Beyond START - Brookings Institution

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to missiles or removed missiles to submarines. Thisproblem is particularly acute if downloaded missilesor submarines can be uploaded quickly. Part of thesolution could be the elimination of excess warheads.For eliminating warheads removed from downloadedmissiles, the sides can draw on the experience of theINF treaty. It provided that the front sections of INFballistic missiles, following removal of the nuclearwarhead device and guidance elements, would becrushed or flattened. 21 U.S. and Russian negotiationscan develop similar procedures to apply to strategicwarhead bodies. Such procedures, with provisionsfor inspection, will give the inspecting side a goodcount of the number of warheads eliminated, whichwill increase confidence in compliance with the follow-ontreaty. Those procedures will not, however,provide certainty regarding the number of remainingwarheads, as neither side likely knows preciselyhow many warheads the other built, and there maybe questions about the possibility for surreptitiousproduction of new warheads.Another way to cap breakout potential would be toinclude a provision in the follow-on treaty, as STARTdid, that limits the aggregate number of downloadedwarheads. Yet another approach would be to redesignand build a new “bus” or platform for downloadedmissiles; the new platform would be capable only ofcarrying a reduced number. This option, however,could prove expensive.The problem of constraining breakout potential issimpler to address with regard to SLBMs and missile-carryingsubmarines. Several steps can be takenregarding the empty missile tubes to preclude rapidreloading. First, for ballast purposes, a concrete orsome other weight would likely be placed in emptytubes (to compensate for the loss of the removed missile’sweight). Such a weight would be visibly differentfrom an SLBM. It could be fixed in the missiletube in such a way that removing it would be difficultand require time and special equipment. Second,other obstructions could be inserted into thetube that would require time and special equipmentto return the tube to launch-capable status, or otherways could be found to render the tube incapable oflaunching a missile. On U.S. Trident submarines, thesteam generators which propel the SLBM from themissile tube could be removed from empty tubes,making the tube incapable of launching an SLBM.Russian inspectors could be allowed to verify the removal.22An alternative approach would be to allow the otherside’s inspectors to examine empty missile tubes,confirm they are empty, and then observe the deckhatches to the tubes being welded shut. The drawbackto this approach is that it would not permit easysubsequent confirmation that the tube was emptywithout allowing inspectors to enter the submarine.If they were allowed internal access, inspectors couldconfirm that tubes were empty (for example, the missiletubes on Trident submarines have portals that canbe opened to allow access to the inside of the tubefrom the missile compartment.)The negotiators might develop a provision to limitthe number of non-deployed SLBMs (that is, SLBMsthat are not deployed in submarine missile tubes).Each side will want some non-deployed SLBMs,for use as spares and for reliability and training testlaunches. An excessively large number of non-deployedSLBMs, however, could give rise to concernthat SLBMs were being retained for possible redeploymentto downloaded submarines.Take the example of the Trident force. The U.S.Navy plans to continue procurement of the TridentII through 2013, when it will have bought a totalof 561 Trident II missiles to equip 14 Trident submarinesand four British submarines (the UnitedKingdom uses the Trident II as well), and to havespares and extra missiles for reliability and traininglaunches. The U.S. Navy normally keeps 12 Tridentsubmarines in operational status (at any time, twoare usually undergoing overhaul and thus do notcarry missiles). The Navy thus requires 288 missilesfor the operational submarines. 23 The total numberof Trident II missiles could be cut significantly ifTrident submarines were downloaded to carry only12 missiles each. If the treaty limited each Tridentsubmarine to no more than 12 SLBMs instead of itscapacity of 24, at least 144 Trident II missiles (12Fo r e i g n P o l i c y at Bro o k i n g s 13
