Beyond START - Brookings Institution

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United States and Russia might be able to agree ona reduction to 1000 deployed strategic warheadson each side in the not-too-distant future, doing sowill not be possible this year. They should insteadnegotiate a treaty in 2009 that reduces each side’sforces to no more than 1500 deployed strategicnuclear warheads on 700 SNDVs.• Time: The negotiators have limited time, as STARTexpires on December 5. In order to allow for Senateratification, the follow-on treaty likely must besigned by September. Washington and Moscowshould be prepared to consider some bridging arrangementshould they require additional time tofinalize and ratify the follow-on treaty.• Counting Rules: A priority task will be determiningthe counting rules for the new agreement. Indeveloping the follow-on treaty, the negotiatorsshould adopt START-type counting rules that attributea specific number of warheads to each typeof strategic ballistic missile and bomber. This willfacilitate counting and verification.• Downloading: For purposes of nuclear stability,neither side will want to concentrate its warheadson too few missile launchers or submarines.The follow-on treaty should include downloadingprovisions to allow the sides to remove warheadsfrom ballistic missiles, as START permitsto a limited extent, and also to allow removal ofsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles from missilecarryingsubmarines. Downloaded missiles wouldbe counted with fewer warheads and downloadedsubmarines with fewer missiles than they are otherwisecapable of carrying.• Conversion and Conventionally-Armed Systems: Thefollow-on treaty should contain provisions thatallow the sides to convert some strategic systemsto conventional-only roles and remove them frombeing accountable under the treaty. A potentiallydifficult issue will be conventional warheads ontreaty-accountable ballistic missiles.• Constraining Breakout Potential: The follow-ontreaty will need inspection measures and otherprocedures to prevent the rapid uploading ofdownloaded systems. This can be addressed byprovisions for inspections of downloaded systems,for preventing rapid uploading, and forverifiably eliminating excess ballistic missiles andwarheads.• Monitoring and Verification Measures: The sidesshould consider streamlining START’s verificationmeasures. However, the follow-on treatywill need sufficient monitoring measures to givethe sides confidence in their ability to verify theother’s compliance. In order to complete the treatyquickly, the sides should avoid new verificationprovisions where possible, though more intrusivemeasures will be needed in subsequent agreementsthat provide for deeper reductions.• Third-Country Strategic Forces: As U.S. and Russianstrategic force levels decrease, the strategic forcesof Britain, France, and China will assume greaterimportance. The United States and Russia shouldbe able to reduce their deployed strategic warheadsto 1500, or even 1000, without taking accountof third-country forces. However, at some pointthereafter those forces will have to be addressed,either through separate constraints or by multilateralizingthe U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear reductionsprocess.• Missile Defense: As U.S. and Russian strategic forcesare reduced, there will be greater pressure to addressmissile defense. This will have to be factoredin at some point, but the sides should be able tocut their forces to 1500, and perhaps 1000, deployedwarheads without limits on missile defensesystems. Bringing constraints on missile defenseinto the negotiation of the START follow-on treatywould likely make it impossible to have a treatyconcluded and ratified by December.• Tactical Nuclear Weapons: As U.S. and Russianstrategic nuclear forces are reduced, their tacticalnuclear weapons will assume greater importance.They can be left aside for the immediate negotiation,but will have to be addressed at some futurepoint as further strategic reductions are considered.2 B e y o n d START: Negotiating the Nex t Step in U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduc t i o n s
A U.S. Negotiating PositionGiven the shortness of time until START’s expirationin December, the Obama administration should seeka START follow-on treaty that sets a ceiling of 1500deployed strategic warheads on 700 SNDVs on eachside. As a subsequent step, perhaps in 2010, the UnitedStates and Russia could pursue deeper reductions.When negotiating the follow-on treaty, the administrationshould draw heavily on START for countingrules and verification measures; seek to include provisionsfor downloading missiles and missile-carryingsubmarines, with appropriate verification measuresand constraints on breakout potential; and allow someconversion of strategic systems to conventional-onlyroles. While third-country strategic nuclear forces,missile defense, and tactical nuclear weapons willneed to be taken into account at some point in thestrategic reductions process, U.S. negotiators shouldseek to leave them aside for the immediate negotiationof the START follow-on treaty or address themin other channels.A limit of 1500 deployed warheads on 700 SNDVswould allow the United States and Russia to maintainsurvivable and effective strategic nuclear forces,though at levels significantly below those today. Undersuch an agreement, the United States could deploya force structure with 300 single-warhead MinutemanIII ICBMs, 168 Trident II SLBMs (with fivewarheads each), and some 50 nuclear-capable heavybombers.This is largely a modified START framework. PresidentObama has called for reductions in “all U.S. andRussian nuclear weapons—whether deployed or nondeployed,whether strategic or nonstrategic.” If he andPresident Medvedev are serious about pursuing evendeeper reductions, the START framework will have tobe broadened. Washington and Moscow will have todevelop new approaches that bring non-deployed strategicnuclear warheads and tactical nuclear warheadsinto the arms reduction process. Washington shouldtake or propose several measures in parallel with thenegotiation of a START follow-on treaty:• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The U.S. administrationshould seek Senate ratification of the treaty,which the Russians previously ratified.• A Broad Nuclear Security Approach: With a view tothe 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) reviewconference, Washington should suggest to Moscowthat they lead in a broad effort that wouldgo beyond negotiation of the follow-on treaty toinclude: support for measures to prevent furthernuclear proliferation; a joint effort to provideenrichment services for civil nuclear reactors innon-nuclear weapons states; and leadership inpromoting a fissile materials cut-off treaty.• Missile Defense: While not bringing missile defenseinto the START follow-on negotiations, Washingtonand Moscow should discuss the relationshipbetween offensive and defensive arms, differencesover the U.S. plan to deploy a missile defensesystem in Central Europe, and possible joint approaches,including NATO-Russia cooperation, toaddress the challenge posed by new ballistic missilethreats.• Warhead Numbers: While counting rules can givea good tally of deployed strategic warheads, neitherside knows with confidence the other’s numberof non-deployed warheads. At a level of 1500deployed strategic warheads, this will not mattermuch. However, in anticipation of deeper reductions,Washington should propose to Moscowdiscussions on how the sides might better understandeach other’s strategic warhead numbers,non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Aprocess of continuing reductions will ultimatelyrequire a framework that addresses all strategicwarheads.• Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Washington should proposediscussions on measures to increase transparencyregarding tactical nuclear weapons and possibleapproaches for dealing with them in the future.Those discussions might also address measures toassure that tactical nuclear weapons on both sidesare safely and securely stored.Fo r e i g n P o l i c y at Bro o k i n g s 3
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Beyond START - Brookings Institution

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