strong>in</strong>ks toAl-Qaida;” 22% believe that Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> “helped plan and support the hijackers whoattacked the United States on September 11;” 26% believe that <strong>Iraq</strong> “had weapons <strong>of</strong> massdestruction when the U.S. <strong>in</strong>vaded;” and 24% believe that “several <strong>of</strong> the hijackers who attackedthe United States on September 11 were <strong>Iraq</strong>is.” Furthermore, a plurality <strong>of</strong> Americans stillaccept the contention that despite a dozen years <strong>of</strong> debilitat<strong>in</strong>g sanctions, a barely functionalmilitary, and the complete absence <strong>of</strong> weapons <strong>of</strong> mass destruction (WMDs) or <strong>of</strong>fensivedelivery systems, “<strong>Iraq</strong>, under Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>, was a serious threat to the United States.”Notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g these misconceptions, criticism <strong>of</strong> the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration has been grow<strong>in</strong>g,forc<strong>in</strong>g the president to f<strong>in</strong>ally acknowledge the widespread citizen opposition to the <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>War</strong>.Bush says that he is will<strong>in</strong>g to “listen to honest criticism” and that he has heard those whodisagree with his policies, but he cont<strong>in</strong>ues to dismiss such critics as “defeatists” who advocatepolicies that threaten the “security <strong>of</strong> our people” and who would “give up on this fight forfreedom.”Though acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g that restor<strong>in</strong>g order to <strong>Iraq</strong> has been “more difficult than we expected”and that “reconstruction efforts and the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces started more slowly thanwe hoped,” President Bush has blamed these failures solely on the <strong>in</strong>surgency, which hedescribes as “Saddam loyalists and foreign terrorists.” In reality, the majority <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgencyconsists not <strong>of</strong> supporters <strong>of</strong> the former <strong>Iraq</strong>i dictator nor <strong>of</strong> foreign terrorists but <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>nationalists and <strong>Is</strong>lamists resentful <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>vasion and occupation by what they see as a Westernimperialist power <strong>in</strong>tent on controll<strong>in</strong>g their country's rich natural resources.Hav<strong>in</strong>g provoked this resentment, the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration now uses the <strong>in</strong>surgency to justify thecont<strong>in</strong>ued U.S. military occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Though the orig<strong>in</strong>al rationale for the <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>War</strong> wasSaddam's alleged WMD program, by redef<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the U.S. <strong>in</strong>cursion as a war on terrorism,Wash<strong>in</strong>gton rationalizes an <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>ite U.S. military presence and condones the ongo<strong>in</strong>gAmerican dom<strong>in</strong>ance <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s economy.Combat<strong>in</strong>g terrorism cannot be done by a s<strong>in</strong>gle nation, no matter how strong a military itma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s. For a counter-terrorism strategy to be effective, a multilateral approach is essential,but the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration cont<strong>in</strong>ues to reject this reality and <strong>in</strong>sists on act<strong>in</strong>g alone. Moreover,combat<strong>in</strong>g terrorism must employ a variety <strong>of</strong> tactics, not just military action. But once aga<strong>in</strong>,President Bush has failed to exam<strong>in</strong>e the root causes beh<strong>in</strong>d the violence.145


In the face <strong>of</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g criticism over its <strong>Iraq</strong> policies, the current adm<strong>in</strong>istration hasacknowledged mistakes such as <strong>in</strong>accurate prewar claims <strong>of</strong> Saddam's military capability and<strong>in</strong>adequate policies to address post-<strong>in</strong>vasion stabilization. However, these statements appearcalculated to defend the ongo<strong>in</strong>g U.S.-led war rather than to admit fault. Though Bush'sacceptance <strong>of</strong> ultimate responsibility for the failures <strong>of</strong> U.S. policy is a positive step, no one hasyet been held accountable for these errors.For example, the president says he was “responsible for the decision to go <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Iraq</strong>.” Yet hedefends that decision, even though the <strong>in</strong>vasion was a clear violation <strong>of</strong> the United NationsCharter and was based upon false claims that <strong>Iraq</strong> already disarmed <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fensive militarycapabilities by the United Nations constituted a threat to U.S. national security.Regard<strong>in</strong>g his prewar contention that <strong>Iraq</strong> still had chemical and biological weapons, an activenuclear program, and <strong>of</strong>fensive weapons delivery capabilities, President Bush admits <strong>in</strong>accuracybut attributes it to mistakes <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>telligence gather<strong>in</strong>g. He excuses his misjudgment by argu<strong>in</strong>gthat members <strong>of</strong> Congress and the <strong>in</strong>telligence branches <strong>of</strong> allied governments reviewed thesame <strong>in</strong>formation and came to similar conclusions.In reality, prior to the U.S. <strong>in</strong>vasion, foreign governments noted that <strong>Iraq</strong> had failed to properlyaccount for all proscribed weapons programs, and some countries suspected that Saddam hadresidual weapons or components banned under UN Security Council mandates, but most nationswere dubious <strong>of</strong> U.S. and British claims that <strong>Iraq</strong> still constituted a military threat. Similarly,most members <strong>of</strong> Congress simply believed the <strong>in</strong>telligence presented to them by theadm<strong>in</strong>istration rather than studies <strong>in</strong> scholarly journals and United Nations reports. It nowappears that errors did not come from problems with<strong>in</strong> the CIA but that adm<strong>in</strong>istration <strong>of</strong>ficialsdeliberately manipulated <strong>in</strong>telligence data <strong>in</strong> order to frighten Congress and the American people<strong>in</strong>to support<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>vasion.Acknowledg<strong>in</strong>g obvious problems is a positive step for a president <strong>of</strong>ten considered arrogant andunaware <strong>of</strong> the havoc result<strong>in</strong>g from his decision to <strong>in</strong>vade and occupy <strong>Iraq</strong>. However, until thereis a serious re-evaluation <strong>of</strong> adm<strong>in</strong>istration policies, there is little hope that suchacknowledgements will improve America's stand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the world or ease the suffer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the<strong>Iraq</strong>i people. What neither the adm<strong>in</strong>istration nor Congress has acknowledged is that the <strong>in</strong>vasion<strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> would have been wrong even if Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> still had WMDs and even if the post<strong>in</strong>vasionsituation had been handled more responsibly.Recently, lead<strong>in</strong>g figures <strong>in</strong> the Democratic Party who had largely supported President Bush's<strong>Iraq</strong> policies are f<strong>in</strong>ally start<strong>in</strong>g to voice their opposition <strong>in</strong> response to pressure from theirconstituents. However, the Democrats have yet to present much <strong>of</strong> an alternative. Their recentlyreleased defense plan entitled “Real Security” fails to renounce Bush's preventive war doctr<strong>in</strong>eand simply urges <strong>Iraq</strong>is to assume “primary responsibility for secur<strong>in</strong>g and govern<strong>in</strong>g theircountry with the responsible redeployment <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces.” Democrats and their apologists claimthat a more forceful statement for withdrawal would risk their be<strong>in</strong>g portrayed as weak, but eventheir moderate plan was branded “a strategic retreat” by Vice President Dick Cheney. RepublicanSenator Christopher Bond was more honest. He noted essentially no difference between the146


Democratic position and that <strong>of</strong> the adm<strong>in</strong>istration, observ<strong>in</strong>g, “It's taken them all this time t<strong>of</strong>igure out what we've been do<strong>in</strong>g for a long time.”Deal<strong>in</strong>g with the InsurgencyThere are dozens <strong>of</strong> armed groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> battl<strong>in</strong>g U.S. occupation forces and the U.S.-backedgovernment. This resistance <strong>in</strong>cludes supporters <strong>of</strong> Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong>, well-armed remnants <strong>of</strong> hisarmed forces, other Baathists, <strong>in</strong>dependent nationalists, various Shiite w<strong>in</strong>gs, tribal-basedgroup<strong>in</strong>gs, and several Sunni Arab <strong>of</strong>fshoots. The al-Qaida-<strong>in</strong>spired jihadists and the foreignfighters upon whom the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration focuses represent a m<strong>in</strong>ority <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgency.Opposition is grow<strong>in</strong>g and, despite many differences ideologically and tactically, the variousfactions have demonstrated an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g ability to coord<strong>in</strong>ate their operations.Beyond the many similarities between the war <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and the one <strong>in</strong> Vietnam years ago, one keydifference is <strong>in</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> the opposition. Although some anti-Vietnam <strong>War</strong> activists naivelydownplayed the autocratic tendencies <strong>of</strong> the communist-led National Liberation Front (NLF),these rebels and the North Vietnamese government eventually brought relative peace andstability to the country. Despite current repression and misguided economic policies, the SouthVietnamese have arguably suffered less <strong>in</strong> a reunified country under the communists than dur<strong>in</strong>gthe U.S.-led war under the corrupt and brutal Thieu regime <strong>in</strong> Saigon. Bely<strong>in</strong>g dire warn<strong>in</strong>gsfrom Wash<strong>in</strong>gton prior to the war's end, the NLF/North Vietnamese victory has not harmed thenational security <strong>of</strong> the United States, and other than its misadventure <strong>in</strong> Cambodia to rootout the genocidal Khmer Rouge and a brief border war with Ch<strong>in</strong>a Vietnam has coexistedrelatively well with its neighbors and is now a full member <strong>of</strong> the Association <strong>of</strong> Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN).The same cannot be said <strong>of</strong> the armed opposition to the U.S.-backed government <strong>in</strong> Baghdad.Unlike <strong>in</strong> Vietnam, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i resistance is not unified. As a result, toppl<strong>in</strong>g the current leaderswill not likely br<strong>in</strong>g peace but rather cont<strong>in</strong>ued violence and disorder. The <strong>in</strong>surgents also<strong>in</strong>clude some decidedly nasty elements that are genu<strong>in</strong>ely fascistic <strong>in</strong> orientation. In the powerstruggle that would follow a hypothetical overthrow <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'s central government, it is quitepossible that the new rulers would <strong>in</strong>clude militant jihadists, Saddam's w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Ba'ath party,or other elements far worse than those currently <strong>in</strong> power or likely to be elected next month.There is also a real risk <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>stability spill<strong>in</strong>g over <strong>in</strong>to adjacent countries.There are many scary scenarios that could result from the withdrawal <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces from <strong>Iraq</strong>.The country could plunge <strong>in</strong>to full-scale civil war, it might split <strong>in</strong>to three parts (accompanied byethnic cleans<strong>in</strong>g), fundamentalist <strong>Is</strong>lamic rule may emerge, Iranian extremists could exert undue<strong>in</strong>fluence, or this war-torn nation could become a tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and logistical base for <strong>in</strong>ternationalterrorism. All <strong>of</strong> these possibilities should be taken seriously.Unfortunately, these scenarios may even more likely occur if U.S. forces rema<strong>in</strong> than if theywithdraw. Bush's war <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgents, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g terrorists, faster than the Pentagoncan kill them. The U.S. and British military presence is exacerbat<strong>in</strong>g ethnic and sectariandivisions, not lessen<strong>in</strong>g them. The overwhelm<strong>in</strong>g U.S. dom<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> the Baghdad government is147


underm<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g its sovereignty, weaken<strong>in</strong>g its stand<strong>in</strong>g with the <strong>Iraq</strong>i people, and compromis<strong>in</strong>g itsability to govern.Many observers, even among those who opposed the U.S. <strong>in</strong>vasion, concede that althoughthe pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>of</strong> self-determ<strong>in</strong>ation must be respected and although <strong>Iraq</strong>is are more than capable<strong>of</strong> govern<strong>in</strong>g themselves once stability and basic services are restored current circumstances<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> may require active leadership from the outside. The United States, however, simply doesnot have the credibility to fill that role. There are sound proposals for an <strong>in</strong>ternationalpeacekeep<strong>in</strong>g force led by other Arab or <strong>Is</strong>lamic states that should be considered, but theseoptions will not be possible as long as the United States <strong>in</strong>sists on orchestrat<strong>in</strong>g militaryoperations.All but the most extreme jihadists <strong>in</strong> the opposition would likely be open to a negotiatedsettlement to the conflict, but only if there was a clear timetable or specific achievablebenchmarks for a complete U.S. withdrawal. With the bulk <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgents then allied with theBaghdad government, <strong>Iraq</strong>is could likely deal with the jihadists and other radical elementsthemselves, s<strong>in</strong>ce the jihadists' extreme ideology and terrorist tactics have little popularfollow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the country.The Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration has thus far refused to discuss withdraw<strong>in</strong>g all U.S. forces from <strong>Iraq</strong>.The new bases under construction (under no-bid contracts with Vice President Dick Cheney'sfirm Halliburton) are elaborate, self-conta<strong>in</strong>ed towns that appear to be <strong>in</strong>tended for permanence.One be<strong>in</strong>g built outside Baghdad is more than 15 square miles. The new U.S. embassy underconstruction <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is designed to <strong>in</strong>clude 21 build<strong>in</strong>gs compris<strong>in</strong>g residences for 1,000American <strong>of</strong>ficials, a school, a warehouse, and its own utilities. As long as such an overbear<strong>in</strong>g,neocolonial lightn<strong>in</strong>g-rod presence rema<strong>in</strong>s, there will be armed resistance.There have also been reasonable proposals for the United States to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> an over-the-horizonmilitary presence or to conduct more modest military operations. Such a plan, however, wouldrequire putt<strong>in</strong>g trust <strong>in</strong> the very same people who have proven themselves pr<strong>of</strong>oundly ignorantabout <strong>Iraq</strong> and totally <strong>in</strong>ept at manag<strong>in</strong>g the postwar situation. Perhaps U.S. forces could providetactical air support to <strong>Iraq</strong>i soldiers if Jihadists seize Ramadi and start march<strong>in</strong>g on the GreenZone. But absent such a crisis, the only responsible option is a withdrawal <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces as soonas possible.Americans from across the political spectrum have a k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> optimism and “can do” attitude thathas served us well on many occasions. There are some situations, however, where a series <strong>of</strong>tragic mistakes and unfortunate circumstances preclude a positive outcome. <strong>Iraq</strong> may be justsuch a case.The <strong>War</strong> at HomeThis is my third annual article analyz<strong>in</strong>g the U.S. war <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and its impact. Unless theAmerican people more fully mobilize to change U.S. policy, I will have to write these articles formany years to come.148


This year's Democratic primaries and the general election will be key tests <strong>of</strong> whether the U.S.citizenry will be will<strong>in</strong>g to challenge the bipartisan support for the <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>War</strong>, the doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong>preventive war, and the exaggerated claims <strong>of</strong> foreign strategic threats brandished to frighten thepopulace <strong>in</strong>to support<strong>in</strong>g war. Scores <strong>of</strong> U.S. representatives and senators who voted <strong>in</strong> October2002 to authorize the <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> are up for re-election this year, and most <strong>of</strong> them stillsupport fund<strong>in</strong>g the war. If the majority <strong>of</strong> these pro-war Republican and Democratic lawmakersare re-elected, it will signal Wash<strong>in</strong>gton politicians that the grow<strong>in</strong>g grassroots opposition to thewar will not threaten their political careers. Despite the message it would send, some leaders <strong>in</strong>the peace movement are <strong>in</strong>sist<strong>in</strong>g that progressives work to re-elect pro-war members <strong>of</strong>Congress, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g those who lied about <strong>Iraq</strong> still hav<strong>in</strong>g WMDs, simply because they areDemocrats. Such a strategy will virtually guarantee many more years <strong>of</strong> death and destruction <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>, and- as the 2004 presidential election showed us- such Democrats will probablyend up los<strong>in</strong>g anyway.But a determ<strong>in</strong>ed citizenry is the decisive factor. The anti-Vietnam <strong>War</strong> movement, the antiapartheidstruggle, the nuclear freeze campaign, and Central America solidarity effortsdemonstrated that the particular <strong>in</strong>dividuals or party that the American people elect are lessimportant than the choices we give them. As the old adage goes, “If the people lead, the leaderswill follow.”The United States will eventually have to leave <strong>Iraq</strong>. The question is, how many Americans and<strong>Iraq</strong>is will have to die <strong>in</strong> the meantime? For the United States to pull out, Bush and his bipartisangroup <strong>of</strong> supporters would have to recognize that they cannot Americanize <strong>Iraq</strong>, establish U.S.hegemony <strong>in</strong> the Persian Gulf region, control <strong>Iraq</strong>'s vast oil reserves, or <strong>in</strong>timidate other nationsby subdu<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>tractable <strong>in</strong>surgency. In short, the leadership <strong>of</strong> the greatest militarysuperpower the world has ever known would be forced to accept a humiliat<strong>in</strong>g retreat.It may be unrealistic to believe that the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration would simply pull out <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> even<strong>in</strong> the face <strong>of</strong> grow<strong>in</strong>g popular opposition. The Nixon adm<strong>in</strong>istration was unwill<strong>in</strong>g to simplypull out <strong>of</strong> Vietnam. However, the anti-war movement forced Wash<strong>in</strong>gton to negotiate with theSouth Vietnamese resistance and their North Vietnamese allies, which eventually led to thewithdrawal <strong>of</strong> U.S. forces. Demand<strong>in</strong>g negotiations that <strong>in</strong>clude a timetable for a total U.S.withdrawal may be the most realistic strategy that today's anti-war movement could advocate.Otherwise, President Bush will likely hold firm and leave the pa<strong>in</strong>ful decisions to a Democraticsuccessor, who would then take the blame for not “f<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g the job.” This is why it is soimportant for Democrats to stop fund<strong>in</strong>g the war and to <strong>in</strong>sist that President Bush negotiate asettlement to withdraw U.S. forces before he leaves <strong>of</strong>fice, thereby accept<strong>in</strong>g full responsibilityfor the consequences.Another question is, what will the United States learn from all this? Will it be just a tactical,stylistic precept that <strong>in</strong> the words <strong>of</strong> 2004 Democratic presidential nom<strong>in</strong>ee JohnKerry the war aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Iraq</strong> was not a mistake but rather that “the way the president went towar is a mistake”? The next time the United States <strong>in</strong>vades and occupies another country, shouldit be done the “right way” by a Democratic adm<strong>in</strong>istration?149


Will our lesson be merely a strategic realization that, even if Wash<strong>in</strong>gton had not made whatSecretary <strong>of</strong> State Condoleezza Rice called “thousands” <strong>of</strong> errors <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, <strong>in</strong>vad<strong>in</strong>g andoccupy<strong>in</strong>g a large Arab Muslim state with a strong history <strong>of</strong> nationalism is fraught withdisaster?Or will Americans f<strong>in</strong>ally embrace what we thought had been learned at the end <strong>of</strong> World <strong>War</strong>II -with the ratification <strong>of</strong> the United Nations Charter- that <strong>in</strong>vad<strong>in</strong>g another country isjust pla<strong>in</strong> wrong?Stephen Zunes is the Middle East editor for Foreign Policy In Focus, where this article firstappeared. He is a pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> politics at the University <strong>of</strong> San Francisco and the author <strong>of</strong>T<strong>in</strong>derbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots <strong>of</strong> Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003).150


http://www.<strong>in</strong>formationclear<strong>in</strong>ghouse.<strong>in</strong>fo/article12885.htmhttp://news.<strong>in</strong>dependent.co.uk/world/fisk/article360624.eceSeen through a Syrian lens, 'unknown Americans' are provok<strong>in</strong>g civil war <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>By Robert FiskApril 29, 200604/29/06 "The Independent" -- - In Syria, the world appears through a glass, darkly. As dark asthe smoked w<strong>in</strong>dows <strong>of</strong> the car which takes me to a build<strong>in</strong>g on the western side <strong>of</strong> Damascuswhere a man I have known for 15 years - we shall call him a "security source", which is the namegiven by American correspondents to their own powerful <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficers - waits with hisown ferocious narrative <strong>of</strong> disaster <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and dangers <strong>in</strong> the Middle East.His is a fearful portrait <strong>of</strong> an America trapped <strong>in</strong> the bloody sands <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, desperately try<strong>in</strong>g toprovoke a civil war around Baghdad <strong>in</strong> order to reduce its own military casualties. It is a scenario<strong>in</strong> which Saddam Husse<strong>in</strong> rema<strong>in</strong>s Wash<strong>in</strong>gton's best friend, <strong>in</strong> which Syria has struck at the<strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>surgents with a ruthlessness that the United States wilfully ignores. And <strong>in</strong> which Syria'sInterior M<strong>in</strong>ister, found shot dead <strong>in</strong> his <strong>of</strong>fice last year, committed suicide because <strong>of</strong> his ownmental <strong>in</strong>stability.The Americans, my <strong>in</strong>terlocutor suspected, are try<strong>in</strong>g to provoke an <strong>Iraq</strong>i civil war so that SunniMuslim <strong>in</strong>surgents spend their energies kill<strong>in</strong>g their Shia co-religionists rather than soldiers <strong>of</strong>the Western occupation forces. "I swear to you that we have very good <strong>in</strong>formation," my sourcesays, f<strong>in</strong>ger stabb<strong>in</strong>g the air <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> him. "One young <strong>Iraq</strong>i man told us that he was tra<strong>in</strong>ed bythe Americans as a policeman <strong>in</strong> Baghdad and he spent 70 per cent <strong>of</strong> his time learn<strong>in</strong>g to driveand 30 per cent <strong>in</strong> weapons tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. They said to him: 'Come back <strong>in</strong> a week.' When he wentback, they gave him a mobile phone and told him to drive <strong>in</strong>to a crowded area near a mosque andphone them. He waited <strong>in</strong> the car but couldn't get the right mobile signal. So he got out <strong>of</strong> the carto where he received a better signal. Then his car blew up."Impossible, I th<strong>in</strong>k to myself. But then I remember how many times <strong>Iraq</strong>is <strong>in</strong> Baghdad have toldme similar stories. These reports are believed even if they seem unbelievable. And I know wheremuch <strong>of</strong> the Syrian <strong>in</strong>formation is gleaned: from the tens <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> Shia Muslim pilgrimswho come to pray at the Sayda Ze<strong>in</strong>ab mosque outside Damascus. These men and women comefrom the slums <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, Hillah and <strong>Is</strong>kandariyah as well as the cities <strong>of</strong> Najaf and Basra.Sunnis from Fallujah and Ramadi also visit Damascus to see friends and relatives and talk freely<strong>of</strong> American tactics <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>."There was another man, tra<strong>in</strong>ed by the Americans for the police. He too was given a mobile andtold to drive to an area where there was a crowd - maybe a protest - and to call them and tellthem what was happen<strong>in</strong>g. Aga<strong>in</strong>, his new mobile was not work<strong>in</strong>g. So he went to a landl<strong>in</strong>ephone and called the Americans and told them: 'Here I am, <strong>in</strong> the place you sent me and I can tellyou what's happen<strong>in</strong>g here.' And at that moment there was a big explosion <strong>in</strong> his car."151


Just who these "Americans" might be, my source did not say. In the anarchic and panic-strickenworld <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, there are many <strong>US</strong> groups - <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g countless outfits supposedly work<strong>in</strong>g for theAmerican military and the new Western-backed <strong>Iraq</strong>i Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry - who operate outside anylaws or rules. No one can account for the murder <strong>of</strong> 191 university teachers and pr<strong>of</strong>essors s<strong>in</strong>cethe 2003 <strong>in</strong>vasion - nor the fact that more than 50 former <strong>Iraq</strong>i fighter-bomber pilots whoattacked Iran <strong>in</strong> the 1980-88 Iran-<strong>Iraq</strong> war have been assass<strong>in</strong>ated <strong>in</strong> their home towns <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>in</strong>the past three years.Amid this chaos, a colleague <strong>of</strong> my source asked me, how could Syria be expected to lessen thenumber <strong>of</strong> attacks on Americans <strong>in</strong>side <strong>Iraq</strong>? "It was never safe, our border," he said. "Dur<strong>in</strong>gSaddam's time, crim<strong>in</strong>als and Saddam's terrorists crossed our borders to attack our government. Ibuilt a wall <strong>of</strong> earth and sand along the border at that time. But three car bombs from Saddam'sagents exploded <strong>in</strong> Damascus and Tartous- I was the one who captured the crim<strong>in</strong>als responsible.But we couldn't stop them."Now, he told me, the rampart runn<strong>in</strong>g for hundreds <strong>of</strong> miles along Syria's border with <strong>Iraq</strong> hadbeen heightened. "I have had barbed wire put on top and up to now we have caught 1,500 non-Syrian and non-<strong>Iraq</strong>i Arabs try<strong>in</strong>g to cross and we have stopped 2,700 Syrians from cross<strong>in</strong>g ...Our army is there - but the <strong>Iraq</strong>i army and the Americans are not there on the other side."Beh<strong>in</strong>d these grave suspicions <strong>in</strong> Damascus lies the memory <strong>of</strong> Saddam's long friendship withthe United States. "Our Hafez el-Assad [the former Syrian president who died <strong>in</strong> 2000] learntthat Saddam, <strong>in</strong> his early days, met with American <strong>of</strong>ficials 20 times <strong>in</strong> four weeks. Thisconv<strong>in</strong>ced Assad that, <strong>in</strong> his words, 'Saddam is with the Americans'. Saddam was the biggesthelper <strong>of</strong> the Americans <strong>in</strong> the Middle East (when he attacked Iran <strong>in</strong> 1980) after the fall <strong>of</strong> theShah. And he still is! After all, he brought the Americans to <strong>Iraq</strong>!"So I turn to a story which is more distress<strong>in</strong>g for my sources: the death by shoot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> BrigadierGeneral Ghazi Kenaan, former head <strong>of</strong> Syrian military <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>in</strong> Lebanon - an awesomelypowerful position - and Syrian M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> Interior when his suicide was announced by theDamascus government last year.Widespread rumours outside Syria suggested that Kenaan was suspected by UN <strong>in</strong>vestigators <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the murder <strong>of</strong> the former Lebanese prime m<strong>in</strong>ister Rafik Hariri <strong>in</strong> a massive carbomb <strong>in</strong> Beirut last year - and that he had been "suicided" by Syrian government agents toprevent him tell<strong>in</strong>g the truth.Not so, <strong>in</strong>sisted my orig<strong>in</strong>al <strong>in</strong>terlocutor. "General Ghazi was a man who believed he could giveorders and anyth<strong>in</strong>g he wanted would happen. Someth<strong>in</strong>g happened that he could not reconcile -someth<strong>in</strong>g that made him realise he was not all-powerful. On the day <strong>of</strong> his death, he went to his<strong>of</strong>fice at the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry and then he left and went home for half an hour. Then he cameback with a pistol. He left a message for his wife <strong>in</strong> which he said goodbye to her and asked herto look after their children and he said that what he was go<strong>in</strong>g to do was 'for the good <strong>of</strong> Syria'.Then he shot himself <strong>in</strong> the mouth."152


Of Hariri's assass<strong>in</strong>ation, Syrian <strong>of</strong>ficials like to recall his relationship with the former <strong>Iraq</strong>i<strong>in</strong>terim prime m<strong>in</strong>ister Iyad Alawi - a self-confessed former agent for the CIA and MI6 - and analleged $20bn arms deal between the Russians and Saudi Arabia <strong>in</strong> which they claim Hariri was<strong>in</strong>volved.Hariri's Lebanese supporters cont<strong>in</strong>ue to dismiss the Syrian argument on the grounds that Syriahad identified Hariri as the jo<strong>in</strong>t author with his friend, French President Jacques Chirac, <strong>of</strong> theUN Security Council resolution which demanded the retreat <strong>of</strong> the Syrians from Lebaneseterritory.But if the Syrians are understandably obsessed with the American occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, their longhatred for Saddam - someth<strong>in</strong>g which they shared with most <strong>Iraq</strong>is - is still <strong>in</strong>tact. When I askedmy first "security" source what would happen to the former <strong>Iraq</strong>i dictator, he replied, bang<strong>in</strong>g hisfist <strong>in</strong>to his hand: "He will be killed. He will be killed. He will be killed."© 2006 Independent News and Media Limited153


http://www.globalresearch.ca/<strong>in</strong>dex.php?context=viewArticle&code=MEY20060518&articleId=2461<strong>Iraq</strong>: Security Companies and <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> Campsby Sarah MeyerGlobal ResearchBRussells TribunalMay 18, 2006Private <strong>US</strong> and UK security firms are closely allied to Mr. Bremer’s ‘Facilities ProtectionService’ (FPR) programme <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Newsweek (24.04.06) suggested 146,0001 belong to this‘security’ force. The Interior M<strong>in</strong>ister, Bayan Jabr, associated the FPS with the endemic ‘deathsquads’ operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>side the police forces, which are hasten<strong>in</strong>g the dis<strong>in</strong>tegration <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>2.What is the Facilities Protection Service?The establishment <strong>of</strong> the ‘Facilities Protection Service’ was on 04.10.03, accord<strong>in</strong>g to PaulBremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 27 (see appendix one).This document says that “The FPS may also consist <strong>of</strong> employees <strong>of</strong> private security firms3 whoare engaged to perform services for the m<strong>in</strong>istries or governorates through contracts, providedsuch private security firms and employees are licensed and authorized by the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interioras provided <strong>in</strong> Section 7 here<strong>in</strong>.”Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Global Security.<strong>org</strong>, “The Facilities Protection Service works for all m<strong>in</strong>istries andgovernmental agencies, but its standards are set and enforced by the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> the Interior. Itcan also be privately hired. The FPS is tasked with the fixed site protection <strong>of</strong> M<strong>in</strong>isterial,Governmental, or private build<strong>in</strong>gs, facilities and personnel. The FPS <strong>in</strong>cludes Oil, ElectricityPolice and Port Security.The majority <strong>of</strong> the FPS staff consists <strong>of</strong> former service members and former security guards.The FPS will now secure public facilities such as hospitals, banks, and power stations with<strong>in</strong>their district. Once tra<strong>in</strong>ed, the guards work with <strong>US</strong> military forces protect<strong>in</strong>g critical sites likeschools, hospitals and power plants.”Which private security firms are operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>?There are about 30 known private security firms work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. These <strong>in</strong>clude:Aegis PLCAegis is run by Lt. Col. Tim Spicer. A film recently showed Aegis members happily shoot<strong>in</strong>g<strong>Iraq</strong>i civilians. See the film here.154


Sourcewatch <strong>in</strong>formation on Aegis: “Aegis Defence Services was <strong>in</strong>itially awarded a $293million contract by the Pentagon <strong>in</strong> May 2004 to act as the ‘coord<strong>in</strong>ation and management hub’for the fifty-plus private security companies <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. As <strong>of</strong> December, 2005, that contract wasworth <strong>in</strong> excess <strong>of</strong> $430 million. They also contributed seventy-five teams <strong>of</strong> eight armedcivilians each to assist and protect the Project Management Office <strong>of</strong> the United States. Theyalso provided protection for the Oil-for-Food Program <strong>in</strong>quiry.”Blackwater <strong>US</strong>A.Blackwater was the security firm hired to protect Paul Bremer <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Sourcewatch on Blackwater. “Blackwater is one <strong>of</strong> two companies which make up The Pr<strong>in</strong>ceGroup, the other be<strong>in</strong>g Pr<strong>in</strong>ce Manufactur<strong>in</strong>g. … The Pr<strong>in</strong>ce Group bought Aviation WorldwideServies. AWS consists <strong>of</strong> STI Aviation, Inc., Air Quest, Inc., and Presidential Airways, Inc.These companies provide the logistical and air support for Blackwater operations. Blackwateritself consists <strong>of</strong> Blackwater <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> Center, Blackwater Target Systems, Blackwater SecurityConsult<strong>in</strong>g and Blackwater Can<strong>in</strong>e."Blackwater vs. FallujahThe 1st Mar<strong>in</strong>e Expeditionary Force took over Fallujah on 27.03.04. Dur<strong>in</strong>g a demonstration onthe 28th, the <strong>US</strong> killed 18 Fallujah civilians. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i response to this was the murder andhang<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> 4 Blackwater employees on 31.03.04. <strong>War</strong> crimes committed by the United Statesfollowed. See: Fallujah, the Hidden Nightmare (Rai/ICH)Najaf was also affected. Sourcewatch says: “Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Russel Mokhiber and RobertWeissman, a few days after the Fallujah kill<strong>in</strong>gs, "Blackwater Security Consult<strong>in</strong>g engaged <strong>in</strong>full-scale battle <strong>in</strong> Najaf, with the company fly<strong>in</strong>g its own helicopters amidst an <strong>in</strong>tense firefightto re-supply its own commandos. … The <strong>in</strong>creased scrut<strong>in</strong>y <strong>of</strong> security firms led Blackwater tohire the Alexander Strategy Group (now <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> three “K Street” scandals) for crisismanagement, public and media relations.”For a shady story that gets progressively darker, see IRAQ: Blood is Thicker Than BlackwaterEr<strong>in</strong>ys <strong>Iraq</strong> Ltd.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Global Security, “Er<strong>in</strong>ys <strong>Iraq</strong> Ltd is the private security company hired to protect<strong>Iraq</strong>’s oil pipel<strong>in</strong>es under a <strong>US</strong>$40 million contract awarded <strong>in</strong> August 2003. Er<strong>in</strong>ys <strong>Iraq</strong> is anaffiliate <strong>of</strong> Er<strong>in</strong>ys International formed <strong>in</strong> 2001, landed the <strong>Iraq</strong> contract to supply and tra<strong>in</strong>6,500 armed guards charged with protect<strong>in</strong>g 140 <strong>Iraq</strong>i oil wells, 7,000 kilometers <strong>of</strong> pipel<strong>in</strong>esand ref<strong>in</strong>eries, as well as power plants and the water supply for the <strong>Iraq</strong>i M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Oil. Amajority <strong>of</strong> Er<strong>in</strong>ys’ workforce (15,000 <strong>Iraq</strong>i and 350 <strong>in</strong>ternational staff) <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> are Kurdishpeshmerga.”Sourcewatch <strong>in</strong>formation on Er<strong>in</strong>ys. “Er<strong>in</strong>ys <strong>Iraq</strong> Ltd, which won an $80 million contract lastAugust from the Coalition Provisional Authority to provide security for the oil <strong>in</strong>frastructure <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>, has had some powerful alliances <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.155


