http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6814001/site/newsweek/Dickey: <strong>Iraq</strong>, Salvador and <strong>Death</strong>-Squad Democracy. Are there parallels between ElSalvador <strong>in</strong> the ‘80s and <strong>Iraq</strong> today? Maybe. But the ‘lessons learned’ by Wash<strong>in</strong>gton arethe wrong onesWEB-EXCL<strong>US</strong>IVE COMMENTARYBy Christopher DickeyNewsweekJan 11, 2005Jan. 11 - Among the many tools used to build and defend pro-American democracies, murder isamong the trickiest. But murder—yes, let’s <strong>in</strong>sist on that word—is also quite common <strong>in</strong> theannals <strong>of</strong> nation-build<strong>in</strong>g, at least <strong>in</strong> my experience, and sometimes it’s been very effective. Nowwe hear that some <strong>of</strong> the Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration’s strategists are talk<strong>in</strong>g about what they call “TheSalvador Option”, which seems to imply “death squads” (as the murderers were called <strong>in</strong> ElSalvador and Guatemala) or “hit teams” (as they’ve been called <strong>in</strong> <strong>Is</strong>rael).Hav<strong>in</strong>g watched the slaughter <strong>in</strong> El Salvador first hand dur<strong>in</strong>g the early 1980s, hav<strong>in</strong>g lost manyfriends and acqua<strong>in</strong>tances to the butchers there—among them nuns, priests and an archbishopwho will someday be sa<strong>in</strong>ted—and hav<strong>in</strong>g been targeted myself, I have someth<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a personal<strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> this notion. I’m not about to f<strong>org</strong>et the bodies ly<strong>in</strong>g unclaimed <strong>in</strong> the streets, thefamilies <strong>of</strong> the victims too afraid to pick them up lest they become targets as well. When I heartalk <strong>of</strong> a Salvador Option, I can’t help but th<strong>in</strong>k about El Playón, a wasteland <strong>of</strong> volcanic rockthat was one <strong>of</strong> the killers’ favorite dump<strong>in</strong>g grounds. I’ve never f<strong>org</strong>otten the sick-sweet stench<strong>of</strong> carnal refuse there, the mutilated corpses half-devoured by mongrels and buzzards, the holloweyes <strong>of</strong> a human skull peer<strong>in</strong>g up through the loose-piled rocks, the hair fallen away from thebone like a gruesome halo.Still, I’m prepared to admit that build<strong>in</strong>g friendly democracies sometimes has to be a coldbloodedbus<strong>in</strong>ess <strong>in</strong> the shadowland <strong>of</strong> moral grays that is the real world. The Reaganadm<strong>in</strong>istration was just do<strong>in</strong>g—or, more <strong>of</strong>ten, allow<strong>in</strong>g to be done—whatever it took to defeat alargely Communist <strong>in</strong>surgency. I’m even prepared to believe that Arena, the political partyfounded by the late death squad leader, Roberto D’Aubuisson, has long s<strong>in</strong>ce cleaned up its act.Salvadoran voters returned Arena to power last year for the third time s<strong>in</strong>ce 1992. Its presidentialcandidate, Tony Saca, beat former guerrilla leader Shafik Handal by a landslide. Would ElPlayón’s voters have made a difference? Well, we’ll never know.The question <strong>of</strong> the moment is not the state <strong>of</strong> play <strong>in</strong> El Salvador, however, it’s the disaster <strong>in</strong><strong>Iraq</strong>. The Bush adm<strong>in</strong>istration has a dismal record learn<strong>in</strong>g the wrong lessons from the wrongparadigms when it comes to <strong>Iraq</strong>. This was not the liberation <strong>of</strong> France, nor the occupation <strong>of</strong>Germany or Japan, and America’s war on terrorists is not the same as <strong>Is</strong>rael’s war with thePalest<strong>in</strong>ians. So, let’s take a real close look at what we’re talk<strong>in</strong>g about here when we discuss theSalvador Option.64
For starters, what’s been written about the NEWSWEEK report by Michael Hirsh and JohnBarry goes far beyond what the story says. It doesn’t suggest for a m<strong>in</strong>ute, as the BBC reported,that the Pentagon is look<strong>in</strong>g to create “paramilitary” death squads. It’s about the possible tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<strong>of</strong> elite units to snatch or kill very specific <strong>in</strong>surgent leaders.In fact, the policy could be a formalization <strong>of</strong> what's already tak<strong>in</strong>g place. “We are, <strong>of</strong> course,already target<strong>in</strong>g enemy cadres for elim<strong>in</strong>ation whether by capture or death <strong>in</strong> various places<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g Afghanistan and <strong>Iraq</strong>,” says Patrick Lang, former chief <strong>of</strong> Middle East analysis for theU.