Union certification: Developing a level playing field ... - LabourWatch

Table of contentsEXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71. UNIONIZATION IN CANADA AND OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92. COMPARISON OF CURRENT UNION CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST UNION CERTIFICATIONTHROUGH SECRET BALLOTS OR CARD CHECKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .174. ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF LABOUR REPRESENTATION:UNION VS. NON-UNION ALTERNATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235. THE RELATIVE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF QUEBEC,THE REST OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: GROWTH,JOB CREATION AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecIntroductionIn votes of various types, such as electionsand referendums, the secret ballot is seen as a wayof guaranteeing that voters are protected frompressure or intimidation and of ensuring that thevote represents their true opinion. However, thisis not the approach used in labour relations inQuebec and elsewhere: the outcome of a unioncertification or a strike vote may be determinedby a less rigorous process that involves canvassingworkers to get signatures or a show of hands infavour of a strike. This procedure may alterworkers’ true will and encourage labour relationsdisputes, putting economic growth and investmentat risk.The British government attacked this problemsuccessfully in the 1980s by pushingthrough several laws that included measures toimplement secret votes for union certificationsand strikes and to have ballots sent in the mail.In Quebec and across Canada, employersand employees face various challenges regardinglabour relations and its related laws. The maintopics of discussion in recent years have involvedanti-scab legislation, the Rand formula, unioncertification rules, and new forms of labourrepresentation.The anti-scab law was introduced as anamendment to Quebec’s Labour Code in 1977. In1993, the province of British Columbia adopted asimilar law. Anti-scab rules prevent establishmentsfrom replacing striking or locked-out workers. 1The arguments in favour of such legislation arethat it would decrease violence and shortenconflicts between employers and employees.However, studies could not prove these positiveeffects. Rather, the economic effects of anti-scablaws were found in some studies to involvereductions in employment and investment.In Canada, legislation allows the Randformula to apply to a collective agreement, whichmakes it compulsory for employees to pay tradeunion dues even if some employees do not wantto be part of the union. “In contrast, U.S. federallegislation states that nobody can be forced tojoin a union. Moreover, in U.S. states with “rightto work” laws, nobody is automatically requiredto pay union dues. These states give workers themore democratic choice of whether or not tosupport a union.” 2However, debate on reform of federal labourrelations law continues in the United States,especially with regard to union certification.Union-friendly bills (the Employee Free ChoiceAct and the Re-Empowerment of Skilled andProfessional Employees and Construction TradeworkersAct) have received the support of the newpresident.Discussion on union certification, the mainsubject of this research paper, focuses on findingthe best procedure for obtaining certification.According to an opinion poll commissioned bythe Conseil du patronat du Québec in October2006, 79% of Quebecers think the governmentshould change the law and require the secretballot as a way of getting union certification. 3Support for this change is even stronger amongunionized workers, at 83%.1. Guy Lemay and Norma Kozhaya, The perverse effects of anti-scabmeasures, Economic Note, Montreal Economic Institute, January2005, p. 1.2. Norma Kozhaya, The consequences of a strong union presence in Quebec,Economic Note, Montreal Economic Institute, September 2005, p. 2.3. Pascale Gauthier, Les grands dossiers en relations de travail, Conseil dupatronat du Québec, November 2007, p. 1.Montreal Economic Institute7

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecThe goal of this research paper is to examinereform options for the union certification processin Quebec. To this end, we will begin bypresenting an overview of the state of unionizationin Canadian provinces and in otherdeveloped countries (Section 1). We will thencompare the various union certification systemsin North America (Section 2) and the argumentsfor and against each of these systems (Section 3),focusing especially on the advantages anddisadvantages for interested parties. We will alsoanalyze non-union forms of employee representationas an alternative to unionism (Section 4).Finally, we will present a portrait of the relativeeconomic performance of Quebec (economicgrowth, job creation and private investment)compared to the rest of Canada and to the UnitedStates (Section 5), which is obviously influencedby Quebec’s particular position with regard tolabour relations.8 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebec1. Unionizationin Canada andother developedcountriesThe density of trade union membership hasbeen declining in most member countries of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) since 1980. 1 In the UnitedStates, 22.3% of employees were trade unionmembers in 1980, compared to 11.6% in 2007(ranging from 3.9% in North Carolina to 26.3%in New York State). A similar trend occurred inthe United Kingdom, where trade unionmembership reached 50.7% of employees in 1980and declined to 28% in 2007. Besides thesecountries, significant reductions in trade uniondensity also occurred elsewhere, notably inAustralia, Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand,Portugal, and Switzerland. Trade union densityremained about the same in Belgium, Finland,Norway, and Sweden. In Canada, trade uniondensity reached 34.0% in 1980, but declined to29.4% in 2007. Hence, as compared to the U.S.,the U.K. and many other OECD countries, tradeunion membership in Canada declined butremained relatively steady throughout the period.The situation in Canada 2According to Statistics Canada, 3 unions had4.23 million members on average in the first sixmonths of 2008. Meanwhile, 4.54 millionemployees on average were covered by collectiveagreements during the same