Er<strong>in</strong>ys set up a Jo<strong>in</strong>t Venture with Nour <strong>US</strong>A Ltd.. Nour's founder is Abul Huda Farouki, awealthy Jordanian-American who lives <strong>in</strong> northern Virg<strong>in</strong>ia and whose companies have doneextensive construction work for the Pentagon.Farouki's bus<strong>in</strong>esses established $12 million <strong>of</strong> loans from the Petra International Bank<strong>in</strong>gCorporation <strong>in</strong> the 1980s, which was managed at the time by Ahmed Chalabi’s nephew,Mohammed Chalabi. The Jordanian government says this was part <strong>of</strong> a massive embezzlementscheme <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g Chalabi4 and a bank he owned <strong>in</strong> Jordan.A found<strong>in</strong>g partner and the director <strong>of</strong> Er<strong>in</strong>ys <strong>Iraq</strong> is Faisal Dhaghistani. Faisal is the son <strong>of</strong>Tamara Daghistani, who played a large role <strong>in</strong> the development <strong>of</strong> Ahmed Chalabi's <strong>Iraq</strong>iNational Congress.The firm's counsel <strong>in</strong> Baghdad has been Chalabi's nephew, Salem Chalabi.Many among the 14,000 guards recruited by Er<strong>in</strong>ys to protect the oil <strong>in</strong>frastructure came directlyfrom the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Free Forces, a militia that had been loyal to Chalabi's movement.”Follow<strong>in</strong>g is an up-to-date State Department list 5 <strong>of</strong> 27 further known security firms work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>:AD Consultancy (which firm?) (UK)AKE Ltd (UK)BAGHDAD FIRE AND SECURITY (IRAQ)ARMOR GROUP (<strong>in</strong> Mosul, Baghdad, Basra) (UK)CONTROL RISKS GROUP (Baghdad) (UK)C<strong>US</strong>TER BATTLES (now be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestigated) (<strong>US</strong>)DEHDARI GENERAL TRADING & CONTRACTING EST.(KUWAIT)DILIGENCE MIDDLE EAST (<strong>US</strong>)GENRIC (outside Basra) (UK)GLOBAL MIDDLE EAST RISK STRATEGIES (orig<strong>in</strong>ally a firm based <strong>in</strong> UK, known asGlobal Risk Strategies) (Dubai,UAE)GROUP 4 FALCK A/S (INDIA)HENDERSON RISK LTD (UK)HILL AND ASSOCIATES (HONG KONG)ICP (employees are only either former British and <strong>US</strong> Special Forces or Elite Forces personnel.(UK)ISI (Baghdad Conference Palace: (“the only security company to provide 24 hour <strong>Iraq</strong>i securityguards to the CPA "Green Zone". All guards are tra<strong>in</strong>ed by the U.S. army … ISI's seniormanagement <strong>in</strong>cludes experienced military personnel mostly ex-special forces from both the <strong>US</strong>and UK.”) (IRAQ)METEORIC TACTICAL SOLUTIONS (S. AFRICA)MEYER & ASSOCIATES, (TEXAS, <strong>US</strong>)OLIVE SECURITY LTD (UK)OPTIMAL SOLUTION SERVICES (A<strong>US</strong>TRALIA)OVERSEAS SECURITY AND STRATEGIC INFORMATION, INC/SAFENET-IRAQ (<strong>US</strong>)156


RAMOPS RISK MANAGEMENT GROUP (comprised <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> special operations and military<strong>in</strong>telligence pr<strong>of</strong>essionals.) (<strong>US</strong>)SOG-SMG INC. (<strong>US</strong>)SUMER INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (tra<strong>in</strong>ed by DYNCORP. INT; (IRAQ)TOR INTERNATIONAL (former SAS and Special Forces staff) (UK)TRIPLE CANOPY (more than 20 years <strong>in</strong> the most elite military Special Operations units) (<strong>US</strong>)UNITY RESOURCES GROUP (Middle East) LLC. (security pr<strong>of</strong>essionals drawn from theSpecial Forces and Police SWAT communities <strong>of</strong> the United States, United K<strong>in</strong>gdom, Australia,New Zealand and Europe. (Dubai, UAE)WADE-BOYD & ASSOCIATES (<strong>US</strong>)Where is tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for the Facilities Protection Service ("death squads"?) tak<strong>in</strong>g place?• Basra Palace (UK)“19/5 Battery: “Maj. A. J. Layden is responsible for the Facilities Protection Service (FPS). TheBattery oversees a wide range <strong>of</strong> activities; from work<strong>in</strong>g with the border guards away to the east<strong>of</strong> Basra, to runn<strong>in</strong>g tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g courses for the FPS. Sgt Duncan’s multiple (sic) is one that hasbeen tasked with this FPS tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g task. He and his team have already run four five-day courseswhich <strong>in</strong>clude foot drill, weapon handl<strong>in</strong>g, basic first aid and vehicle check po<strong>in</strong>t drills. The aimthroughout each course is to raise confidence amongst the men <strong>of</strong> the FPS <strong>in</strong> basic standards andencourage good practice. At the end <strong>of</strong> each course, the top students have been selected toreceive further <strong>in</strong>struction to educate them how to lead future courses. Sgt Duncan and his teamare now reap<strong>in</strong>g the rewards <strong>of</strong> their hard work with <strong>Iraq</strong>i FPS staff lead<strong>in</strong>g the most recentcourse under their guidance. “ (There is no date on this communication.)• Baghdad, Al Rashid districtCol. Jon Brockman said (21.01.04) “that those achievements <strong>in</strong>clude recruit<strong>in</strong>g, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g,equipp<strong>in</strong>g and employ<strong>in</strong>g 2,900 <strong>Iraq</strong>is as Facility Protection Services guards.”• MEK Compound / FOB Mercury / Camp MercuryA photo tour <strong>of</strong> Camp Mercury can be seen here. The photo <strong>of</strong> the prisoner compound has beendeleted.Global Security says: “Forward Operat<strong>in</strong>g Base [FOB] Mercury is an abandoned <strong>Iraq</strong>i militarybase and a former Iranian terrorist tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g camp, located midway between Baghdad andFallujah.”“TF 1-504 operates out <strong>of</strong> FOB Mercury. They are responsible for several towns west <strong>of</strong>Baghdad, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the external security <strong>of</strong> the largest prison and detention facility <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. TF 1-504 recently started tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i Facility Protection Service guards. This is a program to tra<strong>in</strong>and equip <strong>Iraq</strong>is so they can beg<strong>in</strong> guard<strong>in</strong>g their own critical facilities, such as police stations,food warehouses, oil storage depots, etc. … A class <strong>of</strong> twenty-five <strong>Iraq</strong>is completed the FacilitiesProtection Force (FPS) program 11 October 2003 at Forward Operat<strong>in</strong>g Base Mercury. The157


group <strong>of</strong> students is the first to participate <strong>in</strong> the three-day course. Upon their graduation, theybecame an <strong>in</strong>tegral part <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong> rehabilitation process. …”“There have been allegations made that between 2003-2004 at Camp Mercury U.S. militarypersonnel engaged <strong>in</strong> rout<strong>in</strong>e and widespread physical punishment towards <strong>Iraq</strong>i deta<strong>in</strong>ees. It isalleged that enlisted men conducted beat<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> prisoners prior to question<strong>in</strong>g, forced strenuousexercises to the po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> unconsciousness and exposed deta<strong>in</strong>ees to extremes <strong>of</strong> heat and cold.These alleged methods were employed to produce greater cooperation with <strong>in</strong>terrogators some <strong>of</strong>whom were apparently members <strong>of</strong> the CIA. As <strong>of</strong> September 2005 the U.S. Army wasconduct<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>vestigation on what exactly happened at Camp Mercury. Some militarypersonnel also claim that these actions were also used as a form <strong>of</strong> stress relief from the war.”• An NajafAn Najaf area, two hundred one facility protection service guards graduated from securitytra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g on 03 July 2003. Sixty-seven guards will work at oil and gas facilities and 134 will workat hospitals. On 29.08.03, the mosque <strong>in</strong> Najaf was bombed.The 11th MEU commander declared Nov. 30 (04) that <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces have formallyassumed local control <strong>of</strong> An Najaf prov<strong>in</strong>ce. Col. Anthony Haslam said, "In the past threemonths, they have demonstrated their ability to keep this prov<strong>in</strong>ce and its citizens safe andsecure." As <strong>of</strong> 09.12.05, The <strong>Iraq</strong>i army had the primary responsibility for security <strong>in</strong> Najaf andKarbala, but full control had not yet been handed over.06.14.06. Car bomb<strong>in</strong>g. 10 people killed near Shi’ite Muslim shr<strong>in</strong>e.Further Najaf security matters can be seen here.• AR RAMADI• KARBALAThere is no further detailed <strong>in</strong>formation about where the FPS members are be<strong>in</strong>g tra<strong>in</strong>ed. Thereis, however, further <strong>in</strong>formation about <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> Camps for <strong>Iraq</strong>is. For example, see thedescription <strong>of</strong> Camp David, where Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), emergency response,and dignitary protection, similar to functions carried out by the U.S. Secret service, take place.Black masks are ‘de rigour’ (see photo). These camps will be detailed <strong>in</strong> my research on <strong>US</strong>bases <strong>in</strong> North/South/East/West <strong>Iraq</strong>.APPENDIX ONE: PAUL BREMER’S ORDER NUMBER 27:ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE… The FPS is an <strong>org</strong>anization <strong>of</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>ed, armed, uniformed entities charged with provid<strong>in</strong>gsecurity for m<strong>in</strong>istry and governorate <strong>of</strong>fices, government <strong>in</strong>frastructure, and fixed sites underthe direction and control <strong>of</strong> governmental m<strong>in</strong>istries and governorate adm<strong>in</strong>istrations.158


Section 2: Organization <strong>of</strong> the FPS1) Governmental employees employed by the m<strong>in</strong>istries or governorates are eligible to serve <strong>in</strong>the FPS. The FPS may also consist <strong>of</strong> employees <strong>of</strong> private security firms who are engaged toperform services for the m<strong>in</strong>istries or governorates through contracts, provided such privatesecurity firms and employees are licensed and authorized by the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior as provided<strong>in</strong> Section 7 here<strong>in</strong>. Persons who have participated <strong>in</strong> Ba`ath Party activity with<strong>in</strong> the leadershiptiers described <strong>in</strong> CPA Order Number 1, De-Ba`athification <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i Society (CPA/ORD/16 May2003/01) may not serve <strong>in</strong> the FPS <strong>in</strong> any capacity except by the express grant <strong>of</strong> an exception bythe Coalition Provisional Authority.2) M<strong>in</strong>isters and heads <strong>of</strong> governorate adm<strong>in</strong>istrations shall determ<strong>in</strong>e the need for FPS membersat locations under their supervision. Each m<strong>in</strong>istry or governorate adm<strong>in</strong>istration is responsiblefor ensur<strong>in</strong>g the FPS branch under its supervision is sufficient to protect key sites for which it isresponsible, with the additional support <strong>of</strong> police or other forces <strong>in</strong> times <strong>of</strong> emergency.3) M<strong>in</strong>istries and governorate adm<strong>in</strong>istrations are responsible for the fund<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> FPS membersassigned to their agency. M<strong>in</strong>istries and governorate adm<strong>in</strong>istrations are responsible for thesupervision and control <strong>of</strong> the FPS force assigned to their governmental agency, consistent withthe standards and regulations established by the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior.4) Governorates will establish Regional Operations Centers to coord<strong>in</strong>ate the operations <strong>of</strong> FPSguards and to ensure their proper <strong>in</strong>tegration with police and other emergency services.5) The M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior will establish standards and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for the FPS <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g standardsand tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g for private security firms perform<strong>in</strong>g FPS duties pursuant to contracts.Pursuant to this Order, the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior will issue FPSAdm<strong>in</strong>istrative Instructions def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the standards for dress, tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, certification, anddeportment. All members <strong>of</strong> the FPS whether contracted or employed directly by thegovernmental agency are required to comply with the Adm<strong>in</strong>istrative Instructions issued by theM<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Interior.6) FPS <strong>org</strong>anizations may be known by different names <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g, for example "ElectricityPolice," "Diplomatic Protective Services," or "Oil Police" but each will have only the specificpowers and authorities granted <strong>in</strong> this Order.7) Members <strong>of</strong> the FPS may not participate <strong>in</strong> any manner <strong>in</strong> <strong>org</strong>anizations or activities thatadvocate racial, gender or ethnic hatred or <strong>in</strong>tolerance; advocate, create, or engage <strong>in</strong> illegaldiscrim<strong>in</strong>ation based on race, color, gender, religion, or regional orig<strong>in</strong>; or use, or advocate theuse <strong>of</strong>, force or violence or other unlawful means to achieve <strong>in</strong>ternal political goals. Violationsmay result <strong>in</strong> the removal <strong>of</strong> the member from employment <strong>in</strong> the FPS or the withdrawal <strong>of</strong> theauthorization for the member to perform FPS responsibilities as a member <strong>of</strong> a private securityfirm.159


Section 3: Authority <strong>of</strong> the FPS1) Members <strong>of</strong> the FPS may, while perform<strong>in</strong>g their <strong>of</strong>ficial duties, apprehend persons who (i)they witness committ<strong>in</strong>g or attempt<strong>in</strong>g to commit a crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>of</strong>fense, (ii) have escaped afterbe<strong>in</strong>g lawfully arrested, or (iii) otherwise <strong>in</strong>terfere with their lawful activities. Personsapprehended by the FPS must be turned over to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police or Coalition Forces with<strong>in</strong> twelvehours <strong>of</strong> apprehension or be released.2) Members <strong>of</strong> the FPS may, while perform<strong>in</strong>g their <strong>of</strong>ficial duties, conduct reasonable searchesfor weapons or other dangerous or prohibited items <strong>of</strong> persons enter<strong>in</strong>g or with<strong>in</strong> thegovernmental property or <strong>of</strong>fices they are secur<strong>in</strong>g, crim<strong>in</strong>al suspects <strong>in</strong> their custody, orvehicles enter<strong>in</strong>g or with<strong>in</strong> the governmental property or <strong>of</strong>fices they are secur<strong>in</strong>g.3) Members <strong>of</strong> the FPS may, while perform<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficial duties, use force aga<strong>in</strong>st persons or th<strong>in</strong>gsas is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. However, the use <strong>of</strong> force that may belikely to cause death or serious bodily <strong>in</strong>jury is not permitted unless the member reasonablybelieves that us<strong>in</strong>g such force is necessary to: (i) protect himself or others from the imm<strong>in</strong>ent use<strong>of</strong> deadly force or force likely to cause serious bodily <strong>in</strong>jury, (ii) prevent the escape <strong>of</strong> a personsuspected <strong>of</strong> committ<strong>in</strong>g murder or assault result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> serious bodily <strong>in</strong>jury, or (iii) defendm<strong>in</strong>istry or governorate <strong>of</strong>fices, government or state-owned <strong>in</strong>frastructure, and fixed sites underthe direction and control <strong>of</strong> governmental m<strong>in</strong>istries and governorate adm<strong>in</strong>istrations, to preventtheir destruction or <strong>in</strong>capacitation.Section 4: Jurisdiction1) Members <strong>of</strong> the FPS will be subject to <strong>Iraq</strong>i law at all times, and the courts <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> shall havejurisdiction over <strong>of</strong>fenses alleged to have been committed by members <strong>of</strong> the FPS. TheAdm<strong>in</strong>istrator <strong>of</strong> the CPA may determ<strong>in</strong>e that <strong>of</strong>fenses alleged to have been committed bymembers <strong>of</strong> the FPS while on duty may be submitted to the Central Crim<strong>in</strong>al Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>in</strong>accordance with CPA Order Number 13 (Revised), The Central Crim<strong>in</strong>al Court <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>(CPA/ORD/13 July 2003/13).2) Members <strong>of</strong> the FPS shall enjoy immunity from civil liability for acts or omissions aris<strong>in</strong>gwith<strong>in</strong> the scope <strong>of</strong> their duties and <strong>in</strong> the conduct <strong>of</strong> authorized operations to the same degree asother governmental <strong>of</strong>ficials under the law <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Section 5: WeaponsThe possession <strong>of</strong> weapons by members <strong>of</strong> the FPS is regulated by CPA Order Number 3,Weapons Control Order (CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/03).CPA/ORD/4 September 2003 / 27Comments160


The UK was criticized for start<strong>in</strong>g the Basra turmoil <strong>in</strong> 10.05. Two SAS, part <strong>of</strong> a 24-memberteam, were discovered with explosives <strong>in</strong> the back <strong>of</strong> their car. They were dressed <strong>in</strong> Arabcloth<strong>in</strong>g. See Basra Shadowlands.“Majid al-Sari, an adviser to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Defence, describ<strong>in</strong>g the situation <strong>in</strong> Basra tothe daily al-Zaman, said that on average one person (<strong>in</strong> Basra) was be<strong>in</strong>g assass<strong>in</strong>ated every hour… The governor <strong>of</strong> Basra, Mohammed Misbahal-Wa'ili, is try<strong>in</strong>g to sack the city's police chief,claim<strong>in</strong>g that the police have not carried out a s<strong>in</strong>gle <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to hundreds <strong>of</strong> recentassass<strong>in</strong>ations,” accord<strong>in</strong>g to Patrick Cockburn (17.05.06) <strong>in</strong> The IndependentOn March, 06, a security contractor <strong>in</strong> Tikrit was arrested with a “Do It Yourself Car Bomb Kit”<strong>in</strong> his BMW. What was he go<strong>in</strong>g to blow up? Was this go<strong>in</strong>g to be a “suicide bomb<strong>in</strong>g?” Howmany ‘suicide bomb<strong>in</strong>gs’ are actually caused by ‘security’ mercenaries, ordered to do so by the<strong>US</strong>/UK government?Headl<strong>in</strong>e (05.06). “Baghdad: American security contractors shot dead an <strong>Iraq</strong>i ambulancecrewman on Tuesday when they opened fire on his vehicle after a roadside bomb blasted theirconvoy.” Which security firm did this? Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Geneva Convention, it is a war crime tokill ambulance crew members.Hospitals, as well as ambulances, have been bombed (also aga<strong>in</strong>st the Geneva Convention). Theexcuse given is that they ‘harbour terrorists.’Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt defended raid<strong>in</strong>g al Tabul mosque <strong>in</strong> 01.04 because, he said, “<strong>Iraq</strong>icitizens had identified it as a hub <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgency operations.” One has to extend this excuse, andask, ‘Are mosques also bombed by security forces because they ‘harbour terrorists?’ Suchcharges have been made.The Khadamiya shr<strong>in</strong>e, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Newsweek (24.04.06) is guarded by the FPS. “Not onem<strong>in</strong>istry contacted by Newsweek would accept overall responsibility for the FPS.” If Bremercreated the FPS, then isn’t the coalition is responsible for the FPS?No prosecution? Bremer’s Order 27 exempts security contractors as well as the FacilitiesProtection Service: “Members <strong>of</strong> the FPS shall enjoy immunity from civil liability for acts oromissions aris<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the scope <strong>of</strong> their duties.”How many Security (sic) people are there <strong>in</strong> total? How many <strong>of</strong> these belong now, or havebelonged <strong>in</strong> the past, to the Special Forces / SAS? How many <strong>of</strong> these have put Car Bomb Kits <strong>in</strong>the back <strong>of</strong> their car? How many have carried out assass<strong>in</strong>ations? How many ‘Kill For Fun’ (likeAegis)?Are any <strong>of</strong> these ‘security’ people responsible for the 190 academic and 225 health workerassass<strong>in</strong>ations? See http://www.brusselstribunal.<strong>org</strong> for details <strong>of</strong> these assass<strong>in</strong>ations.<strong>Is</strong> the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> number <strong>of</strong> security companies / FPS directly related to / caus<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>of</strong>violence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>?161


Related Sites:Negroponte supports FPS.Wolfovitz supports FPS.Rumsfeld (22.10.03) supports the FPS.President Bush, <strong>in</strong> a 07.09.03 speech <strong>in</strong> which he talks about an <strong>Iraq</strong> “free <strong>of</strong> assass<strong>in</strong>s, andtorturers, and secret police,” supports the FPS.The most important articles, with excellent l<strong>in</strong>ks, are by Max Fuller:For <strong>Iraq</strong>, “The Salvador Option” Becomes RealityCry<strong>in</strong>g Wolf: Media Dis<strong>in</strong>formation and <strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong> <strong>in</strong> Occupied <strong>Iraq</strong>.Video with annotated scene selection and selected l<strong>in</strong>ks: Cry<strong>in</strong>g Wolf: Who is beh<strong>in</strong>d the deathsquads <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>?Footnotes[1] Throughout this article you will notice a variation <strong>of</strong> given numbers, dependent on thesource. However, these numbers are not unbearably far apart.[2] The jump<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>f po<strong>in</strong>t for this research was E. Knickmeyer's Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post story <strong>Iraq</strong>Nears Consolidation <strong>of</strong> Paramilitary Unit (11.05.06) and <strong>Iraq</strong> Beg<strong>in</strong>s to Re<strong>in</strong> In ParamilitaryForce (14.05.06)[3] All italics <strong>in</strong> this article are the author's.[4] Chalabi was one <strong>of</strong> the 1998 PNAC signatories to a letter to President Cl<strong>in</strong>ton, call<strong>in</strong>g forregime change <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.[5] The Embassy <strong>of</strong> the United States – <strong>Iraq</strong> also has a website for Security Companies <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>,with websites, emails, details.The url to <strong>Iraq</strong>: Security Companies and <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> Camps is:http://www.brusselstribunal.<strong>org</strong>/SecurityCompanies.htmhttp://<strong>in</strong>dexresearch.blogspot.com/2006/05/iraq-security-companies-and-tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g.htmlSarah Meyer is a researcher liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Sussex, UKHer email address is sarahmeyer@freedom255.com162


http://www.wash<strong>in</strong>gton<strong>in</strong>stitute.<strong>org</strong>/templateC05.php?CID=2507The Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Institute for Near East PolicyPolicyWatch #1140:The Confused Security Situation <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>: Some Less Publicized UnitsBy Cecile ZwiebachAugust 21, 2006While U.S. and coalition forces—and <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Security Forces (ISF)—struggle todefeat the Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, they are also deal<strong>in</strong>g with a range <strong>of</strong> armed groups thatcomplicate the security scenario. Militias and ad hoc units with different levels <strong>of</strong> governmentsanction are grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> strength, and the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the ISF is progress<strong>in</strong>g unevenly. While it isnot possible to conduct a comprehensive survey <strong>of</strong> both <strong>in</strong>dependent groups and ISF units, asampl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> less publicized units illustrates how diffuse military power <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> has become.The Problem <strong>of</strong> Shiite MilitiasThe growth <strong>of</strong> Shiite militias that exist outside <strong>of</strong> any legal security frameworks threatens to feedethnic conflict and challenges the authority <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government. Shiite militias rang<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>size from neighborhood groups to nationwide <strong>org</strong>anizations are grow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> strength andattack<strong>in</strong>g Sunnis, either as retaliations for <strong>in</strong>surgent attacks or out <strong>of</strong> sectarian motives. This hasled the United States to see them as an <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g threat on a level <strong>of</strong> with Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgency. Atthe same time, Sunnis <strong>in</strong> mixed-sect neighborhoods are form<strong>in</strong>g local militias <strong>in</strong> response toShiite militia <strong>org</strong>anization, and many Sunni clerics are call<strong>in</strong>g for their followers to armthemselves and fight aga<strong>in</strong>st those who attack them.The two most prom<strong>in</strong>ent and <strong>in</strong>fluential Shiite militias compete with the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police for control<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>’s largest cities, Baghdad and Basra. The Mahdi Army, led by the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr,and the Badr Brigades, the armed w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Council for the <strong>Is</strong>lamic Revolution <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>, an <strong>in</strong>fluential political party with longstand<strong>in</strong>g ties to Iran, are well <strong>org</strong>anized and ga<strong>in</strong>popular support with their religious character and their ability to provide security and certa<strong>in</strong>social services. <strong>Iraq</strong>i prime m<strong>in</strong>ister Nouri al-Maliki has repeatedly pledged to conta<strong>in</strong> thesemilitias and others by absorb<strong>in</strong>g them <strong>in</strong>to the current security forces. He has also pressed GrandAyatollah Ali al-Sistani to issue a statement call<strong>in</strong>g for militias to be disbanded. Sistani made apublic statement at the end <strong>of</strong> April 2006 call<strong>in</strong>g for a country free <strong>of</strong> militias and sectarianviolence and for weapons to be <strong>in</strong> the hands <strong>of</strong> the security forces alone. While Sistani supportsMaliki’s push to disband militias, the effort to <strong>in</strong>tegrate them <strong>in</strong>to the security forces wentdirectly aga<strong>in</strong>st Sadr’s wishes. Coalition and <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces on June 14 began a campaign to ridBaghdad <strong>of</strong> militias that is still underway.In addition to directly challeng<strong>in</strong>g the ISF, Shiite militias pose a severe threat to stability <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>with their capacity to <strong>in</strong>filtrate the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police and army and form undercover death squads. Amajor concern <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cidence <strong>of</strong> men <strong>in</strong> Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry uniforms round<strong>in</strong>gup and kill<strong>in</strong>g Sunni men. Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g around May 2005, after Bayan Jabr took <strong>of</strong>fice as m<strong>in</strong>ister163


<strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terior, bodies <strong>of</strong> people who seem to have been killed by the police have been appear<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> places rang<strong>in</strong>g from rivers to sewage treatment facilities. The violent <strong>in</strong>cidents are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g,especially after the February 22 bomb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Golden Mosque <strong>in</strong> Samarra, a Shiite holy site.The targets are civilians, and their bodies are usually found bound with police handcuffs and shot<strong>in</strong> the manner <strong>of</strong> an execution—and also <strong>of</strong>ten bear<strong>in</strong>g the marks <strong>of</strong> torture. The death squadscarry<strong>in</strong>g out these attacks are said to be composed <strong>of</strong> militia members who have enlisted <strong>in</strong> thepolice. While death squads are typically Shiite <strong>in</strong> composition and target Sunnis, there are also<strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>of</strong> Sunnis target<strong>in</strong>g Shiites who have <strong>in</strong>formed the police about explosives orimprovised explosive devices.Former <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister Jabr and Shiite religious leaders ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> that these attacks are be<strong>in</strong>gcarried out by outsiders who have stolen police uniforms and that the death squads are emerg<strong>in</strong>gfrom private security agencies, such as the Facility Protection Service, rather than from InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry forces. However, the frequency <strong>of</strong> these murders and the fact that police are <strong>of</strong>tenrecruited from their local militias suggests that militias are work<strong>in</strong>g with<strong>in</strong> the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istryand <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g sectarian violence.Ad Hoc UnitsA variety <strong>of</strong> government units arose <strong>in</strong> spontaneous or unplanned ways. Some <strong>of</strong> the morenotable <strong>of</strong> these units are:Desert Protectors. An <strong>in</strong>formant group formed <strong>in</strong> the late summer <strong>of</strong> 2005, this unit is made up <strong>of</strong>members <strong>of</strong> the Albu Mahal tribe, <strong>in</strong> western Anbar prov<strong>in</strong>ce, who were driven out <strong>of</strong> Husaybato Akashat after a compet<strong>in</strong>g tribe, the Salmanis, struck an allegiance with al-Qaeda. The DesertProtectors have received weapons and tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g from U.S. forces. Their role is to move with theAmericans and identify <strong>in</strong>surgents. In fall 2005 there were three platoons, with about onehundred men <strong>in</strong> total, and the goal is to develop n<strong>in</strong>e platoons. The Desert Protectors workedwith U.S. and <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces <strong>in</strong> the November 2005 Operation Steel Curta<strong>in</strong> along the <strong>Iraq</strong>i-Syrianborder to keep al-Qaeda operatives from <strong>in</strong>filtrat<strong>in</strong>g the Euphrates River Valley.<strong>Iraq</strong> Freedom Guard. Orig<strong>in</strong>ally an <strong>in</strong>dependent unit <strong>of</strong> about one hundred members thatperformed well <strong>in</strong> Anbar prov<strong>in</strong>ce, the <strong>Iraq</strong> Freedom Guard is be<strong>in</strong>g folded <strong>in</strong>to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i army.While this unit did good work arrest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgents and f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g weapon caches, <strong>in</strong> March 2005 itsleaders took decisions without clearance from the Mar<strong>in</strong>es commanders with whom they werework<strong>in</strong>g. In particular, the <strong>Iraq</strong> Freedom Guard marched <strong>in</strong>to Haqlaniyah seek<strong>in</strong>g revenge for thedeath <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> its members; Mar<strong>in</strong>es had to <strong>in</strong>tervene to prevent violence from escalat<strong>in</strong>g. U.S.forces subsequently dismantled the unit, fold<strong>in</strong>g its members <strong>in</strong>to the larger New <strong>Iraq</strong>i Army.Facilities Protection Service (FPS). This unit was formed as a group <strong>of</strong> about 4,000 nightwatchmen protect<strong>in</strong>g public build<strong>in</strong>gs, but it has s<strong>in</strong>ce grown <strong>in</strong>to a large force—or rather, anumber <strong>of</strong> largely <strong>in</strong>dependent forces—<strong>of</strong> around 150,000. They are typically armed and wearpolice uniforms, though they do not wear badges. Each unit is <strong>in</strong> effect under the authority <strong>of</strong> them<strong>in</strong>istry for which it works. For example, the FPS cont<strong>in</strong>gent attached to the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>Transportation is led by an open Sadrist, and the entire unit is loyal to the Shiite cleric. In April2006, the Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry began to take steps to provide more direction and oversight for the164


FPS, propos<strong>in</strong>g to give its members identify<strong>in</strong>g badges and to make FPS members liable forcrimes they commit. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i government is also talk<strong>in</strong>g about br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g the FPS under somecentralized command, or at least provid<strong>in</strong>g more structure for supervision by m<strong>in</strong>istries. There isalso talk <strong>of</strong> rely<strong>in</strong>g more on private firms for some guard functions.Regular UnitsSome units <strong>of</strong> the ISF have been quite successful <strong>in</strong> develop<strong>in</strong>g the skills that U.S. and coalitionforces stress <strong>in</strong> their tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g efforts. These <strong>in</strong>clude:Tiger Battalion. Officially the 205th <strong>Iraq</strong>i Army Battalion, this unit has been praised forexhibit<strong>in</strong>g the pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism and competence that U.S. forces are try<strong>in</strong>g to foster <strong>in</strong> the New<strong>Iraq</strong>i Army. Officers have been receptive to the idea <strong>of</strong> delegat<strong>in</strong>g responsibility to their soldiers,a departure from the traditional hierarchy <strong>of</strong> the Saddam-era military. Tiger Battalion’s membersmostly come from the area <strong>in</strong> which the unit operates, which helps them with their <strong>in</strong>telligencegather<strong>in</strong>g efforts.Second Battalion, Second Brigade, <strong>Iraq</strong>i Army First Division. A five-hundred man,predom<strong>in</strong>antly Shiite battalion based <strong>in</strong> the Sunni city <strong>of</strong> Falluja, this battalion has beencommended by its U.S. mentors for its progress toward stand<strong>in</strong>g alone. This success isparticularly mean<strong>in</strong>gful given the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Army’s dispersal dur<strong>in</strong>g fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Falluja <strong>in</strong> 2004.While the battalion still relies on U.S. advisors for guidance, its skills with human <strong>in</strong>telligencehas made it capable <strong>of</strong> identify<strong>in</strong>g and battl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgents.Firefighters. There are twenty-five fire stations <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, each <strong>of</strong> which has 120 firefightersand equipment <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g rescue trucks, command vehicles, and high-tech equipment for fire andexplosion rescue missions. These units are crucial for respond<strong>in</strong>g to the daily bomb<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>Baghdad.Problematic UnitsSome police and army units with<strong>in</strong> the ISF have moved away from their orig<strong>in</strong>al tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g anddeveloped <strong>in</strong>dependent and <strong>of</strong>ten problematic methods <strong>of</strong> operation. A variety <strong>of</strong> notable PoliceCommand Units, such as the Scorpion, Tiger, and Thunder Brigades, were formed by the former<strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>ister Falah al-Naqib, a Sunni, <strong>in</strong> summer 2004 without the consent <strong>of</strong> U.S.commanders. These forces orig<strong>in</strong>ally drew praise as effective <strong>Iraq</strong>i security <strong>in</strong>itiatives and fortheir success <strong>in</strong> counterterrorism operations, but their high level <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dependence and reputationfor brutality are causes for concern. Other problematic units <strong>in</strong>clude:Wolf Brigade. A particularly feared commando unit, Wolf Brigade’s members are self-select<strong>in</strong>gand mostly recruited from the former <strong>Iraq</strong>i Special Forces. They helped to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> security <strong>in</strong>Mosul after an <strong>in</strong>surgent upris<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> late 2004. The Wolf Brigade is led by Maj. Gen. Abu Walid,famous for host<strong>in</strong>g a television show air<strong>in</strong>g what were claimed to be legally obta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>surgentconfessions. The brigade’s members are known to drive around Baghdad wear<strong>in</strong>g Saddam-erauniforms.165


