Beyond START - Brookings Institution

C o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r a Fo l l o w- o n Tr e a t yPresidents Obama and Medvedev in London madeclear that negotiating a follow-on agreement toSTART tops their bilateral agenda for 2009. Craftinga U.S. negotiating position and then coming toterms with the Russians on a new treaty will involvea number of considerations.Levels of Weapons and the NuclearPosture ReviewOne of the key questions for the U.S. negotiating positionwill be the levels for limiting strategic warheadsand strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. From the currentSORT level of 1700-2200 strategic warheads,one possible goal would be to reduce to no more than1000 deployed strategic warheads on each side. Thiscould allow for SNDVs to be reduced significantlybelow START’s limit of 1600, to 500-600 on eachside. This, however, is too ambitious an objective forthe 2009 negotiation of a START follow-on treatyfor reasons noted below.Congress in 2007 mandated that the executivebranch carry out a nuclear posture review “in orderto clarify United States nuclear deterrence policy andstrategy.” Among other things, the review will examine“the role of nuclear forces in United States militarystrategy, planning, and programming,” “the levelsand composition of the nuclear delivery systemsthat will be required for implementing the UnitedStates national and military strategy,” and “the activeand inactive nuclear weapons stockpile that will berequired.” 13 The primary work on the review, which iscurrently underway but may not be completed untilfall, is done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Officeof the Secretary of Defense. In contrast to the past,the Departments of State and Energy are playing agreater role in the nuclear posture review process.This reflects the Obama administration’s view thatU.S. nuclear policy and force levels should take accountof nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, andbroader security objectives.The nuclear posture review is important for determiningthe levels of warheads and SNDVs to whichthe United States can reduce; these numbers cannotcome out of thin air. One of the key questions thatthe chairman of the joint chiefs and the commanderof U.S. Strategic Command will have to answer duringratification hearings for any new strategic armstreaty will be whether the number of weapons allowedby the treaty is sufficient to execute U.S. nuclearpolicy. 14Given the shortness of time until December and theneed to complete the current nuclear posture review,it would be unrealistic for the administration to seta goal of achieving a treaty in 2009 cutting strategicwarheads to 1000. U.S. negotiators should aiminstead for a less ambitious START follow-on treatythat reduces each side to no more than 1500 deployedstrategic warheads on 700 heavy bombers, ICBMs,and SLBMs. While not as dramatic as 1000, a ceilingof 1500 nevertheless would represent a 30 percentreduction from SORT’s upper limit of 2200. A limitof 1500 also is close to the 1700-2200 level validatedby the 2001 nuclear posture review. The treaty couldput in place the framework for further strategic reductions,perhaps to be negotiated in 2010.The negotiators might also consider subceilings withinthe overall limit of 1500 deployed warheads, as inFo r e i g n P o l i c y at Bro o k i n g s 9