Rigid Disk Drive Industry: A History of Commercial and Technological Turbulence,” Business HistoryReview (67), Winter, 1993, 531–588. This history focuses only on the manufacturers of rigid diskdrives or hard drives—products on which data are stored on rigid metal platters. Companiesmanufacturing floppy disk drives (removable diskettes of flexible mylar coated with iron oxide onwhich data are stored) historically were different firms from those making hard disk drives.2. Much of the data for this analysis came from Disk/Trend Report, a highly respected annual marketresearch publication, augmented with more detailed product-specification sheets obtained from the diskdrive manufacturers themselves. I am grateful to the editors and staff at Disk/Trend, Inc., for theirpatient and generous assistance in this project.3. The concept of trajectories of technological progress was examined by Giovanni Dosi in“Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories,” Research Policy (11), 1982, 147–162.4. The ways in which the findings of this study differ from those of some earlier scholars of technologychange while building upon those of others are discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.5. The first technology for making heads built an electromagnet by wrapping a fine thread of copperwire around a core of iron oxide (ferrite); hence the term ferrite head. Incremental improvements tothis approach involved learning to grind the ferrite to finer and finer dimensions, using better lappingtechniques, and strengthening the ferrite by doping it with barium. Thin-film heads were madephotolithographically, using technology similar to that used in making integrated circuits on siliconwafers to etch the electromagnet on the surface of the head. This was difficult because it involved muchthicker layers of material than were common in IC manufacturing. The third technology, adoptedstarting in the mid-1990s, was called magneto-resistive heads. These were also made with thin-filmphotolithography, but used the principle that changes in the magnetic flux field on the disk surfacechanged the electrical resistivity of the circuitry in the head. By measuring changes in resistivity ratherthan changes in the direction of current flow, magneto-resistive heads were much more sensitive, andhence permitted denser data recording, than prior technology. In the evolution of disk technology, theearliest disks were made by coating fine needle-shaped particles of iron oxide—literally rust—over thesurface of a flat, polished aluminum platter. Hence, these disks were called oxide disks. Incrementalimprovements to this technology involved making finer and finer iron oxide particles, and dispersingthem more uniformly, with fewer uncoated voids on the aluminum platter’s surface. This wassupplanted by a sputtering technology, also borrowed from semiconductor processing, that coated thealuminum platter with a thin film of metal a few angstroms thick. The thinness of this layer; itscontinuous, rather than particulate nature; and the process’s flexibility in depositing magnetic materialswith higher coercivity, enabled denser recording on thin-film disks than was feasible on oxide disks.6. Richard J. Foster, Innovation: The Attacker’s Advantage (New York: Summit Books, 1986).7. The examples of technology change presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 introduce some ambiguity tothe unqualified term discontinuity, as used by Giovanni Dosi (see “Technological Paradigms andTechnological Trajectories,” Research Policy [11] 1982), Michael L. Tushman and Philip Anderson(see “Technological Discontinuities and Organizational Environments,” Administrative ScienceQuarterly [31], 1986), and others. The innovations in head and disk technology described in Figure 1.4represent positive discontinuities in an established technological trajectory, while the trajectorydisruptingtechnologies charted in Figure 1.7 represent negative discontinuities. As will be shownbelow, established firms seemed quite capable of leading the industry over positive discontinuities, butgenerally lost their industry lead when faced with negative discontinuities.8. This tendency consistently appears across a range of industries. Richard S. Rosenbloom and ClaytonM. Christensen (in “Technological Discontinuities, Organizational Capabilities, and StrategicCommitments,” Industrial and Corporate Change [3], 1994, 655–685) suggest a much broader set ofindustries in which leading firms may have been toppled by technologically straightforward disruptiveinnovations than is covered in this book.9. A summary of the data and procedures used to generate Figure 1.7 is included in Appendix 1.1.10. The minicomputer market was not new in 1978, but it was a new application for Winchester-36
technology disk drives.11. This statement applies only to independent drive makers competing in the OEM market. Some ofthe vertically integrated computer makers, such as IBM, have survived across these generations withthe benefit of a captive internal market. Even IBM, however, addressed the sequence of differentemerging markets for disk drives by creating autonomous “start-up” disk drive organizations to addresseach one. Its San Jose organization focused on high-end (primarily mainframe) applications. A separatedivision in Rochester, MN, focused on mid-range computers and workstations. IBM created a differentorganization in Fujisawa, Japan, to produce drives for the desktop personal computer market.12. This result is very different from that observed by Rebecca M. Henderson (see The Failure ofEstablished Firms in the Face of Technological Change: A Study of the SemiconductorPhotolithographic Alignment Industry, dissertation, Harvard University, 1988), who found the newarchitecturealigners produced by the established manufacturers to be inferior in performance to thoseproduced by entrant firms. One possible reason for these different results is that the successful entrantsin the photolithographic aligner industry studied by Henderson brought to the new product a welldevelopedbody of technological knowledge and experience developed and refined in other markets. Inthe case studied here, none of the entrants brought such well-developed knowledge with them. Most, infact, were de novo start-ups composed of managers and engineers who had defected from establisheddrive