13. “Can 3.5" Drives Displace 5.25s in Personal Computing?” Electronic Business, 1 August, 1986,81–84.14. Personal interview with Mr. William Schroeder, Vice Chairman, Conner Peripherals Corporation,November 19, 1991.15. An insightful study on the linkage among a company’s historical experience, its capabilities, andwhat it consequently can and cannot do, appears in Dorothy Leonard-Barton, “Core Capabilities andCore Rigidities: A Paradox in Managing New Product Development,” Strategic Management Journal(13), 1992, 111–125.16. Personal interview with Mr. John Squires, cofounder and Executive Vice President, ConnerPeripherals Corporation, April 27, 1992.17. See, for example, George Gilder, “The Revitalization of Everything: The Law of the Microcosm,”Harvard Business Review, March-April, 1988, 49–62.18. Much of this information about Allen Bradley has been taken from John Gurda, The BradleyLegacy (Milwaukee: The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, 1992).116
CHAPTER SEVENDiscovering New andEmerging MarketsMarkets that do not exist cannot be analyzed: Suppliers and customers must discover them together.Not only are the market applications for disruptive technologies unknown at the time of theirdevelopment, they are unknowable. The strategies and plans that managers formulate for confrontingdisruptive technological change, therefore, should be plans for learning and discovery rather than plansfor execution. This is an important point to understand, because managers who believe they know amarket’s future will plan and invest very differently from those who recognize the uncertainties of adeveloping market.Most managers learn about innovation in a sustaining technology context because most technologiesdeveloped by established companies are sustaining in character. Such innovations are, by definition,targeted at known markets in which customer needs are understood. In this environment, a planned,researched approach to evaluating, developing, and marketing innovative products is not only possible,it is critical to success.What this means, however, is that much of what the best executives in successful companies havelearned about managing innovation is not relevant to disruptive technologies. Most marketers, forexample, have been schooled extensively, at universities and on the job, in the important art of listeningto their customers, but few have any theoretical or practical training in how to discover markets that donot yet exist. The problem with this lopsided experience base is that when the same analytical anddecision-making processes learned in the school of sustaining innovation are applied to enabling ordisruptive technologies, the effect on the company can be paralyzing. These processes demand crisplyquantified information when none exists, accurate estimates of financial returns when neither revenuesnor costs can be known, and management according to detailed plans and budgets that cannot beformulated. Applying inappropriate marketing, investment, and management processes can render goodcompanies incapable of creating the new markets in which enabling or disruptive technologies are firstused.In this chapter we shall see how experts in the disk drive industry were able to forecast the markets forsustaining technologies with stunning accuracy but had great difficulty in spotting the advent andpredicting the size of new markets for disruptive innovations. Additional case histories in themotorcycle and microprocessor industries further demonstrate the uncertainty about emerging marketapplications for disruptive or enabling technologies, even those that, in retrospect, appear obvious.FORECASTING MARKETS FOR SUSTAINING VERSUS DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIESAn unusual amount of market information has been available about the disk drive industry from itsearliest days—a major reason why studying it has yielded such rich insights. The primary source of117
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TheInnovator’sDilemmaWhen New Tec
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ContentsIn GratitudeIntroductionPAR
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Clayton M. ChristensenHarvard Busin
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Digital Equipment Corporation creat
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they lose their positions of leader
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Disruptive Technologies versus Rati
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understand what has caused those ci
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Chapter 7 discusses a different app
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But the electric car is a disruptiv
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Part OneWHY GREAT COMPANIESCAN FAIL
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was the size of a large refrigerato
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To test this hypothesis, I assemble
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Figure 1.5 describes a sustaining t
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Source: Data are from various issue
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Between 1978 and 1980, several entr
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The 3.5-inch drive was first develo
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Figure 1.8 Leadership of Entrant Fi
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Rigid Disk Drive Industry: A Histor
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CHAPTER TWOValue Networks and theIm
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toward sustaining innovations and a
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how each value network exhibits a v
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structure. Research, engineering, a
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Figure 2.5 The Conventional Technol
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firms’ decision-making processes
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annually introduced as a percentage
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ecause they have no moving parts, t
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Figure 2.7 Improvements in Areal De
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE VALUE NETWORK F
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esident in companies today result f
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CHAPTER THREEDisruptive Technologic
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Source: Data are from the Historica
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Because their capacity was so small
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The major automakers engaged in ele
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customers who pay the present bills
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Clearly, as will be discussed below
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CHAPTER ELEVENThe Dilemmas of Innov
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Seventh, and last, the research sum
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develop those technologies themselv
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2. There is a tendency in all marke