Beyond START - Brookings Institution

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tegic forces. It later offered to continue to limit operationallydeployed strategic warheads. The Russiansrejected limiting only deployed strategic warheads;the U.S. proposal did not constrain non-deployedwarheads in the responsive force or limit strategicmissiles or bombers. Moscow did not regard that asan acceptable approach, believing it could allow theUnited States the possibility to rapidly deploy extrawarheads on unconstrained missiles and bombersand thereby increase its strategic forces well beyondthe limit on deployed warheads. 7While unhappy with the Bush administration proposal,the Russians did express interest in further strategicreductions. Russian strategic forces are both agingand shrinking in number, as older systems reachthe end of their service life. Interestingly, despite the2004-2008 surge in revenues into the Russian government’scoffers due to high energy prices, Moscowhas made relatively modest investments in new strategicsystems, though the Russians have begun to devotegreater resources to their strategic forces.In contrast to its predecessor, the Obama administrationattaches priority to arms control and reductionsand the contribution they can make to U.S. security.The administration is ready to pursue deeper cuts. Itappears willing to accept a framework that will reduceand limit heavy bombers and strategic ballisticmissiles as well as warheads.The Obama administration also appears to recognizethat a U.S.-Russian arms control dialogue can have apositive impact on the broader bilateral relationship.The Russians value the process, if for no other reasonthan it validates Russia as a nuclear superpower onpar with the United States.President Ronald Reagan made arms control a centralelement of his broader U.S.-Soviet agenda inthe 1980s, using Moscow’s interest in arms controlto carve out diplomatic space to pursue other issues.As Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INFtreaty and made progress in negotiating START, paralleltalks won exit permission for Soviet dissidentsand produced more helpful Soviet positions on regionalproblems. Presidents George H. W. Bush andClinton likewise gave arms control a special place intheir dealings with their Soviet and Russian counterparts.Arms control progress, including the signing ofSTART, contributed to a more positive relationship,in which Moscow adopted positions of interest to theUnited States on questions such as German reunification,the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, and Bosnia.Current U.S. and Russian StrategicNuclear ForcesThe United States and Russia have traditionallymaintained a triad of strategic forces: heavy bombers,intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarinelaunchedballistic missiles. Each leg of the triad hasadvantages: bombers can be launched but have longflight times and can be recalled; ICBMs generallyhave larger payloads, fast reaction times, and havebeen more accurate (though SLBM accuracy has improvedmarkedly); and SLBMs on submarines at seahave the advantage of survivability, due to their abilityto lurk hidden under the world’s oceans. Given astrong air force tradition and easy access to the sea, theUnited States has tended to place a greater portion ofits weapons on bombers and SLBMs. Russia has historicallyplaced greater stress on its ICBM force.In keeping with arms control agreements and unilateralpolicy decisions, both the United States andRussia have reduced their strategic nuclear forcessubstantially over the past 15 years. U.S. strategicnuclear forces currently consist of some 900 heavybombers and strategic ballistic missiles: 450 silobasedMinuteman III ICBMs, 336 Trident II SLBMson 14 ballistic missile-carrying submarines, and 95B-52H bombers and 20 B-2 bombers. 8 The U.S. militaryplans to operate the Trident program into the2020s and 2030s, and Minuteman IIIs (which havebeen extensively refurbished) until 2030. The U.S.Air Force would like to develop a new bomber, withpossible introduction in 2018.The START-accountable number for U.S. strategicforces is higher. The most recent START data exchangeshowed the United States with 1198 ICBMs,SLBMs, and heavy bombers, attributed as carrying5576 warheads. 9 These break down as follows:Fo r e i g n P o l i c y at Bro o k i n g s 7
• 550 Minuteman III ICBMs attributed with1250 warheads• 96 Trident I SLBMs attributed with 576 warheads• 336 Trident II SLBMs attributed with 2688warheads• 56 B-1 bombers attributed with 56 warheads(bombs)• 19 B-2 bombers attributed with 19 warheads(bombs)• 94 B-52 bombers attributed with 940 warheads(cruise missiles)• 47 B-52 bombers attributed with 47 warheads(bombs)This count includes systems that no longer have a nuclearrole but have not been eliminated according toSTART rules. They thus remain accountable underthe treaty. These include, for example, retired B-52bombers; B-1 bombers, which have been convertedto carry conventional weapons only; and 96 Trident ISLBMs on four Trident submarines which have beenmodified to carry conventionally-armed cruise missilesinstead.Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has said that theUnited States would reach SORT’s 2200 strategicwarhead limit in 2010, though a February 2009report asserted that U.S. strategic forces already deployno more than 2200 warheads. 10 As noted above,however, the number of attributed warheads is significantlyhigher using START counting rules.Russian strategic nuclear forces currently consist ofsome 700 heavy bombers and strategic ballistic missiles:426 silo-based and mobile ICBMs of four differenttypes, 228 SLBM launchers on 14 missile-carryingsubmarines of four different classes (though oneof these has yet to be commissioned, and two may beundergoing decommissioning), 64 Tu-95 Bear and15 TU-160 Blackjack bombers. 11 Given that RussianICBMs and SLBMs are well into—and in some casesexceed—their service life, the Russians are buildinga new SLBM (the Bulava) and new ICBM (the SS-27), as well as a new class of ballistic missile-carryingsubmarine.As with the United States, the START-accountableRussian strategic force is larger. According to themost recent data exchange, Russia has 814 ICBMs,SLBMs, and heavy bombers, attributed as carrying3909 warheads. 12 These break down as follows:• 180 SS-25 ICBMs attributed with 180 warheads• 65 SS-25 variant (SS-27) ICBMs attributedwith 65 warheads• 120 SS-19 ICBMs attributed with 720 warheads• 104 SS-18 ICBMs attributed with 1040 warheads• 96 SS-N-18 SLBMs attributed with 288 warheads• 40 SS-N-20 SLBMs attributed with 400 warheads• 96 SS-N-23 SLBMs attributed with 384 warheads• 36 RSM-56 SLBMs attributed with 216 warheads• 14 Blackjack bombers attributed with 112warheads (cruise missiles)• 63 Bear bombers attributed with 504 warheads(cruise missiles)This number includes SLBMs attributed to missile-carryingsubmarines that are being decommissionedbut have not yet been eliminated accordingto START rules. Moscow has not yet said whether ithas reached the SORT limit of 1700-2200 strategicnuclear warheads.8 B e y o n d START: Negotiating the Nex t Step in U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduc t i o n s
Page 1 and 2: Beyond START: Negotiating theNext S
Page 3 and 4: Ta b l e of C o n t e n t sAcknowle
Page 5 and 6: I n t r o d u c t i o n and Summar
Page 7 and 8: A U.S. Negotiating PositionGiven th
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Page 17 and 18: submarines x 12 SLBMs) would not be
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Page 23 and 24: This is a broad and ambitious agend
Page 25 and 26: 25Phillip Webster and Tony Halpin,
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Beyond START - Brookings Institution

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