382 The Ch<strong>in</strong>a Quarterlysuddenly at <strong>the</strong> very last moment, claim<strong>in</strong>g that nei<strong>the</strong>r Liu Shaoqi norDeng Xiaop<strong>in</strong>g had been authorized to speak for <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese Party. He<strong>in</strong>sisted that <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union had become <strong>the</strong> most dangerous enemy of<strong>the</strong> peoples of <strong>the</strong> world and called for <strong>the</strong> establishment of an "anti-imperialistand anti-revisionist <strong>in</strong>ternational united front."86 Mao would laterrelate this event to his earlier criticism of Wang Jiaxiang, charg<strong>in</strong>g thatboth Liu and Deng had become <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a's</strong> "revisionists." Mao's criticism ofLiu's and Deng's handl<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>the</strong> Miyamoto mission became <strong>the</strong> first signto <strong>the</strong> outside world that profound division had emerged among top CCPleaders. As it soon turned out, both Liu and Deng would become <strong>the</strong> ma<strong>in</strong>targets of <strong>the</strong> Cultural Revolution.So far as its impact on Ch<strong>in</strong>ese-<strong>Vietnam</strong>ese relations is considered, <strong>the</strong>failure of <strong>the</strong> Miyamoto mission fur<strong>the</strong>r distanced Hanoi from Beij<strong>in</strong>g.Beij<strong>in</strong>g's leaders, while feel<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly uneasy about Hanoi's lack of<strong>in</strong>terest <strong>in</strong> keep<strong>in</strong>g a distance from Moscow, noted with surprise that <strong>the</strong><strong>Vietnam</strong>ese media began to use <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a's</strong> <strong>in</strong>vasion of <strong>Vietnam</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> pastto spur patriotism among ord<strong>in</strong>ary <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese people. Conv<strong>in</strong>ced that <strong>the</strong><strong>Vietnam</strong>ese were <strong>in</strong> fact <strong>in</strong>cl<strong>in</strong>ed toward Moscow, Beij<strong>in</strong>g's leaders weregenu<strong>in</strong>ely offended.87Among Ch<strong>in</strong>ese sources now available, two cases <strong>in</strong>dicate that sharpdifferences had emerged <strong>in</strong> 1966 between Beij<strong>in</strong>g and Hanoi as <strong>the</strong> resultof Hanoi's improv<strong>in</strong>g relations with Moscow. The first details <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a's</strong>reaction to Hanoi's gestures of friendship toward Moscow. In March1966, Le Duan led a <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese Party delegation to attend <strong>the</strong> SovietParty's 23rd Congress. He reportedly once described <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union ashis "second mo<strong>the</strong>rland." When Beij<strong>in</strong>g's leaders learned of this, <strong>the</strong>ywere "angrily shocked." A few months later, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese requestedthat <strong>the</strong> second division of <strong>the</strong> CPVEF stay longer <strong>in</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong> after it hadcompleted its orig<strong>in</strong>al assignments, but <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese turned down <strong>the</strong>request and <strong>the</strong> second division returned to Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> July 1966. OneCh<strong>in</strong>ese source po<strong>in</strong>ts out that this move was designed to demonstrateBeij<strong>in</strong>g's anger toward Le Duan's praise of <strong>the</strong> Soviets <strong>in</strong> Moscow.88The second case more directly reveals Ch<strong>in</strong>ese resentment of Hanoigiv<strong>in</strong>g any priority to <strong>the</strong> Soviets. In early 1966, a Ch<strong>in</strong>ese cargo ship,Hongqi (Red Flag), was assigned to carry materials <strong>in</strong> aid to <strong>Vietnam</strong>. As<strong>the</strong> ship approached <strong>the</strong> Hai Phong port it was stopped so that a Sovietcargo ship, which arrived later than <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese, could enter <strong>the</strong> port first.As <strong>the</strong> result of this delay, Hongqi was exposed to an American air raidand was severely damaged. Dur<strong>in</strong>g a visit to Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> April, Le Duan86. For a detailed record of Miyamoto's visit to Ch<strong>in</strong>a and <strong>Vietnam</strong> <strong>in</strong> spr<strong>in</strong>g 1966, seeMasaru Kojima (ed.), The Record of <strong>the</strong> Talks between <strong>the</strong> Japanese Communist Party and<strong>the</strong> Communist Party of Ch<strong>in</strong>a: How Mao Zedong Scrapped <strong>the</strong> Jo<strong>in</strong>t Communique (Tokyo:The Central Committee of <strong>the</strong> Japanese Communist Party, 1980).87. In a meet<strong>in</strong>g with Lu Duan <strong>in</strong> April 1966, Zhou Enlai mentioned that <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese hadnoted that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese media had recently streng<strong>the</strong>ned <strong>the</strong> propaganda about <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a's</strong><strong>in</strong>vasion of <strong>Vietnam</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> past. Zhou warned that such propaganda had violated <strong>the</strong>fundamental <strong>in</strong>terests of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese and Ch<strong>in</strong>ese people <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir common struggle aga<strong>in</strong>st<strong>the</strong> U.S. imperialists. Guo M<strong>in</strong>g et al., Zhong-Yue guanxi yanbian sish<strong>in</strong>ian, p. 102.88. See Wang Xiangen, Kang Mei yuanyue shilu, p. 225.
Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong> <strong>War</strong>, <strong>1964</strong>-69 383found that this question was <strong>the</strong> first on Zhou Enlai's agenda. Zhou<strong>in</strong>sisted that Duan expla<strong>in</strong> why <strong>Vietnam</strong> had given <strong>the</strong> Soviet cargo shipan unfair priority. Duan, accord<strong>in</strong>g to Ch<strong>in</strong>ese sources, was greatlyembarrassed. He had to promise that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese would not allow <strong>the</strong>same th<strong>in</strong>g to happen aga<strong>in</strong>, as well as repeatedly praise <strong>the</strong> importanceof <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese support, before Zhou would turn to o<strong>the</strong>r topics.89The gap between Beij<strong>in</strong>g and Hanoi widened as North <strong>Vietnam</strong>received more support from Moscow. Beij<strong>in</strong>g would not agree to cooperatewith <strong>the</strong> Soviets <strong>in</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g a united transport system, assuggested by Moscow, to handle Soviet materials go<strong>in</strong>g through Ch<strong>in</strong>eseterritory.90 Ch<strong>in</strong>a did help deliver Soviet materials to <strong>Vietnam</strong>, but onlyon <strong>the</strong> condition that <strong>the</strong> operation be placed under Beij<strong>in</strong>g's directcontrol and be <strong>in</strong>terpreted as a favour from Beij<strong>in</strong>g to Hanoi.91 The<strong>Vietnam</strong>ese obviously did not appreciate such an attitude. By 1968, itbecame evident to <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese that Hanoi was grow<strong>in</strong>g closer to Moscowthan to Beij<strong>in</strong>g. When a series of conflicts occurred between Ch<strong>in</strong>esetroops and Soviet military personnel <strong>in</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong>, <strong>the</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese authoritiesstood on <strong>the</strong> side of <strong>the</strong> Soviets, alleg<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese "hadimp<strong>in</strong>ged upon <strong>Vietnam</strong>'s sovereignty."92Hanoi's deep <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r parts of Indo-Ch<strong>in</strong>a, especially <strong>in</strong>Laos, was ano<strong>the</strong>r reason for suspicion and friction between <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>eseand <strong>the</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese. Historically <strong>the</strong> relationship between Communists <strong>in</strong><strong>Vietnam</strong>, Laos and Cambodia had been very close (<strong>the</strong>y once belonged to<strong>the</strong> same Indo-Ch<strong>in</strong>a Communist Party). This was not a problem to <strong>the</strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>ese dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> First Indo-Ch<strong>in</strong>a <strong>War</strong>. But <strong>the</strong> situation became quitedifferent dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> second war. When a Ch<strong>in</strong>ese work<strong>in</strong>g team arrived <strong>in</strong>Laos <strong>in</strong> early 1965, <strong>the</strong>y reported to Beij<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese virtuallycontrolled <strong>the</strong> Laotian People's Revolutionary Party, and viewed <strong>the</strong>presence of <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese team as a threat to Hanoi's <strong>in</strong>terests <strong>the</strong>re.93F<strong>in</strong>ally, <strong>in</strong> September 1968, apparently under pressure from Hanoi,Kaysone Phomvihane suggested that Li Wenzheng, <strong>the</strong> head of <strong>the</strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>ese team at that time, should take a vacation back <strong>in</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>a. Beij<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>terpreted this suggestion as an <strong>in</strong>dication that <strong>the</strong> cont<strong>in</strong>uous presenceof <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese team was no longer appreciated and ordered <strong>the</strong> with-89. Ibid. pp. 255-56.90. Zhou Enlai made it clear <strong>in</strong> his meet<strong>in</strong>g with Le Duan <strong>in</strong> April 1966 that as <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a's</strong>own railway system was overloaded <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese were not <strong>in</strong> a position to establish a unitedtransport system with <strong>the</strong> Soviets <strong>in</strong> handl<strong>in</strong>g Soviet materials go<strong>in</strong>g through Ch<strong>in</strong>ese territory.Ibid. p. 226.91. Accord<strong>in</strong>g to official Ch<strong>in</strong>ese sources, dur<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> entire period of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Vietnam</strong> <strong>War</strong>,Ch<strong>in</strong>a "helped transfer 5,750 tra<strong>in</strong> trucks of materials <strong>in</strong> aid from o<strong>the</strong>r socialist countries to<strong>Vietnam</strong>, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g materials from <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union." Ibid.92. Here is an example: <strong>in</strong> April 1968, a Ch<strong>in</strong>ese unit stationed <strong>in</strong> Dien Bien Phu area ran<strong>in</strong>to a confrontation with a group of Soviet officers <strong>the</strong>re. Ch<strong>in</strong>ese soldiers temporarilydeta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>the</strong> Soviets, and, follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> practice of <strong>the</strong> Cultural Revolution, held adenunciation meet<strong>in</strong>g criticiz<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> "Soviet revisionists." The local <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese authoritieswere greatly offended, and protested to <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese <strong>in</strong> strong words, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> allegationthat <strong>the</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese "had imp<strong>in</strong>ged upon <strong>Vietnam</strong>ese sovereignty." The Ch<strong>in</strong>ese denied thisallegation immediately. See ibid. pp. 229-235.93. Quan Yanchi and Du Weidong, Gongheguo mishi, pp. 249-251; and Hu Zhengq<strong>in</strong>g,Yige waijiaoguan de riji, pp. 161-66.
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