Volcano Brigade. A police commando brigade, Volcano Brigade is dist<strong>in</strong>ct from the others bybe<strong>in</strong>g made up <strong>of</strong> Shiites loyal to the Badr Brigades. In 2005, this brigade began operat<strong>in</strong>g as adeath squad, openly <strong>in</strong>timidat<strong>in</strong>g civilians and target<strong>in</strong>g Sunnis for arrest and execution. It isthought to be the unit responsibly for a massacre <strong>of</strong> thirty-six Sunni men <strong>in</strong> Baghdad’s al-Hurriyah neighborhood <strong>in</strong> August 2005 and is greatly feared <strong>in</strong> Baghdad.Punishment Committee. A police unit, the Punishment Committee is known to harass—at thevery least—civilians, particularly Sunnis, accused <strong>of</strong> flout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Is</strong>lamic law or the rul<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Shiiteclerics.Maghawir Special Commando Brigades. Special commando units largely made up <strong>of</strong> veterans <strong>of</strong>the Saddam-era military, the Maghawir Special Commando Brigades are made up <strong>of</strong> about12,000 men <strong>in</strong> total. They have worked with U.S. forces <strong>in</strong> Najaf, Falluja, Ramadi, Mosul, andBaghdad, and are led by Maj. Gen. Flayih Muhammad. The brigades are known for both theireffectiveness and their brutality.Farook Brigade. A mostly Sunni Arab brigade that fought alongside U.S. forces <strong>in</strong> Ramadi andother places <strong>in</strong> Anbar prov<strong>in</strong>ce, this unit was disbanded when Jabr was appo<strong>in</strong>ted <strong>in</strong>teriorm<strong>in</strong>ister.Secret Investigative Unit. A police unit that has been accused <strong>of</strong> br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g Badrist militiamembers <strong>in</strong>to the police, the Secret Investigative Unit was housed at the bunker where U.S.forces found an Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry secret prison.ConclusionAssess<strong>in</strong>g the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the ISF or creat<strong>in</strong>g metrics for stability <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is a difficult task because<strong>of</strong> the many active groups and the fluidity with which <strong>in</strong>dividuals move between governmentsanctionedunits and private armed groups. As army and police units <strong>in</strong>crease and beg<strong>in</strong> todiversify, and as the black market for weapons and uniforms flourishes, it becomes harder toregulate legitimate units with<strong>in</strong> the security forces and to recognize militia members pos<strong>in</strong>g as<strong>Iraq</strong>i soldiers and policemen. While reduc<strong>in</strong>g the chaos <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is prov<strong>in</strong>g to be an immensechallenge, the future stability <strong>of</strong> the country will depend on the success <strong>of</strong> ongo<strong>in</strong>g efforts on thepart <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government and U.S. and coalition forces to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>tegrity <strong>of</strong> the ISF andelim<strong>in</strong>ate militias.Cecile Zwiebach was a research assistant at The Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Institute <strong>in</strong> 2005–2006.166


http://www.greenleft.<strong>org</strong>.au/2006/683/7982IRAQ: 'Civil war' refra<strong>in</strong> hides <strong>US</strong> death-squad programBy Doug LorimerSeptember 13, 2006GreenleftOn September 3, <strong>Iraq</strong>i national security adviser Mouwafak al Rubaie told journalists that thealleged second-<strong>in</strong>-command <strong>of</strong> the t<strong>in</strong>y al Qaeda <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> group, Hamed Jumaa Farid al Saeedi,had been arrested a few days earlier <strong>in</strong> north-east Baghdad. Rubaie said he was the mostimportant leader <strong>of</strong> the group after Abu Ayyub al Masri, who is believed to have taken controlafter a <strong>US</strong> air strike killed Abu Musab al Zarqawi on June 7.Rubaie said Saeedi was “directly responsible” for the February 22 bomb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Golden Domemosque <strong>in</strong> Samarra, north <strong>of</strong> Baghdad. This attack, Associated Press reported, “touched <strong>of</strong>f thesectarian bloodlett<strong>in</strong>g between Shiite and Sunni Muslims push<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong> toward civil war”.The mosque was a symbol <strong>of</strong> cooperation between the two major Muslim sects <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> — aSunni-run mosque that housed the Shiite Askari shr<strong>in</strong>e.The February 23 Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post reported that “witnesses said that <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istrycommandos and <strong>Iraq</strong>i police were cordon<strong>in</strong>g the shr<strong>in</strong>e before the explosions took place”. Aresident who lived near the mosque told the Post: “I was leav<strong>in</strong>g my house to go to work at 6am,but the [police] commandos did not allow me and said curfew is imposed. About an hour later,we heard the explosions.”With<strong>in</strong> hours, <strong>US</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>in</strong> Baghdad blamed the bomb<strong>in</strong>g on Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgents “dressed aspolice commandos” — which is how the next day’s New York Times reported the event.Blam<strong>in</strong>g the mosque bomb<strong>in</strong>g on “Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgents” provided a pretext for Wash<strong>in</strong>gton’scollaborators among the Shiite political-religious establishment to whip up animosity toward<strong>Iraq</strong>i Sunnis, who have been the ma<strong>in</strong> social base <strong>of</strong> the resistance movement’s guerrilla waraga<strong>in</strong>st the occupation forces.Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, <strong>Iraq</strong>’s top Shiite cleric, for example, issued a February 22 statementcall<strong>in</strong>g for Shiite street protests. Tens <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> Shiites took to the streets, vow<strong>in</strong>g revenge.With<strong>in</strong> a few hours, 168 Sunni mosques had been damaged.Later that day, <strong>Iraq</strong>i cleric Moqtada al Sadr, an outspoken Shiite opponent <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong>-ledoccupation, read a message on Aljazeera TV denounc<strong>in</strong>g attacks on Shiite and Sunni mosques.He warned that there was “a plan by the occupation to spark a sectarian war”.A week later <strong>US</strong> ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad accused Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia <strong>of</strong> carry<strong>in</strong>gout a wave <strong>of</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Sunnis <strong>in</strong> the mosque bomb<strong>in</strong>g’s wake. The March 7 Los Angeles167


Times reported that Khalilzad claimed “the <strong>US</strong> has little choice but to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> a strong presence<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> — or risk a regional conflict <strong>in</strong> which Arabs side with Sunnis and Iranians back Shiites”.S<strong>in</strong>ce then, the mantra <strong>of</strong> a Shiite versus Sunni “sectarian civil war” has dom<strong>in</strong>ated Westerncorporate media reports about <strong>Iraq</strong>, despite Pentagon figures show<strong>in</strong>g that 90% <strong>of</strong> “<strong>in</strong>surgentattacks” target the occupation troops and the <strong>US</strong>-controlled <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces.The Khalilzad-<strong>in</strong>itiated refra<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> “sectarian civil war” has conveniently ended any seriousexam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>in</strong> the corporate media <strong>of</strong> claims, made by Sunnis <strong>in</strong> the year lead<strong>in</strong>g up to theSamarra bomb<strong>in</strong>g, that the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry’s paramilitary police units, led by <strong>US</strong>“advisers”, had been carry<strong>in</strong>g out a large-scale program <strong>of</strong> abduction, torture and extrajudicialexecution <strong>of</strong> suspected resistance supporters.On those rare occasions s<strong>in</strong>ce then that the Western media has reported the activities <strong>of</strong> thesedeath squads, the role <strong>of</strong> their <strong>US</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>ers and “advisers” is never exam<strong>in</strong>ed.The May 22 New York Times, for example, reported that <strong>in</strong> August 2005 a police commandobrigade is believed to have kidnapped and killed 36 Sunnis <strong>in</strong> northern Baghdad. Although awarrant for murder was issued by a judge for the unit’s commander, “the arrest warrant wasnever executed, accord<strong>in</strong>g to court records”.A spokesperson for the Baghdad “Civilian Police Assistance <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> Team” told the paper that<strong>US</strong> military advisers were “attached to the Volcano Brigade last August, but that they wereunaware <strong>of</strong> the allegations concern<strong>in</strong>g the Huriya massacre or the outstand<strong>in</strong>g arrest warrant”.The spokesperson's statement was apparently good enough for the NYT.Only a few weeks before the Samarra bomb<strong>in</strong>g, General William Boyk<strong>in</strong>, the <strong>US</strong> deputyundersecretary <strong>of</strong> defence for <strong>in</strong>telligence, confirmed the accuracy <strong>of</strong> claims that the <strong>US</strong> isrunn<strong>in</strong>g a death-squad program.The February 4 NYT reported that Boyk<strong>in</strong> “was asked whether the government should reestablisha program <strong>of</strong> identify<strong>in</strong>g and assass<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g specific adversaries, like Operation Phoenix,conducted <strong>in</strong> Vietnam by the CIA”, under which <strong>US</strong>-<strong>org</strong>anised death squads killed at least26,000 Vietnamese civilians between January 1968 and August 1972.“Emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g that he was giv<strong>in</strong>g his personal op<strong>in</strong>ion, General Boyk<strong>in</strong> said that America’sconventional military forces and its Special Operations teams <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and Afghanistan were'do<strong>in</strong>g a pretty good job <strong>of</strong> that right now’.”“I th<strong>in</strong>k we’re do<strong>in</strong>g what the Phoenix program was designed to do, without all <strong>of</strong> the secrecy”,Boyk<strong>in</strong> added.S<strong>in</strong>ce April 2004, DynCorp International has been the pr<strong>in</strong>cipal “private military contractor”provid<strong>in</strong>g tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Iraq</strong>’s <strong>US</strong>-recruited police. The May 13, 2002 Chicago Tribune reportedthat “public records show that DynCorp, which hires former Special Operations military168


personnel and CIA operators and contracts them back to the government, is l<strong>in</strong>ked to at least 50subsidiaries and satellite companies across the <strong>US</strong> and around the world”.United Press International reported <strong>in</strong> July 2004 that through State Department and Pentagoncontracts, which account for 98% <strong>of</strong> its bus<strong>in</strong>ess, DynCorp “implements foreign policy byproxy” and its security personnel “are effectively immune from crim<strong>in</strong>al sanctions”.DynCorp’s website boasts that for “more than 50 years” the corporation “has been entrusted withimportant responsibilities to keep our military personnel safe and ready, help stem the flow <strong>of</strong>illegal narcotics to the United States, help protect American diplomats and key foreign leaders,[and] tra<strong>in</strong> police and military <strong>in</strong> countries that are critical to <strong>US</strong> <strong>in</strong>terests”.The corporate media, however, hardly ever reports on the connection between this CIA frontcompany, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police and the wave <strong>of</strong> extrajudicial executions that has steadily mounteds<strong>in</strong>ce 2004.A rare exception was the May 22 NYT, which reported that it was after DynCorp employee JonVillanova “arrived <strong>in</strong> Basra last spr<strong>in</strong>g to help build a police force <strong>in</strong> southern <strong>Iraq</strong> when bodiesbegan pil<strong>in</strong>g up. Twenty or more <strong>Iraq</strong>i civilians were dragged from their homes, shot <strong>in</strong> the headand dumped <strong>in</strong> the streets.“The evidence po<strong>in</strong>ted to some <strong>of</strong> the very people he and his team <strong>of</strong> foreign police adviserswere struggl<strong>in</strong>g to tra<strong>in</strong>: a cluster <strong>of</strong> senior <strong>of</strong>ficers work<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> a station called Jamiat.“But local <strong>of</strong>ficials resisted efforts to prosecute the <strong>of</strong>ficers. By the time <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>in</strong> Baghdad<strong>in</strong>tervened n<strong>in</strong>e months later, the corruption <strong>in</strong> Basra had gotten so bad that the 135-member<strong>in</strong>ternal affairs unit, set up to police the police, was operat<strong>in</strong>g as a r<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> extortionists,kidnappers and killers, American and <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>of</strong>ficials said.”From: Archives, Green Left Weekly issue #683 13 September 2006.169


http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/9/20/10401/8655CIA-Sponsored <strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong> Rampant <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>Daily KosBy francislhollandSeptember 20, 2006How could we have been so bl<strong>in</strong>d, decry<strong>in</strong>g the scores <strong>of</strong> daily deaths <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is without everdemand<strong>in</strong>g the end <strong>of</strong> the CIA-sponsored death squads there? Many <strong>of</strong> us have been compar<strong>in</strong>gthe war <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> to Vietnam without focus<strong>in</strong>g on the more obvious parallels to the modus operandiand <strong>US</strong> personnel that <strong>Iraq</strong> shares with the previous <strong>US</strong>-sponsored conflicts <strong>in</strong> the El Salvadorand Guatemala <strong>of</strong> the 1980's. The difference is crucially important, because it is the key to thesource <strong>of</strong> the rampant "unexpla<strong>in</strong>ed" and "unattributed" deaths <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is that we read <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong> thepapers each day. To determ<strong>in</strong>e who is do<strong>in</strong>g all the death-squad kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, lets just add upwhat President has told us, factor <strong>in</strong> the post-Central America anti-<strong>in</strong>surgency team he hasappo<strong>in</strong>ted, and then draw the dreadfully obvious and necessary conclusions.francislholland's diary ::For five years, the President has told us that:(1) "I do th<strong>in</strong>k <strong>Iraq</strong> is a central front <strong>in</strong> the war on terror", [ http://www.cbsnews.com/... ] andhe has said,(2) "To w<strong>in</strong> the war on terror, we must be able to deta<strong>in</strong>, question and, when appropriate,prosecute terrorists captured here <strong>in</strong> America and on the battlefields around the world." [http://www.cnn.com/... ], and Bush further <strong>in</strong>sists <strong>in</strong>cessantly that he(3) Must use "all the tools" <strong>of</strong> anti-<strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. [ http://www.whitehouse.gov/... ]Meanwhile, each day even the MSM reports one or more <strong>Iraq</strong> stories to the effect that,Authorities <strong>in</strong> the capital discovered the bodies <strong>of</strong> six men who were bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded, handcuffedand shot <strong>in</strong> the back <strong>of</strong> the head, police said. [ http://www.americanchronicle.com/... ][G]unmen, militias, and paramilitary armies have attacked buses and m<strong>in</strong>ivans, kill<strong>in</strong>g allaboard, and they have carried out mass kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> scores <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is at a time.[http://www.military.com/... ]S<strong>in</strong>ce early 2005, gruesome f<strong>in</strong>ds <strong>of</strong> groups <strong>of</strong> corpses, <strong>of</strong>ten show<strong>in</strong>g signs <strong>of</strong> execution ortorture, have been becom<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly common. [ http://news.bbc.co.uk/... ]170


Although Bush hasn't specifically stated (to my knowledge) that death squads are among "all <strong>of</strong>the tools" he is us<strong>in</strong>g per se, Alternet.com po<strong>in</strong>ts out that the modus operandi <strong>of</strong> the deathsquads operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the <strong>US</strong>'s <strong>Iraq</strong> conflict is identical to the modus operandi <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong>Government's counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency techniques <strong>in</strong> the Central America <strong>in</strong> the 1980's.Amnesty International characterized the Salvadoran death squads as "<strong>of</strong>ficial personnel act<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> civilian clothes under the direction <strong>of</strong> superior <strong>of</strong>ficers." A 1989 Amnesty report, El Salvador"<strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong>"-A Government Strategy, identified a "persistent pattern <strong>of</strong> gross human rightsviolations by the Salvadoran armed forces" <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g "arbitrary arrest, torture, disappearance andextrajudicial execution."Although human rights groups have cont<strong>in</strong>ually l<strong>in</strong>ked death squad activities to the Salvadorangovernment, most U.S. media have reported on death squads as if they were a mysterious,<strong>in</strong>dependent force. This convenient fiction allows the U.S. government to cont<strong>in</strong>ue provid<strong>in</strong>gmassive military aid to the Salvadoran government as it commits horrendous cruelties-all <strong>in</strong> thename <strong>of</strong> promot<strong>in</strong>g "democracy." [ http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/... ]To deal with the skyrocket<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surgency, the Pentagon is consider<strong>in</strong>g creat<strong>in</strong>g secret deathsquads <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Now, the Pentagon's brave new solution for democracy <strong>in</strong> the Middle East is torevisit the reprehensible "Salvador Option," the clandest<strong>in</strong>e operation implemented by theReagan White House <strong>in</strong> the 1980s <strong>in</strong> El Salvador. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Newsweek, "Back then, facedwith los<strong>in</strong>g a war aga<strong>in</strong>st the Salvadoran rebels, the United States government funded"nationalist" forces that allegedly <strong>in</strong>cluded so-called death squads which killed scores <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>nocent civilians." Today, accord<strong>in</strong>g to an explosive new article <strong>in</strong> Newsweek, the Pentagondusted <strong>of</strong>f that model and has a proposal on the table to "advise, support and possibly tra<strong>in</strong>"secret <strong>Iraq</strong>i squads, "most likely hand-picked Kurdish Peshmerga fighters and Shiite militiamen,to target Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgents and their sympathizers, even across the border <strong>in</strong>to Syria."It's unclear whether the current proposed policy would direct the <strong>Iraq</strong>i squads to assass<strong>in</strong>atetheir targets or "snatch" them and send them to secret facilities for <strong>in</strong>terrogation. In pla<strong>in</strong>language: the squads would be either hit men or kidnapper/torturers. [ http://www.alternet.<strong>org</strong>/...]Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense Donald Rumsfeld has held El Salvador up as a model for <strong>Iraq</strong>. Anddur<strong>in</strong>g the recent Vice Presidential debates, Vice President Dick Cheney stated, "Twenty yearsago we had a similar situation <strong>in</strong> El Salvador. We had a guerilla <strong>in</strong>surgency that controlledroughly a third <strong>of</strong> the country, 75,000 people dead. And we held free elections ... And today ElSalvador is a whale <strong>of</strong> a lot better because we held free elections." Accord<strong>in</strong>g to a 1993 U.N.-sponsored truth commission, however, up to "90 percent <strong>of</strong> the atrocities <strong>in</strong> the conflict "werecommitted by the U.S.-sponsored army and its surrogates, "with the rebels responsible for 5percent and the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 5 percent undeterm<strong>in</strong>ed." These death squads "abducted members <strong>of</strong>the civilian population and <strong>of</strong> rebel groups. They tortured their hostages, were responsible fortheir disappearance and usually executed them." [ http://www.alternet.<strong>org</strong>/... ]171


President Bush also appo<strong>in</strong>ted neocon Elliot Abrams to be his senior adviser on the MiddleEast. Abrams was also a staunch supporter <strong>of</strong> the Salvador Option <strong>in</strong> the 1980s: whennewspapers "reported that a U.S.-tra<strong>in</strong>ed military unit had massacred hundreds <strong>of</strong> villagers <strong>in</strong> thet<strong>in</strong>y Salvadoran hamlet <strong>of</strong> El Mozote, Abrams told Congress the story was noth<strong>in</strong>g butcommunist propaganda." When confronted with the United Nations report that the vast majority<strong>of</strong> "atrocities <strong>in</strong> El Salvador's civil war were committed by Reagan-assisted death squads,"Abrams's response: "The adm<strong>in</strong>istration's record on El Salvador is one <strong>of</strong> fabulousachievements." Abrams was convicted <strong>of</strong> ly<strong>in</strong>g to Congress about Iran-Contra <strong>in</strong> 1987 - he waspardoned by Ge<strong>org</strong>e H.W. Bush <strong>in</strong> 1992. [ http://www.alternet.<strong>org</strong>/... ]The <strong>US</strong> has even hired as contractors thousands <strong>of</strong> the very same people previously responsiblefor <strong>US</strong>-sponsored extra-judicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs and death squad activity <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America. [http://www.alternet.<strong>org</strong>/... ]Blackwater <strong>US</strong>A [<strong>US</strong> contractor <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>] has sent recruiters to Chile, Peru, Argent<strong>in</strong>a,Colombia and Guatemala for one specific reason alone," said an <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>in</strong> Kuwaitwho requested anonymity. "All these countries experienced dirty warsâ€_ and they have militarymen well-tra<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> deal<strong>in</strong>g with <strong>in</strong>ternal subversives. They are well-versed <strong>in</strong> extract<strong>in</strong>gconfessions from prisoners. [ http://www.alternet.<strong>org</strong>/... ]So, if Bush says that it is necessary to torture people <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i "central front" <strong>of</strong> the terror war,and then he moves the <strong>US</strong> death-squad personnel to <strong>Iraq</strong>, and then thousands <strong>of</strong> tortured <strong>Iraq</strong>isare found dead <strong>in</strong> the streets, just like <strong>in</strong> San Salvador [ http://www.pbs.<strong>org</strong>/... ] and GuatemalaCity, [ http://www.gwu.edu/... ] we have to draw the obvious conclusion that CIA-sponsoreddeath squads are rampant <strong>in</strong> the rampant daily kill<strong>in</strong>gs occurr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.To my <strong>in</strong>complete knowledge, the Adm<strong>in</strong>istration has yet to admit that death squads are <strong>US</strong>policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, but <strong>US</strong> policy <strong>in</strong> Central America was to deny the <strong>US</strong> <strong>of</strong> death squads as well.With cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g reports <strong>of</strong> atrocities and murders <strong>in</strong> El Salvador, the U.S. Congress no longeraccepted the State Department's assurance that th<strong>in</strong>gs were gett<strong>in</strong>g better. Speaker <strong>of</strong> the HouseTom Foley created a special task force to monitor El Salvador's <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong> the murders.Congressman Joe Moakley <strong>of</strong> Massachusetts was selected to head up the <strong>in</strong>vestigation. Dur<strong>in</strong>ghis research and visits to El Salvador, Congressman Moakley encountered a massive cover-up,deep problems with the Salvadoran armed forces, conspiracy and lies, which led him tochallenge U.S. policy. [ http://www.pbs.<strong>org</strong>/... ]Amnesty International characterized the Salvadoran death squads as "<strong>of</strong>ficial personnel act<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> civilian clothes under the direction <strong>of</strong> superior <strong>of</strong>ficers." A 1989 Amnesty report, El Salvador"<strong>Death</strong> <strong>Squads</strong>"-A Government Strategy, identified a "persistent pattern <strong>of</strong> gross human rightsviolations by the Salvadoran armed forces" <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g "arbitrary arrest, torture, disappearance andextrajudicial execution."Although human rights groups have cont<strong>in</strong>ually l<strong>in</strong>ked death squad activities to the Salvadorangovernment, most U.S. media have reported on death squads as if they were a mysterious,<strong>in</strong>dependent force. This convenient fiction allows the U.S. government to cont<strong>in</strong>ue provid<strong>in</strong>g172


massive military aid to the Salvadoran government as it commits horrendous cruelties-all <strong>in</strong> thename <strong>of</strong> promot<strong>in</strong>g "democracy." [ http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/... ]Above, I quoted Bush say<strong>in</strong>g that he would "question [torture] and, when appropriate, prosecuteterrorists." But what does Bush do with those whom he deems to be suspected or potentialterrorists when he does NOT deem it "appropriate" to formally prosecute them? Does hesimply let them go or do they end up dead by the score on the streets <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, "bl<strong>in</strong>dfolded,handcuffed and shot <strong>in</strong> the back <strong>of</strong> the head" [ http://www.americanchronicle.com/... ] "show<strong>in</strong>gsigns <strong>of</strong> execution or torture"? [ http://news.bbc.co.uk/... ]History and the President's own words and deeds speak for themselves. [http://www.alternet.<strong>org</strong>/... ] The <strong>US</strong> is certa<strong>in</strong>ly sponsor<strong>in</strong>g or directly <strong>org</strong>aniz<strong>in</strong>g the deathsquads that are kill<strong>in</strong>g thousands or <strong>Iraq</strong>i, many more than are be<strong>in</strong>g killed <strong>in</strong> directconfrontations with <strong>US</strong> troops.I don't th<strong>in</strong>k the majority <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong> public favors anonymous <strong>US</strong>-sponsored death squads thatkill dozens <strong>of</strong> people a day. It's time for the public and Democratic members <strong>of</strong> Congress toconduct <strong>in</strong>vestigations and render a full account<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong>-sponsored death-squad activity <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>,just as Congressman Joe Moakley <strong>of</strong> Massachusetts led such <strong>in</strong>vestigations <strong>in</strong> the 1980's, as part<strong>of</strong> the effort to stop it. [ http://www.serendipity.li/... ]. [ http://www.amnestyusa.<strong>org</strong>/... ] "Our"Government, which operates <strong>in</strong> our name, should not be round<strong>in</strong>g up dozens <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is each dayand shoot<strong>in</strong>g them <strong>in</strong> the back <strong>of</strong> the head.173


http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/10/04/iraq.ma<strong>in</strong>/<strong>in</strong>dex.html?section=cnn_topstories<strong>Iraq</strong> police brigade suspected <strong>of</strong> aid<strong>in</strong>g abuctions pulledCNN.comOctober 4, 2006BAGHDAD, <strong>Iraq</strong> (CNN) -- The Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry has removed a police brigade from the streets<strong>of</strong> Baghdad because <strong>of</strong> a brazen kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g this week <strong>of</strong> 26 people, a m<strong>in</strong>istry spokesman saidWednesday.Some Sunnis blame the abductions on Shiite death squads, which many people suspect are<strong>in</strong>filtrat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i police units.Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry spokesman, Brig. Gen. Abdul Karim Khalaf, said Wednesday the brigade waspatrolled the southwestern neighborhood <strong>of</strong> Amil, where the kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g happened on Sunday.At least 20 gunmen, several dressed like police commandos, parked <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> a meat process<strong>in</strong>gplant, seized the workers and put them <strong>in</strong> three trucks before driv<strong>in</strong>g away.U.S. Maj. Gen. William Caldwell announced the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police unit's recall earlier Wednesday andidentified it as the 8th Brigade, 2nd National Police.'Clear evidence <strong>of</strong> complicity'There is "clear evidence that there was some complicity <strong>in</strong> allow<strong>in</strong>g death squad elements tomove freely when, <strong>in</strong> fact, they were supposed to have been imped<strong>in</strong>g their movement; thatperhaps they did not respond as rapidly when reports were made," Caldwell said.The brigade police <strong>of</strong>ficers "had not put their full allegiance commitment beh<strong>in</strong>d the government<strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>," and <strong>in</strong>stead, aligned with "some other elements outside" <strong>of</strong> the national police, he said.The government lost "trust and confidence" <strong>in</strong> the unit because <strong>of</strong> "poor performances" and"alleged crim<strong>in</strong>al wrongdo<strong>in</strong>gs," said Caldwell.The brigade will get "anti-militia, anti-sectarian violence, and national unity tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, both at theunit level and at the <strong>in</strong>dividual level," he said.Triple bomb<strong>in</strong>g kills 12A triple bomb<strong>in</strong>g target<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>'s M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Industry employees killed at least 12 people andwounded 70 others Wednesday <strong>in</strong> a ma<strong>in</strong>ly Christian neighborhood <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, police said.Two bombs targeted m<strong>in</strong>istry guards and another bomb targeted a m<strong>in</strong>istry convoy, accord<strong>in</strong>g toa Baghdad emergency police <strong>of</strong>ficial.A m<strong>in</strong>istry spokesman said Industry M<strong>in</strong>ister Fawzi al-Hariri was not present when the bombswent <strong>of</strong>f <strong>in</strong> rapid succession as bodyguards were tak<strong>in</strong>g cars to a refuel<strong>in</strong>g site.174


The convoy was travel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the Camp Sara neighborhood and the attack also damaged part <strong>of</strong> anearby build<strong>in</strong>g.Bodies lay <strong>in</strong> the street next to the smok<strong>in</strong>g wreckage <strong>of</strong> burn<strong>in</strong>g cars, accord<strong>in</strong>g to TheAssociated Press.Rescue workers piled corpses <strong>in</strong>to an ambulance parked next to the crumbled facade <strong>of</strong> abuild<strong>in</strong>g, while a policeman warned residents to leave for fear more bombs would explode, APreported.An <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly common <strong>in</strong>surgent tactic is to detonate one bomb to draw rescue workers andonlookers, then to explode a second device to cause mass casualties.One witness, who identified himself to AP only by his first name, Hamdi, said a roadside bombwent <strong>of</strong>f first and people started to gather, then the second blast went <strong>of</strong>f."Then more people gathered and they were search<strong>in</strong>g for their dead or miss<strong>in</strong>g relatives when thecar bomb exploded," he told Associated Press Television News at the scene. "Everybody knowsthis is a Christian neighborhood, they are neither Sunnis or Shiites, so why are they do<strong>in</strong>g this tothem?"Meanwhile, security forces <strong>in</strong> the capital have found 22 bullet-riddled bodies <strong>in</strong> the past 24hours. Some <strong>of</strong> the bodies showed signs <strong>of</strong> torture.Other violence around the capital Wednesday <strong>in</strong>cluded:* A suicide truck bomb went <strong>of</strong>f at the <strong>Iraq</strong>i army headquarters <strong>in</strong> Ramadi, the capital <strong>of</strong>Anbar prov<strong>in</strong>ce, a hospital <strong>of</strong>ficial told CNN. There was no immediate word on casualties.* A car bomb <strong>in</strong> the Dora district killed an <strong>Iraq</strong>i civilian and wounded four others, a police<strong>of</strong>ficial said.* A roadside bomb apparently meant for an <strong>Iraq</strong>i police patrol exploded <strong>in</strong> central Baghdad'sKarrada neighborhood wound<strong>in</strong>g a police <strong>of</strong>ficer and a civilian, police said.* Also, the U.S. military on Wednesday reported two troop deaths on Tuesday, one <strong>in</strong>Baghdad and the other near Kirkuk.15 U.S. troops killed <strong>in</strong> three daysThe U.S. military on Wednesday reported the two more American soldiers were killed, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>gthe number <strong>of</strong> U.S. troop fatalities <strong>in</strong> the first three days <strong>of</strong> October to 15.The latest reported death was a U.S. soldier who was killed <strong>in</strong> eastern Baghdad on Tuesday.175


The Multi-National Division Baghdad soldier died at around 3:15 p.m. "when terrorists attackedhis patrol with small-arms fire," accord<strong>in</strong>g to the U.S. military.Also Tuesday, unknown gunfire killed a U.S. soldier serv<strong>in</strong>g with Task Force Lightn<strong>in</strong>g nearKirkuk, the military reported Wednesday.Ten <strong>of</strong> the 15 troops killed this month were attacked <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, where U.S. and <strong>Iraq</strong>i troopshave been crack<strong>in</strong>g down on <strong>in</strong>surgents.Four <strong>of</strong> them were killed <strong>in</strong> Anbar prov<strong>in</strong>ce, where fight<strong>in</strong>g has persisted between U.S. troopsand militants up and down the Euphrates River valley.Only one <strong>of</strong> the 15 -- one <strong>of</strong> the Anbar fatalities -- did not happen <strong>in</strong> combat. The deaths are part<strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>tensify<strong>in</strong>g sectarian fight<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong>surgent violence.Seventy-three U.S. troops were killed <strong>in</strong> September and 64 died <strong>in</strong> August. The highest monthlyU.S. troop death number <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong> war was <strong>in</strong> November 2004, at the time <strong>of</strong> the U.S.-led<strong>of</strong>fensive aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>surgents <strong>in</strong> Falluja.S<strong>in</strong>ce the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the U.S.-led <strong>Iraq</strong> war, 2,729 U.S. military service members have beenkilled, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g seven military contractors.CNN's Mohammed Tawfeeq contributed to this report.Copyright 2006 CNN. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast,rewritten, or redistributed. Associated Press contributed to this report.176


http://www.timesonl<strong>in</strong>e.co.uk/article/0,,7374-2388711,00.htmlBaghdad police unit scrapped for help<strong>in</strong>g death squadsTimes <strong>of</strong> LondonBy James Hider, <strong>of</strong> The Times, <strong>in</strong> BaghdadOctober 4, 2006An entire police brigade <strong>in</strong> Baghdad has been suspended and its commander placed under arreston charges <strong>of</strong> aid<strong>in</strong>g sectarian death squads that have carried out mass kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs, it emergedtoday.The Eighth Brigade <strong>of</strong> the 2nd National Police Battalion, created to keep order <strong>in</strong> westernBaghdad, was de-mobilised a day after armed men <strong>in</strong> uniform herded <strong>of</strong>f 14 shopkeepers fromcentral Baghdad, and two days after 24 workers were abducted from a meat process<strong>in</strong>g plant <strong>in</strong>the capital."The brigade’s past performance does not demonstrate the level <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essionalism sought by them<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>terior," Major General William Caldwell, <strong>of</strong> the <strong>US</strong> military, said."It was realised that remov<strong>in</strong>g them from Baghdad would, <strong>in</strong> fact, enhance security." The brigadehas more than 800 <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>in</strong> uniform."There was clear evidence that there was some complicity <strong>in</strong> allow<strong>in</strong>g death squad elements tomove freely, when <strong>in</strong> fact they were supposed to be imped<strong>in</strong>g their movement," GeneralCaldwell said."The forces <strong>in</strong> the unit have not put their full allegiance to the government <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and gave theirallegiance to others," he added.Sunni leaders have for months accused police units <strong>of</strong> help<strong>in</strong>g Shia death squads carry out aseries <strong>of</strong> massive kidnapp<strong>in</strong>gs, which have <strong>in</strong>cluded the abduction <strong>of</strong> the entire <strong>US</strong>-<strong>Iraq</strong>iChamber <strong>of</strong> Commerce, several groups <strong>of</strong> factory workers and the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Olympic Committee.They have charged that the police forces are hopelessly <strong>in</strong>filtrated by members <strong>of</strong> Shia militiaswho have killed scores <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>nocent people.Brigadier Abdel Karim Khalaf, an <strong>in</strong>terior m<strong>in</strong>istry spokesman, said the lieutenant colonel <strong>in</strong>charge <strong>of</strong> the Eighth Brigade had been deta<strong>in</strong>ed and was be<strong>in</strong>g questioned, while rank-and-filepolicemen were be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestigated at random.The charges <strong>of</strong> complicity <strong>in</strong> the sectarian war that has crippled the capital was a furtheradmission by the Shia-led government that its own security forces are partly responsible for the<strong>in</strong>cessant violence plagu<strong>in</strong>g Baghdad.177


