laser jet division is headed, will probably become small. One of HP’s businesses may, in the end, havekilled another. But had HP not set up its ink-jet business as a separate organization, the ink-jettechnology would probably have languished within the mainstream laser jet business, leaving one ofthe other companies now actively competing in the ink-jet printer business, such as Canon, as a seriousthreat to HP’s printer business. And by staying in the laser business, as well, HP has joined IBM’smainframe business and the integrated steel companies in making a lot of money while executing anupmarket retreat. 16Figure 5.4 Speed Improvements in InkJet and LaserJet PrintersSource: Hewlett-Packard product brochures, various years.NOTES1. The theory of resource dependence has been most thoroughly argued by Jeffrey Pfeffer and GeraldR. Salancik in The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (NewYork: Harper & Row, 1978).2. This implies that, in managing business under both normal conditions and conditions of assault by adisruptive technology, the choice of which customers the firm will serve has enormous strategicconsequences.3. Joseph L. Bower, in Managing the Resource Allocation Process (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin,1972), presents an elegant and compelling picture of the resource allocation process.4. Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938),190–191.5. Quantum’s spin-out of the Hardcard effort and its subsequent strategic reorientation is an example ofthe processes of strategy change described by Robert Burgelman, in “Intraorganizational Ecology ofStrategy-Making and Organizational Adaptation: Theory and Field Research,” Organization Science100
(2), 1991, 239–262, as essentially a process of natural selection through which suboptimal strategicinitiatives lose out to optimal ones in the internal competition for corporate resources.6. The failure of Micropolis to maintain simultaneous competitive commitments to both its establishedtechnology and the new 5.25-inch technology is consistent with the technological histories recountedby James Utterback, in Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation (Boston: Harvard Business School Press,1994). Utterback found that firms that attempted to develop radically new technology almost alwaystried to maintain simultaneous commitment to the old and that they almost always failed.7. A set of industries in which disruptive technologies are believed to have played a role in topplingleading firms is presented by Richard S. Rosenbloom and Clayton M. Christensen in “TechnologicalDiscontinuities, Organizational Capabilities, and Strategic Commitments,” Industrial and CorporateChange (3), 1994, 655–685.8. In the 1990s, DEC finally set up a Personal Computer Division in its attempt to build a significantpersonal computer business. It was not as autonomous from DEC’s mainstream business; however, theQuantum and Control Data spin-outs were. Although DEC set up specific performance metrics for thePC division, it was still held, de facto, to corporate standards for gross margins and revenue growth.9. “Harvard Study on Discount Shoppers,” Discount Merchandiser, September, 1963, 71.10. When this book was being written, Kmart was a crippled company, having been beaten in a gameof strategy and operational excellence by WalMart. Nonetheless, during the preceding two decades,Kmart had been a highly successful retailer, creating extraordinary value for Kresge shareholders.Kmart’s present competitive struggles are unrelated to Kresge’s strategy in meeting the originaldisruptive threat of discounting.11. A detailed contrast between the Woolworth and Kresge approaches to discount retailing can befound in the Harvard Business School teaching case. “The Discount Retailing Revolution in America,”No. 695-081.12. See Robert Drew-Bear, “S. S. Kresge’s Kmarts,” Mass Merchandising: Revolution and Evolution(New York: Fairchild Publications, 1970), 218.13. F. W. Woolworth Company Annual Report, 1981, p. 8.14. “Woolco Gets Lion’s Share of New Space,” Chain Store Age, November, 1972, E27. This was anextraordinarily elegant, rational argument for the consolidation, clearly crafted by a corporate spindoctorextraordinaire. Never mind that no Woolworth stores approached 100,000 square feet in size!15. See, for example, “The Desktop Printer Industry in 1990,” Harvard Business School, Case No. 9-390-173.16. Business historian Richard Tedlow noted that the same dilemma had confronted A&P’s executivesas they deliberated whether to adopt the disruptive supermarket retailing format:The supermarket entrepreneurs competed against A&P not by doing better what A&P was the bestcompany in the world at doing, but by doing something that A&P did not want to do at all. The greatestentrepreneurial failure in this story is Kroger. This company was second in the market, and one of itsown employees (who left to found the world’s first supermarket) knew how to make it first. Krogerexecutives did not listen. Perhaps it was lack of imagination or perhaps, like the executives at A&P,those at Kroger also had too much invested in the standard way of doing business. If the executives atA&P endorsed the supermarket revolution, they were ruining their own distribution system. That iswhy they sat by paralyzed, unable to act until it was almost too late. In the end, A&P had little choice.The company could ruin its own system, or see others do it.See Richard Tedlow, New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in America (Boston: HarvardBusiness School Press, 1996).101
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TheInnovator’sDilemmaWhen New Tec
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ContentsIn GratitudeIntroductionPAR
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Clayton M. ChristensenHarvard Busin
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Digital Equipment Corporation creat
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they lose their positions of leader
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Disruptive Technologies versus Rati
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understand what has caused those ci
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Chapter 7 discusses a different app
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But the electric car is a disruptiv
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Part OneWHY GREAT COMPANIESCAN FAIL
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was the size of a large refrigerato
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To test this hypothesis, I assemble
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Figure 1.5 describes a sustaining t
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Source: Data are from various issue
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Between 1978 and 1980, several entr
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The 3.5-inch drive was first develo
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Figure 1.8 Leadership of Entrant Fi
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Rigid Disk Drive Industry: A Histor
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CHAPTER TWOValue Networks and theIm
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toward sustaining innovations and a
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how each value network exhibits a v
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structure. Research, engineering, a
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Figure 2.5 The Conventional Technol
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firms’ decision-making processes
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1. The Weaknesses of Disruptive Tec
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Scott Cook, Intuit’s founder, sur
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CONTROLLING THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUC
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originally developed by Venetian me
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The first step in making this chart
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Having decided that electric vehicl
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its braking distance longer than ot
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The major automakers engaged in ele
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customers who pay the present bills
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Clearly, as will be discussed below
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CHAPTER ELEVENThe Dilemmas of Innov
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Seventh, and last, the research sum
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develop those technologies themselv
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2. There is a tendency in all marke