61 Rethinking local government: Essays on municipal reform - VATT

Enid Slack – Richard M. BirdProblems of accountability may arise when services are provided byanother jurisdiction. The voluntary model can work well when policymakersin the various <strong>local</strong> <strong>government</strong>s have the same objectives.It does not work so well, however, when different <strong>government</strong>shave divergent objectives. Some degree of redistribution may ormay not be accepted by the municipalities involved. Cooperationusually involves bargaining, and some municipalities in a regionmay not have much with which to bargain. The problems faced bymany metropolitan areas – global competition, fiscal disparities,sprawl – are so great that any real solution likely requires a governancestructure that has a permanent institutional status.The dominant governance model in the metropolitan areas ofZurich and Geneva, as in most of Switzerland, is voluntaryinter<strong>government</strong>al cooperation (including cooperation among thethree levels of <strong>government</strong> as well as among <strong>local</strong> <strong>government</strong>swithin the metropolitan area). In the case of Geneva, inter<strong>government</strong>alcooperation extends to <strong>local</strong> <strong>government</strong> in neighbouring France.Inter<strong>government</strong>al cooperation tends to be purpose-oriented, directedat services such as electricity, waste disposal, and energy supply.Political representation is indirect because decision-making bodiesfor these cooperative schemes are composed of delegates of themember communes (Kübler and Rochat 2012). Given the high degreeof institutional fragmentation, this approach to dealing with intermunicipalexternalities is seen in Switzerland as the most pragmaticway of addressing the metropolitan challenges (Kübler and Rochat2012).Brazil also provides some successful instances of inter-municipalcooperation. In 2005, the national <strong>government</strong> passed legislation topromote the creation of municipal consortia. The legislation grantslegal status to consortia which enables them to get loans and offerguarantees on their own. Municipal consortia are also entitled toexercise supervisory, regulatory, and planning roles. When thestate capital is included in an inter-municipal consortium, the state<strong>government</strong> may also (like the federal and cantonal <strong>government</strong>sin Switzerland) take part. In Belo Horizonte, state level incentives,97