Nouri al-Maliki, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, announced yesterday a four-po<strong>in</strong>t plan that <strong>in</strong>cludedthe establishment <strong>of</strong> neighbourhood committees who would be able to report on suspiciousactivities by the security forces and local militias.The disgraced brigade will be sent for re-tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g by American forces, although one <strong>US</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>ersaid the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g programme had been scheduled months ago as part <strong>of</strong> a sweep<strong>in</strong>g overhaul <strong>of</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>’s police forces, who were hastily recruited after the 2003 <strong>in</strong>vasion and which havefrequently proved <strong>in</strong>adequate to the task <strong>of</strong> eradicat<strong>in</strong>g violence.In late 2004, almost the entire police force <strong>in</strong> the northern city <strong>of</strong> Mosul fled their bases when<strong>in</strong>surgents attacked, while Shia policemen <strong>in</strong> Najaf jo<strong>in</strong>ed rebels from the Mahdi Army militiaand gave them their weapons when they took over the shr<strong>in</strong>e city earlier that year.S<strong>in</strong>ce those major setbacks, <strong>US</strong> forces have been re-tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police, but the programmehas had little impact.A survivor <strong>of</strong> Monday’s mass kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a parade <strong>of</strong> computer shops near Baghdad’sTechnology University described how half a dozen vehicles, with <strong>of</strong>ficial security forcesmark<strong>in</strong>gs on them, pulled up and men <strong>in</strong> military fatigues rounded up all the Sunnis <strong>in</strong> the shops.They drove <strong>of</strong>f with 14 people but stopped two shops short <strong>of</strong> his establishment, he said.The bodies <strong>of</strong> several <strong>of</strong> those abducted from a meat process<strong>in</strong>g plant on Sunday later show<strong>in</strong>gsigns <strong>of</strong> torture. Hundreds <strong>of</strong> Sunni residents from the area later demonstrated near the factorycarry<strong>in</strong>g banners that read "Get police troops out <strong>of</strong> our area."178


http://news.<strong>in</strong>dependent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article1938380.eceOperation endur<strong>in</strong>g chaos: The retreat <strong>of</strong> the coalition & rise <strong>of</strong> the militiasThe IndependentPublished: 29 October 2006By Kim Sengupta<strong>Iraq</strong>'s savage sectarian war, with its <strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ate torture and kill<strong>in</strong>gs, is an even greaterobstacle to peace than the <strong>in</strong>surgency. What will happen to the country when the coalition troopseventually pull out? Kim Sengupta reportsThe message to the Baghdad m<strong>org</strong>ue was simple - they could do what they liked with the plastichandcuffs, but the metal ones were expensive and needed to be returned. Such is the murderousstate <strong>of</strong> affairs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> at the moment that the demand, made by a militia gunman who is alsobelieved to be a member <strong>of</strong> the Special Police Commandos, hardly caused a stir.There was a similar lack <strong>of</strong> shock when a dozen bodies were brought <strong>in</strong> with identification cardsshow<strong>in</strong>g that each had the name Omar. The catch here was that Omar is a Sunni name, and thisfact was enough to seal their fate at Shia checkpo<strong>in</strong>ts.Baghdad is full <strong>of</strong> checkpo<strong>in</strong>ts. Leav<strong>in</strong>g the Hamra Hotel, where the dw<strong>in</strong>dl<strong>in</strong>g band <strong>of</strong> Britishjournalists outside the Green Zone stay, means negotiat<strong>in</strong>g the Badr Brigade, their Shiacompetitors the Mehdi Army <strong>of</strong> Moqtada al-Sadr, and the Kurdish peshmerga. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i policeand the government paramilitaries, <strong>in</strong> the meantime, have their own barriers. And there areothers: the Shia Defenders <strong>of</strong> Khadamiya, set up by Moqtada's cous<strong>in</strong> Husse<strong>in</strong> al-Sadr, and thegovernment-backed Tiger and Scorpion brigades.They all have similar looks: balaclavas or wrap-around sunglasses and headbands, black leathergloves with f<strong>in</strong>gers cut <strong>of</strong>f, and a very lethal arsenal <strong>of</strong> weapons. When not mann<strong>in</strong>gcheckpo<strong>in</strong>ts, they hurtle through the streets <strong>in</strong> 4x4s, scatter<strong>in</strong>g the traffic by fir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the air. Out<strong>of</strong> sight, they stand accused <strong>of</strong> arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs.This is a shadowy struggle, which <strong>in</strong>volves tortured prisoners huddled <strong>in</strong> dungeons, murdervictims mutilated with knives and electric drills, and distraught families search<strong>in</strong>g for relationswho have been "disappeared".<strong>Iraq</strong>'s savage sectarian war is now regarded as a greater obstacle to any semblance <strong>of</strong> peacereturn<strong>in</strong>g than the <strong>in</strong>surgency, and was the ma<strong>in</strong> reason for the Americans recently pour<strong>in</strong>g12,000 troops <strong>in</strong>to the capital - an operation that, they now acknowledge, has failed.Yet, ironically, the death squads are the result <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> policy. At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> last year, withno end to the Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> sight, the Pentagon was reported to have decided to tra<strong>in</strong> Shiaand Kurdish fighters to carry out "irregular missions". The policy, exposed <strong>in</strong> the <strong>US</strong> media, wascalled the "Salvador Option" after the American-backed counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> America179


more than 20 years ago, which led to 70,000 deaths and countless <strong>in</strong>stances <strong>of</strong> human rightsabuse.Some <strong>of</strong> the most persistent allegations <strong>of</strong> abuse have been made aga<strong>in</strong>st the Wolf Brigade, many<strong>of</strong> whom were formerly <strong>in</strong> Saddam's Baathist forces. Their ma<strong>in</strong> <strong>US</strong> adviser until April last yearwas James Steele, who, <strong>in</strong> his own biography, states that he commanded the <strong>US</strong> military group <strong>in</strong>El Salvador dur<strong>in</strong>g the height <strong>of</strong> the guerrilla war and was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>surgencytra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. The compla<strong>in</strong>ts aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Iraq</strong>i special forces cont<strong>in</strong>ue. At the end <strong>of</strong> last year, while <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>, I <strong>in</strong>terviewed Ahmed Sadoun who was arrested <strong>in</strong> Mosul and held for seven months beforebe<strong>in</strong>g released without charge.Dur<strong>in</strong>g that time, he said, he was tortured. He showed marks on his body, which were the results<strong>of</strong> the beat<strong>in</strong>gs and burn<strong>in</strong>gs. Mr Sadoun, 38, did not know which paramilitary group,accompanied by American soldiers, had seized him, but the Wolf Brigade was widely <strong>in</strong>volved<strong>in</strong> suppress<strong>in</strong>g disturbances <strong>in</strong> Mosul at the time.Mr Sadoun fled to Amman to escape further <strong>of</strong>ficial attention. His family, however, had stayedbeh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Mosul, and last month his 27-year-old brother, Rashid, was arrested by paramilitaries.His body, shot <strong>in</strong> the head, was dumped on a stretch <strong>of</strong> waste ground five days later.As the <strong>US</strong> and British policies <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> reach the last stages <strong>of</strong> unravell<strong>in</strong>g, there are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glyfrantic calls to the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, Nour al-Maliki, from Wash<strong>in</strong>gton and London to re<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> thegovernment-sponsored death squads. The problem is that the militias, well armed andentrenched, are connected to political parties who know that Mr al-Maliki is dependant on theirsupport. Two violent <strong>in</strong>cidents last week illustrated the extent <strong>of</strong> the grip the gunmen now haveon <strong>Iraq</strong>i society.<strong>US</strong> and <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces went <strong>in</strong>to Sadr City, the vast Shia slum on the outskirts <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, tocapture, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the military, "a top, illegal armed group commander direct<strong>in</strong>g widespreaddeath-squad activity".Instead <strong>of</strong> congratulat<strong>in</strong>g the troops, Mr al-Maliki, purportedly the commander-<strong>in</strong>-chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'smilitary, angrily compla<strong>in</strong>ed he was not told about the operation, add<strong>in</strong>g: "We will ask forclarification <strong>of</strong> what happened <strong>in</strong> Sadr City, we will review the issue with the mult<strong>in</strong>ationalforces so that it will not be repeated."Mr al-Maliki, needless to say, needs the back<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Moqtada al-Sadr, who controls Sadr City.Falan Hassan Shansai, the leader <strong>of</strong> the Sadr bloc, which has 30 out <strong>of</strong> the 275 seats <strong>in</strong> theparliament, publicly warned <strong>of</strong> the consequences if such action was, <strong>in</strong>deed, repeated.In the south, 800 members <strong>of</strong> the Mehdi Army <strong>in</strong> black uniforms stormed Amarah, the capital <strong>of</strong>Maysan prov<strong>in</strong>ce, recently vacated by the British, and took over the city. Dozens were killed <strong>in</strong>the fight<strong>in</strong>g, while around 500 British forces were put on standby <strong>in</strong> Basra but did not <strong>in</strong>tervene.Moqtada's men left after blow<strong>in</strong>g up three <strong>of</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong> police stations.180


The Mehdi Army does not always have to resort to violence to achieve its aim. In districts itcontrols, such as Hurriyah <strong>in</strong> north-west Baghdad, owners <strong>of</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>esses and properties aresimply told they are be<strong>in</strong>g taken over, and large red crosses are pa<strong>in</strong>ted on the premises as amessage that they have a few days to leave.Sergeant Jeff Nelson, an <strong>in</strong>telligence analyst with the <strong>US</strong> army's 1st Battalion, 23rd InfantryRegiment, <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, said: "They have <strong>in</strong>filtrated every branch <strong>of</strong> public service and everypolitical <strong>of</strong>fice they can get their hands on. As soon as the <strong>US</strong> leaves, they will be able todom<strong>in</strong>ate the area with key citizens, key <strong>of</strong>fices."Sgt Nelson said his battalion has <strong>in</strong>vestigated 40 sectarian kill<strong>in</strong>gs and collected 57 bodies <strong>in</strong> oneweek. None had led to any arrest. He said: "Sometimes we have a feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> completehopelessness."One reason why Mr al-Maliki's government was not told about the Sadr City raid was that thishas led <strong>in</strong> the past to the targets be<strong>in</strong>g warned <strong>of</strong>f. Earlier this month, the Americans received<strong>in</strong>telligence about a Shia militia torture chamber <strong>in</strong> Baghdad. Capta<strong>in</strong> Kev<strong>in</strong> Sage, whose unitwas due to raid the address, needed approval from the <strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities. This was delayed forseveral days, and, when it eventually came through, the two-storey build<strong>in</strong>g was found to beabandoned.Be<strong>in</strong>g arrested does not mean that militia members will be kept <strong>in</strong> custody. Major Husse<strong>in</strong> al-Qaisi, a battalion commander with the 6th Division <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i army, said: "Sometimes they willback them up no matter what, and we just have to let them go."The message to the Baghdad m<strong>org</strong>ue was simple - they could do what they liked with the plastichandcuffs, but the metal ones were expensive and needed to be returned. Such is the murderousstate <strong>of</strong> affairs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> at the moment that the demand, made by a militia gunman who is alsobelieved to be a member <strong>of</strong> the Special Police Commandos, hardly caused a stir.There was a similar lack <strong>of</strong> shock when a dozen bodies were brought <strong>in</strong> with identification cardsshow<strong>in</strong>g that each had the name Omar. The catch here was that Omar is a Sunni name, and thisfact was enough to seal their fate at Shia checkpo<strong>in</strong>ts.Baghdad is full <strong>of</strong> checkpo<strong>in</strong>ts. Leav<strong>in</strong>g the Hamra Hotel, where the dw<strong>in</strong>dl<strong>in</strong>g band <strong>of</strong> Britishjournalists outside the Green Zone stay, means negotiat<strong>in</strong>g the Badr Brigade, their Shiacompetitors the Mehdi Army <strong>of</strong> Moqtada al-Sadr, and the Kurdish peshmerga. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i policeand the government paramilitaries, <strong>in</strong> the meantime, have their own barriers. And there areothers: the Shia Defenders <strong>of</strong> Khadamiya, set up by Moqtada's cous<strong>in</strong> Husse<strong>in</strong> al-Sadr, and thegovernment-backed Tiger and Scorpion brigades.They all have similar looks: balaclavas or wrap-around sunglasses and headbands, black leathergloves with f<strong>in</strong>gers cut <strong>of</strong>f, and a very lethal arsenal <strong>of</strong> weapons. When not mann<strong>in</strong>gcheckpo<strong>in</strong>ts, they hurtle through the streets <strong>in</strong> 4x4s, scatter<strong>in</strong>g the traffic by fir<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the air. Out<strong>of</strong> sight, they stand accused <strong>of</strong> arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial kill<strong>in</strong>gs.181


This is a shadowy struggle, which <strong>in</strong>volves tortured prisoners huddled <strong>in</strong> dungeons, murdervictims mutilated with knives and electric drills, and distraught families search<strong>in</strong>g for relationswho have been "disappeared".<strong>Iraq</strong>'s savage sectarian war is now regarded as a greater obstacle to any semblance <strong>of</strong> peacereturn<strong>in</strong>g than the <strong>in</strong>surgency, and was the ma<strong>in</strong> reason for the Americans recently pour<strong>in</strong>g12,000 troops <strong>in</strong>to the capital - an operation that, they now acknowledge, has failed.Yet, ironically, the death squads are the result <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> policy. At the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> last year, withno end to the Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> sight, the Pentagon was reported to have decided to tra<strong>in</strong> Shiaand Kurdish fighters to carry out "irregular missions". The policy, exposed <strong>in</strong> the <strong>US</strong> media, wascalled the "Salvador Option" after the American-backed counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency <strong>in</strong> Lat<strong>in</strong> Americamore than 20 years ago, which led to 70,000 deaths and countless <strong>in</strong>stances <strong>of</strong> human rightsabuse.Some <strong>of</strong> the most persistent allegations <strong>of</strong> abuse have been made aga<strong>in</strong>st the Wolf Brigade, many<strong>of</strong> whom were formerly <strong>in</strong> Saddam's Baathist forces. Their ma<strong>in</strong> <strong>US</strong> adviser until April last yearwas James Steele, who, <strong>in</strong> his own biography, states that he commanded the <strong>US</strong> military group <strong>in</strong>El Salvador dur<strong>in</strong>g the height <strong>of</strong> the guerrilla war and was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>surgencytra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g. The compla<strong>in</strong>ts aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Iraq</strong>i special forces cont<strong>in</strong>ue. At the end <strong>of</strong> last year, while <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>, I <strong>in</strong>terviewed Ahmed Sadoun who was arrested <strong>in</strong> Mosul and held for seven months beforebe<strong>in</strong>g released without charge.Dur<strong>in</strong>g that time, he said, he was tortured. He showed marks on his body, which were the results<strong>of</strong> the beat<strong>in</strong>gs and burn<strong>in</strong>gs. Mr Sadoun, 38, did not know which paramilitary group,accompanied by American soldiers, had seized him, but the Wolf Brigade was widely <strong>in</strong>volved<strong>in</strong> suppress<strong>in</strong>g disturbances <strong>in</strong> Mosul at the time.Mr Sadoun fled to Amman to escape further <strong>of</strong>ficial attention. His family, however, had stayedbeh<strong>in</strong>d <strong>in</strong> Mosul, and last month his 27-year-old brother, Rashid, was arrested by paramilitaries.His body, shot <strong>in</strong> the head, was dumped on a stretch <strong>of</strong> waste ground five days later.As the <strong>US</strong> and British policies <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> reach the last stages <strong>of</strong> unravell<strong>in</strong>g, there are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>glyfrantic calls to the Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister, Nour al-Maliki, from Wash<strong>in</strong>gton and London to re<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> thegovernment-sponsored death squads. The problem is that the militias, well armed andentrenched, are connected to political parties who know that Mr al-Maliki is dependant on theirsupport. Two violent <strong>in</strong>cidents last week illustrated the extent <strong>of</strong> the grip the gunmen now haveon <strong>Iraq</strong>i society.<strong>US</strong> and <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces went <strong>in</strong>to Sadr City, the vast Shia slum on the outskirts <strong>of</strong> Baghdad, tocapture, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the military, "a top, illegal armed group commander direct<strong>in</strong>g widespreaddeath-squad activity".Instead <strong>of</strong> congratulat<strong>in</strong>g the troops, Mr al-Maliki, purportedly the commander-<strong>in</strong>-chief <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>'smilitary, angrily compla<strong>in</strong>ed he was not told about the operation, add<strong>in</strong>g: "We will ask for182


clarification <strong>of</strong> what happened <strong>in</strong> Sadr City, we will review the issue with the mult<strong>in</strong>ationalforces so that it will not be repeated."Mr al-Maliki, needless to say, needs the back<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Moqtada al-Sadr, who controls Sadr City.Falan Hassan Shansai, the leader <strong>of</strong> the Sadr bloc, which has 30 out <strong>of</strong> the 275 seats <strong>in</strong> theparliament, publicly warned <strong>of</strong> the consequences if such action was, <strong>in</strong>deed, repeated.In the south, 800 members <strong>of</strong> the Mehdi Army <strong>in</strong> black uniforms stormed Amarah, the capital <strong>of</strong>Maysan prov<strong>in</strong>ce, recently vacated by the British, and took over the city. Dozens were killed <strong>in</strong>the fight<strong>in</strong>g, while around 500 British forces were put on standby <strong>in</strong> Basra but did not <strong>in</strong>tervene.Moqtada's men left after blow<strong>in</strong>g up three <strong>of</strong> the ma<strong>in</strong> police stations.The Mehdi Army does not always have to resort to violence to achieve its aim. In districts itcontrols, such as Hurriyah <strong>in</strong> north-west Baghdad, owners <strong>of</strong> bus<strong>in</strong>esses and properties aresimply told they are be<strong>in</strong>g taken over, and large red crosses are pa<strong>in</strong>ted on the premises as amessage that they have a few days to leave.Sergeant Jeff Nelson, an <strong>in</strong>telligence analyst with the <strong>US</strong> army's 1st Battalion, 23rd InfantryRegiment, <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, said: "They have <strong>in</strong>filtrated every branch <strong>of</strong> public service and everypolitical <strong>of</strong>fice they can get their hands on. As soon as the <strong>US</strong> leaves, they will be able todom<strong>in</strong>ate the area with key citizens, key <strong>of</strong>fices."Sgt Nelson said his battalion has <strong>in</strong>vestigated 40 sectarian kill<strong>in</strong>gs and collected 57 bodies <strong>in</strong> oneweek. None had led to any arrest. He said: "Sometimes we have a feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> completehopelessness."One reason why Mr al-Maliki's government was not told about the Sadr City raid was that thishas led <strong>in</strong> the past to the targets be<strong>in</strong>g warned <strong>of</strong>f. Earlier this month, the Americans received<strong>in</strong>telligence about a Shia militia torture chamber <strong>in</strong> Baghdad. Capta<strong>in</strong> Kev<strong>in</strong> Sage, whose unitwas due to raid the address, needed approval from the <strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities. This was delayed forseveral days, and, when it eventually came through, the two-storey build<strong>in</strong>g was found to beabandoned.Be<strong>in</strong>g arrested does not mean that militia members will be kept <strong>in</strong> custody. Major Husse<strong>in</strong> al-Qaisi, a battalion commander with the 6th Division <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i army, said: "Sometimes they willback them up no matter what, and we just have to let them go."183


APPENDIX:THE CASE OF BRITISHCOVERT ACTION184


http://www.brusselstribunal.<strong>org</strong>/BritishBombers.htmThe Salvador Option exposed.Who's Blow<strong>in</strong>g Up <strong>Iraq</strong>? Evidence shows that bombs are planted by occupation forces.2005Compiled by Brussels TribunalBasra Shadowlands - The British Bombers - British bombs <strong>in</strong> Basra - Fake Terrorism <strong>Is</strong> aCoalition's Best Friend - Who's Blow<strong>in</strong>g Up <strong>Iraq</strong>? New evidence that bombs are be<strong>in</strong>g planted byBritish - British Special Forces Caught Carry<strong>in</strong>g Out Staged Terror In <strong>Iraq</strong>? - Were the BritishSoldiers Engaged <strong>in</strong> Counter-Insurgency Operation <strong>in</strong> Basra? - British “Pseudo-Gang” TerroristsExposed <strong>in</strong> Basra - Carry on Kill<strong>in</strong>g - Middle East Press: "Suspicions occupation <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>armed operations aga<strong>in</strong>st civilians and places <strong>of</strong> worship" - Further on arrest <strong>of</strong> two Britishsoldiers <strong>in</strong> Basra - The day that <strong>Iraq</strong>i anger exploded <strong>in</strong> the face <strong>of</strong> the British occupiers - MoreBlatant Lies From CNN! - Five <strong>Iraq</strong>i civilians killed' <strong>in</strong> SAS rescue operation - Double Standards<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>; British Agents <strong>in</strong> Local Drag Saved by Cavalry - Agents Provocateurs? - Media ShiftsAttention from SAS Screw Up to Iran - Where The Neocon Job Unraveled - What is CovertAction? - Big Trouble for British Occupation <strong>of</strong> Southern <strong>Iraq</strong> - Al-Sadr Official Says StagedBomb<strong>in</strong>gs Aimed at Start<strong>in</strong>g Ethnic <strong>War</strong> - Pictures from the Basra "<strong>in</strong>cident" - Were BritishSpecial Forces Soldiers Plant<strong>in</strong>g Bombs <strong>in</strong> Basra? - What was the British SAS do<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Basra? -Basra; another milestone <strong>in</strong> war on terror - British Terrorism <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> - <strong>Iraq</strong>i border guards arrestBritish national <strong>in</strong> desert - Cars stolen <strong>in</strong> <strong>US</strong> cities used <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i suicide attacks - British military<strong>in</strong>vestigator found hung <strong>in</strong> BasraThe British BombersSploid.comSeptember 20, 2005More details emerge on the most outrageous story from the <strong>Iraq</strong> occupation s<strong>in</strong>ce Abu Ghraib.The last rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g public justification for the U.S./U.K. occupation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is terrorism: Theforeign forces cannot leave until <strong>Iraq</strong> is somewhat peaceful and the terrorists have been defeated.That threadbare reason<strong>in</strong>g was ripped apart on Monday as the world -- other than the UnitedStates, where broadcast media avoided the story -- was shown two agents provocateurs employedby the British government. Their exact mission will never be proven. The evidence, however, isdamn<strong>in</strong>g.The two commandoes -- alternately identified as members <strong>of</strong> Britian's notorious SAS or a newer<strong>of</strong>fshoot, the SRR -- were driv<strong>in</strong>g around a demonstration <strong>in</strong> Basra when their suspiciousbehavior attracted the attention <strong>of</strong> Basra police.185


The Scotsman now reports that the men are members <strong>of</strong> the SRR, or Special ReconnaissanceRegiment. The <strong>in</strong>signia shows a Greek helmet with a sword thrust through the mouth and upthrough the back <strong>of</strong> the skull.The police attempted to stop the men, who were disguised as Arabs <strong>in</strong> local garb over their T-shirts and trousers. The men wore black-hair wigs and, accord<strong>in</strong>g to some reports, typicalheadresses.And they also carried a whole lot <strong>of</strong> weapons, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g explosives and other bomb-mak<strong>in</strong>gmaterials. They began fir<strong>in</strong>g at the police and passers-by.At least one Basra policeman was shot dead. At least one person <strong>in</strong> the crowd was shot dead. Anundeterm<strong>in</strong>ed number <strong>of</strong> others were <strong>in</strong>jured <strong>in</strong> the gunfight.The British pair was jailed. Arab television showed the beaten men with bandages on their heads,and their huge collection <strong>of</strong> weaponry. Basra -- a relatively peaceful city compared to the rest <strong>of</strong>bloodsoaked <strong>Iraq</strong> -- had suddenly lost patience with the British occupiers, caught red-handedwith all the tools necessary to launch "suicide bombs" aga<strong>in</strong>st the people.And then the British tanks rolled <strong>in</strong> ... and destroyed the jail, releas<strong>in</strong>g 150 "terrorists" <strong>in</strong> theprocess. Whether the British commandoes were <strong>in</strong>side the jail is now disputed, as are most parts<strong>of</strong> the story, with Britian <strong>in</strong> damage-control mode and <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials universally condem<strong>in</strong>g the"barbaric" destruction <strong>of</strong> the jail and the suspected terrorist goals <strong>of</strong> the captured duo.The city rioted aga<strong>in</strong>st the tanks and troops, sett<strong>in</strong>g fire to at least one <strong>of</strong> the tanks.U.K. media is now desperately backpedal<strong>in</strong>g from the version <strong>of</strong> events reported by at least adozen <strong>in</strong>dependent reporters work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, after report<strong>in</strong>g the same general events as otherworld media on Monday.* * *A spokesman for rebel Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr said the British commandoes were try<strong>in</strong>g topass themselves <strong>of</strong>f as members <strong>of</strong> Sadr's rebel militia.Sheikh Hassan told Socialist Worker that the two undercover soldiers seized by <strong>Iraq</strong>i police lastMonday were armed with explosives and a remote control detonator. The soldiers were disguisedas members <strong>of</strong> Sadr's militia, the Mehdi Army.The trouble started when a senior Sadr <strong>of</strong>ficial was arrested on Sunday. "We called a protestoutside the mayor’s <strong>of</strong>fice on Monday demand<strong>in</strong>g the Sheikh be released," Sheikh Hassan said."This protest was peaceful.""But events <strong>in</strong> our city took a s<strong>in</strong>ister turn when the police tried to stop two men dressed asmembers <strong>of</strong> the Mehdi Army driv<strong>in</strong>g near the protest. The men opened fire on the police andpassers-by. After a car chase they were arrested."186


"What our police found <strong>in</strong> their car was very disturb<strong>in</strong>g — weapons, explosives and a remotecontrol detonator," Sheikh Hassan said. "These are the weapons <strong>of</strong> terrorists. We believe thesesoldiers were plann<strong>in</strong>g an attack on a market or other civilian targets, and thanks be to God theywere stopped and countless lives were saved."There are about 8,500 British troops <strong>in</strong> and around Basra. Four <strong>Iraq</strong>is died <strong>in</strong> the riots aga<strong>in</strong>st thejailbreak mission. Also, a local reporter who wrote for the New York Times and The Guardianwas found murdered after be<strong>in</strong>g abducted by mysterious gunmen.Follow<strong>in</strong>g the lead <strong>of</strong> its American partners, the British M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Defense denied allwrongdo<strong>in</strong>g, called the destruction <strong>of</strong> the jail "absolutely right," and blamed everyth<strong>in</strong>g on a"civil war" develop<strong>in</strong>g (or Iran, depend<strong>in</strong>g on the mouthpiece) <strong>in</strong> southern <strong>Iraq</strong>.www.sploid.com/news/2005/09/the_british_bom.phpBritish bombs <strong>in</strong> BasraXymphoraSeptember 21, 2005I f<strong>in</strong>d myself <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly becom<strong>in</strong>g the old fogey <strong>of</strong> the conspiracy field. While the youngsterscont<strong>in</strong>ue to come up with new and excit<strong>in</strong>g conspiracies, xymphora slowly deteriorates <strong>in</strong>to alousy debunk<strong>in</strong>g blog. Witness the latest revelations from Basra. To summarize, two Britishsoldiers, disguised as Arabs and with a car full <strong>of</strong> explosives, somehow f<strong>in</strong>d themselves <strong>in</strong> acontretemps with an <strong>Iraq</strong>i policeman, shoot him dead, are arrested by local authorities, refuse toexpla<strong>in</strong> what they were do<strong>in</strong>g, end up <strong>in</strong> detention, and f<strong>in</strong>ally become the subject <strong>of</strong> negotiationsbetween the British and <strong>Iraq</strong>is concern<strong>in</strong>g their release, 'negotiations' apparently mean<strong>in</strong>g to theBritish driv<strong>in</strong>g up to the prison with tanks and knock<strong>in</strong>g the walls down (a fact which the Britishf<strong>in</strong>ally, but grudg<strong>in</strong>gly, admitted), caus<strong>in</strong>g a riot which results <strong>in</strong> civilian deaths and the escape<strong>of</strong> other prisoners (and the soldiers weren't even <strong>in</strong> the prison!). Everybody has come to theobvious conclusion that this is the first documented pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the fact that much <strong>of</strong> the sectarianviolence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is the work <strong>of</strong> coalition agents provocateurs, attempt<strong>in</strong>g to cause a civil war <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>. While I have no doubt that this <strong>in</strong>tentional process is go<strong>in</strong>g on elsewhere <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> (andlargely to fit the <strong>Is</strong>raeli agenda, described here many times before, <strong>of</strong> break<strong>in</strong>g the country up<strong>in</strong>to small, unthreaten<strong>in</strong>g statelets, with the additional motive <strong>of</strong> lead<strong>in</strong>g to the new <strong>Is</strong>raeli ally,the Shi'ite Empire, to counter the largely Sunni opposition to <strong>Is</strong>raeli imperial plans), I doubt thatthe Basra case is an example <strong>of</strong> it. There seems to be another conspiracy afoot.The British have made a big deal <strong>of</strong> how much better they are than the Americans at shoulder<strong>in</strong>gthe 'white man's burden' <strong>of</strong> polic<strong>in</strong>g their portion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Of course, the Americans are soarrogant, culturally <strong>in</strong>sensitive, and generally stupid, it is not difficult to do a better job. As well,the South is easier to police just because it is majority Shi'ite, and not <strong>in</strong>terested <strong>in</strong> caus<strong>in</strong>gtrouble for the central government. Nevertheless, it is true that the British have done a muchbetter job than the Americans, and have some right to feel superior. And yet, just recently,everyth<strong>in</strong>g has gone sideways. Here is the timel<strong>in</strong>e:187


