Beyond START - Brookings Institution

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warheads over the long term in the absence of testing,and concern about the ability to detect any nucleartest, even if of very low yield. The administration willhave to prepare the ground with the Senate carefullyin order to win ratification. Among other issues, itwill have to decide how to handle the reliable replacementwarhead question.A Broad Nuclear Security Approach. Washington andMoscow should discuss a broad approach to nuclearsecurity questions with a view to the 2010 NPT reviewconference. This is an area on which the twocapitals can show global leadership. Elements of thisapproach should go beyond U.S. and Russian strategicnuclear reductions to include:• U.S.-Russian support for measures to strengthenthe bar against other states acquiring nuclearweapons, such as universal adherence tothe International Atomic Energy Agency’s additionalprotocol;• a joint U.S.-Russian effort to make low-enricheduranium fuel for civil nuclear powerreactors available to all non-nuclear weaponsstates that abide by their NPT obligations; and• a joint effort to achieve a fissile materials cutofftreaty that would ban the production ofnew highly-enriched uranium or plutoniumfor nuclear weapons purposes.This broad approach would reaffirm the basic bargainof the NPT: the nuclear-weapons states disarm (ormove in that direction) and share civil nuclear technologywith the non-nuclear weapons states, whichfor their part agree not to acquire nuclear weapons.Missile Defense: While not bringing missile defenseinto the START follow-on negotiations, Washingtonand Moscow should continue discussions onmissile defense issues. These exchanges should coverthe broader question of the relationship between offensiveand defensive arms, differences over the U.S.plan to deploy a missile defense system in Poland andthe Czech Republic, and possible joint approaches toaddress the challenge posed by new ballistic missilethreats. Joint approaches should include ideas forNATO-Russia cooperation, given that theater missiledefense has been identified as a subject for work betweenthe Alliance and Russia.Warhead Numbers. While counting rules can give agood tally of deployed strategic warheads, neither sideknows with confidence the other’s number of nondeployedwarheads. At a level of 1500 deployed strategicwarheads, this will not matter much. However,in anticipation of deeper reductions, Washington andMoscow should begin side discussions regarding verifyingnumbers of all strategic nuclear warheads—nondeployedas well as deployed warheads. The UnitedStates and Russia will each want to maintain somenumber of spare warheads beyond the deployed warheadlimit, but too large a number will raise concernsabout breakout potential. At some point, further strategiccuts may not be possible unless the sides havegreater confidence in their knowledge of the other’sspare and other non-deployed warhead numbers.The sides thus should begin to discuss now howthey can develop a limit that covers all strategic warheads.One immediate step would be for both sidesto declare to the other the number of its deployedand non-deployed strategic warheads. While neitherside now could verify the other’s declared number ofnon-deployed warheads, this would create a baselineagainst which future monitoring measures might beapplied. 38Tactical Nuclear Weapons. The United States andRussia should begin discussions on how to increasetransparency regarding tactical nuclear weapons onboth sides and possible approaches for dealing withthem in the future. This could begin to prepare abasis for a more formal negotiation at a later time,bearing in mind that the absence of any limits ontactical nuclear weapons will at some point become abarrier to future strategic force reductions. In parallelwith this, and as part of the development of thenew NATO strategic concept mandated by Allianceleaders at their April 3-4 summit, the United Statesand its NATO allies should discuss the future role ofand requirements for U.S. tactical nuclear weaponsin Europe.Fo r e i g n P o l i c y at Bro o k i n g s 19
This is a broad and ambitious agenda. Moving alongthese lines will maintain the U.S.-Russian strategicnuclear framework and open the possibility of deeperreductions in U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals thatwill improve their mutual security, reduce the costs ofmaintaining strategic forces, and signal their commitmentto live up to their commitments under the NPT.Beginning discussions now, as opposed to formalnegotiations, on issues such as non-deployed warheadnumbers and tactical nuclear weapons could facilitatelater negotiations of further nuclear arms cuts. Finally,embedding their approach to negotiating a follow-ontreaty to START in a broader nuclear security effortoffers Washington and Moscow the opportunity totake a joint leadership role to press a more aggressiveeffort to constrain nuclear proliferation worldwide.20 B e y o n d START: Negotiating the Nex t Step in U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduc t i o n s
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Page 3 and 4: Ta b l e of C o n t e n t sAcknowle
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Page 25 and 26: 25Phillip Webster and Tony Halpin,
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Beyond START - Brookings Institution

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