period. Thisdifference, as illustrated by the distinctionbetween union membership and union coverage,can be explained by the fact that some employeeswho are not union members are coverednonetheless by collective agreements. On anannual basis, 31.5% of Canadian employees werecovered by collective agreements in 2007, downfrom 33.7 % in 1997.Union coverage rates are higher in the publicsector—particularly in educational services,utilities, public administration, and health careand social assistance—as well as in full-time jobsand among employees in larger workplaces.According to Statistics Canada, 4 unionmembership and coverage rates were respectively71.0% and 74.5% in the public sector and 16.3%and 17.9% in the private sector. These rates wererespectively 52.0% and 54.8% in workplaces withmore than 500 employees and 12.6% and 14.2%in those with less than 20 employees. These job,worker and workplace characteristics areassociated with higher earnings, which mayexplain in part the higher pay reported byunionized employees. Collective bargaining onbehalf of unionized employees may also partlyexplain their higher pay.1. OECD, Trade union density in OECD countries (1960-2007),http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/42/39891561.xls.2. This section is based, sometimes verbatim, on data from HumanResources and Social Development Canada, Union membership inCanada—2008, http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/labour_relations/info_analysis/ union_membership/index.shtml and on StatisticsCanada, Union coverage rates, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/71-222-x/2008001/sectionk/k-rates-taux-eng.htm.3. Statistics Canada, “Unionization,” Perspectives on Labour and Income,Vol. 9, No. 8 (August 2008), Catalogue No. 75-001-X.4. Id.Montreal Economic Institute9

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecIn 2008, union coverage rates were aboveaverage in Quebec, Newfoundland-and-Labrador, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, andlowest in Alberta. 5 Membership and coveragerates were respectively 35.5% and 39.2% inQuebec, 29.7% and 31.1% in the AtlanticProvinces, 26.7% and 28.2% in Ontario, 26.9%and 28.8% in the Prairies and 29.8% and 31.4%in British Columbia. Hence, Quebec is by far themost heavily unionized region in Canadawhether measured by membership rates or bycoverage rates.The results of a survey by Human Resourcesand Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) showthat national unions represent 67.1% ofmembership; whereas international unions(those headquartered outside Canada) represent27.7%. Independent local organizations anddirectly chartered unions represent respectively3.8% and 1.5% of total union membership.(dues must be shared), loss of local autonomyand greater distrust between employer andunion. The Canadian Labour Congress (CLC)has the largest membership affiliation at 70.7%.Meanwhile, the Confédération des syndicatsnationaux (CSN) accounts for 6.6% of totalmembership affiliation, the Centrale dessyndicats du Québec (CSQ) 2.3%, the Centraledes syndicats démocratiques (CSD) 1.5%, andthe Confederation of Canadian Unions 0.2%.Ten unions, representing 4.7% of the overallnumber of national and international unions,have memberships over 100,000, and account for51.4% of union membership. On the other hand,153 unions, representing 71.8% of national andinternational unions, have fewer than 10,000members and account for 8.1% of unionmembership.Most unions are affiliated to a labourfederation, which offers certain benefits in termsof financial assistance, professional staff,negotiating power and political representation,but there are also disadvantages such as cost5. Id.10 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebec(000s)18,00016,000Figure 1.1Union Membership, Non-Agricultural Paid Workers,and Civilian Labour Force (1998-2008)UnionMembershipCivilianLabour Force*Non-AgriculturalPaid Workers*12,00010,0006,0004,00001998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* Statistics Canada, The Labour Force Survey.Civilian labour force and non-agricultural paid employment data shown for each year are annual averages of the preceding year;data shown for union membership are as of January of the years shown and as reported by labour organizations.Source: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada – Strategic Policy, Analysis, and Workplace Information Directorate.Table 1.1Union Membership in Canada (1998-2008)Year Union Civilian Non- Union UnionMembership Labour Agricultural Membership MembershipForce* Paid Workers* as a Percentage as a Percentageof CivilianLabour Forceof Non-AgriculturalPaid Workers(000s) (000s) (000s) % %1998 3,938 15,079 11,964 26.1 32.91999 4,010 15,316 12,212 26.2 32.82000 4,058 15,588 12,603 26.0 32.22001 4,111 15,847 13,027 25.9 31.62002 4,174 16,110 13,304 25.9 31.42003 4,178 16,579 13,650 25.2 30.62004 4,261 16,959 13,965 25.1 30.52005 4,381 17,182 14,265 25.5 30.72006 4,441 17,343 14,464 25.6 30.72007 4,480 17,593 14,782 25.5 30.32008 4,592 17,945 15,111 25.6 30.4* Statistics Canada, The Labour Force Survey.Note: Civilian labour force and non-agricultural paid employment data shown for each year are annual averages of the preceding year;data shown for union membership are as of January of the years shown and as reported by labour organizations.Source: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada – Strategic Policy, Analysis, and Workplace Information Directorate.Montreal Economic Institute11

