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how many warheads are on its ICBMs and SLBMs,just as only Russia knows the number on its strategicballistic missiles. SORT by itself offers no way for theRussians to confirm the number of warheads on anyU.S. missile, nor for American inspectors to confirmthe number of warheads on any Russian missile.Given that the sides will want confidence in theirability to monitor the other’s compliance with warheadlimits, U.S. and Russian negotiators will mostlikely need START-type counting rules for the follow-ontreaty. Each type of SNDV should be attributedwith a specific number of warheads for countingpurposes. The sides might agree, for example, toattribute each Trident II with five warheads (see thedownloading discussion below), relying on STARTverification procedures to allow Russian inspectors toconfirm that Trident II missiles are deployed with nomore than that number. While there may be some interestin counting actual warhead loads (which couldvary from missile to missile), it is difficult to see howsuch a counting rule could be monitored without extremelyintrusive verification measures.DownloadingRelated to the counting rule issue will be the questionof downloading, that is, removing warheads frommissiles and perhaps removing missiles from missilecarryingsubmarines. In order to maintain a survivableforce, both the United States and Russia will want tospread out their warheads. Neither, for example, willwant to deploy too many warheads on one missilecarryingsubmarine. This is the nuclear stability versionof not putting too many eggs in one basket.The problem is most evident with regard to theTrident submarine fleet. Under START countingrules, 336 Trident II missiles (attributed with eightwarheads each) on 14 Trident submarines by themselvescount as 2688 warheads—well above the 2200limit below which Presidents Obama and Medvedevhave pledged to reduce. For operational and stabilitypurposes, the U.S. Navy may not wish to reducethe number of ballistic missile-carrying submarinesbelow 14. Hence the U.S. need for downloading asreductions are implemented.START allows for downloading missiles by type andattributing a lower number of warheads to those missiles,albeit under a complex set of limitations. Forexample, some Minuteman III ICBMs are alreadycounted as having been downloaded and carryinga single warhead, and some Trident II SLBMs havebeen downloaded as well. 16 START’s verificationrules allow Russian inspectors to spot-check missilesand confirm that they carry no more than the declarednumber of warheads.The negotiators should adopt provisions to permitdownloading ICBMs and SLBMs in the START follow-ontreaty. The negotiators might agree, for example,that Trident II missiles could be downloaded andcounted with five warheads each. START verificationmeasures would permit Russian inspectors to spotcheckindividual Trident II missiles and confirm theycarry no more than the agreed number of warheads.(Similar procedures could be applied to downloadedRussian ballistic missiles.) Even at five warheads perTrident II, however, the 14 Trident submarines carryingSLBMs would be counted as carrying 1760warheads. 17If the START follow-on treaty limits each side to nomore than 1500 warheads, U.S. negotiators shouldseek provisions to allow downloading U.S. and Russianmissile-carrying submarines. For example, eachTrident submarine could be counted as carrying nomore than 12 Trident II missiles (instead of its capacityof 24). Relatively simple monitoring provisionscould allow Russian inspectors to spot-checkthis: Russian inspectors visiting a Trident base couldchoose a submarine at random and ask that 12 missiletubes be opened to confirm that they were empty.(The “empty” tubes likely would contain some ballast,but that would be clearly distinguishable froma missile.) Counting each Trident II as carrying fivewarheads and each Trident submarine as carrying 12Trident II missiles would mean the 14 submarineswould be attributed with 840 warheads.Whatever the particular numbers, downloading willbe a key element for the United States in a STARTfollow-on agreement if that agreement is to limit eachside to a number of warheads less than 2200. TheFo r e i g n P o l i c y at Bro o k i n g s 11