submarines x 12 SLBMs) would not be needed. Thiswould allow earlier than planned termination of theTrident II procurement program, with significantcost savings.If necessary, the sides could also agree to eliminate excessSLBMs in a verifiable manner. Although STARTrequired elimination of ICBM and SLBM launchers—silosand missile tubes on submarines—not ofICBMs and SLBMs, the United States and Russiahave extensive experience monitoring elimination ofmissiles under the INF treaty.Monitoring and Verification MeasuresMonitoring and verification measures include dataexchanges, notifications, inspections of various kinds,and other measures. Their purpose is to give each sidethe ability to monitor with confidence the other’scompliance with the terms of the agreement, whileprotecting information that each military considersto be sensitive.Among its verification provisions, START providesfor more than a dozen different kinds of inspectionsand exhibitions, as well as providing for monitoringby national technical means, data exchanges, notifications,and a ban on most missile telemetry encryption.Over the past 20 years, the United States andRussia have gained considerable experience with inspectionsunder the START and INF treaties. For example,as of September 2008, U.S. officials had conducted621 START inspections in Russia, Belarus,Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, while Russian officials hadmade 437 START inspections on U.S. territory. 24The Russian military reportedly wishes to streamlineSTART’s verification provisions, eliminating somemeasures which it considers no longer necessary oroverly burdensome. It may be that the U.S. militaryalso would like to shed some of the verification provisions.This should be a subject for the follow-onnegotiation. It is in the interest of both sides to maketreaty implementation as simple as possible, providedthat the verification measures suffice to give each sideconfidence that it can monitor the other’s compliancewith treaty limitations. That said, if the sides areserious about pursuing even deeper reductions, moreintrusive verification measures will be necessary later.Third-Countr y Strategic NuclearForcesIn addition to the United States and Russia, threeother countries have strategic nuclear forces: Britain,France, and China. (Other countries, such as Indiaand Pakistan, have nuclear weapons and intermediate-rangedelivery systems, but they do not haveICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers.)Britain operates four missile-carrying submarines,each of which can carry 16 Trident II missiles, thoughonly three submarines normally carry missiles at anyone time. Trident IIs on British submarines carry significantlyfewer than eight warheads. British PrimeMinister Gordon Brown recently stated that the Britishstrategic force deploys 160 warheads and thatBritain stood ready to enter a broader negotiation onreducing strategic nuclear arms. 25President Nicolas Sarkozy has said that France willmaintain fewer than 300 nuclear weapons in its arsenal.The bulk of these are on SLBMs (France has threemissile-carrying submarines, with a fourth underconstruction). France also has some 50 Mirage-2000aircraft with a strategic nuclear strike role. 26China has 37-49 single-warhead ICBMs and is buildinga modern missile-carrying submarine. China ismodernizing its ICBM force and also has a numberof intermediate-range missiles and aircraft. The estimatedtotal number of warheads on these strategicand intermediate-range systems is some 175. 27Strategic nuclear arms control agreements thus farhave been bilateral accords between the United Statesand the Soviet Union or Russia, with the exceptionof the Lisbon Protocol that applied the START limitsto Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as well as Russia.U.S. negotiators staunchly resisted Soviet effortsto take account of British and French nuclear forcesin the past. However, the lower the level for U.S. andRussian strategic warheads, the greater the relativeweight of British, French, and Chinese forces.14 B e y o n d START: Negotiating the Nex t Step in U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduc t i o n s
Page 1 and 2: Beyond START: Negotiating theNext S
Page 3 and 4: Ta b l e of C o n t e n t sAcknowle
Page 5 and 6: I n t r o d u c t i o n and Summar
Page 7 and 8: A U.S. Negotiating PositionGiven th
Page 9 and 10: Gorbachev in 1991, was modified by
Page 11 and 12: • 550 Minuteman III ICBMs attribu
Page 13 and 14: START. They might agree, for exampl
Page 15: Russians, however, will be less int
Page 19 and 20: they are generally more susceptible
Page 21 and 22: not armed with cruise missiles as c
Page 23 and 24: This is a broad and ambitious agend
Page 25 and 26: 25Phillip Webster and Tony Halpin,
Page 27: The Brookings Institution1775 Massa

Beyond START - Brookings Institution

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