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecTable 1.2Unions with Largest MembershipName and AffiliationMembersCanadian Union of Public Employees (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .570,000National Union of Public and General Employees (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .340,000United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy,Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (AFL-CIO / CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .280,000National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation andGeneral Workers Union of Canada (CAW Canada) (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .255,000United Food and Commercial Workers Canada (CtW / CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .245,327Public Service Alliance Canada (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173,686Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .142,592Fédération de la santé et des services sociaux (CSN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122,193Teamsters Canada (CtW / CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108,516Service Employees International Union (CtW / CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92,781Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73,296FTQ Construction (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69,914Alberta Union of Provincial Employees (Ind.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69,000Laborers' International Union of North America (CtW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68,650Centrale des syndicats démocratiques (Syndicats à charte directe) (CSD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61,742Fédération des syndicats de l'enseignement (CSQ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60,000Fédération interprofessionnelle de la santé du Québec (Ind.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57,191International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL-CIO / CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57,130Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56,456Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55,260Ontario Nurses' Association (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54,000Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (Ind.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53,122United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (CtW / CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50,000United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing andPipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada (AFL-CIO/ CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48,325Fédération des employés de services publics inc. (CSN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48,000UNITE HERE Canada (CtW / CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46,000British Columbia Teachers' Federation (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44,748Christian Labour Association Canada (Ind.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43,239Syndicat de la fonction publique du Québec (Ind.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42,500International Union of Operating Engineers (AFL-CIO/ CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41,993International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (AFL-CIO/ CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40,567Alberta Teachers' Association (Ind.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37,031Fédération du commerce inc. (CSN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36,274Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Association (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36,000Canadian Office and Professional Employees Union (CLC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34,000Affiliations Legend:AFL-CIO: American Federation of Labor -Congress of Industrial OrganizationsCCU: Confederation of Canadian UnionsCLC: Canadian Labour CongressCSD: Centrale des syndicats démocratiquesCSN: Confédération des syndicats nationauxCSQ: Centrale des syndicats du QuébecCtW: Change to WinInd.: Independent Local OrganizationNUPGE: National Union of Public and General EmployeesSource: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada – Strategic Policy, Analysis, and Workplace Information Directorate.12 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecTable 1.3Union Membership by Congress Affiliation (2008)Congress Affiliation Membership %Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) 3,248,490 70.7CLC only 2,083,012 45.4AFL-CIO/CLC 622,794 13.6CtW / CLC 542,624 11.8Directly Chartered Unions 60 0.0Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN) 303,271 6.6CSN only 297,390 6.5Directly Chartered Unions 5,881 0.1Centrale des syndicats du Québec (CSQ) 107,084 2.3Centrale des syndicats démocratiques (CSD) 67,500 1.5CSD only 5,758 0.1Directly Chartered Unions 61,742 1.3Confederation of Canadian Unions (CCU) 7,439 0.2AFL-CIO only 36,040 0.8Change to Win (CtW) only 68,650 1.5Unaffiliated National Unions 579,240 12.6Unaffiliated International Unions 1,930 0.0Independent Local Organizations 172,603 3.8TOTAL 4,592,247 100.0Source: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada – Strategic Policy, Analysis, and Workplace Information Directorate.Table 1.4Union Membership by Type of Union and Affiliation (2008)Type of Union and Affiliation Unions Locals MembershipNumber %National Unions 174 10,795 3,079,923 67.1Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) 42 7,151 2,083,012 45.4Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN) 10 1,831 297,390 6.5Centrale des syndicats du Québec (CSQ) 13 311 107,084 2.3Confederation of Canadian Unions (CCU) 6 27 7,439 0.2Centrale des syndicats démocratiques (CSD) 1 63 5,758 0.1Unaffiliated Unions 102 1,412 579,240 12.6International Unions 39 3,896 1,272,038 27.7American Federation of Labor and Congress of IndustrialOrganizations (AFL-CIO) / Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) 27 3,434 622,794 13.6American Federation of Labor and Congress ofIndustrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) only 4 72 36,040 0.8Change to Win (CtW) / Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) 5 354 542,624 11.8Change to Win (CtW) only 1 29 68,650 1.5Unaffiliated Unions 2 7 1,930 0.0Independent Local Organizations 257 2 172,603 3.8Directly Chartered Unions 4 287 67,683 1.5Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) 2 0 60 0.0Centrale des syndicats démocratiques (CSD) 1 287 61,742 1.3Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN) 1 0 5,881 0.1TOTAL 474 14,978 4,592,247 100.0Note: Due to rounding, total percentage does not equal 100%.Source: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada – Strategic Policy, Analysis, and Workplace Information Directorate.Montreal Economic Institute13