1. In the early Spr<strong>in</strong>g, British <strong>of</strong>ficials anticipated that British troops would soon bewithdraw<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>Iraq</strong>.2. In July, plans are leaked <strong>of</strong> a British plan to withdraw almost all British troops from <strong>Iraq</strong>(send<strong>in</strong>g some <strong>of</strong> them to Afghanistan). This withdrawal would have started next month. Almostimmediately, the deaths <strong>of</strong> British contractors is said to 'threaten' these plans.3. In early August, journalist Steven V<strong>in</strong>cent, who worked for the New York Times, is foundmurdered outside <strong>of</strong> Basra. He had been shot and was found with his hands bound. Days beforehis death, he "had written an Op-Ed piece for The Times <strong>in</strong> which he criticized British securityforces for fail<strong>in</strong>g to act aga<strong>in</strong>st the Shiite militias' grow<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>in</strong> the local police force." It'sunlikely, even given the ubiquity <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternet, that local militias would be on top <strong>of</strong> veryrecently published New York Times Op-Eds (although V<strong>in</strong>cent had written previously on thematter).4. Normally quiescent Basra starts to become dangerous for British troops, and three areactually killed. While there has been a constant series <strong>of</strong> British deaths <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, these most recentdeaths seem to cause a new type <strong>of</strong> overreaction. On Sunday, September 18, the British arrestlocal leaders Sheik Ahmed Majid Farttusi and Sayyid Sajjad, arrests that almost certa<strong>in</strong>ly willlead to more trouble (Juan Cole has the timel<strong>in</strong>e).5. The British plans to withdraw are <strong>in</strong>def<strong>in</strong>itely cancelled, as conditions have worsened.6. The two British soldiers are arrested near a protest arranged aga<strong>in</strong>st the arrest <strong>of</strong> SheikAhmed Majid Farttusi, and rescued with a completely unnecessary, show <strong>of</strong> lethal violence.7. Journalist Fakher Haider, who also worked for the New York Times, is found murdered onthe same day as the British soldiers were arrested. He also had his hands bound and was shot. Hehad been taken away for 'question<strong>in</strong>g' by people claim<strong>in</strong>g to be <strong>Iraq</strong>i police, a claim backed upby the fact they arrived <strong>in</strong> a police car (!). He "had recently reported on the grow<strong>in</strong>g friction andviolence among Basra's rival Shiite militias, which are widely believed to have <strong>in</strong>filtrated thepolice." Now there are two murdered journalists <strong>in</strong> Basra, each <strong>of</strong> whom wrote about thegrow<strong>in</strong>g power <strong>of</strong> Shi'ite militias <strong>in</strong> Basra (scuttlebutt that Steven V<strong>in</strong>cent's murder was relatedto his relationship with his <strong>Iraq</strong>i female translator seems to be disproved by the nature <strong>of</strong> thesecond murder). Local militia leaders would almost certa<strong>in</strong>ly have been unaware <strong>of</strong> the writ<strong>in</strong>gs<strong>of</strong> these journalists (and you have to wonder why they would care if they did know). Somebodywants to remove Western journalists with good local contacts from Basra.What I see here is an attempt to sabotage the British withdrawal, and the murders <strong>of</strong> bothjournalists may well be associated with this.Creat<strong>in</strong>g sectarian violence doesn't really make sense <strong>in</strong> Basra, as the Zionist planners <strong>in</strong>tend tokeep the South whole, and part <strong>of</strong> the Shi'ite Empire. Caus<strong>in</strong>g trouble <strong>in</strong> Basra will only mess upthose plans. On the other hand, sett<strong>in</strong>g a bomb <strong>of</strong>f <strong>in</strong> Basra would have cont<strong>in</strong>ued the campaign,started right after the announcement <strong>of</strong> withdrawal was made, to ensure that the British troopscannot be withdrawn from the South. Who benefits from non-withdrawal?:1. the Americans, who would have been all alone <strong>in</strong> their battle aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Is</strong>lam once the Britishleft;2. elements <strong>in</strong> the British military, who so rarely get to be <strong>in</strong> a real war these days, are probablyloathe hav<strong>in</strong>g to go back to more endless march<strong>in</strong>g drills <strong>in</strong> the ra<strong>in</strong> (or, at best, <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan);188


3. the <strong>in</strong>ternational cadre <strong>of</strong> war f<strong>in</strong>anciers, who still derive considerable <strong>in</strong>come from theBritish presence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>; and4. Tony Blair, who works for the f<strong>in</strong>anciers and has this extremely weird relationship with theUnited States (he seems to be under the misapprehension that he is Prime M<strong>in</strong>ister <strong>of</strong> the UnitedStates).I th<strong>in</strong>k there is a conspiracy here, but not necessarily the obvious one.xymphora.blogspot.com/2005/09/british-bombs-<strong>in</strong>-basra.htmlFake Terrorism <strong>Is</strong> a Coalition's Best FriendMatt HutaffSeptember 20, 2005<strong>Iraq</strong>i police recently caught two terrorists with a car full <strong>of</strong> explosives. Would it surprise you tolearn they were British Special Forces?The story sounds amaz<strong>in</strong>g, almost fantastical.A car driv<strong>in</strong>g through the outskirts <strong>of</strong> a besieged city opens fire on a police checkpo<strong>in</strong>t, kill<strong>in</strong>gone. In pursuit, the police surround and deta<strong>in</strong> the drivers and f<strong>in</strong>d the vehicle packed withexplosives – perhaps part <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>surgent's plan to destroy lives and cripple property. If that isn'tenough, when the suspects are thrown <strong>in</strong> prison their allies drive right up to the walls <strong>of</strong> the jail,break through them and brave petroleum bombs and burn<strong>in</strong>g clothes to rescue their comrades.150 other prisoners break free <strong>in</strong> the ensu<strong>in</strong>g melee.Incredible, no? Yet this story took place <strong>in</strong> the southern <strong>Iraq</strong>i city <strong>of</strong> Basra recently. Violencecont<strong>in</strong>ues to escalate <strong>in</strong> the breakout's aftermath... just not for the reasons you th<strong>in</strong>k.You see, the drivers <strong>of</strong> the explosive-laden car were not members <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>surgency group – theywere British Special Forces. Their rescuers? British soldiers driv<strong>in</strong>g British tanks.That's right – two members <strong>of</strong> the British Armed forces disguised as Arab civilians killed amember <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police while evad<strong>in</strong>g capture. When the people <strong>of</strong> Basra rightfully refused toturn the murderers over to the British government, per Coalition "mandate," they sent their ownmen <strong>in</strong> and released over 100 prisoners <strong>in</strong> the process.W<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g the hearts and m<strong>in</strong>ds, aren't we?Sadly, this story is really not all that surpris<strong>in</strong>g. After hear<strong>in</strong>g countless accounts <strong>of</strong> us<strong>in</strong>g napalmand torture aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>nocent civilians <strong>in</strong> addition to the other daily abuses dished out byAmerican overseers, the thought <strong>of</strong> British schem<strong>in</strong>g seems perfectly reasonable.So what we have here is a clear <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> a foreign power attempt<strong>in</strong>g to fabricate a terroristattack. Why else would the soldiers be dressed as Arabs if not to frame them? Why have a carladen with explosives if you don't plan to use them for destructive purposes? <strong>Iraq</strong> is headedtowards civil war, and this operation was meant to accelerate the process by kill<strong>in</strong>g people and189


lam<strong>in</strong>g others. Noth<strong>in</strong>g more, noth<strong>in</strong>g less. That the British army staged an over-the-top escapewhen it could rely on normal diplomatic channels to recover its people proves that.Such extreme methods highlight the need to keep secrets.There have been a number <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgent bomb<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> recently. Who really is responsible forthe bloodshed and destruction? The only tangible benefit <strong>of</strong> the bomb<strong>in</strong>gs is justification forCoalition forces ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the peace <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Who benefits from that? Certa<strong>in</strong>ly not the <strong>Iraq</strong>is –they already believe most suicide bomb<strong>in</strong>gs are done by the United States to prompt religiouswar. After read<strong>in</strong>g about this <strong>in</strong>cident, I'm not <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed to disagree.Even though this false-flag operation was blown wide open, I'm afraid it might still be used <strong>in</strong>the ma<strong>in</strong>stream media to <strong>in</strong>cite further violence <strong>in</strong> the Middle East. Judg<strong>in</strong>g by the coverage thathas emerged after the <strong>in</strong>cident, my fears seem warranted.Several articles have already turned the story aga<strong>in</strong>st the angry <strong>Iraq</strong>is who fought the Britishtanks as they demolished the jail wall, pa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g them as aggressive Shia militia attack<strong>in</strong>g the doeeyed,<strong>in</strong>nocent troops respond<strong>in</strong>g to the concern that their comrades were held by religiousfanatics. A photograph <strong>of</strong> a troop on fire comes complete with commentary that the vehicleswere under attack dur<strong>in</strong>g a "bid to recover arrested servicemen" that were possibly undercover.All crim<strong>in</strong>al elements <strong>of</strong> British treachery are downplayed, the car's explosive cache is nevermentioned and the soldiers who <strong>in</strong>stigated the affair are made victims <strong>of</strong> an unstable country theyare defend<strong>in</strong>g.Hilariously, all <strong>of</strong> this sp<strong>in</strong> has already landed Iran at the top <strong>of</strong> the blame game. Because whenthe war comb<strong>in</strong>e botches its own clandest<strong>in</strong>e terrorist acts, what better way to recover than bypa<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g the soulless, freedom-hat<strong>in</strong>g country you'd love to <strong>in</strong>vade next as the culprit? In a way, Ialmost admire the nerve <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficials who are able to <strong>in</strong>fer that Basra's riots have noth<strong>in</strong>g to dowith fake <strong>in</strong>surgent bomb<strong>in</strong>g raids and everyth<strong>in</strong>g to do with religious ties to a foreign country.It's a sheer unmitigated gall that flies <strong>in</strong> the face <strong>of</strong> logic and reason."The Iranians are careful not to be caught," a British <strong>of</strong>ficial said as the UK threatened to referIran to the UN Security Council for sanctions. Too bad the British aren't! Maybe then they'd beable to complete their black-ops mission without look<strong>in</strong>g like complete fools <strong>in</strong> the process!Make no mistake – any and all violence to erupt from Basra over this <strong>in</strong>cident lands squarely onthe shoulders <strong>of</strong> the British army and its special forces. Instead <strong>of</strong> stok<strong>in</strong>g the flames <strong>of</strong>propaganda aga<strong>in</strong>st a nation it has no hope <strong>of</strong> ever conquer<strong>in</strong>g, maybe Brita<strong>in</strong> should quit try<strong>in</strong>gto <strong>in</strong>timidate the <strong>Iraq</strong>is with fear and torture and start focus<strong>in</strong>g on fix<strong>in</strong>g its mistakes and gett<strong>in</strong>gout <strong>of</strong> the Middle East.These actions are <strong>in</strong>excusable and embarrass<strong>in</strong>g; however, they should make you th<strong>in</strong>k. If acountry like the United K<strong>in</strong>gdom is will<strong>in</strong>g to commit acts <strong>of</strong> terror, what k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> false-flagoperations do you th<strong>in</strong>k the United States is capable <strong>of</strong>?190


If you thought the U.S. wouldn't blow up people it claims to support <strong>in</strong> the hopes <strong>of</strong> advanc<strong>in</strong>gits agenda, th<strong>in</strong>k aga<strong>in</strong>. Use this <strong>in</strong>cident as your first reference po<strong>in</strong>t.Canon Fodder is a weekly analysis <strong>of</strong> politics and society.www.thesimon.com/magaz<strong>in</strong>e/articles/canon_fodder/0961_fake_terrorism_coalition_best_friend.htmlWho's Blow<strong>in</strong>g Up <strong>Iraq</strong>? New evidence that bombs are be<strong>in</strong>g planted by BritishMike WhitneySeptember 20, 2005"The <strong>Iraq</strong>i security <strong>of</strong>ficials on Monday variously accused two Britons they deta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>of</strong> shoot<strong>in</strong>gat <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces or TRYING TO PLANT EXPLOSIVES." Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post, Ellen Knickmeyer, 9-20-05; "British Smash <strong>in</strong>to Jail to Free Two Deta<strong>in</strong>ed Soldiers"In more than two years s<strong>in</strong>ce the United States <strong>in</strong>itiated hostilities aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>Iraq</strong>, there has neverbeen a positive identification <strong>of</strong> Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.Never.That doesn't mean that he doesn't exist; it simply suggests that prudent people will challenge the<strong>of</strong>ficial version until his whereabouts and significance <strong>in</strong> the conflict can be verified.At present, much <strong>of</strong> the rationale for ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the occupation depends on this elusive and,perhaps, illusory figure. It's odd how Al-Zarqawi appears at the precise coord<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>of</strong> America'sbomb<strong>in</strong>g-raids, and then, miraculously vanishes unscathed from the scene <strong>of</strong> the wreckage. Thiswould be a remarkable feat for anyone, but especially for someone who only has one leg.Al-Zarqawi may simply be a fantasy dreamed up by Pentagon planners to put a threaten<strong>in</strong>g faceon the <strong>Iraq</strong>i resistance. The Defense Dept has been aggressive <strong>in</strong> its effort to shape <strong>in</strong>formation<strong>in</strong> a way that serves the overall objectives <strong>of</strong> the occupation. The primary aim <strong>of</strong> the Pentagon's"Strategic Information" program is to distort the truth <strong>in</strong> a way that controls the storyl<strong>in</strong>e createdby the media. Al-Zarqawi fits perfectly with<strong>in</strong> this paradigm <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tentional deception.The manipulation <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation factors heavily <strong>in</strong> the steady <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i casualties, too.Although the military refuses "to do body counts"; many people take considerable <strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> thedaily death toll.Last week, over 200 civilians were killed <strong>in</strong> seem<strong>in</strong>gly random acts <strong>of</strong> violence purportedlycaused by al-Zarqawi. But, were they?Were these massive attacks the work <strong>of</strong> al-Zarqawi as the western media reports or some other"more shadowy" force?One member <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i National Assembly. Fatah al-Sheikh, stated, "It seems that theAmerican forces are try<strong>in</strong>g to escalate the situation <strong>in</strong> order to make the <strong>Iraq</strong>i people suffer..There is a huge campaign for the agents <strong>of</strong> the foreign occupation to enter and plant hatredbetween the sons <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i people, and spread rumors <strong>in</strong> order to scare the one from the other.191


The occupiers are try<strong>in</strong>g to start religious <strong>in</strong>citement and if it does not happen, then they will tryto start an <strong>in</strong>ternal Shiite <strong>in</strong>citement."Al-Sheikh's feel<strong>in</strong>gs are shared by a great many <strong>Iraq</strong>is. They can see that everyth<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>US</strong> hasdone, from the form<strong>in</strong>g a government made up predom<strong>in</strong>antly <strong>of</strong> Shi'ites and Kurds, to creat<strong>in</strong>g aconstitution that allows the break<strong>in</strong>g up to the country (federalism), to us<strong>in</strong>g the Peshmerga andBadr militia <strong>in</strong> their attacks on Sunni cities, to build<strong>in</strong>g an Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry entirely comprised <strong>of</strong>Shi'ites, suggests that the Pentagon's strategy is to fuel the sectarian divisions that will lead tocivil war. Al-Zarqawi is an <strong>in</strong>tegral facet <strong>of</strong> this broader plan. Rumsfeld has cast the Jordanian asthe agent-provocateur; the driv<strong>in</strong>g force beh<strong>in</strong>d religious partition and antagonism.But, al-Zarqawi has noth<strong>in</strong>g to ga<strong>in</strong> by kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>nocent civilians, and everyth<strong>in</strong>g to lose. If hedoes actually operate <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, he needs logistical support<strong>in</strong>g all his movements; <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g helpwith safe-houses, assistants, and the assurance <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>visibility <strong>in</strong> the community. ("The ocean <strong>in</strong>which he swims") These would disappear <strong>in</strong>stantly if he recklessly killed and maimed <strong>in</strong>nocentwomen and children.Last week the Imam <strong>of</strong> Baghdad's al-Kazimeya mosque, Jawad al-Kalesi said, that "al-Zarqawi isdead but Wash<strong>in</strong>gton cont<strong>in</strong>ues to use him as a bogeyman to justify a prolonged militaryoccupation. He's simply an <strong>in</strong>vention by the occupiers to divide the people." Al-Kalesi added thatal-Zarqawi was killed <strong>in</strong> the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the war <strong>in</strong> the Kurdish north and that "His family <strong>in</strong>Jordan even held a ceremony after his death." (AFP)Most <strong>Iraq</strong>is probably agree with al-Kalesi, but that hasn't deterred the Pentagon from cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>gwith the charade. This is understandable given that al-Zarqawi is the last tattered justification forthe <strong>in</strong>itial <strong>in</strong>vasion. It's doubtful that the Pentagon will ditch their f<strong>in</strong>al threadbare apology forthe war. But the reality is vastly different from the sp<strong>in</strong> com<strong>in</strong>g from the military. In fact, foreignfighters play a very small role <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> with or without al-Zarqawi. As the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies (CSIS) revealed this week <strong>in</strong> their report, "Analysts and government<strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>in</strong> the <strong>US</strong> and <strong>Iraq</strong> overstated the size <strong>of</strong> the foreign element <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>in</strong>surgency..<strong>Iraq</strong>i fighters made up less than 10% <strong>of</strong> the armed groups' ranks, perhaps, even half <strong>of</strong> that." Thereport poignantly notes that most <strong>of</strong> the foreign fighters were not previously militants at all, butwere motivated by, "revulsion at the idea <strong>of</strong> an Arab land be<strong>in</strong>g occupied by a non-Arabcountry."The report concludes that the <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> has added thousands <strong>of</strong> "fresh recruits to Osamab<strong>in</strong> Laden's network;" a fact that is no longer <strong>in</strong> dispute among those who have studied the dataon the topic.The al-Zarqawi phantasm is a particularly weak-l<strong>in</strong>k <strong>in</strong> the Pentagon's muddled narrative. Thefacts neither support the allegations <strong>of</strong> his participation nor prove that foreigners are a majorcontributor to the ongo<strong>in</strong>g violence. Instead, the <strong>in</strong>formation po<strong>in</strong>ts to a Defense establishmentthat cannot be trusted <strong>in</strong> anyth<strong>in</strong>g it says and that may be directly <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the terroristbomb<strong>in</strong>gsthat have killed countless thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i civilians.192


Regrettably, that is prospect that can't be ignored. After all, no one else benefits from theslaughter.(Note: S<strong>in</strong>ce this article was written, the Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post has added to our suspicions. In anEllen Knickmeyer article "British Smash <strong>in</strong>to <strong>Iraq</strong>i Jail to free 2 deta<strong>in</strong>ed Soldiers" 9-20-05,Knickmeyer chronicles the fight<strong>in</strong>g between British forces and <strong>Iraq</strong>i police who were deta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g 2British commandos. "THE IRAQI SECURITY OFFICIALS ON MONDAY VARIO<strong>US</strong>LYACC<strong>US</strong>ED THE TWO BRITONS THEY DETAINED OF SHOOTING AT IRAQI FORCES orTRYING TO PLANT EXPLOSIVES."<strong>Is</strong> this why the British army was ordered to "burst through the walls <strong>of</strong> an <strong>Iraq</strong>i jail Monday <strong>in</strong>the southern city <strong>of</strong> Basra".followed by "British armored vehicles backed by helicopter gunships"end<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> "hours <strong>of</strong> gun battles and riot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> Basra's streets"? (Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post)Reuters reported that "half a dozen armored vehicles had smashed <strong>in</strong>to the jail" and theprov<strong>in</strong>cial governor, Mohammed Walli, told news agencies that the British assault was "barbaric,savage and irresponsible."So, why were the British so afraid to go through the normal channels to get their men released?Could it be that the two commandos were "try<strong>in</strong>g to plant explosives" as the article suggests?An <strong>in</strong>terview on Syrian TV last night also alleges that the British commandos "were plant<strong>in</strong>gexplosives <strong>in</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the Basra streets"."Al-Munajjid] In fact, Nidal, this <strong>in</strong>cident gave answers to questions and suspicions that werelack<strong>in</strong>g evidence about the participation <strong>of</strong> the occupation <strong>in</strong> some armed operations <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Many analysts and observers here had suspicions that the occupation was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> somearmed operations aga<strong>in</strong>st civilians and places <strong>of</strong> worship and <strong>in</strong> the kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> scientists. But thosewere only suspicions that lacked pro<strong>of</strong>. The pro<strong>of</strong> came today through the arrest <strong>of</strong> the twoBritish soldiers while they were plant<strong>in</strong>g explosives <strong>in</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the Basra streets. This proves,accord<strong>in</strong>g to observers, that the occupation is not far from many operations that seek to sowsedition and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> disorder, as this would give the occupation the justification to stay <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>for a longer period. [Zaghbur] Ziyad al-Munajjaid <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, thank you very much. CopyrightSyrian Arab TV and BBC Monitor<strong>in</strong>g, 2005"And then there was this on Al-Jazeera TV, Doha, 9-19-05; Interview with Fattah al-Shayk,member <strong>of</strong> the National Assembly and deputy for Basra.."the sons <strong>of</strong> Basra caught two non-<strong>Iraq</strong>is, who seem to be Britons and were <strong>in</strong> a car <strong>of</strong> theCressida type. It was a booby-trapped car laden with ammunition and was meant to explode <strong>in</strong>the centre <strong>of</strong> the city <strong>of</strong> Basra <strong>in</strong> the popular market. However, the sons <strong>of</strong> the city <strong>of</strong> Basraarrested them. They [the two non-<strong>Iraq</strong>is] then fired at the people there and killed some <strong>of</strong> them.The two arrested persons are now at the Intelligence Department <strong>in</strong> Basra, and they were held bythe National Guard force, but the British occupation forces are still surround<strong>in</strong>g this department<strong>in</strong> an attempt to absolve them <strong>of</strong> the crime."


Does this solve the al-Zarqawi mystery? Are the bombs that are kill<strong>in</strong>g so many <strong>Iraq</strong>i civiliansare be<strong>in</strong>g planted by British and American Intelligence?We'll have to see if this damn<strong>in</strong>g story can be corroborated by other sources.)Courtesy and Copyright © Mike Whitneywww.uruknet.<strong>in</strong>fo?p=15926British Special Forces Caught Carry<strong>in</strong>g Out Staged Terror In <strong>Iraq</strong>?Paul Joseph WatsonSeptember 20, 2005Media blackout shadows why black op soldiers were arrestedPaul Joseph Watson | September 20 2005In another example <strong>of</strong> how the <strong>Iraq</strong>i quagmire is deliberately designed to degenerate <strong>in</strong>to achaotic abyss, British SAS were caught attempt<strong>in</strong>g to stage a terror attack and the media havedutifully shut up about the real questions surround<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>cident.What is admitted is that two British soldiers <strong>in</strong> Arab garb and head dress drove a car towards agroup <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> police and began fir<strong>in</strong>g. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Basra governor Mohammed al-Waili, onepoliceman was shot dead and another was <strong>in</strong>jured. Pictured below are the wigs and cloth<strong>in</strong>g thatthe soldiers were wear<strong>in</strong>g.The Arab garb is obviously undeniable pro<strong>of</strong> that the operation, whatever its ultimate <strong>in</strong>tention,was staged so that any eyewitnesses would believe it had been carried out by <strong>Iraq</strong>is.This has all the <strong>in</strong>dications <strong>of</strong> a frame up.This is made all the more <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g by the fact that early reports cited as orig<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g from BBCWorld Service radio stated that the car used conta<strong>in</strong>ed explosives. Was this another staged carbomb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tended to keep tensions high? As you will discover later, the plan to keep <strong>Iraq</strong> dividedand <strong>in</strong> turmoil is an actual policy directive that spans back over two decades.The BBC reports that the car did conta<strong>in</strong>, "assault rifles, a light mach<strong>in</strong>e gun, an anti-tankweapon, radio gear and medical kit. This is thought to be standard kit for the SAS operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>such a theatre <strong>of</strong> operations."And are fake bushy black wigs and turbans standard kit for the SAS? What happened to the earlyreports <strong>of</strong> explosives? Why has the media relentlessly reported on the subsequent rescue effortand failed to address these key questions?The soldiers were arrested and taken to a nearby jail where they were confronted and<strong>in</strong>terrogated by an <strong>Iraq</strong>i judge.194


The <strong>in</strong>itial demand from the puppet authorities that the soldiers be released was rejected by theBasra government. At that po<strong>in</strong>t tanks were sent <strong>in</strong> to 'rescue' the terrorists and the 'liberated'<strong>Iraq</strong>is started to riot, firebomb<strong>in</strong>g and pelt<strong>in</strong>g stones at the vehicles <strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g British troops as wasdepicted <strong>in</strong> this dramatic Reuters photo.As the SAS were be<strong>in</strong>g rescued 150 prisoners escaped from the jail. Was this <strong>in</strong>tentional or just aresult <strong>of</strong> another botched black op?From this po<strong>in</strong>t on media coverage was monopolized by accounts <strong>of</strong> the rescue and the giantmaraud<strong>in</strong>g p<strong>in</strong>k elephant <strong>in</strong> the liv<strong>in</strong>g room, namely why the soldiers were arrested <strong>in</strong> the firstplace, was rout<strong>in</strong>ely ignored.The only outlet to ask any serious questions was Australian TV news which accord<strong>in</strong>g to oneviewer gave, "credibility to the 'conspiracy theorists' who have long claimed many terrorist acts<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> are, <strong>in</strong> fact, be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>itiated and carried out by <strong>US</strong>, British and <strong>Is</strong>raeli forces."Iran's top military commander Brigadier General Mohammad-Baqer Zolqadr po<strong>in</strong>ted the f<strong>in</strong>gerat the occupational government last week by publicly stat<strong>in</strong>g,“The Americans blame weak and feeble groups <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> for <strong>in</strong>security <strong>in</strong> this country. We do notbelieve this and we have <strong>in</strong>formation that the <strong>in</strong>security has its roots <strong>in</strong> the activities <strong>of</strong> Americanand <strong>Is</strong>raeli spies,” Zolqadr said.“Insecurity <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is a deeply-rooted phenomenon. The root <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>security <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> lies <strong>in</strong> theoccupation <strong>of</strong> this country by foreigners”.“If <strong>Iraq</strong> is to become secure, there will be no room for the occupiers”.That explanation has a lot <strong>of</strong> currency amongst ord<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>Iraq</strong>is who have been direct witnesses tothese bomb<strong>in</strong>gs.In the past we’ve asked questions about why so-called car bomb<strong>in</strong>gs leave giant craters, <strong>in</strong>addition with eyewitness reports that helicopters were carry<strong>in</strong>g out the attacks.Throughout history we see the tactic <strong>of</strong> divide and conquer be<strong>in</strong>g used to enslave populationsand swallow formerly sovereign countries by piecemeal. From the British stirr<strong>in</strong>g up aggressionbetween different Indian tribes <strong>in</strong> order to foment division, to modern day Yugoslavia where thecountry was reject<strong>in</strong>g the IMF and world bank takeover before the Globalists broke it up andtook the country piece by piece by arm<strong>in</strong>g and empower<strong>in</strong>g extremists.And so to <strong>Iraq</strong>, New York Times November 25th 2003, Leslie Gelb <strong>of</strong> the Council on ForeignRelations writes,"To put most <strong>of</strong> its money and troops where they would do the most good quickly - with theKurds and Shiites. The United States could extricate most <strong>of</strong> its forces from the so-called SunniTriangle, north and west <strong>of</strong> Baghdad.... American <strong>of</strong>ficials could then wait for the troublesome195


and dom<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g Sunnis, without oil or oil revenues, to moderate their ambitions or suffer theconsequences."Gelb argues for allow<strong>in</strong>g the rebellion to escalate <strong>in</strong> order to create a divided <strong>Iraq</strong>.And <strong>in</strong> 1982, Oded Y<strong>in</strong>on, an <strong>of</strong>ficial from the <strong>Is</strong>raeli Foreign Affairs <strong>of</strong>fice, wrote: "To dissolve<strong>Iraq</strong> is even more important for us than dissolv<strong>in</strong>g Syria. In the short term, it's <strong>Iraq</strong>i power thatconstitutes the greatest threat to <strong>Is</strong>rael. The Iran-<strong>Iraq</strong> war tore <strong>Iraq</strong> apart and provoked itsdownfall. All manner <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ter-Arab conflict help us and accelerate our goal <strong>of</strong> break<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>Iraq</strong><strong>in</strong>to small, diverse pieces."So if the plan is to keep the different sects at each others' throats then who benefits from thechaos created by the endless bomb<strong>in</strong>gs? President Bush's slip <strong>of</strong> the tongue when he stated, "it'lltake time to restore chaos and order -- order out <strong>of</strong> chaos, but we will" seems less farcical <strong>in</strong> thislight.Plans for 4,000 NATO troops to replace <strong>US</strong> troops <strong>in</strong> Afghanistan will likely be mirrored <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>and the country will be used as a launch pad for the com<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vasions <strong>of</strong> Syria and Iran.It is certa<strong>in</strong> that any reports com<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> accus<strong>in</strong>g occupational forces <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d carbomb<strong>in</strong>gs will be brutally censored.The Pentagon admitted before the war that <strong>in</strong>dependent journalists would be military targets ands<strong>in</strong>ce then we've seen more journalists killed <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> over two and a half years than the entireseven year stretch <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> Vietnam.In many cases, such as that <strong>of</strong> Mazen Dana, an acclaimed hero who was killed after film<strong>in</strong>gsecret <strong>US</strong> mass graves, journalists are hunted down and executed because they record someth<strong>in</strong>gthat the occupational government doesn't want to reach the wider world.Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena's car was fired upon and an Italian secret service agent killedafter Sgrena was told by the group that kidnapped her that a threat to kill her if Italian troopsdidn't pull out <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> wasn't made by them. This means that Rumsfeld's M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Truth <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is putt<strong>in</strong>g out false statements by fake Jihad groups to try and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> the facade that theresistance is run by brutal terrorists under the direction <strong>of</strong> Al-Qaeda/Iran/Syria or whoever elsethey want to bomb next.Every high pr<strong>of</strong>ile kidnapp<strong>in</strong>g br<strong>in</strong>gs with it eyewitness reports <strong>of</strong> white men <strong>in</strong> suits and policecarry<strong>in</strong>g out the abductions.Many will f<strong>in</strong>d it hard to believe that ord<strong>in</strong>ary soldiers would have it <strong>in</strong> them to carry out suchbrutal atrocities. The people carry<strong>in</strong>g out these acts are not ord<strong>in</strong>ary soldiers, they are SAS thugswho have been told that they have to be 'more evil than the terrorists' to defeat the terrorists. Thisis how they morally justify to themselves engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> this crim<strong>in</strong>al behavior.We will update this story as and when new developments take place.196


www.prisonplanet.com/articles/september2005/200905stagedterror.htmWere the British Soldiers Engaged <strong>in</strong> Counter-Insurgency Operation <strong>in</strong> Basra?Yam<strong>in</strong> ZakariaSeptember 20, 2005For certa<strong>in</strong>, the ‘free’, ‘<strong>in</strong>dependent’ and embedded Anglo-<strong>US</strong> mass media would have tried tosp<strong>in</strong> the evidences surround<strong>in</strong>g the events <strong>in</strong> Basra to suit the <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>of</strong> their governments.However, <strong>in</strong> this case it was too late, as the facts seemed to have already been reported byvarious other media outlets. Let us exam<strong>in</strong>e what cannot be denied, on the basis <strong>of</strong> what has beenreported and corroborated by the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police and Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficials, who are allies <strong>of</strong> thecoalition forces.a) British undercover soldiers were on a mission wear<strong>in</strong>g traditional Arab dress, driv<strong>in</strong>g acivilian car. What was their mission <strong>in</strong> Basra, consider<strong>in</strong>g that we have hear<strong>in</strong>g how happy andpeaceful Shi’ite-dom<strong>in</strong>ated Basra is. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the earlier embedded media reports, resistanceis almost negligible <strong>in</strong> the region.b) When the <strong>Iraq</strong>i soldiers (not the Sunni Insurgents), approached the suspicious look<strong>in</strong>g car at acheck po<strong>in</strong>t, carry<strong>in</strong>g the British soldiers <strong>in</strong> question, they were fired upon. Clearly, the BritishSoldiers did not fire <strong>in</strong> fear but to avoid capture and/or <strong>in</strong>terrogation by the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police.Therefore, they must have had someth<strong>in</strong>g significant to hide from the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police who are theirallies <strong>in</strong> the region. It would be safe to assume that the ‘legitimate’ <strong>Iraq</strong>i government <strong>in</strong>stalled bythe coalition forces were also ignorant <strong>of</strong> the facts; so far they have been quiet about the wholeaffair.c) Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the Italian press, when the British soldiers fired, two <strong>Iraq</strong>i police were shot andone <strong>of</strong> them died later. But that matters little for the mass media and no one seems to even knowtheir names. The benevolent liberators are not perturbed by such small details <strong>of</strong> kill<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>Iraq</strong>ihere and there! However, the event raised the temperature even more, after the earlier arrests <strong>of</strong>two prom<strong>in</strong>ent members <strong>of</strong> the Mehdi army militia (led by the radical Shi'ite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr), carried out by the British forces.d) After capture <strong>of</strong> the undercover British soldiers, they refused to state what their mission was.<strong>Iraq</strong>is <strong>in</strong> the mean time had been driv<strong>in</strong>g through the streets, with loudhailers demand<strong>in</strong>g that theundercover Britons rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> jail for their crimes. It was then reported through numerous sourcesthat the British forces with Tanks surrounded the prison, where the two British soldiers <strong>in</strong>question were deta<strong>in</strong>ed. This led to the protest develop<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to a riot and pictures were airedshow<strong>in</strong>g the British soldiers be<strong>in</strong>g attacked by the mob.e) An <strong>Iraq</strong>i Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong>ficial said British forces stormed and demolished the walls <strong>of</strong> thejail us<strong>in</strong>g six tanks and that dozens <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i prisoners escaped. Basra's governor said thedemolition was a "barbaric act <strong>of</strong> aggression".197


f) However, Brita<strong>in</strong>'s M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Defence disputed that the prison had been stormed, on thecontrary, stated that the release <strong>of</strong> the two soldiers was negotiated. Contradict<strong>in</strong>g the statement <strong>of</strong>the Basra governor and the numerous reports (po<strong>in</strong>t d), that clearly alluded to the British forcesaction to release the British prisoners sparked <strong>of</strong> the riot. Why was there no statement from theso-called new <strong>Iraq</strong>i government?Whatever the case, the British forces were not happy with two <strong>of</strong> their soldiers kept <strong>in</strong> an <strong>Iraq</strong>iprison, controlled by their <strong>Iraq</strong>i allies. Inside the prison, their lives were not under any threat. Butwhat the two soldiers concealed as regards to their mission must have really worried the Britishgovernment. Thus, they moved quickly to get the undercover soldiers out <strong>of</strong> the prisons bystorm<strong>in</strong>g it with Tanks and demolish<strong>in</strong>g the walls.Now, what has been deliberately avoided by the ma<strong>in</strong>stream TV and Satellite stations is thereference [1] to allegation from the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police, that the British soldiers were plant<strong>in</strong>g bombs.Turkish and a few other media outlets also reported that the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police allegedly found bombs<strong>in</strong> unidentified cars owned by Britons.So the facts are, the British soldiers were caught wear<strong>in</strong>g Arab dress <strong>in</strong> a civilian car, armed, mayhave been carry<strong>in</strong>g bombs, shot the <strong>Iraq</strong>i soldiers when approached by them, later the Britishgovernment <strong>in</strong> desperation stormed the prison to get them out; clearly they were on a secretmission. It was secret because it would be too embarrass<strong>in</strong>g to conduct openly <strong>in</strong> an area that issupposed to be the calmest with no <strong>in</strong>surgency. Given the facts, the only plausible explanation isthat the undercover soldiers were engaged <strong>in</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency operations. This <strong>in</strong>cident maywell prove to be another Abu-Ghraib, confirm<strong>in</strong>g the strong rumours <strong>of</strong> counter-<strong>in</strong>surgencyoperations, particularly the bombs explod<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the markets and mosques, away from coalitionand <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces that would benefit no one, except the coalition forces.Without a shadow <strong>of</strong> doubt, a full scale sectarian war would help the collation forces; they wouldbe the primary beneficiary. In fact from the very beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the conflict the media has beenconstantly stok<strong>in</strong>g sectarian tensions, the language employed was crafted accord<strong>in</strong>gly. They kepton repeat<strong>in</strong>g m<strong>in</strong>ority Sunni Arabs <strong>of</strong> 20%, who become m<strong>in</strong>ority Sunnis <strong>of</strong> 20%! The majorityShi’ites became the oppressed Shi’ites, as if the hearts <strong>of</strong> the Anglo-<strong>US</strong> government bleeds forthem! The Arab nationalist Baath party became a Sunni party, as if religion def<strong>in</strong>ed it!But the sectarian conflict failed to ignite, and then the coalition forces engaged <strong>in</strong> counter<strong>in</strong>surgencyactivities by explod<strong>in</strong>g bombs <strong>in</strong> markets, mosques and churches. There have beenearlier reports and <strong>in</strong>dependent eyewitness accounts <strong>of</strong> coalition soldiers caught plant<strong>in</strong>g bombs.However, like hurricane Katr<strong>in</strong>a, this time they were caught and exposed, the world can now seetheir fork-tongue and <strong>in</strong>sidious nature.Yam<strong>in</strong> ZakariaLondon, UK[1] http://www.iraqwar.mirror-world.ru/article/63808iraqwar.mirror-world.ru/article/63926198