manufacturing firms.13. This finding is similar to the phenomenon observed by Joseph L. Bower, who saw that explicitcustomer demands have tremendous power as a source of impetus in the resource allocation process:“When the discrepancy (the problem to be solved by a proposed investment) was defined in terms ofcost and quality, the projects languished. In all four cases, the definition process moved towardcompletion when capacity to meet sales was perceived to be inadequate. . . . In short, pressure from themarket reduces both the probability and the cost of being wrong.” Although Bower specifically refersto manufacturing capacity, the same fundamental phenomenon—the power of the known needs ofknown customers in marshaling and directing the investments of a firm—affects response to disruptivetechnology. See Joseph L. Bower, Managing the Resource Allocation Process (Homewood, IL:Richard D. Irwin, 1970) 254.14. In booking $113 million in revenues, Conner Peripherals set a record for booking more revenues inits first year of operation than any manufacturing company in United States history.15. This finding is consistent with what Robert Burgelman has observed. He noted that one of thegreatest difficulties encountered by corporate entrepreneurs has been finding the right “beta test sites”where products could be interactively developed and refined with customers. Generally, a newventure’s entrée to the customer was provided by the salesperson representing the firm’s establishedproduct lines. This helped the firm develop new products for established markets but not to identifynew applications for new technology. See Robert A. Burgelman and Leonard Sayles, Inside CorporateInnovation (New York: The Free Press, 1986) 76–80.16. I believe this insight—that attacking firms have an advantage in disruptive innovations but not insustaining ones—clarifies, but is not in conflict with, Foster’s assertions about the attacker’s advantage.The historical examples Foster uses to substantiate his theory generally seem to have been disruptiveinnovations. See Richard J. Foster, Innovation: The Attacker’s Advantage (New York: Summit Books,1986).37
- Page 2 and 3: TheInnovator’sDilemmaWhen New Tec
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Part TwoMANAGING DISRUPTIVETECHNOLO
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The sum of these studies is that wh
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want? One option is to convince eve
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engineering workstations, and has a
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those laws, people flew quite succe
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The first discount store was Korvet
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expansion in the regular variety st
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laser jet division is headed, will
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CHAPTER SIXMatch the Size of theOrg
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What benefit, if any, did leadershi
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Source: Data are from various issue
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Finally, there is substantial evide
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Because emerging markets are small
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There are many success stories to t
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This recommendation is not new, of
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13. “Can 3.5" Drives Displace 5.2
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data, Disk/Trend Report, published
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MB, and a second model, introduced
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to make small deliveries to local c
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Japanese semiconductor manufacturer
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powerful deterrent to the movement
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therefore, may view creation of new
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ResourcesResources are the most vis
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its Corona model—a product target
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go public based upon a hot initial
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such success in the minicomputer bu
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they made these acquisitions late a
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Figure 8.1 Fitting an Innovation’
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structured. For Compaq, Hewlett-Pac
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CHAPTER NINEPerformance Provided,Ma
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Specifically, in the desktop person
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A product becomes a commodity withi
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1. The Weaknesses of Disruptive Tec
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Scott Cook, Intuit’s founder, sur
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CONTROLLING THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUC
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Source: An earlier version of this
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originally developed by Venetian me
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The first step in making this chart
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Having decided that electric vehicl
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its braking distance longer than ot
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The major automakers engaged in ele
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customers who pay the present bills
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Clearly, as will be discussed below
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CHAPTER ELEVENThe Dilemmas of Innov
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Seventh, and last, the research sum
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develop those technologies themselv
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2. There is a tendency in all marke