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebec2. Comparisonof current unioncertification systemsIn Canada, each of the ten provinces hasdifferent rules regarding union certification,which means that labour relations laws are highlydecentralized (more than in the United States).However, some workers are employed in federallyregulated industries with distinct rules that arethe same regardless of the province in which thebusiness operates. Two systems exist in Canadafor obtaining union certification: the CardMajority Certification Regime (CMCR) and theMandatory Secret Ballot Vote CertificationRegime (MSBVCR). Under both systems, the firststage in applying for union certification is proofof support for the trade union in a bargainingunit.Under the Card Majority CertificationRegime, adopted by four of the ten provinces(Quebec, New Brunswick, Manitoba and PrinceEdward Island) and applying also underCanadian federal jurisdiction, union certificationwill succeed if a majority of employeesrepresented by the bargaining unit are signed up.This majority varies among the differentjurisdictions: New Brunswick and Manitobarequire a super majority of signed cards (60%+1and 65% respectively), while a simple majority(50%+1) is sufficient for automatic certificationin Quebec and Prince Edward Island. Even underthis system, should a group not obtain automaticcertification, labour law allows a vote whenanother threshold of signed cards (obviouslylower than for automatic certification) is met.Table 2.1Trade Union Application for Certification in CanadaCharacteristicsFederal jurisdiction - CMCR (50% +1), VT 35%British Columbia - MSBVCR, VT 45%Alberta - MSBVCR, VT 40%Saskatchewan* - MSBVCR, VT 45%Manitoba - CMCR (65%), VT 40%Ontario - MSBVCR, VT 40%Quebec - CMCR (50% +1), VT 35%New Brunswick - CMCR (60% +1), VT 40%Nova Scotia - MSBVCR, VT 40%Prince Edward Island- CMCR (50% +1), VT not specifiedNewfoundland-and-Labrador - MSBVCR, VT 40%* In May 2008, Saskatchewan made several changes to its labour relations laws. It introduced secret ballot voting for certification elections,and the thresholds is now 45%.Sources: Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Trade Union Application for Certification,http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/lp/spila/clli/irlc/07trade_union_application_for_certification.shtml; Roy Heenan, Card Majority Certification,presentation before The National Finance Industry Employment Law Committee (Philadelphia), June 2007.14 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecThe six other provinces (British Columbia,Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Nova Scotia, andNewfoundland-and-Labrador) use the MandatorySecret Ballot Vote Certification Regime. Under thissystem, employees supporting union representationwill sign membership cards. If the number ofemployees is sufficient (each province sets its ownminimum percentage), a secret ballot vote isconducted to determine if the union is to becertified. Table 2.1 summarizes the characteristicsof the process for obtaining union certification ineach of the ten provinces.Rules applicable inthe United StatesIn the United States, labour relations aremore centralized, with labour relations lawsenforced by the National Labour RelationsBoard. 1 “However, federal laws allow individualstates to clarify, expand upon, or introduce newlaws in addition to, but not contravening, federallaw. Like Canadian provinces, U.S. states have thesole authority to regulate labour relations in thepublic sector.” 2 Also, in the United States, rightto-worklaws, in force in 22 states, permit workersto choose whether or not to join a union andsupport it financially. 3 In Canada, as wementioned earlier, no legislation prevents theadoption of an obligation for workers to payunion dues, even if they do not necessarilysupport the union representing them (Randformula).As in Canada, unions in the United Stateswishing to obtain certification have todemonstrate that a majority of workers in abargaining unit want to be represented by aunion. Also, the bargaining unit should be anappropriate one, meaning that there are somecriteria that determine the appropriateness of abargaining unit such as its history, the parties’wishes, and similarities in skills, interests, dutiesand working conditions among employees. 4In the U.S., the National Labour Relations Actprovides the basic legal framework for labourrelations in the private sector. 5 To run a secretballot election, a petition must be filed andconducted by the National Labour RelationsBoard. At least 30% of employees must sign thepetition or authorization cards for a petition tobe attended. In states without right-to-work laws,employers may agree to voluntary recognition ofa union through a card check arrangement.Employers can also consent to a neutralityagreement under which they agree to remainneutral during a union organizing campaign. 6Provincial preponderance in labour legislationand the fact that some Canadian provincescurrently favour card majority certificationregimes partly explains Canada’s higher unionizationrate compared to the U.S.The unusual situationof QuebecQuebec is at odds with the other largeCanadian provinces, namely Ontario, BritishColumbia and Alberta, regarding certificationand decertification provisions as well as statutoryprovisions regarding strikes, ratifications andfinal offer votes. 71. Keith Godin, Milagros Palacios, Jason Clemens, Niels Veldhuis andAmela Karabegovic, An Empirical Comparison of Labour RelationsLaws in Canada and the United States, Fraser Institute, May 2006, p. 9.2. Id.3. Id., p. 17. These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska,Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina,South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming.4. Terry Thomason and Silvana Pozzebon, “Managerial Opposition toUnion Certification in Quebec and Ontario,” Relations industrielles /Industrial Relations, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Fall 1998), pp. 750-771, on page751.5. Roy Heenan, Card Majority Certification, presentation before TheNational Finance Industry Employment Law Committee(Philadelphia), June 2007, p. 4.6. Gerald Mayer, Labor Union Recognition Procedures: Use of SecretBallots and Card Checks, Congressional Research Service, April 2007,p. 12.7. See: Canadian LabourWatch Association, http://www.labourwatch.com.Montreal Economic Institute15