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to Lang, so many people <strong>in</strong> the Special OperationsForces have been caught up <strong>in</strong> efforts to do just that, there’s actually a shortage <strong>of</strong> Green Beretsto do what they’re most needed for: tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g regular <strong>Iraq</strong>i troops. “Surely,” says Lang, “no oneexcept the Jihadis th<strong>in</strong>ks that we should not be hunt<strong>in</strong>g enemy leaders and key personnel.”But that’s not the problem, quite. What those <strong>of</strong> us <strong>in</strong> El Salvador learned was that Americanpolicy might call for surgical action, but once the local troops are <strong>in</strong>volved, they’re as likely touse a cha<strong>in</strong>-saw as a scalpel. And that, too, can serve American ends. In almost any counter<strong>in</strong>surgency,the basic message the government or the occupiers tries to get across to thepopulation is brutally simple: “We can protect you from the guerrillas, but the guerrillas can’tprotect you from us, and you’ve got to choose sides.” Sometimes you can w<strong>in</strong> the population’shearts and m<strong>in</strong>ds; sometimes you just have to make them more frightened <strong>of</strong> you than they are <strong>of</strong>the <strong>in</strong>surgents.“That was part <strong>of</strong> the th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g beh<strong>in</strong>d Fallujah,” says a well-<strong>in</strong>formed Coalition <strong>of</strong>ficial, referr<strong>in</strong>gto the ferocious <strong>of</strong>fensive that re-took the city <strong>in</strong> November. “We have only one <strong>of</strong> the tools s<strong>of</strong>ar. That is, ‘You can’t protect your people from us.’ In Fallujah they had a little Salafi state.Well, that’s gone now.” The city rema<strong>in</strong>s <strong>in</strong> ru<strong>in</strong>s; at least 50 American soldiers lost their lives,as well as hundreds, perhaps thousands <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>surgents and civilians. It was a mighty tough lessonto teach. In terms <strong>of</strong> toe-to-toe urban combat, “that was the heaviest fight<strong>in</strong>g the U.S. has been<strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> s<strong>in</strong>ce 1968,” says the same <strong>of</strong>ficial. Yet the Americans have not managed to protectthe <strong>Iraq</strong>i citizenry from terror and <strong>in</strong>timidation by the guerrillas. “That’s not someth<strong>in</strong>g we’regood at,” says the <strong>of</strong>ficial.His remarks were echoed by a senior U.S. embassy <strong>of</strong>ficer, who said the Americans just can’tbeg<strong>in</strong> to out-<strong>in</strong>timidate the guerrillas. “It’s a lesson we can’t teach,” says the embassy <strong>of</strong>ficial.“We’re not capable <strong>of</strong> that.” Grabb<strong>in</strong>g here and there for analogies, this guy started talk<strong>in</strong>g aboutwhat the late Syrian President Hafez Assad did to Sunni fundamentalists holed up <strong>in</strong> the city <strong>of</strong>Hama <strong>in</strong> 1982. Assad flattened a large section <strong>of</strong> the town. “Short <strong>of</strong> ‘Hama rules,’” the <strong>of</strong>ficialasked rhetorically, “what do you do?”In <strong>Iraq</strong>, <strong>in</strong> fact, as <strong>in</strong> many other places where the United States has tried to tra<strong>in</strong> ethical armiesto fight dirty wars, the <strong>Iraq</strong>i troops are tacitly expected to do what American troops won’t. Afundamental purpose <strong>of</strong> the upcom<strong>in</strong>g elections on January 30 is to create democratic legitimacyfor whatever extreme measures the newly <strong>org</strong>anized military decides to take.Because we’re talk<strong>in</strong>g about the supposed Salvador Option, I figured I’d get back <strong>in</strong> touch withJoaquín Villalobos, El Salvador’s most brilliant guerrilla leader. Now at Oxford, he favored the65
- Page 7 and 8:
guard was called upon. Now people l
- Page 11 and 12:
After the commandos set up their he
- Page 13 and 14: more skilled than American troops I
- Page 15 and 16: ‘‘I think it was all an act to
- Page 17 and 18: Ministry of Interior Security Force
- Page 19 and 20: ‘‘For some, there’s definitel
- Page 21 and 22: with prominent Shiite cleric Hussei
- Page 23 and 24: The Police Commandos’ penchant fo
- Page 25 and 26: effective at responding to the atta
- Page 27 and 28: http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Nov2005/da
- Page 29 and 30: In another twist, the bodies of 8 m
- Page 31 and 32: Subject: [oneheartpeacework] Traine
- Page 33 and 34: 3. Maass, Peter, "The Way of the Co
- Page 35 and 36: We now have Judith Miller’s New Y
- Page 37 and 38: arrangements with the CEO of the Ir
- Page 39 and 40: November 6, 2003, was designated fo
- Page 41 and 42: March 9, 2006 -- Los Angeles Times
