US Training of Death Squads in Iraq? - War Is A Crime .org

Ministry of Interior Security Forces. . . . Reports of human rights violations are deeplyinvestigated by the Ministry of Interior’s Human Rights Department.’’The Uses of FearIn El Salvador, a subpar army fought an insurgency to a standoff that eventually led to a politicalsolution. Kalev Sepp, who was a Special Forces adviser in El Salvador and is currently aprofessor at the Navy’s Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, said he believes that thehandful of United States-trained Salvadoran strike battalions made the difference. ‘‘Those sixbattalions held back the guerrillas for years,’’ he said in a recent phone interview. ‘‘The rest ofthe army was guarding bridges and power lines.’’In Iraq, the insurgency does not fight everywhere; most attacks occur around Baghdad and in theSunni Triangle. This allows a small and agile counterinsurgency force to play adisproportionately large role, and the commandos are precisely that kind of force. As aparamilitary unit, they are not slowed down by heavy weapons, and they do not engage in theattrition warfare of lumbering army regiments with thousands of troops and tanks and artillerypieces. Instead, they go wherever there is trouble, racing up and down the highways at 90 milesan hour in their Dodge trucks (so quickly, in fact, that Humvees cannot keep up with them).When Mosul erupted in November, with local police officers fleeing their stations as insurgentstook control of the streets, several battalions of commandos sped to the city and restored order(or what passes for order in Iraq). When National Guard troops collapsed in Ramadi earlier thisyear, a battalion of commandos was rushed in. The commandos in Samarra will return to theirbase in Baghdad once their mission is completed — or they will head to the next hot spot.Intriguingly, a reputation for severity can accomplish as much as severity itself. One day atroublesome local leader, Sheik Taha, met with Adnan at Samarra’s City Hall. Lt. Col. MarkWald, who commands the Third Infantry Division troops in the city, told me that Taha supportedthe insurgency but was reconsidering his options now that Adnan had arrived with hiscommandos. I assumed that Adnan conveyed a message to the sheik that was not dissimilar tohis warning to the commando who found an arms cache — do as I say or you will lose a preciousbody part.After the meeting, I asked Adnan whether the sheik had agreed to fall in line. ‘‘It is not importantwhether he is with us or against us,’’ he growled in response. ‘‘We are the authority. We are thegovernment, and everybody must cooperate with us. He is beginning to cooperate with us.’’Adnan’s remarks were put into context for me by Wald, a graduate of the University ofCalifornia at Berkeley. He pointed at the door behind which Adnan and Taha met. ‘‘This is whatI consider an Iraqi solution,’’ he said. ‘‘The beauty of an Iraqi solution is that they know howjustice has been dealt with in the past years. They know what they are subject to. We are boundby laws. I think they are, too, but that doesn’t mean a guy like Sheik Taha doesn’t go in therefearing it’s an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth.’’17