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecQuebec is alone among the four bigprovinces in not requiring a secret ballot forcertification. Moreover, the card membershipevidence threshold required for certificationthrough a secret ballot is lower in Quebec, at35%, compared to 40% in Ontario and Albertaand 45% in British Columbia. Finally, theduration for which a union card is valid for aunion certification drive is longer in Quebec(12 months, compared to 6 months in Ontarioand 90 days in B.C.; in Alberta, signatures for acertification petition are valid for 90 days, whileproof of current union membership in goodstanding applies indefinitely).These two characteristics of the certificationand voting statutes and regulations, namely thecertification regime and the eligibility to vote instrike and final offer proceedings, are symptomaticof Quebec’s favourable bias toward unionization.In the next section, we will review the mainarguments that support or oppose this favourablebias as formulated by various labour relationsanalysts, focusing on the certification system issue.As regards strike votes and final offer votesin the private sector, Quebec is the only one of thefour big provinces where only current unionmembers are eligible to vote. In the other bigprovinces, all members of a bargaining unit areeligible to vote.16 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebec3. Arguments forand against unioncertification throughsecret ballots orcard checksAs mentioned above, four provinces inCanada use the card majority certificationregime: Quebec, Manitoba, New Brunswick andPrince Edward Island. The federal jurisdictionalso uses the card majority certification regime.The rules for automatic certification vary amongtheses jurisdictions, though. The other provincesuse the mandatory secret ballot vote certificationregime when a union reaches a minimumthreshold of signed cards, which is generallylower than the percentage required for automaticcertification.Proponents of both systems use similarlanguage to support their positions. 1 Unionssupport the idea that card certification isnecessary to “avoid the campaign-style electionsprevalent in the United States and the influencethat the employer is perceived to have over itsemployees during such campaigns.” 2 They fearthat, under the mandatory secret ballot votecertification regime, employers can pressure orcoerce workers during the election campaign tovote against the union since they have privilegedaccess to workers.employer intimidation, “often ignores the veryreal existence of either peer intimidation orsubstantial peer pressure.” Furthermore, undercard check recognition, workers are exposed onlyto the union’s point of view. 3 This could lead toemployees being misled and pressured intosigning authorization cards without havingaccess to all relevant information. Also, it isimportant to note that there is no limit to thepressure that union organizers can exert on theircolleagues, in contrast to employers. Indeed, legalrules against “unfair labour practices” protectemployees from employers’ abuse. But there areno measures to limit the persistence of unionorganizers. “There is neither any restriction as tothe number of times that the union may visit noras to what can be told to the employee.” 4Another point of discord between theproponents of each system is whether a signedcard is sufficient proof of an employee’s desire tojoin a union. Given empirical evidence thatemployees often join rival unions, or join unionstwice, it may be that their choice does notnecessarily reflect their support for a union butmore their fears of being harassed or intimidatedby union organizers. In such cases, theuncertainty of employee support for a unionundermines the union’s capacity to negotiatewith the employer since its credibility is notproven: “to expect negotiations in good faith withthe employer to get under way, it is necessary thatthe employer be persuaded that the tradeunion does indeed represent and enjoy thesupport of a majority of its employees.” 5On the other hand, as pointed out by RoyHeenan, a well-known authority in labour law,card majority certification, which is said to avoid1. As mentioned in Gerald Mayer, Labor Union Recognition Procedures:Use of Secret Ballots and Card Checks, Congressional Research Service,April 2007, p. 18.2. Roy Heenan, Card Majority Certification, presentation before TheNational Finance Industry Employment Law Committee (Philadelphia),June 2007, pp. 1-2.3. Gerald Mayer, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 18.4. Danny Kaufer and Michael Grodinsky, The Employee Free Choice Act(EFCA): Lessons to Be Learned from the Canadian Experience,presentation before the American Employment Law Council, October2008, p. 19.5. Roy Heenan, op. cit., footnote 2, p. 6.Montreal Economic Institute17

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecOne of the proposed solutions is the prehearingvote, 6 which consists of calling animmediate vote within five days of an applicationfor certification being filed and before thehearing on the application. In this way, the unionmay choose when the application is filed, at atime it feels it has the most support. This leavestoo little time for any elaborate campaign by anemployer, but it does provide for a vote as anappropriate test of employees’ wishes. If unfairlabour practices occur despite the short period,the results of the vote can be discarded and thedecision on certification will be based on otherfactors, including cards signed. This would allowfor more privacy and confidentiality than cardmajority certification does while increasing theunion’s credibility when negotiating with theemployer.6. Id., pp. 7-8. The pre-hearing vote was suggested by Innis Christie,professor of labour law and at the time Chairman of the Nova ScotiaLabour Relations Board. The measure was introduced on anexperimental basis in Nova Scotia and later included as a mandatoryfeature.Table 3.1Main arguments for eachunion certification regimeCard Check RecognitionCard check recognition requires signatures frommore than 50% of bargaining unit employees.During a secret ballot campaign, the employerhas greater access to employees.Because of the potential employer pressure orintimidation during a secret ballot election, someworkers feel coerced into voting against a union.Employer objections can delay a secret ballotelection.Allegations against a union for unfair labourpractices can be addressed under existing law.Exiting remedies do not deter employer violationsof unfair labour practices.Card check recognition is less costly for both theunion and employer. If secret ballot electionswere required, the labour relations