Russians, however, will be less interested in downloading,as Russian SLBMs carry fewer warheadsthan Trident II SLBMs, and most Russian submarineshave only 16 missile tubes in contrast to 24 onthe Trident.Conversion and Conventionally-ArmedSystemsDealing with heavy bombers, missile-carrying submarines,and strategic ballistic missiles converted toconventional-only roles will pose one of the mostdifficult issues for the negotiators. The United Stateslikely will want significant relief in this area, probablymore so than Russia. The Russians, moreover, mayseek limits that will constrain U.S. conventional aswell as strategic nuclear capabilities.START II (which never entered into force) wouldhave allowed each side to convert up to 100 heavybombers to conventional-only roles, which would notcount against the SNDV limit. 18 The United Stateshas converted its B-1 bomber fleet to conventionalonlyroles, though they still count as strategic bombersunder START I counting rules. U.S. negotiatorsshould seek a variant of the START II rule to allowfor some number of conventional bombers outside ofthe follow-on treaty’s SNDV and warhead limits. Thefollow-on treaty could contain a numerical limit onconventional-role only bombers, as did START II.Four of the original 18 Trident submarines havebeen modified to carry conventionally-armed Tomahawkland-attack cruise missiles (TLAMs) insteadof SLBMs. Each of the four submarines has been refittedso that 22 of its missile tubes hold a canisterlauncher containing seven TLAMs; the remainingtwo tubes have been modified to support special operationsforces. 19 Since START requires that SLBMlaunchers be eliminated by completely removingthem from the submarine, which has not happened,these submarines continue to count under START.Washington will likely seek provisions allowing thisconversion so that these submarines are not countedas carrying SLBMs, with inspection procedures thatallow Russian inspectors to confirm that the convertedsubmarines do not carry SLBMs.If Moscow is not interested in similar relief, the Russianscould try to limit conventional-only Tridentsubmarines as strategic systems or propose othermeasures for such submarines. For example, Moscowmight propose that such submarines be restricted tocertain patrol areas (away from Russia) and that theUnited States provide information on those areas.The U.S. Navy traditionally has not been interestedin such ideas.Conventionally-armed strategic ballistic missiles posea more difficult challenge. The Bush administrationdeveloped a plan to arm two Trident II SLBMs oneach of 12 Trident submarines with conventional warheadsin order to have a prompt global conventionalstrike capability. 20 As a matter of general practice, theUnited States will not want conventionally-armedsystems to be counted as strategic nuclear arms. Butdeveloping verification measures to demonstrate thatsuch conventionally-armed SLBMs are not uncountednuclear systems will not be an easy task, unlessthe United States is prepared to accept very intrusivemonitoring measures. With a higher ceiling on strategicnuclear warheads and a small number of conventionally-armedTrident II SLBMs, counting thoseconventional warheads as nuclear warheads may notpose a big problem. However, a precedent would beset that could prove difficult to live with if strategicnuclear warhead levels later were cut more drastically.The problem may be further complicated if the Russiansregard SLBMs outfitted with highly accurateconventional warheads as posing a “strategic” threatto targets such as ICBM silos. Should the Obama administrationwish to protect a conventional Tridentoption outside of limits on strategic nuclear arms,this could pose one of the most difficult issues for thenegotiators.Constraining Breakout PotentialClosely linked to the downloading question is the issueof constraining breakout potential, that is the abilityof one side or the other to deploy strategic nuclearwarheads and missiles beyond the limits containedin the follow-on treaty, for example, by uploadingdownloaded systems—returning removed warheads12 B e y o n d START: Negotiating the Nex t Step in U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduc t i o n s
Page 1 and 2: Beyond START: Negotiating theNext S
Page 3 and 4: Ta b l e of C o n t e n t sAcknowle
Page 5 and 6: I n t r o d u c t i o n and Summar
Page 7 and 8: A U.S. Negotiating PositionGiven th
Page 9 and 10: Gorbachev in 1991, was modified by
Page 11 and 12: • 550 Minuteman III ICBMs attribu
Page 13: START. They might agree, for exampl
Page 17 and 18: submarines x 12 SLBMs) would not be
Page 19 and 20: they are generally more susceptible
Page 21 and 22: not armed with cruise missiles as c
Page 23 and 24: This is a broad and ambitious agend
Page 25 and 26: 25Phillip Webster and Tony Halpin,
Page 27: The Brookings Institution1775 Massa

Beyond START - Brookings Institution

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