FLASHBACK: Sick strategies for senseless slaughterJohn Kam<strong>in</strong>skiThe murderous fools are not try<strong>in</strong>g to end the war;they're try<strong>in</strong>g to keep it go<strong>in</strong>g as long as they canMay 24, 2005The cat is out <strong>of</strong> the bag now.It happened quite by accident, as most revelations do. And it is seen by most <strong>of</strong> the world as themost revolt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the American/<strong>Is</strong>raeli atrocities <strong>in</strong> the past few years, although it's hard toprioritize that claim because <strong>of</strong> the level and frequency <strong>of</strong> barbaric acts that are committed on aregular basis by those affluent automatons who call themselves the good guys.Yet everyone but the comatose American populace — bl<strong>in</strong>ded by its Orwellian media andstupefied by its demented diet <strong>of</strong> physical and mental poisons — can see it.So permit me to spell it out for those cowardly people who say they're liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the freest countryon Earth, but absolutely refuse <strong>in</strong> their silent ignorance to see the blood they're spill<strong>in</strong>g. Nocountry that condones deliberate torture for any reason can ever be trusted.The first h<strong>in</strong>t came <strong>in</strong> Imad Khadduri's "A warn<strong>in</strong>g to car drivers" written <strong>in</strong> Arabic and postedon www.albasrah.net on May 11.The dispatch was quickly picked up by two <strong>of</strong> the most realistic and reliable news sites on theWeb, www.uruknet.<strong>in</strong>fo , which I try to read every day,and www.globalresearch.ca , which I try to read every week, s<strong>in</strong>ce it <strong>of</strong>fers less break<strong>in</strong>g andmore analytical news. I consider these two sites essential to keep<strong>in</strong>g up with the real news <strong>of</strong> theworld, and highly recommend that you monitor them, too.Khadduri recounted a scam that opens up a clear w<strong>in</strong>dow to see<strong>in</strong>g who is perpetrat<strong>in</strong>g all this<strong>in</strong>explicable violence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. Beyond the American attempt to pacify an outraged and abusednation through demonic destruction, and beyond the <strong>Iraq</strong>i attempt to resist this totalitariantakeover by a foreign conqueror, there are more than numerous acts <strong>of</strong> violence that simply can'tbe understood by straightforward explanations.I mean, when a mosque blows up and Americans blame <strong>Is</strong>lamic terrorists, whether Sunni orShiite, it makes no sense. Muslims never blow up their own houses <strong>of</strong> worship. Or whenreporters sympathetic to either the <strong>Iraq</strong>i cause <strong>of</strong> freedom, or even just general pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>ternational justice, are suddenly assass<strong>in</strong>ated and the blame is placed on <strong>of</strong>ten imag<strong>in</strong>ary<strong>Is</strong>lamic extremists whose perspective is supported by these writers, how can anyone believe thatMuslims did it, even thought this is what the Zionist American press and government cont<strong>in</strong>ue to<strong>in</strong>sist.So who’s do<strong>in</strong>g all these demented deeds? As if we didn’t know ....199


Khadduri’s report went like this:“A few days ago, an American manned check po<strong>in</strong>t confiscated the driver license <strong>of</strong> a driver andtold him to report to an American military camp near Baghdad airport for <strong>in</strong>terrogation and <strong>in</strong>order to retrieve his license. The next day, the driver did visit the camp and he was allowed <strong>in</strong> thecamp with his car. He was admitted to a room for an <strong>in</strong>terrogation that lasted half an hour. At theend <strong>of</strong> the session, the American <strong>in</strong>terrogator told him: ‘OK, there is noth<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st you, butyou do know that <strong>Iraq</strong> is now sovereign and is <strong>in</strong> charge <strong>of</strong> its own affairs. Hence, we haveforwarded your papers and license to al-Kadhimia police station for process<strong>in</strong>g. Therefore, gothere with this clearance to reclaim your license. At the police station, ask for Lt. Hussa<strong>in</strong>Mohammed, who is wait<strong>in</strong>g for you now. Go there now quickly, before he leaves his shift work”.The driver did leave <strong>in</strong> a hurry, but was soon alarmed with a feel<strong>in</strong>g that his car was driv<strong>in</strong>g as ifcarry<strong>in</strong>g a heavy load, and he also became suspicious <strong>of</strong> a low fly<strong>in</strong>g helicopter that kepthover<strong>in</strong>g overhead, as if trail<strong>in</strong>g him. He stopped the car and <strong>in</strong>spected it carefully. He foundnearly 100 kilograms <strong>of</strong> explosives hidden <strong>in</strong> the back seat and along the two back doors.The only feasible explanation for this <strong>in</strong>cident is that the car was <strong>in</strong>deed booby trapped by theAmericans and <strong>in</strong>tended for the al-Khadimiya Shiite district <strong>of</strong> Baghdad. The helicopter wasmonitor<strong>in</strong>g his movement and witness<strong>in</strong>g the anticipated “hideous attack by foreign elements”.The same scenario was repeated <strong>in</strong> Mosul, <strong>in</strong> the north <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. A car was confiscated along withthe driver’s license. He did follow up on the matter and f<strong>in</strong>ally reclaimed his car but was told togo to a police station to reclaim his license. Fortunately for him, the car broke down on the wayto the police station. The <strong>in</strong>spect<strong>in</strong>g car mechanic discovered that the spare tire was fully ladenwith explosives."If this were the only example <strong>of</strong> this type I heard, I might have let it pass as just a story. But itwasn’t.There was also the sorry tale <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i man who saw American soldiers plant a bomb whichshortly thereafter exploded, and when he said so out loud for all to hear, he was hauled away,never to be seen aga<strong>in</strong>.This story was reported on arguably the most authentic and rivet<strong>in</strong>g source <strong>of</strong> news from <strong>Iraq</strong>,the heart-rend<strong>in</strong>g "Baghdad Burn<strong>in</strong>g: Girl Blog from <strong>Iraq</strong>," which is compiled by someoneknown only as Riverbend or <strong>Iraq</strong>i Girl < http://riverbendblog.blogspot.com/ >. Aga<strong>in</strong>,recommended read<strong>in</strong>g.She recounts, "the last two weeks have been violent ....The number <strong>of</strong> explosions <strong>in</strong> Baghdad alone is frighten<strong>in</strong>g. There have also been severalassass<strong>in</strong>ations — bodies be<strong>in</strong>g found here and there. It's somewhat disturb<strong>in</strong>g to know thatcorpses are turn<strong>in</strong>g up <strong>in</strong> the most unexpected places. Many people will tell you it's not wise toeat river fish anymore because they have been nourished on the human rema<strong>in</strong>s be<strong>in</strong>g dumped200


<strong>in</strong>to the river. That thought alone has given me more than one sleepless night. It is almost as ifBaghdad has turned <strong>in</strong>to a giant graveyard.The latest corpses were those <strong>of</strong> some Sunni and Shia clerics — several <strong>of</strong> them well-known.People are be<strong>in</strong>g patient and there is a general consensus that these kill<strong>in</strong>gs are be<strong>in</strong>g done toprovoke civil war. Also worrisome is the fact that we are hear<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> people be<strong>in</strong>g rounded up bysecurity forces (<strong>Iraq</strong>i) and then be<strong>in</strong>g found dead days later — apparently when the new <strong>Iraq</strong>igovernment recently decided to re<strong>in</strong>state the death penalty, they had someth<strong>in</strong>g else <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d.But back to the explosions. One <strong>of</strong> the larger blasts was <strong>in</strong> an area called Ma'moun, which is amiddle class area located <strong>in</strong> west Baghdad. It’s a relatively calm residential area with shops thatprovide the basics and a bit more. It happened <strong>in</strong> the morn<strong>in</strong>g, as the shops were open<strong>in</strong>g up fortheir daily bus<strong>in</strong>ess and it occurred right <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> a butcher’s shop. Immediately after, we heardthat a man liv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a house <strong>in</strong> front <strong>of</strong> the blast site was hauled <strong>of</strong>f by the Americans because itwas said that after the bomb went <strong>of</strong>f, he sniped an <strong>Iraq</strong>i National Guardsman.I didn’t th<strong>in</strong>k much about the story — noth<strong>in</strong>g about it stood out: an explosion and a sniper —hardly an anomaly. The <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g news started circulat<strong>in</strong>g a couple <strong>of</strong> days later. People fromthe area claim that the man was taken away not because he shot anyone, but because he knew toomuch about the bomb. Rumor has it that he saw an American patrol pass<strong>in</strong>g through the area andpaus<strong>in</strong>g at the bomb site m<strong>in</strong>utes before the explosion. Soon after they drove away, the bombwent <strong>of</strong>f and chaos ensued. He ran out <strong>of</strong> his house scream<strong>in</strong>g to the neighbors and bystandersthat the Americans had either planted the bomb or seen the bomb and done noth<strong>in</strong>g about it. Hewas promptly taken away.The bombs are mysterious. Some <strong>of</strong> them explode <strong>in</strong> the midst <strong>of</strong> National Guard and nearAmerican troops or <strong>Iraq</strong>i Police and others explode near mosques, churches, and shops or <strong>in</strong> themiddle <strong>of</strong> sougs. One th<strong>in</strong>g that surprises us about the news reports <strong>of</strong> these bombs is that theyare <strong>in</strong>evitably l<strong>in</strong>ked to suicide bombers. The reality is that some <strong>of</strong> these bombs are not suicidebombs — they are car bombs that are either be<strong>in</strong>g remotely detonated or maybe time bombs. Allwe know is that the techniques differ and apparently so do the <strong>in</strong>tentions. Some will tell you theyare resistance. Some say Chalabi and his thugs are responsible for a number <strong>of</strong> them. Othersblame Iran and the SCIRI militia Badir.In any case, they are terrify<strong>in</strong>g. If you're close enough, the first sound is a that <strong>of</strong> an earsplitt<strong>in</strong>gblast and the sounds that follow are <strong>of</strong> a ra<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong> glass, shrapnel and other sharp th<strong>in</strong>gs. Then thewails beg<strong>in</strong> — the shrill mechanical wails <strong>of</strong> an occasional ambulance comb<strong>in</strong>ed with the wail <strong>of</strong>car alarms from neighbor<strong>in</strong>g vehicles… and f<strong>in</strong>ally the wail <strong>of</strong> people try<strong>in</strong>g to sort out theirdead and dy<strong>in</strong>g from the debris.Then there was this one.On May 13, 2005, a 64 years old <strong>Iraq</strong>i farmer, Haj Haidar Abu Sijjad, took his tomato load <strong>in</strong> hispickup truck from Hilla to Baghdad, accompanied by Ali, his 11 years old grandson. They werestopped at an American check po<strong>in</strong>t and were asked to dismount. An American soldier climbedon the back <strong>of</strong> the pickup truck, followed by another a few m<strong>in</strong>utes later, and thoroughly201


<strong>in</strong>spected the tomato filled plastic conta<strong>in</strong>ers for about 10 m<strong>in</strong>utes. Haj Haidar and his grandsonwere then allowed to proceed to Baghdad.A m<strong>in</strong>ute later, his grandson told him that he saw one <strong>of</strong> the American soldiers putt<strong>in</strong>g a greymelon size object <strong>in</strong> the back among the tomato conta<strong>in</strong>ers. The Haj immediately slammed onthe brakes and stopped the car at the side <strong>of</strong> the road, at a relatively far distance from the checkpo<strong>in</strong>t. He found a time bomb with the clock tick<strong>in</strong>g tucked among his tomatoes. He immediatelyrecognized it, as he was an ex-army soldier. Panick<strong>in</strong>g, he grabbed his grandson and ran awayfrom the car. Then, realiz<strong>in</strong>g that the car was his only means <strong>of</strong> work, he went back, took thebomb and carried it <strong>in</strong> fear. He threw it <strong>in</strong> a deep ditch by the side <strong>of</strong> the road that was dug by<strong>Iraq</strong>i soldiers <strong>in</strong> preparation for the war, two years ago.Upon return<strong>in</strong>g from Baghdad, he found out that the bomb had <strong>in</strong>deed exploded, kill<strong>in</strong>g threesheep and <strong>in</strong>jur<strong>in</strong>g their shepherd <strong>in</strong> his head. He thanked God for giv<strong>in</strong>g him the courage to goback and remove the bomb, and for the luck <strong>in</strong> that the American soldiers did not notice hissudden stop at a distance and his gett<strong>in</strong>g rid <strong>of</strong> the bomb."They <strong>in</strong>tended it to explode <strong>in</strong> Baghdad and claim that it is the work <strong>of</strong> the 'terrorists', or'<strong>in</strong>surgents' or who call themselves the 'Resistance'.I decided to expose them and asked your reporter to take me to Baghdad to tell you the story.They are to be exposed as they now want to sow strife <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and ta<strong>in</strong>t the Resistance afterfail<strong>in</strong>g to defeat it militarily.Do not f<strong>org</strong>et to mention my name. I fear nobody but God, as I am a follower <strong>of</strong> Muqtada al-Sadir."The background and admission <strong>of</strong> guilt for such satanic shenanigans was clearly outl<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>Frank Morales' piece on globalresearch.ca: "The Provocateur State: <strong>Is</strong> the CIA Beh<strong>in</strong>d the <strong>Iraq</strong>i'Insurgents' — and Global Terrorism," by Frank Morales clearly demonstrates how Donald Rumsfeldsaid he was go<strong>in</strong>g to do exactly what these three sorry episodes show he actually did.Morales writes:Back <strong>in</strong> 2002, follow<strong>in</strong>g the trauma <strong>of</strong> 9-11, Secretary <strong>of</strong> Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld predictedthere would be more terrorist attacks aga<strong>in</strong>st the American people and civilization at large. Howcould he be so sure <strong>of</strong> that? Perhaps because these attacks would be <strong>in</strong>stigated on the order <strong>of</strong> theHonorable Mr. Rumsfeld. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Los Angeles Times military analyst William Ark<strong>in</strong>,writ<strong>in</strong>g Oct. 27, 2002, Rumsfeld set out to create a secret army, "a super-Intelligence SupportActivity" network that would "br<strong>in</strong>g together CIA and military covert action, <strong>in</strong>formationwarfare, <strong>in</strong>telligence, and cover and deception," to stir the pot <strong>of</strong> spiral<strong>in</strong>g global violence.We never got the full story on those ghastly behead<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> Nick Berg and others. Nor have weever understood who killed the American mercenaries <strong>in</strong> Fallujah that eventually precipitatedone <strong>of</strong> the great slaughters <strong>in</strong> history. Nor have we ever been able to discern if Abu Musab al-202


Zarqawi is actually a real person or just another b<strong>in</strong> Ladenesque boogeyman. Nor if the al-Qaedawebsite which claims responsibility for various atrocities is not really run by the CIA.Provok<strong>in</strong>g this type <strong>of</strong> violence also further conceals the s<strong>in</strong>ister genocide the <strong>Is</strong>raelis cont<strong>in</strong>ue toperpetrate on the hapless Palest<strong>in</strong>ians, which is exactly its po<strong>in</strong>t, as is the entire <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion anddestruction, and as was the <strong>in</strong>side job mass murder on 9/11 <strong>in</strong> New York City. The purpose <strong>of</strong> allthese despicable acts is to conceal what the <strong>Is</strong>raelis and the Americans have been do<strong>in</strong>g all alongto the entire Arab world, namely enslav<strong>in</strong>g and destroy<strong>in</strong>g it.There is not now nor ever was an Arab terror threat. That was all <strong>in</strong>vented by Rothschild,Rockefeller, Kiss<strong>in</strong>ger, Brzez<strong>in</strong>ski, Bush, Cheney, Sharon, Zakheim, Perle, Wolfowitz, Feith,Abrams and <strong>War</strong>ren Buffett. These people are all traitors to not only their countries but tohumanity <strong>in</strong> general, and should all be slammed and RICOed <strong>in</strong>to Guantanamo immediately.And so should the government <strong>of</strong>ficials, media lackeys, and ord<strong>in</strong>ary citizens who, by theircomplicity or their ignorance, support them.The ma<strong>in</strong> po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> understand<strong>in</strong>g these deliberate provocations to prevent peace is to understandhow the American capitalist system, now hijacked by billionaires with no trace <strong>of</strong> conscience,thrives on war and pr<strong>of</strong>its from the misery <strong>of</strong> others.The neocon murder menace has been for months ratchet<strong>in</strong>g up the hyperbole about why we needto <strong>in</strong>vade Iran — which some predict will happen <strong>in</strong> June — and just this week, rumors <strong>of</strong> troopmovements <strong>in</strong> the Caribbean and lockdowns at Florida military bases appear to augur animm<strong>in</strong>ent <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>of</strong> oil-produc<strong>in</strong>g Venezuela.The overall plan is to create hell on Earth, and we are succeed<strong>in</strong>g. By our silent complicity andcowardly reluctance to oppose and stop this homicidal behavior <strong>in</strong> the name <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it, we are allaccessories to mass murder and the destruction <strong>of</strong> human society, not to even mention theext<strong>in</strong>ction <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual human freedom and the God-given right to be safe and secure <strong>in</strong> thehomes <strong>of</strong> our choice.So now that you know, what are you go<strong>in</strong>g to do about it? You know if you do noth<strong>in</strong>g, thesesame th<strong>in</strong>gs will one day happen to you.John Kam<strong>in</strong>skimailto: skylax@comcast.netJohn Kam<strong>in</strong>ski is a writer whose Internet essays are seen on hundreds <strong>of</strong> websites around theworld. These stories have been compiled <strong>in</strong>to two anthologies, “America’s Autopsy Report” and“The Perfect Enemy.” In addition, he has written “The Day America Died: Why You Shouldn’tBelieve the Official Story <strong>of</strong> What Happened on September 11, 2001,” a booklet written forthose who still believe the government’s cynical lies about that tragic day. All three books areavailable at http://www.johnkam<strong>in</strong>ski.com/203


www.uruknet.<strong>in</strong>fo?p=15949British “Pseudo-Gang” Terrorists Exposed <strong>in</strong> BasraKurt Nimmo, Another Day <strong>in</strong> the EmpireSeptember 20, 2005Baghdad Dweller reports two British soldiers held by “<strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities” <strong>in</strong> Basra (also describedas “Shiite militiamen” <strong>in</strong> the corporate media), and subsequently freed after the British stormed apolice jail, were work<strong>in</strong>g undercover as bombers. Baghdad Dweller <strong>in</strong>cludes a l<strong>in</strong>k to theWash<strong>in</strong>gton Post, where the follow<strong>in</strong>g appears: “<strong>Iraq</strong>i security <strong>of</strong>ficials on Monday variouslyaccused the two Britons they deta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>of</strong> shoot<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces or try<strong>in</strong>g to plant explosives.Photographs <strong>of</strong> the two men <strong>in</strong> custody showed them <strong>in</strong> civilian clothes.” The Herald notes thefollow<strong>in</strong>g: “Sources say the British soldiers, possibly members <strong>of</strong> the new SpecialReconnaissance Regiment formed earlier this month to provide <strong>in</strong>telligence for SAS operations,were look<strong>in</strong>g at <strong>in</strong>filtration <strong>of</strong> the city’s police by the followers <strong>of</strong> the outspoken Shi’ite cleric,Moqtada al Sadr,” thus admitt<strong>in</strong>g the soldiers worked undercover.The “Special Reconnaissance Regiment,” accord<strong>in</strong>g to Regiments.<strong>org</strong>, “formed with HQ atHereford from volunteers <strong>of</strong> other units to support <strong>in</strong>ternational expeditionary operations <strong>in</strong> thefight aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>ternational terrorism, absorb<strong>in</strong>g 14th Intelligence Company (formed foroperations aga<strong>in</strong>st Ulster terrorists), Intelligence Corps, and releas<strong>in</strong>g the SAS and SBS for the‘hard end’ <strong>of</strong> missions.” <strong>Is</strong> it possible the “hard end” <strong>of</strong> the “mission” <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is to discredit theresistance and sow chaos <strong>in</strong> the country by front<strong>in</strong>g pseudo-gang terrorist groups (or the variant“pseudo-guerilla operations”), as the British have ample experience with elsewhere, notably <strong>in</strong>Kenya dur<strong>in</strong>g the Mau Mau upris<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong> Malaya? “Pseudo operations are those <strong>in</strong> whichgovernment forces disguised as guerrillas, normally along with guerrilla defectors, operate asteams to <strong>in</strong>filtrate <strong>in</strong>surgent areas,” writes Lawrence E. Cl<strong>in</strong>e for the U.S. Army <strong>War</strong> CollegeExternal Research Associates Program. “This technique has been used by the security forces <strong>of</strong>several other countries <strong>in</strong> their operations, and typically it has been very successful.” Indeed, onelong runn<strong>in</strong>g pseudo op, Gladio, was so successful it managed to render a nom<strong>in</strong>al Italianterrorist group, the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse), <strong>in</strong>to an excuse (after proper <strong>in</strong>filtration byagents provocateurs) to <strong>in</strong>crease the power <strong>of</strong> reactionary forces <strong>in</strong> Italy and discredit socialist,communist, and even labor movements.The British SAS honed its “counter-<strong>in</strong>surgency” techniques <strong>in</strong> Northern Ireland and there is noreason to believe it has refra<strong>in</strong>ed from do<strong>in</strong>g so <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>. “Formed to perform acts <strong>of</strong> sabotage andassass<strong>in</strong>ation beh<strong>in</strong>d enemy l<strong>in</strong>es dur<strong>in</strong>g World <strong>War</strong> 2, the SAS evolved <strong>in</strong>to a counter<strong>in</strong>surgencyregiment after the war,” writes Sean Mac Mathuna. Mathuna cites a 1969 Army<strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> manual (British Army Land Operations Manual, volume 3, counter-revolutionaryoperations) that enumerates several “tasks,” <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g:the ambush and harassment <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgents, the <strong>in</strong>filtration <strong>of</strong> sabotage, assass<strong>in</strong>ation anddemolition parties <strong>in</strong>to <strong>in</strong>surgent-held areas, border surveillance … liaison with, and <strong>org</strong>anization<strong>of</strong> friendly guerrilla forces operat<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st the common enemy.204


Examples “were found dur<strong>in</strong>g the Mau-Mau rebellion <strong>in</strong> Kenya dur<strong>in</strong>g the mid-fifties,” Mathunaexpla<strong>in</strong>s, “when SAS <strong>of</strong>ficers commanded some <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>famous ‘pseudo gangs’ that terrorizedthe civilian population,” and<strong>in</strong> Borneo, where they used cross-border operations to attack and destroy guerrilla bases; and <strong>in</strong>Aden <strong>in</strong> 1967, where they dressed as Arabs and would use an Army <strong>of</strong>ficer to lure Arab gunmen<strong>in</strong>to a trap and kill them. To defeat the <strong>in</strong>surgents counter-terror must be deployed back atthem—described by Ken Liv<strong>in</strong>gstone as “subvert<strong>in</strong>g the subverters”….In order to “subvert the subverters” and discredit the IRA <strong>in</strong> Northern Ireland, the SAS formedthe Military Reconnaissance Force (MRF), a covert pseudo-gang. “Dur<strong>in</strong>g the 1972 [IRA]ceasefire the MRF shot civilians from unmarked cars us<strong>in</strong>g IRA weapons,” writes Mathuna. “InNovember 1972 the Army admitted that the MRF had done this one three occasions. One <strong>of</strong>these <strong>in</strong>cidents happened on 22nd June 1972—the day the IRA announced its <strong>in</strong>tention to<strong>in</strong>troduce a ceasefire. The shoot<strong>in</strong>gs appear to have been done to discredit the IRA…”It is clear now, that because elements with<strong>in</strong> the security forces did not want a political deal withthe IRA <strong>in</strong> the mid-seventies, and the military solution was only possible with a change at the top<strong>of</strong> the Labour leadership, MI5 and the SAS were prepared to use the same methods the IRA arecondemned for - civilian deaths, assass<strong>in</strong>ations, bomb<strong>in</strong>gs and black propaganda—to br<strong>in</strong>g thisabout.In fact, so effective were these “military solution” pseudo-gang terrorist techniques the Frenchemployed them <strong>in</strong> Algeria and Vietnam. “The most widespread use <strong>of</strong> pseudo type operationswas dur<strong>in</strong>g the ‘Battle <strong>of</strong> Algiers’ <strong>in</strong> 1957,” expla<strong>in</strong>s Lawrence E. Cl<strong>in</strong>e. “The pr<strong>in</strong>cipal Frenchemployer <strong>of</strong> covert agents <strong>in</strong> Algiers was the Fifth Bureau, the psychological warfare branch.”The Fifth Bureau “planted <strong>in</strong>crim<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>org</strong>ed documents, spread false rumours <strong>of</strong> treacheryand fomented distrust among the [FLN, the National Liberation Front] … As a frenzy <strong>of</strong> throatcutt<strong>in</strong>gand disembowel<strong>in</strong>g broke out among confused and suspicious FLN cadres, nationalistslaughtered nationalist from April to September 1957 and did France’s work for her,” notesCl<strong>in</strong>e, quot<strong>in</strong>g Mart<strong>in</strong> S. Alexander and J. F. V. Kieger (“France and the Algerian <strong>War</strong>: Strategy,Operations, and Diplomacy,” Journal <strong>of</strong> Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 2002, pp. 6-7).Even though the Wash<strong>in</strong>gton Post mentions two Brits were deta<strong>in</strong>ed, apparently caught redhandedshoot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>i police and plant<strong>in</strong>g explosives, it does not bother to mention the SAS or itslong and sordid history <strong>of</strong> engag<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> covert pseudo-gang behavior and conclude the obvious:Brita<strong>in</strong>, and the United States—the latter hav<strong>in</strong>g admitted formulat<strong>in</strong>g the Proactive PreemptiveOperations Group (P2OG) <strong>in</strong> 2002, a bra<strong>in</strong> child <strong>of</strong> neocons staff<strong>in</strong>g the Pentagon’s DefenseScience Board, designed to “stimulate reactions” on the part <strong>of</strong> “terrorists” (<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, that wouldbe the resistance)—are <strong>in</strong>timately <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> sow<strong>in</strong>g chaos and spread<strong>in</strong>g violence <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> andmore than likely soon enough <strong>in</strong> Iran and Syria.Of course, this unfortunate and embarrass<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cident <strong>in</strong> Basra will fall <strong>of</strong>f the front page <strong>of</strong>corporate newspapers and websites soon enough, replaced with more appropriate, if fantastical,propaganda implicat<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>Iraq</strong>i resistance and <strong>in</strong>tel ops such as al-Zarqawi for the violence,205


obviously eng<strong>in</strong>eered to create a civil war <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and thus divide the country and accomplish theneocon-Likudite plan to destroy <strong>Is</strong>lamic culture and society.AddendumIt is not surpris<strong>in</strong>g the corporate media <strong>in</strong> the United States and Brita<strong>in</strong> would omit crucial detailson this story. In order to get the whole story, we have to go elsewhere—for <strong>in</strong>stance, Ch<strong>in</strong>a’sX<strong>in</strong>huanet news agency. “Two persons wear<strong>in</strong>g Arab uniforms [see the M.O. cited above]opened fire at a police station <strong>in</strong> Basra. A police patrol followed the attackers and captured themto discover they were two British soldiers,” an Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry source told X<strong>in</strong>hua. “The twosoldiers were us<strong>in</strong>g a civilian car packed with explosives, the source said.”So, the next time you read or hear about crazed “al-Qaeda <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>” terrorists blow<strong>in</strong>g up childrenor desperate job applicants, keep <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i Interior M<strong>in</strong>istry, theperpetrators may very well be British SAS goons who cut their teeth kill<strong>in</strong>g Irish citizens.kurtnimmo.com/?p=32Carry on Kill<strong>in</strong>gJeff Wells, Rigorous IntuitionSeptember 20, 2005Now at midnight all the agents, and the superhuman crew,Come out and round up everyone that knows more than they do - Bob DylanDamn the bl<strong>in</strong>d eyes <strong>of</strong> anyone who still can't see after Basra.How it began:"Two persons wear<strong>in</strong>g Arab uniforms opened fire at a police station <strong>in</strong> Basra. A police patrolfollowed the attackers and captured them to discover they were two British soldiers," an InteriorM<strong>in</strong>istry source told X<strong>in</strong>hua. The two soldiers were us<strong>in</strong>g a civilian car packed with explosives,the source said.Here are the two while <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i police custody. Reuters appended a note to each photo over thewire: "ATTENTION EDITORS - THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT REQUESTS THAT THEIDENTIFICATION OF THIS MAN IS NOT REVEALED, EITHER VIA PIXELLATION OFTHEIR FACES OR BY NOT PUBLISHING THE PHOTOS."As you probably know, they didn't rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> custody for long:British forces us<strong>in</strong>g tanks broke down the walls <strong>of</strong> the central jail <strong>in</strong> the southern city <strong>of</strong> Basralate Monday and freed two Britons, allegedly undercover commandos, who had been arrested oncharges <strong>of</strong> shoot<strong>in</strong>g two <strong>Iraq</strong>i policemen.206


Witnesses said about 150 <strong>Iraq</strong>i prisoners also fled the jail.Violence flared earlier <strong>in</strong> the day as demonstrators hurled stones and Molotov cocktails at Britishtanks; at least four people were killed.The British Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry spun, but found it difficult to maneuver with its pants about itsankles. "We‘ve heard noth<strong>in</strong>g to suggest we stormed the prison," a defense m<strong>in</strong>istry spokesman<strong>in</strong> London said. "We understand there were negotiations." When it found some equilibrium, itchanged its story to better comport with the undeniables: "We understand that the authoritiesordered their release. Unfortunately they weren't released and we became concerned for theirsafety and as a result a <strong>War</strong>rior <strong>in</strong>fantry fight<strong>in</strong>g vehicle broke down the perimeter wall <strong>in</strong> oneplace."These hard men, likely SAS ops, must have had some stories to tell, otherwise tanks would nothave negotiated their way through the prison walls <strong>of</strong> Brita<strong>in</strong>'s reputed hosts so soon after theircapture.Walk<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the untidied mess <strong>of</strong> this astonish<strong>in</strong>g and grotesque and predictable story feels a bitlike the British detective catch<strong>in</strong>g the killer red-handed: "Well well well, what have we here?"We have long had reason to suspect imperial <strong>in</strong>stigation to <strong>Iraq</strong>'s sectarian violence, but here, asclearly as we've ever seen it, is the provocateur state revealed: two British "undercover soldiers"<strong>in</strong> Arab dress, caught fir<strong>in</strong>g upon police from a car laden with explosives. And the Britishgovernment all but admitt<strong>in</strong>g its culpability by break<strong>in</strong>g them out <strong>of</strong> prison.It doesn't make sense? Only if you haven't been pay<strong>in</strong>g attention. This is the subtext <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>tragedy: blow up the Hajis and play the Sunnis on the Shias; create the chaos that <strong>in</strong>troduces theconditions necessary for the long-game, and the long-held aspirations <strong>of</strong> the neoconservatives todivide <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>in</strong>to ethnographic bantustans.I wonder what will be made <strong>of</strong> this story by those who th<strong>in</strong>k escalat<strong>in</strong>g bloodshed <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is ameasure <strong>of</strong> the failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> policy, and not its success, and who believe black ops and falseflags are figments <strong>of</strong> our paranoiac fantasies. Probably, as with so much that would bedevil theirworldview if only they were <strong>in</strong>tellectually honest enough to permit it, this too will be filtered outand f<strong>org</strong>otten. But our burden is we won't f<strong>org</strong>et. And damned if the <strong>Iraq</strong>is will.A British soldier jumps from a burn<strong>in</strong>g tank which was set ablaze after a shoot<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>cident <strong>in</strong> thesouthern <strong>Iraq</strong>i city <strong>of</strong> Basra September 19, 2005. Angry crowds attacked a British tank withpetrol bombs and rocks <strong>in</strong> Basra on Monday after <strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities said they had deta<strong>in</strong>ed twoBritish undercover soldiers <strong>in</strong> the southern city for fir<strong>in</strong>g on police.rigorous<strong>in</strong>tuition.blogspot.com/2005/09/carry-on-kill<strong>in</strong>g.htmlMiddle East Press: "Suspicions occupation <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> armed operations aga<strong>in</strong>st civilians andplaces <strong>of</strong> worship"GlobalResearch.caSeptember 20, 2005207