board wouldhave to devote more resources to conductingelections.Card check and neutrality agreements may lead tomore cooperative labour-management relations.Mandatory Secret Ballot ElectionsCasting a secret ballot is private and confidential. Asecret ballot election is conducted by the labourrelations board. Under card check recognition,authorization cards are controlled by the union.Under card check recognition, employees may only hearthe union’s point of view.Because of potential union pressure or intimidation,some workers may feel coerced into signingauthorization cards.Most secret ballot elections are held soon after apetition is filed.Allegations against an employer for unfair labourpractices can be addressed under existing law. Existingremedies do not deter union violations of unfair labourpractices.Union members must pay union dues. Unionization mayresult in fewer union jobs.An employer may be pressured by a corporate campaigninto accepting a card check or neutrality agreement. Ifan employer accepts a neutrality agreement, employeeswho do not want a union may hesitate to speak out.Source: Gerald Mayer, Labor Union Recognition Procedures: Use of Secret Ballots and Card Checks, Congressional Research Service, April 2007, p. 17.18 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecAs regards the cost of the two regimes,unions argue that card majority certificationcosts less than secret ballot certification, whileemployers argue that unionization is more costlyfor workers since, once a union is certified,workers will have to pay union dues. Employersalso claim that, once a union is certified, higherwages, which is usually a goal of unionization,may end up reducing the number of jobs. A reportfor the U.S. Congress 7 summarizes the commonarguments (see Table 3.1).Impact of certificationregime on unionization ratesAlthough little research has been realized sofar in associating different regimes of unioncertification with the rate of union certificationsuccess, the evidence suggests that the cardmajority certification regime may increase thelevel of union certification success while themandatory secret ballot vote certification regimemay decrease it. Moreover, the report to the U.S.Congress argues that: “To the extent thatmandatory secret ballot election or mandatorycard check recognition would affect the level ofunionization, the economic effects may dependon how well labour markets fit the model ofperfect competition. Mandatory card checkrecognition may improve worker benefits andreduce earnings inequality — if more workers areunionized. Mandatory secret ballot elections mayincrease inequality in compensation — if fewerworkers are unionized.” All the results andstatements by various authors are conditional innature, in the sense that they depend on theparticular data used and the particular periodconsidered.Another study 8 evaluates the impact ofvarious tactics used by Quebec and Ontariomanagers during union organizing drives. Itshypothesis is that employers’ actions (requiringemployees to attend anti-union speeches by theemployer, meeting between supervisors and smallgroups of bargaining unit employees, thedistribution of anti-union literature, threatsagainst union supporters, and promises of higherwage or benefits) reduce support for the unionand the probability of certification. The resultsshow that managerial opposition tactics duringcertification campaigns are substantially lower inQuebec and Ontario than in the United States.The practices used by Canadian employers areeffective, however, in reducing the number ofemployees supporting the union.Professor Riddell’s research, 9 using datafrom British Columbia, shows that rates ofcertification success in the private sector werelower in mandatory secret ballot years whencompared to card majority years. Moreover, hisresults show that certification attempts alsodecreased during mandatory secret ballot yearswhen compared to card majority years, asmandatory secret ballots complicate the processof obtaining certification. Thus, Riddell arguesthat the following are the two main reasons forthe decline in unionization:• Mandatory voting is believed to lengthencertification procedures;• Mandatory voting possibly increases theincidence of management opposition,therefore leading to more unionizationfailures.7. Gerald Mayer, op. cit., footnote 1.8. Terry Thomason and Silvana Pozzebon, “Managerial Opposition toUnion Certification in Quebec and Ontario,” Relations industrielles /Industrial Relations, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Fall 1998), pp. 750-771.9. Chris Riddell, “Union Suppression and Certification Success,”Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2 (May 2001), pp. 396-410.Montreal Economic Institute19

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecTo analyze and test the impact ofmanagement opposition in the success ofcertification, Riddell used multiple regressionanalysis and data comprising 422 certificationapplications in British Columbia. He investigatedthe impact of union suppression within amandatory voting system and the interactionbetween processing time and employer behaviour.Results show that, during the sample yearsof mandatory voting in B.C., employers weresuccessful in deterring success of organizingdrives. The success rate of unionization fell by20% during the mandatory voting years in B.C.,while the number of certification attemptsdecreased by over 50%. The impacts are similar tothose found in the U.S. literature and muchhigher than those in the limited Canadianliterature. 