China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69* Chen Jian

366 The China Quarterlyplanning, Mao emphasized, should now be oriented toward China'snational defence, to prepare for a coming war with the imperialists.35The escalation of the Vietnam War in late 1964 thus triggered aprofound transformation of the entire structure of China's national economy.Following Mao's ideas, the CCP Central Committee discussed theneed to establish a "Headquarters for National Economy and NationalDefence," with Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi as its co-commanders. Byearly 1965, a large portion of the coastal industry had begun to move intothe inner areas, and the emphasis of China's economic developmentchanged from agriculture and light industry to heavy industry, particularlyin the sectors related to the military build-up.36 All this touched uponthe everyday life of a large portion of China's population (especially incoastal areas), further radicalizing China's society and politics and thusfollowing Mao's intentions.Working out the Specifics of China's Support to Vietnam, Late 1964 toEarly 1965The security commitments Beijing had previously offered Hanoi weregiven in general terms. It was thus necessary, in late 1964 and early 1965,for Beijing's leaders to define the specifics of China's support to Vietnamin light of both the country's domestic and international needs as perceivedby Mao and the changing situation in Vietnam. While doing so,their thinking had been influenced by the lessons of the Korean War, aswell as by the assumption that the Americans would also learn from theirexperience in Korea. Consequently, by the spring of 1965, when policymakers in Washington decided to send more troops to South Vietnam andbegan operation "Rolling Thunder," Beijing's leaders had decided onthree basic principles in formulating China's strategy. First, if the Americanswent beyond the bombing of the North and used land forces toinvade North Vietnam, China would have to send military forces. Secondly,China would give clear warnings to the Americans, so that theywould not feel free to expand military operations into the North, let aloneto bring the war to China. Thirdly, China would avoid direct militaryconfrontation with the United States as long as possible; but if necessary,it would not shrink from a confrontation.37Under the guidance of these principles, Beijing sent out a series ofwarnings to Washington in spring 1965. On 25 March, the officialRenmin ribao (People's Daily) announced in an editorial that China wasto offer "the heroic Vietnamese people any necessary material support,including the supply of weapons and all kinds of military materials,"and that, if necessary, China was also ready "to send its personnel tofight together with the Vietnamese people to annihilate the American35. Cong Jin, Quzhe qiangjin de shinian, p. 465; and Naughton, "The Third Front," p. 353.36. Cong Jin, Quzhe qiangjin de shinian, p. 46.37. Interviews with Beijing's military researchers, August 1992.