- Page 1: Reformingthe United Nationsfor Peac
- Page 6 and 7: Rediscovering the Security Council:
- Page 8 and 9: Muchkund DubeyPresident, Council fo
- Page 11: AcknowledgementsI would like to ext
- Page 14 and 15: A More Secure World: Our Shared Res
- Page 16 and 17: the Council’s composition, voting
- Page 18 and 19: Those in the skeptical camp begin t
- Page 20 and 21: Enlargement by itself will not over
- Page 22 and 23: concerned. 4 It endorses the notion
- Page 24 and 25: total revamping of the non-prolifer
- Page 26 and 27: definition of what is allowed for a
- Page 28 and 29: Most discussants agreed on the impo
- Page 30 and 31: level—endorse some notions for bo
- Page 32 and 33: help the Community to meet its full
- Page 34 and 35: In practice, the United Nations has
- Page 36 and 37: effective role in helping to establ
- Page 38 and 39: Secretary-General Kofi Annan addres
- Page 40 and 41: • promotion of the rule of law, f
- Page 42 and 43: on the relative merits of several o
- Page 44 and 45: from anarchy (absence of the rule o
- Page 46 and 47: 3. Propose the ways and means by wh
- Page 48 and 49: 3. Lobby the Convening Group to tak
- Page 50 and 51: Democracy Coalition Project and Fre
- Page 52 and 53: In setting up the Panel, the Secret
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tending towards their reading of th
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that it remains “as important tod
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oad enough definition to satisfy de
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Thoughts on the Report of the High-
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sovereign nation states. At the sam
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the UN budget as well as military c
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Interrelatedness of security and ec
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States are concerned”, are most h
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The High-level Panel report broaden
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of the 1990s, but the process is st
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UN and specialized agenciesThe Pane
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there is the recommendation to crea
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of force in self defense only “if
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The Panel in general seems to be ag
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1. Bring to a speedy conclusion the
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objectives of the Paris Charter, in
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which the EU states endeavor to coo
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Security Council to “the specific
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EUROPE IN THE SYSTEM OF REGIONAL GR
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THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UN CHART
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the Draft Treaty (now Art. III-292
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which are members of the Security C
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without a respective amendment of t
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universally accepted—guiding idea
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That said, what follows will be cri
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But why should member states contin
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Third, I suspect that Annan’s sen
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To doubters who worry about the “
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voluntary contributions, or peaceke
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makes for less buy-in by important
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15. If so, this change may increase
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Political Affairs, and lots of agen
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If we had tried-and-true methods of
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more funding is requested for such
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UN can operate efficiently and effe
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In the late 1980s, the thawing of t
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instruments so that they can be bet
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of collective security and try to g
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e repeated. The preamble to the Cha
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REFORMING THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL A
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clear threat to international peace
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figure represents a third of all hu
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Rediscovering the Security Council:
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years. It argues that those calling
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member states, put much greater emp
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making leads automatically to activ
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the United Kingdom and France tend
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dismiss delegations with other idea
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At San Francisco, as today, the mos
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legitimacy would seem to bear furth
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Finally, the aspirants had hoped fo
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charges of its irrelevance into a s
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transparency, and accountability. 1
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Balkans to Africa to East Timor, ha
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Over the longer term, a more radica
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Providing a greater regional voice
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or the Middle East. The world’s p
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approximately 23 members, of whom u
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The coalition-of-minorities problem
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contrast, when the United States an
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that we don’t even know how rapid
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Voting power is the power to author
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coalition of minorities constitutin
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government decisions for implementa
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should respond to the threatened ov
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sensitivity for the Secretariat of
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Security Council members to termina
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and actually implemented, they woul
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headline problems of peace and secu
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3. Satisfaction of member states. P
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to function independently but in cl
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destruction and the belated recogni
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Some Comments on UN Charter ReformE
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The case against Charter reform is
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expires as practice evolves away fr
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methods—such as particular region
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If Model B were to be approved by t
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CONCLUSIONSThe fact that Charter re