10For Riddell, it is clear that, if a governmentwants to reduce unionization, it may do so byestablishing mandatory voting requirements.However, recent trends are toward compulsorysecret ballot voting requirements. The studysuggests that, if a government seeks a moreneutral policy toward unionization, stricteremployer penalties for improper intimidationshould be considered. The author also thinks thatstrict time limits could form a useful policy toolto enforce neutrality in the organizing process,but mentions that further investigation into therelationship between representation voting andmanagement opposition is required to make anyfinal conclusion.In a second study, 11 Riddell estimates theimpact of mandatory vote laws on certificationsuccess using data on over 6,500 private sectorcertifications from British Columbia over theyears 1978–1998. A unique quasi-experimentaldesign is used, exploiting two changes in the10. Terry Thomason, “The effect of accelerated certification procedureson certification success in Ontario,” Industrial and Labor RelationsReview, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 207-226; Terry Thomasonand Silvana Pozzebon, op. cit., footnote 8.union recognition law: first, in 1984, theintroduction of mandatory elections; and second,in 1993, the repeal of elections and theirreplacement by the original card checkprocedure. The author also estimates theeffectiveness of management opposition tacticsacross union recognition regimes. Success ratesdeclined by an average of 19 percentage pointsduring the voting regime, and then increased byabout the same amount when card checks werere-instituted. The results indicate that themandatory election law can account for virtuallythe entire decline. In addition, the findingssuggest that management opposition was twice aseffective under elections as under card checks.Using cross-section time-series analysis ofnine Canadian jurisdictions over 19 years,Johnson aimed to identify the effect ofmandatory votes and card check on certificationsuccess. 12 Her results, which are significant atabove the 99% confidence level, indicate thatmandatory votes reduce certification successrates by approximately nine percentage pointsbelow what they would have been under cardcheck. 1311. Chris Riddell, “Union Certification Success Under Voting VersusCard-Check Procedures: Evidence From British Columbia, 1978—1998,” Industrial & Labor Relations Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (July 2004),pp. 493-517.12. Susan Johnson,“Card Check or Mandatory Representation Vote? Howthe Type of Union Recognition Procedure Affects Union CertificationSuccess,” Economic Journal, Vol. 112 (April 2002), pp. 344-361.13. Since the average success rate in the sample is 69%, this represents a13% drop in the certification success rate when the mandatory secretballot vote is in effect.20 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecImpact of the certificationsystem on a firm’s valueAs we have seen above, the type ofcertification regime greatly influences the level ofcertification attempts and successes. But thequestion remains as to whether the increase ordecrease of union density directly affectseconomic growth or even firm performance. It isundeniable that employers are generally opposedto unions on the grounds that they would affect afirm’s profitability. But the magnitude of theeffect of unions on company performance is stillunclear.There are a very limited number of studiesthat have tried to tackle this specific question.Three reasons seem to explain this: “First, largescale establishment or firm-level micro-datacontaining the relevant information on the extentof unionization are not readily available. Second,even when such data are available, omittedvariables and the endogeneity of unionization atthe firm level makes it difficult to separate causaleffects from other unobserved confoundingfactors. Third, it is difficult to find data that canalso be plausibly representative of the populationof unionized companies in the United States.” 14Nonetheless, the study conducted by Leeand Mas indicates that there is a clear relationbetween unionization and reduction in a firm’sequity value. To ensure a large sample size andtherefore robust results, the authors focused onpublicly traded firms for which stock marketinformation and other performance measureswere readily available. Their results suggest that,after a union election victory, a typical firm’smarket value is decreased by 10%, whichrepresents a decline of US$40,500 (in 1998dollars) per unionized worker.The authors obtained these results byassessing the impact of union elections on thestock market value of firms. They used the eventstudymethod to compare “the firm’s stockreturns to the returns the firm would haveexperienced in the absence of a union organizingevent.” 15 They then plotted the “average cumulativereturn of union victory firms against theaverage cumulative return of the size-matchedreference portfolios over the same time period.The figure reveals that both union victory firmsand the corresponding reference portfolios havealmost identical trends in returns prior to theunion victory. However, near the time of theelection there is a pronounced downward breakin the returns of union victory firms relative tothe benchmark, persisting for approximately ayear and a half. The average cumulative abnormalreturn implied by this divergence is approximately-10 percent.” 16They argue that this total loss in marketvalue is attributed to a combination of transfersto workers as well as lost profit due to the inefficienciescaused by unionization.Another way to consider the impact ofunion certification and union density on theoverall performance of the economy would be tostudy the question of flexibility. According to aFraser Institute report: “The key to a highperforming,efficient labour market characterizedby strong job creation, low unemployment, shortdurations of unemployment, and a highlyproductive workforce is flexibility. Labour marketflexibility refers to the ease with which workersand employers alike are able to adjust their effortsgiven changes in the marketplace. For employees,flexibility allows them to supply their labour asthey wish and shift their efforts to endeavoursthat provide the greatest return or benefit.Similarly, flexibility allows employers to adjust14. David Lee and Alexandre Mas, Long-run impacts of unions on firms:New evidence from financial markets, 1961-1999, National Bureau ofEconomic Research, Working Paper No. 14709, February 2009, p. 1.15. Id.,p.11.16. Id.,p.16.Montreal Economic Institute21