Text <strong>of</strong> reportSyrian TV (Arabic), 19 September 2005[Newsreader Nidal Zaghbur] Ten <strong>Iraq</strong>is - seven police commandos, two civilians and a child -were killed and more than 10 others wounded <strong>in</strong> the explosion <strong>of</strong> two car bombs near twocheckpo<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong> Al-Mahmudiyah and Al-Latifiyah south <strong>of</strong> Baghdad while hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands<strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is were head<strong>in</strong>g towards the city <strong>of</strong> Karbala to mark the anniversary <strong>of</strong> a religious event.And <strong>in</strong> a significant <strong>in</strong>cident <strong>in</strong> the city <strong>of</strong> Basra, which is also mark<strong>in</strong>g the same religious event,<strong>Iraq</strong>i demonstrators set fire to two British tanks near a police station after <strong>Iraq</strong>i police hadarrested two British soldiers disguised <strong>in</strong> civilian clothes for open<strong>in</strong>g fire on police. Eightarmoured British vehicles surrounded the police station before the eruption <strong>of</strong> the confrontations.A policeman at the scene said the two deta<strong>in</strong>ed Britons were wear<strong>in</strong>g traditional <strong>Iraq</strong>i jallabahs[loose cloaks] and wigs.For more details about this development <strong>in</strong> Basra, we have on the l<strong>in</strong>e with us our correspondent<strong>in</strong> Baghdad Ziyad al-Munajjid. Ziyad, good even<strong>in</strong>g.[Al-Munajjid] Good even<strong>in</strong>g, Nidal.[Zaghbur] What are the dimensions <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>cident <strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g operations aga<strong>in</strong>stcivilians and places <strong>of</strong> worship to create sedition among the <strong>Iraq</strong>is?[Al-Munajjid] In fact, Nidal, this <strong>in</strong>cident gave answers to questions and suspicions that werelack<strong>in</strong>g evidence about the participation <strong>of</strong> the occupation <strong>in</strong> some armed operations <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Many analysts and observers here had suspicions that the occupation was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> somearmed operations aga<strong>in</strong>st civilians and places <strong>of</strong> worship and <strong>in</strong> the kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> scientists. But thosewere only suspicions that lacked pro<strong>of</strong>. The pro<strong>of</strong> came today through the arrest <strong>of</strong> the twoBritish soldiers while they were plant<strong>in</strong>g explosives <strong>in</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the Basra streets. This proves,accord<strong>in</strong>g to observers, that the occupation is not far from many operations that seek to sowsedition and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> disorder, as this would give the occupation the justification to stay <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>for a longer period.[Zaghbur] Ziyad al-Munajjaid <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, thank you very much.Copyright Syrian Arab TV and BBC Monitor<strong>in</strong>g, 2005bold addedFurther on arrest <strong>of</strong> two British soldiers <strong>in</strong> BasraAl-Jazeera TV, Doha, <strong>in</strong> Arabic 14:14 GMT, 19 Sep 05Text <strong>of</strong> report by Qatari Al-Jazeera satellite TV on 19 September208


A British military source has said that the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police <strong>in</strong> southern <strong>Iraq</strong> have arrested two Britons.The police said that they had fired at an <strong>Iraq</strong>i security man <strong>in</strong> Maydan <strong>in</strong> the city <strong>of</strong> Basra.AFP said that angry <strong>Iraq</strong>i demonstrators torched two British tanks after the British soldiers fired<strong>in</strong> the air to disperse them.[Anchorman Al-Habib al-Ghuraybi] We have with us on the telephone from Baghdad Fattah al-Shaykh, member <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i National Assembly. What are the details <strong>of</strong> and the factssurround<strong>in</strong>g this <strong>in</strong>cident?[Al-Shaykh] In the name <strong>of</strong> God, the merciful, the compassionate. There have been cont<strong>in</strong>uousprovocative acts s<strong>in</strong>ce the day before yesterday by the British forces aga<strong>in</strong>st the peaceful sons <strong>of</strong>Basra. There have been <strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ate arrests, the most recent <strong>of</strong> which was the arrest <strong>of</strong> ShaykhAhmad al-Farqusi and two Basra citizens on the pretext that they had carried out terroristoperations to kill <strong>US</strong> soldiers. This is a baseless claim. This was confirmed to us by [name<strong>in</strong>dist<strong>in</strong>ct] the second secretary at the British Embassy <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, when we met with him ashort while ago. He said that there is evidence on this. We say: You should come up with thisevidence or f<strong>org</strong>et about this issue. If you really want to look for truth, then we should resort tothe <strong>Iraq</strong>i justice away from the British provocations aga<strong>in</strong>st the sons <strong>of</strong> Basra, particularly whathappened today when the sons <strong>of</strong> Basra caught two non-<strong>Iraq</strong>is, who seem to be Britons and were<strong>in</strong> a car <strong>of</strong> the Cressida type. It was a booby-trapped car laden with ammunition and was meantto explode <strong>in</strong> the centre <strong>of</strong> the city <strong>of</strong> Basra <strong>in</strong> the popular market. However, the sons <strong>of</strong> the city<strong>of</strong> Basra arrested them. They [the two non-<strong>Iraq</strong>is] then fired at the people there and killed some<strong>of</strong> them. The two arrested persons are now at the Intelligence Department <strong>in</strong> Basra, and theywere held by the National Guard force, but the British occupation forces are still surround<strong>in</strong>g thisdepartment <strong>in</strong> an attempt to absolve them <strong>of</strong> the crime.[Al-Ghuraybi] Thank you Fattah al-Shaykh, member <strong>of</strong> the National Assembly and deputy forBasra.Copyright Al Jazeera TV and BBC Monitor<strong>in</strong>g, 2005bold addedwww.globalresearch.ca/<strong>in</strong>dex.php?context=viewArticle&code=20050920&articleId=973The day that <strong>Iraq</strong>i anger exploded <strong>in</strong> the face <strong>of</strong> the British occupiersHelen McCormack, The IndependentSeptember 20, 2005The dramatic events began to unfold just before dawn yesterday, when two British nationalswere deta<strong>in</strong>ed by <strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities. It emerged later that they were British soldiers. Dressed <strong>in</strong>pla<strong>in</strong> clothes - accord<strong>in</strong>g to some they were wear<strong>in</strong>g traditional Arab dress - the two men hadbeen driv<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> an unmarked car when they arrived at a checkpo<strong>in</strong>t <strong>in</strong> the city.209


In the confrontation that followed, shots were fired, and two <strong>Iraq</strong>i policemen were shot, one <strong>of</strong>whom later died. The <strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities blamed the men, reported to be undercover commandos,and arrested them.Mohammed al-Abadi, an <strong>of</strong>ficial <strong>in</strong> the Basra governorate said that the two men had lookedsuspicious to police. "A policeman approached them and then one <strong>of</strong> these guys fired at him.Then the police managed to capture them," he said."They refused to say what their mission was. They said they were British soldiers and [suggestedthey] ask their commander about their mission," he added.The Britons were taken to an <strong>Iraq</strong>i police station, with local <strong>of</strong>ficials say<strong>in</strong>g they had been<strong>in</strong>formed that the men were undercover soldiers wear<strong>in</strong>g pla<strong>in</strong>clothes. British military <strong>of</strong>ficials,both <strong>in</strong> London and <strong>Iraq</strong>, began to <strong>in</strong>vestigate the arrests.As a beh<strong>in</strong>d-the-scenes operation by British diplomats charged with negotiat<strong>in</strong>g a release for thesoldiers started, tension spread across the city, where 8,500 British troops are based. A Britisharmy tank was surrounded.In a clear demonstration that the hold<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the soldiers would not be tolerated, tanks movedquickly to encircle the police station. Amid the confusion, a crowd <strong>in</strong>itially <strong>of</strong> about a dozen,which later swelled to hundreds, soon surrounded the tanks.Some said it was because the news had spread that British soldiers had been responsible for thedeath <strong>of</strong> an <strong>Iraq</strong>i policeman. One witness said <strong>Iraq</strong>is were driv<strong>in</strong>g through the streets withloudhailers demand<strong>in</strong>g that the soldiers should be kept <strong>in</strong> the police station, and then jailed.Violence began to break out <strong>in</strong> the streets near to the prison. As tempers flared, rocks werethrown, and as tempers flared, the soldiers began to fear that they could no longer conta<strong>in</strong> thesituation. What looked like petrol bombs began to fly through the air, and television footagerecorded one tank attempt<strong>in</strong>g to reverse away from the grow<strong>in</strong>g mob as the crowds around thetanks tightened their grip.Then, flames emerged from the top <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the tanks. It rema<strong>in</strong>ed unclear whether it was thevehicle itself on fire, or whether the flames were emerg<strong>in</strong>g from military equipment placed onthe back <strong>of</strong> the tank.One soldier decided to jump. His uniform on fire, the television footage shows him attempt<strong>in</strong>g tomake his escape, as the crowd pelts him with stones. Another soldier carry<strong>in</strong>g a riot shield stoodby the tank. Last night the condition <strong>of</strong> the soldier was not known.In the riot<strong>in</strong>g that ensued, British control <strong>of</strong> the city, <strong>in</strong> the Shia-dom<strong>in</strong>ated south <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, beganto look seriously under threat. Two <strong>Iraq</strong>is were reported dead <strong>in</strong> the riot<strong>in</strong>g, with 15 <strong>Iraq</strong>isreported <strong>in</strong>jured, along with three British soldiers.210


Meanwhile, frantic negotiations cont<strong>in</strong>ued to free the men, whose arrest had sent Basra <strong>in</strong>to nearanarchy with<strong>in</strong> the space <strong>of</strong> less than two hours.Images <strong>of</strong> the men <strong>in</strong> captivity were available after television cameramen from Arab satellitebroadcasters <strong>in</strong> the Persian Gulf were allowed <strong>in</strong> to the jail. Seated on the floor <strong>of</strong> what lookedlike a prison cell, their hands tied beh<strong>in</strong>d their backs, the men stared directly <strong>in</strong>to the cameralens.Their clothes - pla<strong>in</strong> T-shirts and ch<strong>in</strong>os - were spattered with blood. One had a bandagewrapped around his head, the other also had a head <strong>in</strong>jury, which had been dressed.The television commentary, <strong>in</strong> Arabic, identified them only as Britons. A prov<strong>in</strong>cial councilspokesman for Basra, Nnadhim al-Jabari, confirmed that they were likely to go before an <strong>Iraq</strong>icourt.Calm then descended on the city. In London, the M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Defence would give no detailsabout the talks aimed at secur<strong>in</strong>g the men, a spokesman say<strong>in</strong>g only that they were cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g "tothrash out with <strong>Iraq</strong>i authorities what is happen<strong>in</strong>g and what can be done".Then, just before midday, a solution <strong>of</strong> sorts appeared to have been found. Reports com<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>of</strong>Basra described how up to ten British tanks, possibly Challenger 2 Ma<strong>in</strong> Battle Tanks, possibly<strong>War</strong>rior Infantry Fight<strong>in</strong>g Vehicles, had stormed the jail where the two men were be<strong>in</strong>g held.Witnesses said that they had smashed down a wall to ga<strong>in</strong> entry. The operation was said to bebacked up by helicopters. The witnesses said that up to 150 prisoners took the opportunity toescape through the wall <strong>in</strong> the confusion.The British military action was condemned as "barbaric, savage and irresponsible" byMohammed al-Waili, the governor <strong>of</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ce. "A British force <strong>of</strong> more than 10 tanksbacked by helicopters attacked the central jail and destroyed it. This is an irresponsible act," thegovernor said.The M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Defence <strong>in</strong> London confirmed that the soldiers had been released, but said thathad been achieved by "negotiation". Its explanation is unlikely to assuage the anger on the streets<strong>of</strong> the southern <strong>Iraq</strong>i city, which has so far been relatively calm compared with the daily violencethat has scarred much <strong>of</strong> the rest <strong>of</strong> the country.As an uneasy peace was ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the city last night, all the <strong>in</strong>dications were that yesterday'sviolence could be repeated today.news.<strong>in</strong>dependent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article313848.ece© 2005 Independent News & Media (UK) Ltd.More Blatant Lies From CNN!Jesse, Editor , TVNewsLIES.<strong>org</strong>211


September 21st, 2005CNN cont<strong>in</strong>ued their long tradition <strong>of</strong> ly<strong>in</strong>g to the public today! Dur<strong>in</strong>g their one m<strong>in</strong>ute or sothat they dedicate to news items other than the one or two stories they cover dur<strong>in</strong>g any givenhour, they reported about some tension <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> related to some British soldiers who were“rescued” by British troops. “Rescued!” They told the public that the soldiers were “rescued!!!!”This is a bold face out and out lie! The soldiers <strong>in</strong> question were arrested, shot an <strong>Iraq</strong>i police<strong>of</strong>ficer, were dressed up as Arabs, heavily armed, and the British troops broke them out <strong>of</strong> jailallow<strong>in</strong>g 150 <strong>in</strong>mates to escape <strong>in</strong> the process!!! Can CNN possibly mislead the public any morethan they have on this one news item?CNN, the most trusted name <strong>in</strong> news? How sad a statement about the news <strong>in</strong>dustry is that?Th<strong>in</strong>k about it!www.tvnewslies.<strong>org</strong>/blog/?p=126'Five <strong>Iraq</strong>i civilians killed' <strong>in</strong> SAS rescue operationTelegraphSeptember 21, 2005Five <strong>Iraq</strong>i civilians died <strong>in</strong> clashes surround<strong>in</strong>g the controversial operation to free two BritishSAS men captured <strong>in</strong> Basra, it was claimed today.<strong>Iraq</strong>i police said the latest two died <strong>in</strong> hospital today after be<strong>in</strong>g wounded as British troopsstormed a police station jail on Monday.<strong>Iraq</strong>i police are reported to have taken part <strong>in</strong> anti-British demonstrations <strong>in</strong> the southern <strong>Iraq</strong>icity today.But John Reid, the Defence Secretary, and <strong>Iraq</strong>i prime m<strong>in</strong>ister Ibrahim al-Jaafari <strong>in</strong>sistedrelations between the two countries rema<strong>in</strong>ed strong."There has not been a fundamental breakdown <strong>in</strong> trust between the British Government and the<strong>Iraq</strong>i government," Mr Reid said at a press conference follow<strong>in</strong>g talks between the two men <strong>in</strong>London today.He said the strategy <strong>of</strong> the British Government had not changed, and it would work towards ahandover <strong>of</strong> security to <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces."We will not cut and run, and we will not leave the job half done," he said.Mr Jaafari also said that the <strong>in</strong>cidents <strong>of</strong> the last few days would not affect British-<strong>Iraq</strong>i relations,and said such <strong>in</strong>cidents were "expected to happen". He said he had ordered a full <strong>in</strong>quiry.Confusion still surrounds whether British forces knocked down a prison wall, result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> theescape <strong>of</strong> prisoners, <strong>in</strong> their attempt to rescue the two SAS men.212


The British troops believed the two Special Forces men were be<strong>in</strong>g held there but later freedthem from a house <strong>in</strong> Basra where they were be<strong>in</strong>g held by Shia militia.As concern grew that <strong>Iraq</strong>i police had handed the men over to the militia, <strong>Iraq</strong>'s governmentadmitted that <strong>in</strong>surgents had <strong>in</strong>filtrated its security forces.<strong>Iraq</strong>'s national security adviser Dr Mouwafak al-Rubaie said: "Our <strong>Iraq</strong>i security forces <strong>in</strong>general, police <strong>in</strong> particular, <strong>in</strong> many parts <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, I have to admit, have been penetrated by some<strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>surgents, some <strong>of</strong> the terrorists as well."I can't deny this. We are putt<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> place a very scrupulous, very meticulous vett<strong>in</strong>g procedure<strong>in</strong> the process <strong>of</strong> recruit<strong>in</strong>g a new batch <strong>of</strong> police and <strong>Iraq</strong>i army, which will, if you like, cleanour security forces as well as stop any penetration <strong>in</strong> future from the <strong>in</strong>surgents and terrorists."The capture <strong>of</strong> the SAS men came a day after British forces <strong>in</strong> Basra arrested two lead<strong>in</strong>gmembers <strong>of</strong> the outlawed Mahdi Army, which is loyal to firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and iswidely believed to have heavily <strong>in</strong>filtrated police <strong>in</strong> the city.Other groups to have <strong>in</strong>filtrated the police are believed to <strong>in</strong>clude the Badr Brigade, which is thearmed w<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the Supreme Council <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Is</strong>lamic Revolution, and Hezbollah <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.All three groups have historical ties to neighbour<strong>in</strong>g Iran.Police <strong>in</strong> Basra said the SAS men, who were travell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a car dressed as Arab men, shot andkilled a policeman when they were stopped.But the British said no one was killed and a spokesman for Mr Jaafari said they were arrested forbehav<strong>in</strong>g suspiciously.British <strong>of</strong>ficers say they received <strong>in</strong>telligence that the men's lives were at risk and bulldozed theirway <strong>in</strong>to the jail, <strong>in</strong> the face <strong>of</strong> a mob throw<strong>in</strong>g petrol bombs, to rescue them.The action, condemned by many <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>, was defended as "absolutely right" by Dr Reid.portal.telegraph.co.uk/news/ma<strong>in</strong>.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/09/21/uiraqa.xml&sSheet=/portal/2005/09/21/ixportaltop.htmlDouble Standards <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>British Agents <strong>in</strong> Local Drag Saved by CavalryLINDA S. HEARD, CounterPunchSeptember 21, 2005 - Monday was one <strong>of</strong> those rare illum<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g days. A juxtaposition <strong>of</strong>events starkly exposed Western double standards and made the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government's claims <strong>of</strong>sovereignty even more nonsensical than it already was.213


Anyone who tuned <strong>in</strong>to the BBC's HARDtalk program dur<strong>in</strong>g the day would have beensubjected to <strong>Iraq</strong>'s corpulent marionette <strong>of</strong> a president Jalal Talibani, fresh from grovel<strong>in</strong>g aroundthe nether regions <strong>of</strong> Ge<strong>org</strong>e W.There he was sport<strong>in</strong>g his omnipresent gr<strong>in</strong> worm<strong>in</strong>g his way around Stephen Sackur's questionsover <strong>Iraq</strong>'s so-called democracy, the <strong>in</strong>clusiveness <strong>of</strong> the draft constitution and his own shillyshally<strong>in</strong>gover sign<strong>in</strong>g Saddam's death warrant.When the Kurdish politician--whose demeanor is more suited to a shisha-puff<strong>in</strong>g carpet traderthan a leader--was faced with a query over his government's legitimacy at a time foreign soldierswere still stomp<strong>in</strong>g all over his land, he nostalgically looked back to June 2004 when the<strong>in</strong>vaders handed back sovereignty to <strong>Iraq</strong>is. He thought it was a great day.Talabani must be one <strong>of</strong> the few who took the handover seriously, as anyone with an IQ over 80quickly realized it was yet another Pentagon production on the l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> the rigged toppl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>Saddam's statue, the Jessica Lynch fiasco, and 'Mission Accomplished'.But wait! I'm be<strong>in</strong>g too tough on the old warhorse. His pal Hazem al-Shaalan, who was IyadAllawi's defense m<strong>in</strong>ister, obviously believed <strong>Iraq</strong> was sovereign, too, when he allegedlysiphoned <strong>of</strong>f <strong>US</strong>$1 billion from his procurement budget, which translated means every cent. Apatriot, <strong>in</strong>deed, especially when one remembers how a whopp<strong>in</strong>g <strong>US</strong>$9 billion went walkaboutunder the watch <strong>of</strong> Paul L. Bremer.So let's explore the unlikelihood that HARDtalk viewers were dim enough to swallow Talabani'ssales pitch. Let's imag<strong>in</strong>e they bought the purple f<strong>in</strong>ger garbage or the new holy grail <strong>of</strong> aconstitution. And, let's suppose they could even dig deep <strong>in</strong>to their hearts to excuse Talabanifrom his desire to witness Saddam with his neck snapped and his eyes parted from their socketsas long as he wasn't the one sign<strong>in</strong>g the order. I'll be absent on that day, he said, with a gr<strong>in</strong>,admitt<strong>in</strong>g that task would be left to some subord<strong>in</strong>ate unfortunate.So let's suppose that after that program we were left with starry eyes and a wellspr<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>gratitude towards America's compassionate conservative leader for free<strong>in</strong>g the poor, oppressed,long suffer<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong>is, who thanks to him, have a glorious future <strong>in</strong> store (those who haven'talready been carried <strong>of</strong>f by men <strong>in</strong> white coats, that is)The rema<strong>in</strong>der, who had switched <strong>of</strong>f their sets and gone fish<strong>in</strong>g, or used their newspapers forshelf-l<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, might still be <strong>in</strong>fused with that rosy Talabani glow. But for newshounds, that glowwould swiftly fade <strong>in</strong>to a pallor. Just a few hours after Talabani's schmaltz there came dramaticbreak<strong>in</strong>g news.Accord<strong>in</strong>g to the BBC, two British servicemen dressed like local Shiites drove up to an <strong>Iraq</strong>imannedcheckpo<strong>in</strong>t near Basra. They were apparently driv<strong>in</strong>g a scruffy civilian car and whenchallenged they opened fire result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the deaths <strong>of</strong> an <strong>Iraq</strong>i policeman. A confused-look<strong>in</strong>gBBC anchor struggl<strong>in</strong>g to make sense <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>cident described it as 'murky'.214


Naturally, the sleazy Laurence-emulat<strong>in</strong>g pair was carted <strong>of</strong>f to the slammer--along with theireclectic arsenal <strong>of</strong> weaponry and communication devices--where a riot<strong>in</strong>g crowd soon gathered,furious over the kill<strong>in</strong>g.The Basra police told the British army that the soldiers were due to appear before an <strong>Iraq</strong>i court,which sounds reasonable to me. <strong>Is</strong>n't this exactly what would happen <strong>in</strong> any so-called civilizedcountry where the rule <strong>of</strong> law applies?But this wasn't good enough for <strong>Iraq</strong>'s Ramboesque British guests, ostensibly there to set this'sovereign' country on the road to security even when, after heavy diplomatic arm twist<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>Iraq</strong>'sdefense m<strong>in</strong>ister ordered their guys' release."Last night, British forces used up to 10 tanks supported by helicopters to smash through thewalls <strong>of</strong> the jail and free the two British servicemen," reported the Independent, add<strong>in</strong>g, "around150 prisoners were said to have escaped dur<strong>in</strong>g the assault, which was condemned as 'barbaric,savage and irresponsible' by Mohammed Al-Waili, the prov<strong>in</strong>cial governor.Then after this Hollywood-style blockbuster--thought to have term<strong>in</strong>ally eroded whatever trustthere was between the occupation forces <strong>in</strong> the south and the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police--the Brits discoveredtheir men had been moved to a private house; the home <strong>of</strong> a militia-man.Thank the Lord that the Brits are home and dry and even though a British tank was fired withpetrol bombs its occupants have got away with m<strong>in</strong>or <strong>in</strong>juries. Never m<strong>in</strong>d that three <strong>Iraq</strong>is losttheir lives dur<strong>in</strong>g those <strong>in</strong>cidents or that 15 were wounded <strong>in</strong> their own 'sovereign' democracyappears to be the attitude <strong>of</strong> most media outlets.The British army <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> should be ashamed <strong>of</strong> itself. Its members have behaved like a gang <strong>of</strong>thugs who wouldn't look out <strong>of</strong> place rescu<strong>in</strong>g banditos <strong>in</strong> a banana republic. But <strong>in</strong> a way, it'sdone us all a favor.We are surely forced to cast <strong>of</strong>f our rose-colored specs m<strong>in</strong>e are term<strong>in</strong>ally grey and face reality.<strong>Iraq</strong> is still occupied. And its government is made up <strong>of</strong> employees <strong>of</strong> the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration,its 'jump to it' allies, and its crony companies. Talabani and crew have clearly sold-out, else theywould order yes order--the occupier to sl<strong>in</strong>g its hook without delay.Instead, Talabani told the BBC that the allies are welcome to stay as long as they like. And theywill. Don't worry about that!After all, there are reconstruction contracts, still to be doled out. There is the privatization <strong>of</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>'s resources to complete. There are four permanent military bases to build and we mustn'tf<strong>org</strong>et that foreign carpet baggers and mercenaries have starv<strong>in</strong>g babes <strong>of</strong> one k<strong>in</strong>d or another t<strong>of</strong>eed back home <strong>in</strong> London and Los Angeles.When the Kurdish leader dared ask Mr. Bush how long that might be dur<strong>in</strong>g his recent visit tothe White House he was apparently told "as long as it takes to do the job". Pity he didn't enquire215


to which job the <strong>US</strong> President was referr<strong>in</strong>g. Could it be the pa<strong>in</strong>t job which would allow Ge<strong>org</strong>eW. to stick up two f<strong>in</strong>gers <strong>in</strong>stead <strong>of</strong> the usual one perchance?I know all about the arguments which defend the presence <strong>of</strong> allied armies, warn<strong>in</strong>g darkly <strong>of</strong> afull-blown civil war were they to exit. And it is true that there will be bloodshed, but, on theother hand, the cities and streets are runn<strong>in</strong>g with the red stuff now. And, unfortunately, the sight<strong>of</strong> Brits try<strong>in</strong>g to pass themselves <strong>of</strong>f as Arabs and tak<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>in</strong> shoot-outs simply feeds <strong>in</strong>to<strong>in</strong>surgents' claims that the allies are work<strong>in</strong>g on a 'divide and rule' ethic.There is more and more <strong>of</strong> a consensus that our armies are no longer part <strong>of</strong> the solution but arethe problem. Studies have shown that ord<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>Iraq</strong>is unable to stomach the horrors <strong>of</strong> AbuGhraib, the level<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Fallujah and the brutal 'pacification' <strong>of</strong> Tal Afar are jo<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the<strong>in</strong>surgency.Others, mostly Sunnis, are outraged over the draft constitution, which they view as either aprelude to an <strong>Is</strong>lamist state or the break-up <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>in</strong>to three segments. Just about all are just sickand tired <strong>of</strong> the lack <strong>of</strong> electricity, jobs and opportunity and the abundance <strong>of</strong> backed-up sewage.Sure, allied f<strong>in</strong>gers po<strong>in</strong>t at foreign fighters as be<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>surgency's founta<strong>in</strong>head but the <strong>US</strong>military has admitted that these make-up only six per cent <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgents. But this isn't someth<strong>in</strong>gthey like to dwell upon; not when a low-hang<strong>in</strong>g fruit like Syria is be<strong>in</strong>g slowly ripened byaccusations that it supports the <strong>in</strong>surgents by facilitat<strong>in</strong>g their entry through its borders.Put simply, the double standards we impose are nauseat<strong>in</strong>g. What if <strong>Iraq</strong>is had stormed AbuGhraib to free the prisoners there from sexual abuse, torture, beat<strong>in</strong>gs and assaults on theirreligious beliefs? If they had succeeded bash<strong>in</strong>g down the wall <strong>of</strong> that jail and pluck<strong>in</strong>g theirfriends from their cells, would that cavalry have been termed "rescuers" or "terrorists"? Wealready know the answer to that one don't we?Get with the rule: The allies are honor-soaked heroes when they drop bombs, fire depleteduranium tank shells, send missiles <strong>in</strong>to heavily-populated areas, use cluster-bombs or napalm andforce people <strong>in</strong>to rivers when they cannot swim. But any <strong>Iraq</strong>i who would dare retaliate is 'aterrorist' even if that <strong>Iraq</strong>i happens to be a policeman at a checkpo<strong>in</strong>t guilty <strong>of</strong> arrest<strong>in</strong>g twotrigger-happy drag artist foreign spooks.L<strong>in</strong>da S. Heard is a specialist writer on Mid-East affairs based <strong>in</strong> Egypt. She can be reached atheardonthegrapev<strong>in</strong>es@yahoo.co.ukwww.counterpunch.<strong>org</strong>/heard09212005.htmlAgents Provocateurs?William Bowles, I'n'ISeptember 22, 2005Fasc<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g. No really, the ‘evolution’ <strong>of</strong> state dis<strong>in</strong>formation has probably never been betterdisplayed than <strong>in</strong> the case <strong>of</strong> the two (more than likely) SAS soldiers who were ‘liberated’ after216


e<strong>in</strong>g arrested by the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police on 19 September by a phalanx <strong>of</strong> tanks and helicopter gunshipsthat stormed the police station where the two undercover soldiers were be<strong>in</strong>g held after theyallegedly failed to stop at an <strong>Iraq</strong>i police roadblock and subsequently opened fire on the <strong>Iraq</strong>ipolice, kill<strong>in</strong>g one and wound<strong>in</strong>g another.The car they were travell<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> was loaded with weapons <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g allegedly, assault rifles, alight mach<strong>in</strong>e gun, an anti-tank weapon, radio gear and a medical kit (’standard’ SAS issueaccord<strong>in</strong>g to the BBC). Accord<strong>in</strong>g to at least two reports, the car they were travel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> (AToyota Cressida) was “booby-trapped”.Subsequent accounts vary accord<strong>in</strong>g to the source but accord<strong>in</strong>g to the <strong>in</strong>itial story broadcast onthe BBC (19/9/05), the two men wore traditional Arab dress but then this changed to “civiliandress” (BBC TV News).As more <strong>in</strong>formation trickled out, a BBC story reported that the men were freed after the policestation had been attacked by British tanks, a report that the British government <strong>in</strong>itially deniedsay<strong>in</strong>g that “the release <strong>of</strong> the soldiers had been negotiated” (BBC Website 20/0/05).Brita<strong>in</strong>’s M<strong>in</strong>istry <strong>of</strong> Defence says the release <strong>of</strong> the two soldiers had been negotiated and it didnot believe the prison had been stormed.“We’ve heard noth<strong>in</strong>g to suggest we stormed the prison,” a m<strong>in</strong>istry spokesman said.“We understand there were negotiations.”Lisa Glover, spokeswoman for the British embassy <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, says three people have beenwounded <strong>in</strong> the operation to free the soldiers.She did not give further details <strong>of</strong> how the soldiers were freed.Then the story changed yet aga<strong>in</strong>, only now the ‘<strong>of</strong>ficial’ story, dutifully reported by the BritishState Broadcast<strong>in</strong>g Company (BSBC), was that “negotiations broke down” and that the two menwere <strong>in</strong> the hands <strong>of</strong> the Mehdi Army <strong>in</strong> another build<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong> which case, why was the policestation stormed?Then yet another version was issued by the British government only now the police station was<strong>in</strong>deed attacked but only after “negotiations broke down”. So were the two SAS men <strong>in</strong> thepolice station or not?Accord<strong>in</strong>g to yet another BSBC report, after break<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>to the police station, the Brits discoveredthat they had been moved to a Mehdi Army house for “<strong>in</strong>terrogation”. Yet subsequent accountsrevealed that they had <strong>in</strong> fact, been <strong>in</strong> the police station all along and, accord<strong>in</strong>g to a CNN report,were be<strong>in</strong>g questioned by an <strong>Iraq</strong>i judge, not, as the British government alleged, by the‘<strong>in</strong>surgents’.217