- Page 43 and 44: http://www.newyorker.com/printables
- Page 45 and 46: The former official says that the B
- Page 47 and 48: officials in Colombia. The book “
- Page 49 and 50: The majority of the Bush Administra
- Page 51 and 52: Part Three:200451
- Page 53 and 54: military base on Honduran territory
- Page 55 and 56: Not everyone in Chile is opposed to
- Page 57 and 58: Secret US Gulfstream jets and Swedi
- Page 59 and 60: If ever possible…FOOTNOTES:Seymou
- Page 61 and 62: Part Four:200561
- Page 63: The organization said U.S. and Iraq
- Page 67 and 68: http://www.counterpunch.org/hersh01
- Page 69 and 70: Fallujah I called him at home. I'm
- Page 71 and 72: these people worked as night clerks
- Page 73 and 74: http://nyc.indymedia.org/newswire/d
- Page 75 and 76: y shifting their targets, concentra
- Page 77 and 78: * Arun Gupta, former editor of The
- Page 79 and 80: From Iran-Contra To IraqThe NationB
- Page 81 and 82: his actions this time around become
- Page 83 and 84: might have been imagined.According
- Page 85 and 86: put out by the Interior Ministry, t
- Page 87 and 88: in/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/arch
- Page 89 and 90: However, the analogy is misleading
- Page 91 and 92: http://nytimes.com/cfr/internationa
- Page 93 and 94: which have raised sectarian tension
- Page 95 and 96: http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstr
- Page 97 and 98: A grocer in west Baghdad told Salih
- Page 99 and 100: use of their experience in mass rep
- Page 101 and 102: Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Iraqi
- Page 103 and 104: http://www.informationclearinghouse
- Page 105 and 106: The slaughter and destruction in we
- Page 107 and 108: SEC. RUMSFELD: I'm not going to com
- Page 109 and 110: insurgency. The Iraqi forces, the m
- Page 111 and 112: Part Five:2006111
- Page 113 and 114: They told soldiers they were taking
- Page 115 and 116:
http://www.countercurrents.org/iraq
- Page 117 and 118:
One photo showed what appeared to b
- Page 119 and 120:
Maj. Gen. Hussein Kamal, who announ
- Page 121 and 122:
Baghdad, the 14 Sunnis seized from
- Page 123 and 124:
"You've got the facilities protecti
- Page 125 and 126:
Peterson, the U.S. officer in charg
- Page 127 and 128:
homes or mosques by men in uniform
- Page 129 and 130:
moniker that sounds about as unauth
- Page 131 and 132:
there is a general consensus that t
- Page 133 and 134:
the government officials, media lac
- Page 135 and 136:
experience with Saddam's government
- Page 137 and 138:
http://www.globalecho.org/view_arti
- Page 139 and 140:
working within the country's interi
- Page 141 and 142:
Mr. Karim was originally sentenced
- Page 143 and 144:
Close to one million Iraqis, most o
- Page 145 and 146:
Neither Republicans nor Democrats s
- Page 147 and 148:
Democratic position and that of the
- Page 149 and 150:
This year's Democratic primaries an
- Page 151 and 152:
http://www.informationclearinghouse
- Page 153 and 154:
Of Hariri's assassination, Syrian o
- Page 155 and 156:
Sourcewatch information on Aegis:
- Page 157 and 158:
RAMOPS RISK MANAGEMENT GROUP (compr
- Page 159 and 160:
Section 2: Organization of the FPS1
- Page 161 and 162:
The UK was criticized for starting
- Page 163 and 164:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
- Page 165 and 166:
FPS, proposing to give its members
- Page 167 and 168:
http://www.greenleft.org.au/2006/68
- Page 169 and 170:
personnel and CIA operators and con
- Page 171 and 172:
Although Bush hasn't specifically s
- Page 173 and 174:
massive military aid to the Salvado
- Page 175 and 176:
The convoy was traveling in the Cam
- Page 177 and 178:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/articl
- Page 179 and 180:
http://news.independent.co.uk/world
- Page 181 and 182:
The Mehdi Army does not always have
- Page 183 and 184:
clarification of what happened in S
- Page 185 and 186:
http://www.brusselstribunal.org/Bri
- Page 187 and 188:
"What our police found in their car
- Page 189 and 190:
3. the international cadre of war f
- Page 191 and 192:
If you thought the U.S. wouldn't bl
- Page 193 and 194:
Regrettably, that is prospect that
- Page 195 and 196:
The initial demand from the puppet
- Page 197 and 198:
www.prisonplanet.com/articles/septe
- Page 199 and 200:
FLASHBACK: Sick strategies for sens
- Page 201 and 202:
into the river. That thought alone
- Page 203 and 204:
Zarqawi is actually a real person o
- Page 205 and 206:
Examples “were found during the M
- Page 207 and 208:
Witnesses said about 150 Iraqi pris
- Page 209 and 210:
A British military source has said
- Page 211 and 212:
Meanwhile, frantic negotiations con
- Page 213 and 214:
The British troops believed the two
- Page 215 and 216:
Naturally, the sleazy Laurence-emul
- Page 217 and 218:
eing arrested by the Iraqi police o
- Page 219 and 220:
When viewed in the context of all t
- Page 221 and 222:
throw rose petals at the invaders,
- Page 223 and 224:
enders’ in the Sunni Community. S
- Page 225 and 226:
thus making people believe that cas