US Training of Death Squads in Iraq? - War Is A Crime .org

more skilled than American troops I’ve spent time with at knowing, intuitively, whethersomeone represents a threat. A few men were detained as the evening unfolded, and when theyoffered resistance or didn’t provide information as quickly as the commandos desired, they werepunished with a quick kick, slap or punch.A little after 2 a.m., the commandos rolled into a neighborhood where the homes weresurrounded by walls and had satellite dishes on their roofs. A man who was detained earlier inthe night pointed the commandos toward one house. They entered and soon emerged with aconfiscated computer, but whomever they hoped to find inside was not there.The officer in charge of the raid — a Major Falah — now made it clear that he believed thedetainee had led them on a wild-goose chase. The detainee was sitting at the side of a commandotruck; I was 10 feet away, beside Bennett and four G.I.’s. One of Falah’s captains began beatingthe detainee. Instead of a quick hit or slap, we now saw and heard a sustained series of blows.We heard the sound of the captain’s fists and boots on the detainee’s body, and we heard thedetainee’s pained grunts as he received his punishment without resistance. It was a dockyardmugging. Bennett turned his back to face away from the violence, joining his soldiers in staringuncomfortably at the ground in silence. The blows continued for a minute or so.Bennett had seen the likes of this before, and he had worked out his own guidelines for dealingwith such situations. ‘‘If I think they’re going to shoot somebody or cut his finger off or do anysort of permanent damage, I will immediately stop them,’’ he explained. ‘‘As Americans, wewill not let that happen. In terms of kicking a guy, they do that all the time, punches and stufflike that.’’ It was a tactical decision, Bennett explained: ‘‘You only get so many interventions,and I’ve got to save my butting in for when there is a danger it could go over the line.’’ But evenwhen he doesn’t say anything, he explained, ‘‘they can tell we’re not enjoying it. We’re just kindof like, ‘O.K., here we go again.’’’Though the commandos and their American advisers were working together in Samarra, theirapproaches were decidedly different. The American way of combat is heavily planned, withsatellite maps, G.P.S. coordinates and reconnaissance drones. The Iraqi way is improvisational,relying less on honed skills and high-tech than gut instinct and (literally) bare knuckles. It is theAmericans who are learning to adapt. In briefings that American soldiers receive, a quotationfrom T.E. Lawrence is sometimes included: ‘‘Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do itperfectly.’’Threatening to Kill a Suspect’s SonOn March 8, I went on a series of raids with the commandos, traveling in a Humvee with Maj.Robert Rooker, an artillery officer based in Tikrit who was dispatched to Samarra to serve as myescort. The leader of the American squad was Andrew Johansen, a 30-year-old lieutenant in theWisconsin Army National Guard. The commandos led the way in a half-dozen Dodges, withJohansen’s team following in three Humvees. The target was a house outside Samarra whereNajim al-Takhi, thought to be the leader of an insurgent cell, was believed to be hiding.13