By now, <strong>in</strong> a classic dis<strong>in</strong>formation campaign, so many stories were be<strong>in</strong>g circulated that sort<strong>in</strong>gout the truth from fiction was virtually impossible unless one is prepared to dig and dig deep.What is clear is that the two SAS “undercover operatives” had been caught red-handed by theBritish government’s alleged allies, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police, dressed as Arabs, replete with wigs andarmed to the teeth and <strong>in</strong> a car which accord<strong>in</strong>g to one report, was packed with explosives (thecar by the way, has been taken away by the British occupation forces).The question the BSBC was not and still is not ask<strong>in</strong>g, is what were they up to, creep<strong>in</strong>g arounddressed up as <strong>Iraq</strong>is <strong>in</strong> what is meant to be a relatively peaceful Basra?Once more the BSBC answered the question, sort <strong>of</strong>, courtesy yet another ‘<strong>of</strong>ficial’ story, onethat was to emerge only after a very angry crowd attacked two British armoured vehicles, sett<strong>in</strong>gat least one on fire. The “mob”, as the BSBC described them, were accord<strong>in</strong>g to the report, angryover the arrest <strong>of</strong> two Mehdi Army members, also on 19 September, and that it had noth<strong>in</strong>g towith the free<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the two SAS. In reality <strong>of</strong> course, the ‘mob’ had already been <strong>in</strong>formed aboutthe two SAS undercover guys and were understandably upset.So now, the two undercover SAS men were, it is imputed, search<strong>in</strong>g for ‘<strong>in</strong>surgents’ as part <strong>of</strong> acounter-<strong>in</strong>surgency operation, which if true, what were they do<strong>in</strong>g dressed as <strong>Iraq</strong>is?Were they on some k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> provocative operation? Accord<strong>in</strong>g to one report, this is exactly whatthey were up to. Fattah al-Shaykh, a member <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i National Assembly told this account toal-JazeeraIf you really want to look for truth, then we should resort to the <strong>Iraq</strong>i justice away from theBritish provocations aga<strong>in</strong>st the sons <strong>of</strong> Basra, particularly what happened today when the sons<strong>of</strong> Basra caught two non-<strong>Iraq</strong>is, who seem to be Britons and were <strong>in</strong> a car <strong>of</strong> the Cressida type. Itwas a booby-trapped car laden with ammunition and was meant to explode <strong>in</strong> the centre <strong>of</strong> thecity <strong>of</strong> Basra <strong>in</strong> the popular market. However, the sons <strong>of</strong> the city <strong>of</strong> Basra arrested them. They[the two non-<strong>Iraq</strong>is] then fired at the people there and killed some <strong>of</strong> them. The two arrestedpersons are now at the Intelligence Department <strong>in</strong> Basra, and they were held by the NationalGuard force, but the British occupation forces are still surround<strong>in</strong>g this department <strong>in</strong> an attemptto absolve them <strong>of</strong> the crime.And <strong>in</strong> yet another report from Syrian TV we read[Al-Munajjid] In fact, Nidal, this <strong>in</strong>cident gave answers to questions and suspicions that werelack<strong>in</strong>g evidence about the participation <strong>of</strong> the occupation <strong>in</strong> some armed operations <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>.Many analysts and observers here had suspicions that the occupation was <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> somearmed operations aga<strong>in</strong>st civilians and places <strong>of</strong> worship and <strong>in</strong> the kill<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> scientists. But thosewere only suspicions that lacked pro<strong>of</strong>. The pro<strong>of</strong> came today through the arrest <strong>of</strong> the twoBritish soldiers while they were plant<strong>in</strong>g explosives <strong>in</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the Basra streets. This proves,accord<strong>in</strong>g to observers, that the occupation is not far from many operations that seek to sowsedition and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> disorder, as this would give the occupation the justification to stay <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>for a longer period.218


When viewed <strong>in</strong> the context <strong>of</strong> all the stories that have been circulat<strong>in</strong>g about the mythical ‘al-Zarqawi’ and the alleged role <strong>of</strong> al-Queda, the events <strong>in</strong> Basra are the first real evidence that wehave <strong>of</strong> the role <strong>of</strong> occupation forces <strong>in</strong> destabilis<strong>in</strong>g <strong>Iraq</strong> through the use <strong>of</strong> agents provocateursmasquerad<strong>in</strong>g as ‘<strong>in</strong>surgents’.And, as I have long alleged here, it is now almost certa<strong>in</strong> that ‘al-Zarqawi’ is probably long dead.An AFP story tells us[The] Imam <strong>of</strong> Baghdad’s al-Kazimeya mosque, Jawad al-Kalesi said, that “al-Zarqawi is deadbut Wash<strong>in</strong>gton cont<strong>in</strong>ues to use him as a bogeyman to justify a prolonged militaryoccupation…He’s simply an <strong>in</strong>vention by the occupiers to divide the people.” Al-Kalesi addedthat al-Zarqawi was killed <strong>in</strong> the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the war <strong>in</strong> the Kurdish north and that “His family<strong>in</strong> Jordan even held a ceremony after his death.”And <strong>in</strong>deed, last year, <strong>in</strong> a piece I wrote about ‘al-Zarqawi’, I referred to a report about ‘al-Zarqawi’ be<strong>in</strong>g killed when the <strong>US</strong> flattened the ‘base’ <strong>of</strong> his group Ansar al-<strong>Is</strong>lam <strong>in</strong> northern<strong>Iraq</strong> <strong>in</strong> early 2003, a report that actually orig<strong>in</strong>ated with the <strong>US</strong> government.Yet the BSBC, along with the rest <strong>of</strong> the Western media cont<strong>in</strong>ues to put out endless reams <strong>of</strong>dis<strong>in</strong>formation about ‘al-Zarqawi’ and his connection to the fictitious ‘al-Queda <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>’. Giventhe long-held assertion by the West that goes back to 2003, that <strong>Iraq</strong> was on the verge <strong>of</strong> ‘civilwar’, it’s <strong>in</strong>structive to note that as the military situation <strong>of</strong> the occupation forces hasdeteriorated, so too has the level <strong>of</strong> so-called al-Queda operations <strong>in</strong>creased, <strong>in</strong> a transparentattempt to divide the <strong>Iraq</strong>i national resistance, thus the <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g stories about impend<strong>in</strong>g civilwar and the wave <strong>of</strong> ‘suicide’ bomb<strong>in</strong>gs.The exposure <strong>of</strong> the undercover SAS operations will only add to the resolve <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i resistanceforces to step up their campaign to expel the occupiers regardless <strong>of</strong> what k<strong>in</strong>d <strong>of</strong> blatantpropaganda l<strong>in</strong>e the UK government puts out.It furthermore exposes the untenable position <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i ‘government’ which is now be<strong>in</strong>gsqueezed by both sides, thus we get contradictory positions from the <strong>Iraq</strong>i ‘government’, withone deny<strong>in</strong>g that the SAS operatives had been handed over to ‘Shiite militia’ and the other try<strong>in</strong>gdesperately to tread an almost <strong>in</strong>visible l<strong>in</strong>e between condemn<strong>in</strong>g the actions <strong>of</strong> the Britishgovernment whilst blam<strong>in</strong>g the actions <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i police <strong>in</strong> Basra on ‘<strong>in</strong>surgents’ who have‘<strong>in</strong>filtrated’ the police force. Yet it is a fact that at best, perhaps only 25% <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i militarycan be relied upon to serve their colonial masters.Cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g to call them <strong>in</strong>surgents is itself an admission that the majority <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is are opposedto the occupation and <strong>in</strong>deed, the bulk <strong>of</strong> the fight<strong>in</strong>g is be<strong>in</strong>g carried out by the KurdishPeshmerga as <strong>Iraq</strong>i forces simply cannot be relied on. It’s a classic situation that the <strong>US</strong> and UKmilitary top brass know only too well hav<strong>in</strong>g ‘been there and done that’ before.219


Thus the occupiers become more desperate to destabilise the situation and no doubt we’ll seemore SAS and <strong>US</strong> provocations revealed over the com<strong>in</strong>g weeks as the situation cont<strong>in</strong>ues todeteriorate.www.williambowles.<strong>in</strong>fo/<strong>in</strong>i/<strong>in</strong>i-0365.htmlMedia Shifts Attention from SAS Screw Up to IranKurt Nimmo, Another Day <strong>in</strong> the EmpireSeptember 21, 2005Leave it up to the Moonie-owned United Press International to attempt a none-too delicate effortto steer attention away from the fact British covert <strong>in</strong>tel goons killed a cop and bystander andwere caught red-handed cruis<strong>in</strong>g around Basra <strong>in</strong> car loaded with explosives and detonators.“Attacks on British forces <strong>in</strong> southern <strong>Iraq</strong> may be directed from Iran,” reports the UPI. “Theclashes and the arrest <strong>of</strong> two undercover British soldiers was almost certa<strong>in</strong>ly triggered by thearrest at the weekend <strong>of</strong> Sheikh Ahmed al-Fartusi, the leader <strong>of</strong> the Mahdi Army, a bannedmilitia loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr.”Indeed, al-Fartusi, commander <strong>of</strong> al-Mahdi’s militia <strong>in</strong> Basra, was arrested by the Brits <strong>in</strong> aGestapo-like raid, thus lead<strong>in</strong>g to “the spread <strong>of</strong> a great number <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> al Sadr Militia <strong>in</strong>al Basra streets and the gather<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> many <strong>of</strong> these men near a build<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the city center, whichconta<strong>in</strong>s the headquarters <strong>of</strong> Al Sadr movement,” expla<strong>in</strong>s al-Mendhar News. “Eyewitnesses saidthat they are still <strong>in</strong> their locations hid<strong>in</strong>g their weapons. Sheikh Mohamed Al Ka’bi, a member<strong>of</strong> Al Sadr trend <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, confirmed, ‘Our <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>in</strong> Al Basra ordered us to rema<strong>in</strong> calm andadopt political means to release our Sheikh and his men.’”Editors on the Moonie payroll grabbed their story from the Times. “Political assass<strong>in</strong>ation,murder, smuggl<strong>in</strong>g and extortion: the activities <strong>of</strong> a 50-strong gang <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i policemen <strong>in</strong> Basra[dubbed the “al-Jameat gang”] whose members seized two British servicemen on Monday werebrought to the attention <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Iraq</strong>i government six months ago, accord<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>of</strong>ficial sources <strong>in</strong>the city.” claims Anthony Loyd for the Times, not mak<strong>in</strong>g mention <strong>of</strong> the fact the arrested“British servicemen” were dressed up as Arabs and driv<strong>in</strong>g around <strong>in</strong> a car packed with weaponsand explosives. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Loyd, this “50-strong gang” <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>is, supposedly led by al-Fartusi,is “allegedly connected to a terrorist cell responsible for recent attacks on British units <strong>in</strong> thecity,” a terrorist cell <strong>of</strong> course l<strong>in</strong>ked to Iran. Al-Fartusi’s allegedterrorist cell is said to be a spl<strong>in</strong>ter group <strong>of</strong> the Mahdi Army, whose followers are loyal toMoqtada al-Sadr, the firebrand cleric at the centre <strong>of</strong> last year’s Shia <strong>in</strong>surgency. Now more <strong>of</strong> apopulist, political figure, al-Sadr is not believed to have been aware, or <strong>in</strong> control, <strong>of</strong> al-Fartusi’sactivities. Al-Fartusi, 32, had been sacked from a command position <strong>in</strong> the Mahdi Army. Iran,however, was aware <strong>of</strong> his operations. This year an <strong>in</strong>flux <strong>of</strong> sophisticated shape-charge devicesappeared <strong>in</strong> southern <strong>Iraq</strong>. New methods and materiel bore the hallmarks <strong>of</strong> the Iranian-fundedHezbollah movement.Of course, it all makes sense—the irresponsible and impulsive Moqtada al-Sadr, who had theimpert<strong>in</strong>ence to go up aga<strong>in</strong>st the occupation when he should have had the common decency to220


throw rose petals at the <strong>in</strong>vaders, spawns a break-away gang <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> “assass<strong>in</strong>ation, murder,smuggl<strong>in</strong>g and extortion,” and these ruthless thugs are naturally l<strong>in</strong>ked to Iran and Hezbollah,thus attempt<strong>in</strong>g to buttress the <strong>of</strong>t-demonstrated bogus claim outsiders are runn<strong>in</strong>g the resistance<strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> and maybe stirr<strong>in</strong>g up trouble amongst pacified Shi’ites <strong>in</strong> southern <strong>Iraq</strong>. Instead <strong>of</strong> anexplanation <strong>of</strong> why the Brits are runn<strong>in</strong>g a pseudo-gang <strong>of</strong> phony-baloney terrorists <strong>in</strong> wigs andheaddresses—careless enough to blow their cover and get apprehended red-handed with thegoods—the British media is divert<strong>in</strong>g attention away from the exposed truth—the SAS isresponsible for at least some, probably a lot <strong>of</strong> the terrorism <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>—and are brazenly attempt<strong>in</strong>gto shift blame <strong>in</strong> the direction <strong>of</strong> Iran and Hezbollah, two <strong>of</strong> the usual suspects.It should be obvious the two Brits arrested—and subsequently released after British tanksknocked down the build<strong>in</strong>g where they were held—are part <strong>of</strong> a larger plan to destabilize <strong>Iraq</strong>and foment civil war. <strong>Is</strong> it possible the Brits are beh<strong>in</strong>d a series <strong>of</strong> suicide bomb<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> Basra (73people were killed and 200 wounded, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>eration <strong>of</strong> 17 children, on April 21,2004, and 68 were killed on June 24, 2004, to name but two) or are we to believe it was the work<strong>of</strong> the Shi’a-hat<strong>in</strong>g al-Zarqawi, determ<strong>in</strong>ed, as we are told <strong>in</strong> various audio and video tapesreleased with curiously appropriate tim<strong>in</strong>g, to wipe every Shi’ite Muslim <strong>of</strong>f the face <strong>of</strong> theearth?“British military <strong>in</strong>telligence has concluded that Iran has been support<strong>in</strong>g a local terror group runby Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, who is blamed for the murder <strong>of</strong> at least 11 British soldiers. And <strong>in</strong>a secret report, military <strong>in</strong>telligence warned commanders that attacks on British forces werebe<strong>in</strong>g deliberately <strong>in</strong>tensified,” concludes the Moonie Times, excuse me United PressInternational. Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani is “work<strong>in</strong>g for Iran,” warns Time Magaz<strong>in</strong>e. “Accord<strong>in</strong>gto a U.S. military-<strong>in</strong>telligence document obta<strong>in</strong>ed by TIME, al-Sheibani heads a network <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>surgents created by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps with the express purpose <strong>of</strong>committ<strong>in</strong>g violence aga<strong>in</strong>st U.S. and coalition forces <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>…. the U.S. believes al-Sheibani’steam consists <strong>of</strong> 280 members, divided <strong>in</strong>to 17 bombmak<strong>in</strong>g teams and death squads. The U.S.believes they tra<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> Lebanon, <strong>in</strong> Baghdad’s predom<strong>in</strong>antly Shi’ite Sadr City district and ‘<strong>in</strong>another country’ and have detonated at least 37 bombs [described as “shaped” explosive charges]aga<strong>in</strong>st U.S. forces this year <strong>in</strong> Baghdad alone.” Consider<strong>in</strong>g the track record <strong>of</strong> U.S.<strong>in</strong>telligence—from overthrow<strong>in</strong>g democratically elected governments (<strong>in</strong> Iran for example) tocustomiz<strong>in</strong>g lies <strong>in</strong> preparation for the <strong>in</strong>vasion <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>—we can trust the al-Sheibani campfirestory about as far as we can throw it. In other words, it has about the same degree <strong>of</strong> veracity asthe al-Zarqawi campfire story—that is to say none, s<strong>in</strong>ce virtually everyth<strong>in</strong>g the U.S. and itscorporate media dis<strong>in</strong>formation m<strong>in</strong>istries write or report about al-Zarqawi is undocumentedfear-monger<strong>in</strong>g.As should be obvious, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i resistance has almost completely stalled the Anglo-Americaneffort to pacify the country and reconstruct (or rather deconstruct) it <strong>in</strong>to an acceptable model forthe neocons and their carpet-bagg<strong>in</strong>g neolib co-conspirators who enterta<strong>in</strong>ed high hopes to“structurally adjust” the <strong>Iraq</strong>i economy and steal its natural resources—not simply oil but also itsm<strong>in</strong>erals, natural gas, phosphates, sulfur, hydropower, and other resources <strong>of</strong> commerciallyexploitable importance, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g cheap human labor. In lieu <strong>of</strong> the neocon promise that <strong>Iraq</strong>iswould welcome this thievery with open arms, the Bushites and their British collaborators arework<strong>in</strong>g to split the country <strong>in</strong>to three dist<strong>in</strong>ct pieces along religious and ethnic l<strong>in</strong>es through221


civil war—and thus SAS goons (and their counterparts <strong>in</strong> the Pentagon who have yet to stupidlyblow their cover) are runn<strong>in</strong>g around with explosives and detonators, pretend<strong>in</strong>g to be al-ZarqawiArabs engaged <strong>in</strong> a m<strong>in</strong>dless jihad. Of course, it will not work and the <strong>Iraq</strong>is will eventually bevictorious.Unfortunately, here <strong>in</strong> America, we have an <strong>in</strong>stalled president—not the guy from the fakecowboy ranch <strong>in</strong> Texas, but the other guy, the chicken hawk from Wyom<strong>in</strong>g—who talks aboutlobb<strong>in</strong>g around nukes if millions <strong>of</strong> people (mostly Arabs and Muslims) don’t assume theposition. If <strong>in</strong>deed the <strong>Iraq</strong>is (and the Iranians) eventually eject the U.S. military from the MiddleEast (as Hezbollah did <strong>in</strong> Beirut on October 23, 1983), irradiat<strong>in</strong>g the entire region or at leastsignificant portions will become a dist<strong>in</strong>ct possibility with the current crew <strong>in</strong> control <strong>of</strong> thelevers <strong>of</strong> mass murder. Of course, this would only be an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> magnitude, s<strong>in</strong>ce the U.S.has already nuked and poisoned <strong>Iraq</strong> (and Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia) with depleteduranium (half-life <strong>of</strong> 4.5 billion years), a crime that rivals anyth<strong>in</strong>g the Nazis have done <strong>in</strong> terms<strong>of</strong> outright viciousness s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>Iraq</strong>is will be gett<strong>in</strong>g sick and dy<strong>in</strong>g from various cancers for a verylong time to come.kurtnimmo.com/?p=33The Tipp<strong>in</strong>g Po<strong>in</strong>tWhere The Neocon Job UnraveledPhil Toler, Axis <strong>of</strong> Logic ExclusiveSeptember 21, 2005No matter how they sp<strong>in</strong> it, the red-handed nabb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> two British agents-provocateurs <strong>in</strong> Basrawill lift the veil <strong>of</strong> deceit that has cloaked the otherwise unexpla<strong>in</strong>able <strong>in</strong>ternec<strong>in</strong>e attacksbetween Sunnis and Shi’ites. The long-held <strong>Is</strong>raeli/Neocon goal has been to break up <strong>Iraq</strong>,among other Arab states, <strong>in</strong>to more easily managed Bantustans. The obvious fault l<strong>in</strong>es amongthe Sunni, Shia, and Kurd communities made Wolfowitz believe achiev<strong>in</strong>g the goal would be acakewalk. It wasn’t the toppl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Saddam he was talk<strong>in</strong>g about, you see, and all those terrible'mistakes' made by Proconsuls Garner and Bremmer were as carefully calculated as the rest <strong>of</strong>this bloody farce.What happened <strong>in</strong> Basra, from the <strong>Iraq</strong>i standpo<strong>in</strong>t — which is all that matters now that the endgameapproacheth — is that two Brits <strong>in</strong> robes were driv<strong>in</strong>g a civilian car packed withexplosives. Their mission was to throw a heavy distraction at the Shia militias who were quiteupset that three <strong>of</strong> their chiefs were taken captive by the Brits. They sought to blow up a hugebomb <strong>in</strong> the busy marketplace, with the obvious blame po<strong>in</strong>t<strong>in</strong>g to Sunnis. But, as <strong>of</strong>ten happenswith such false flag tactics, they backfired.Now, those <strong>in</strong> the Shi’ite community who favor the withdrawal <strong>of</strong> the occupation troops,sidel<strong>in</strong>ed only by their apparent power grab <strong>in</strong> the elections, are smell<strong>in</strong>g the salts <strong>of</strong> reality andwill come out <strong>of</strong> their stupor to realize the Yanks have screwed them yet aga<strong>in</strong>. They’ll go backto the bloody beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g, say, to the massive bomb<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the UN Headquarters <strong>in</strong> Baghdad, andrecalculate. They know they weren’t responsible, and it will dawn on them that the ‘coalition’had far more to ga<strong>in</strong> from the rout<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternational body, such as it is, than the ‘dead-222


enders’ <strong>in</strong> the Sunni Community. Same goes for the Jordanian Embassy, the scores <strong>of</strong> journalists,the mosque bomb<strong>in</strong>gs, and virtually all <strong>of</strong> the so-called suicide bombers. These actions all hadthe effect <strong>of</strong> foment<strong>in</strong>g civil war with the Kurds, who are heavily backed by the <strong>Is</strong>raelis, be<strong>in</strong>gthe only local party to ga<strong>in</strong> from the mayhem.Early <strong>in</strong> the war, there were reports <strong>of</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong>i men be<strong>in</strong>g deta<strong>in</strong>ed by occupation authorities forseveral hours while they were <strong>in</strong>terrogated and had their vehicles ‘searched’. The were releasedon the condition they must go to a specific police station to pick up their papers, or some suchnecessity. Fortunately, a lucky few discovered by happenstance that explosives had been placed<strong>in</strong> their vehicle with the purpose remote detonation at whatever dest<strong>in</strong>ation they were directed to.Apparently the trick still works, because the rash <strong>of</strong> ‘suicide’ car bomb<strong>in</strong>gs is unceas<strong>in</strong>g.But back to Basra. The Yanks have to placate the Shia — at least enough to feel secure that theywill not be overwhelmed from the rear, the only po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong> escape if such becomes necessary. Itwas the only reason elections were held <strong>in</strong> a way that would guarantee nom<strong>in</strong>al Shia control <strong>of</strong>the ‘government’. But, perhaps with Iran’s nom<strong>in</strong>al assistance, the Shia began to look for pro<strong>of</strong><strong>of</strong> coalition <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> acts that really only benefit the coalition. Hence the capture <strong>of</strong> thetwo Brit operatives en flagrante. You can ignore comfortably British claims their disguised boyswere just survey<strong>in</strong>g suspected militants. If that was their true mission, why would they shoot upthe <strong>Iraq</strong>i police who stopped them, and why would storm<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the police station occur beforenegotiations could produce the soldiers’ release with far less hoopla? More crucial, why wouldthe usually calm city <strong>of</strong> Basra erupt <strong>in</strong> such rage? Perhaps they’re feel<strong>in</strong>g the twist<strong>in</strong>g Yankeeknife <strong>in</strong> their backs yet aga<strong>in</strong>.As for the other predictions I have made, the potential for economic collapse has been virtuallyguaranteed by Katr<strong>in</strong>a and her sibl<strong>in</strong>g, Rita, which is poised to take out the drill<strong>in</strong>g platformsKatr<strong>in</strong>a missed. Throw <strong>in</strong> further damage to ref<strong>in</strong>eries, and they’re go<strong>in</strong>g to have to retr<strong>of</strong>it thenation’s gas pumps to accommodate triple digit fill-ups. Toss <strong>in</strong> roughly the cost <strong>of</strong> another <strong>Iraq</strong>iwar, which has quietly surpassed the Vietnam debacle <strong>in</strong> one third less time, to sop out the porkto Halliburton and the like for hurricane cleanup, and it’s clear the numbers <strong>in</strong> the debit columnwill overwhelm real American assets to back them up. It’s all blue sky from here on out, baby.As for the growth <strong>of</strong> doubts about the <strong>of</strong>ficial legend <strong>of</strong> 9/11, a former Bush <strong>of</strong>ficial has bluntlystated that the WTC build<strong>in</strong>gs were brought down by explosives, and it is reported that the probe<strong>in</strong>to the outed CIA asset has begun to sniff at the edges <strong>of</strong> the strange anomalies for which noanswer has been given. And this is the real danger for the Neocons, the only th<strong>in</strong>g that couldconceivably br<strong>in</strong>g down the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration, or lead to unabashed martial law so that allwould know the color <strong>of</strong> their true designs. In this regard, America will collapse from the rotwith<strong>in</strong> and on a schedule that resembles the famously aggressive Spartans far more than Brita<strong>in</strong>or Rome.Enjoy your Fall, folks, I’ve got to go stock the storm shelter.© Copyright 2005 by Axis<strong>of</strong>Logic.comwww.axis<strong>of</strong>logic.com/artman/publish/article_19697.shtml223


What is Covert Action?J.V. Grady, ICHSeptember 21, 2005 "ICH" -- -- Intelligence services generally are <strong>org</strong>anized <strong>in</strong>to the follow<strong>in</strong>gmajor functional areas:· Intelligence Collection· Analysis· Counter<strong>in</strong>telligence· Covert ActionIntelligence Collection is the collection <strong>of</strong> Intelligence <strong>in</strong>formation, secret or otherwise, throughspy<strong>in</strong>g, <strong>in</strong>terrogation, satellites, etc. If the <strong>in</strong>formation is collected through spy<strong>in</strong>g or<strong>in</strong>terrogation, it is known as HUMINT (human <strong>in</strong>telligence). If it is collected through technicalmeans such as electronic eavesdropp<strong>in</strong>g or satellites, it is known as TECHINT (technical<strong>in</strong>telligence). Open-source Intelligence (OSINT) is <strong>in</strong>formation gathered from non-secret, publicsources.Intelligence Analysis is the assessment <strong>of</strong> collected raw <strong>in</strong>telligence and the process<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> it <strong>in</strong>tousable <strong>in</strong>telligence product that can be used to guide policy and operations.Counter<strong>in</strong>telligence has as its mission the prevention <strong>of</strong> a foreign <strong>in</strong>telligence service fromobta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>telligence <strong>in</strong>formation from one’s own country. In a preventative role, it ensures theemployment <strong>of</strong> security practices to safeguard <strong>in</strong>formation. In a more active role, it conductsoperations aga<strong>in</strong>st enemy <strong>in</strong>telligence services; <strong>in</strong> other words, it spies on the spies. Such actionis <strong>of</strong>ten referred to as spycatch<strong>in</strong>g.Perhaps the most <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g and s<strong>in</strong>ister field <strong>in</strong> Intelligence is Covert Action (also referred to asClandest<strong>in</strong>e Operations, Black Ops, and Black Operations). Some do not consider Covert Actionas be<strong>in</strong>g part <strong>of</strong> the traditional Intelligence mission, and they therefore believe that it should betreated <strong>in</strong>dependently and even <strong>org</strong>anized with<strong>in</strong> a separate <strong>org</strong>anization. Others feel that,because it <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>in</strong>terrelates with Intelligence Operations and Counter<strong>in</strong>telligence Operations, itshould cont<strong>in</strong>ue to rema<strong>in</strong> with<strong>in</strong> the same rul<strong>in</strong>g <strong>org</strong>anization or apparatus.There are many types <strong>of</strong> Covert Action operations, not all <strong>of</strong> them violent. For example, if agovernment wishes to <strong>in</strong>fluence the politics <strong>of</strong> another country’s government, the governmentmay secretly fund an opposition party <strong>in</strong> that country <strong>in</strong> order to <strong>in</strong>fluence that country’selections. Another method is to employ foreign newspaper reporters to write articles that give theversion <strong>of</strong> events, the propaganda, that you want people to believe, even if it is the furthest th<strong>in</strong>gfrom the truth. Or perhaps the owners or editors <strong>of</strong> a newspaper or media service can be boughtor won over to allow articles or news stories created by the Intelligence <strong>org</strong>anization forpropaganda purposes to be planted <strong>in</strong> the newspaper or media service. A slant can then be givento <strong>in</strong>fluence public perceptions. For example, mercenaries can be referred to as “contractors”,224


thus mak<strong>in</strong>g people believe that casualties among the mercenaries are <strong>in</strong>nocent civilianconstruction workers who were unjustly victimized.The ma<strong>in</strong> th<strong>in</strong>g about Covert Action is that it must be deniable. There is a term called “plausibledeniability”. When a government authorizes a covert action operation, the operation must bedone <strong>in</strong> such a way that the government can claim that it knows noth<strong>in</strong>g about it; <strong>in</strong> other words,the operation must not be attributable to the government that authorized it.Covert Action operations are <strong>of</strong>ten Dis<strong>in</strong>formation Operations, which are conducted <strong>in</strong> such away as to discredit the opposition or the enemy. This is done, for example, by do<strong>in</strong>g a violentaction, such as a bomb<strong>in</strong>g, but mak<strong>in</strong>g it look like the forces <strong>of</strong> another country or group did it.Such operations are sometimes called False-Flag Operations, mean<strong>in</strong>g that the operation isconducted to make it look like it was done by people serv<strong>in</strong>g under another flag, preferably theenemy’s flag. If the operation succeeds as designed, people will blame the action on the wrongparty (the enemy). Thus, public op<strong>in</strong>ion will be won over to the side that actually did the kill<strong>in</strong>g.Such false-flag, covert action operations are <strong>of</strong>ten referred to as Dirty Tricks.The British regularly employed Covert Action operations <strong>in</strong> Ireland, with the result that it islikely that the IRA <strong>of</strong>ten took the blame for violent actions with which they had no <strong>in</strong>volvement,although they were hardly <strong>in</strong>nocent players <strong>in</strong> the general mayhem. Many people suspect that theNorthern Irish bank robbery that occurred some time back was actually a British Covert Actionoperation designed to make the IRA take the blame, so that people would believe that the IRAwas not honour<strong>in</strong>g the Good Friday Agreement. Incidentally, most <strong>of</strong> the British Northern Irishbank notes taken were worthless old notes, so they were no sk<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong>f anyone’s teeth.The policy <strong>in</strong> <strong>Iraq</strong> is to keep the country destabilized and on the verge <strong>of</strong> civil war to show that itcannot govern itself and that it therefore requires the cont<strong>in</strong>ued presence <strong>of</strong> American and Britishforces. The man accused <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d much <strong>of</strong> the bomb<strong>in</strong>g go<strong>in</strong>g on there is Al-Zarqawi, aman known to be dead for some time now. Also, because he is (or, rather, was) a Sunni,bomb<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st the Shi’ia population, if blamed on him and the Sunni <strong>in</strong>surgents, can keep thepot <strong>of</strong> civil war simmer<strong>in</strong>g, thus giv<strong>in</strong>g further justification to keep<strong>in</strong>g American and Britishforces there.Most recently, two British Covert Operations specialists were captured <strong>in</strong> Basra, <strong>in</strong> Southern<strong>Iraq</strong>. They were disguised as Arabs and were carry<strong>in</strong>g bomb-mak<strong>in</strong>g materials. When <strong>Iraq</strong>ipolice tried to apprehend them, the two covert action operatives resisted arrest and killed twopolicemen. They were eventually caught and held <strong>in</strong> jail. After the British military learned thatthey had been captured, it sent tanks <strong>in</strong>to Basra to forcibly free the two men. An enraged mobattacked the tanks with petrol bombs, and people around the world saw British soldiers jump<strong>in</strong>gout <strong>of</strong> a flam<strong>in</strong>g tank and be<strong>in</strong>g stoned. The reaction was one <strong>of</strong> sympathy for the Britishsoldiers. Few stopped to wonder what was beh<strong>in</strong>d the anger and the assault. Most weresympathetic towards the “poor” British soldiers, who were perceived as be<strong>in</strong>g unjustlyvictimized.225


So, who is beh<strong>in</strong>d many <strong>of</strong> the bomb<strong>in</strong>gs aga<strong>in</strong>st the Shi’ia and Sunni populations? It is quitepossible, even probable, that many <strong>of</strong> them are be<strong>in</strong>g carried out by American, British, and even<strong>Is</strong>raeli Covert Action operatives.So, when you watch the news, th<strong>in</strong>k more deeply about what you’re see<strong>in</strong>g; and when you readyour newspapers, try read<strong>in</strong>g between the l<strong>in</strong>es or wonder about the source or the writer beh<strong>in</strong>dthe article. Has the article been planted? <strong>Is</strong> the writer <strong>in</strong> the pay <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>telligence service?J.V. Grady is a former member <strong>of</strong> <strong>US</strong> Military Intelligence<strong>in</strong>formationclear<strong>in</strong>ghouse.<strong>in</strong>fo/article10356.htm<strong>Iraq</strong>i border guards arrest British national <strong>in</strong> desertTue Oct 4, 5:55 AM EThttp://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20051004/wl_mideast_afp/iraqbrita<strong>in</strong>arrest_051004095405A British national has been arrested by <strong>Iraq</strong>i border guards near the Saudi border <strong>in</strong> Najafprov<strong>in</strong>ce, British and <strong>Iraq</strong>i <strong>of</strong>ficials said."We can confirm that a UK national has been arrested by the <strong>Iraq</strong>i department <strong>of</strong> borderenforcement," a British military spokesman said on Tuesday, add<strong>in</strong>g the Foreign Office was<strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g the arrest which was believed to have taken place on Monday night.An <strong>Iraq</strong>i border guards spokesman <strong>in</strong> Najaf, Saadun al-Jaaberi, said guards arrested "a terroristgroup consist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> 10 people, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g one British national called Col<strong>in</strong> Peter, near Mathlum,near the Saudi border".The other n<strong>in</strong>e were <strong>Iraq</strong>is from the southern city <strong>of</strong> Basra, he said.The group was armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and were carry<strong>in</strong>g a video camera, asatellite telephone and GPS satellite-track<strong>in</strong>g device, Jaaberi added.The British embassy <strong>in</strong> Baghdad could not immediately be reached for comment.226

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