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebecthe mix of labour and capital to respond tomarket changes.” 17 The authors believe that, byadopting labour laws that favour either workersor employers, flexibility will be eroded, harmingeconomic performance. They therefore supportthe idea that labour laws should create anenvironment that is free for both employers andemployees. This, of course, supports the idea thatunionization should not be encouraged and thatcard certification regimes should be avoided.The reduction of a firm’s value, whether dueto a transfer to unionized workers or toinefficiencies caused by unionization, as well asthe decrease in flexibility likely to result from aunion certification regime biased in favour ofunions or of employers, can only have negativeconsequences on job creation and privateinvestment, and thus on productivity gains.17. Niels Veldhuis, Milagros Palacios and Keith Godin, MeasuringLabour Markets in Canada and the United States: 2008 Report, FraserInstitute, August 2008, p. 11.22 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebec4. AnalyticalReview of LabourRepresentation:Union versusNon-union AlternativesUnionization is not the only model thatallows workers to be represented in the context oflabour relations. According to Harcourt andLam, 1 union certification serves only a smallportion of workers. By dividing employees intoseven theoretical groups, the authors show thatonly two of these seven groups have theirinterests served by certification. Even for workerswho could be potentially served by unioncertification, the rigid system of certification willnot easily let them change their representative, forexample. In their view: “Certification is akin to apolitical election in which the electorate ispermitted to vote only once, as if people’spreferences are forever set in stone. […] Certificationmakes unionism a take-it-or-leave-itchoicefor the entire bargaining unit, with littleregard for the increasingly diverse workforce,their divergent interests, and their diversepreferences for different kinds of representation.”2 The authors therefore believe thatcertification systems have fundamental flaws;they not only neglect individual and minorityrights in favour of collective rights, they alsorarely fulfil the needs of the majority.In their paper, the authors propose a nonunionform of representation that actuallyemphasizes employee representation rather thanjust unionism. Under compulsory proportionalrepresentation, workers would have the freedomto vote for any representative, and this would notbe restricted to unions (in other words, it wouldinclude non-union representation). Proportionalrepresentation bases the share or proportion ofrepresentatives on the percentage of votersupport. This approach would allow for minorityvoter representation and reduce free riding.Non-union employee representation (NER)can be defined as “one or more employees whoact in an agency function for other employees indealings with management over issues of mutualconcern, including the terms and conditionsunder which people work. Selected workers’representatives meet with managers, usually incommittee-type structures in which communicationand exchange of thoughts is fostered.Representatives usually are internal to thecompany and serve leadership roles for limitedterms.” 3Kaufman and Taras note that, even thoughunions have been on the decline in the NorthAmerican private sector, this has not necessarilylead to a “representation gap”: alternative formsof employee representation are on the rise incorporate environments. Indeed, they believe thatnon-union forms of employee representationhave recently emerged as a contentious issue inboth academic and policy-making circles. Theyhave identified four trends that seem to explainthis phenomenon.1. Mark Harcourt and Helen Lam, “Union certification: A criticalanalysis and proposed alternative,” WorkingUSA: The Journal of Laborand Society, Vol. 10, No. 3 (August 2007), pp. 327-345.2. Id., p. 329.3. Daphne Taras and Bruce Kaufman, “Nonunion EmployeeRepresentation in North America: Diversity, Controversy andUncertain Future,” Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 37, No. 5 (August2006), pp. 513-542, on page 515.Montreal Economic Institute23

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebec“The first is the marked long-term decline inthe organized labor movement in the U.S. and, toa lesser degree, Canada and most otherindustrialized nations.” 4 By the late 1990s, policymakerswere concerned about the widening gapbetween the portion of employees who wished tobe represented in their workplace and those whoalready were. To confront this situation, twooptions were available to them: make unionrepresentation more accessible or encouragealternative non-union forms of representation.“A second trend […] is the popularization ofnew forms of management and work organization,variously referred to as participativemanagement, employee involvement, and ’highperformance’workplace.” 5 Because of heightenedcompetition, skill-intensive production systemsand greater employee expectations of involvement,the traditional “command-and-control”system has given way to more decentralizeddecision-making schemes and enhanced employeeparticipation. By creating channels throughwhich employees can have their voices heard,employers are able to insure productivity andemployee satisfaction in the workplace whiledecreasing the incentives to unionization.“A third, and uniquely American, development[…] is the ongoing political debate overreform of the NLRA” adopted in 1935. 6 Alsoknow as the Wagner Act, this piece of legislationimposed a ban on most forms of non-unionemployee representation. Even though Canadianlabour legislation resembles the U.S. NLRA, thequestion of non-union representation is treateddifferently in the two countries. In Canada, nonunionemployee representation is legal as long asit is not used to handicap or limit unionorganizing. The major difference between the twobodies of legislation is that Canada has adopted a4. Daphne Taras and Bruce Kaufman, “Nonunion EmployeeRepresentation: Introduction,” Journal of Labor Research, Vol. 20,No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 1-8, on page 1.5. Id.,p.2.6. Id.different definition of the concept of labourorganisation. “To avoid banning non-unionforms, Canadians lawmakers concentrated oncreating narrow and structural definitions oflabour organizations.” The result of thisdifference has led to a greater number of nonunionemployee representation schemes inCanada.“Finally, a fourth trend that has worked tovisibly raise interest in NER is the important rolethat such representation plays in the industrialrelations systems of other major industrialcountries outside of North America.” 7 Indeed,there are many European countries that haveadopted legislation strongly encouraging nonunionemployee representation. For example,work councils are very popular in Europe.Japanese companies have also innovated in thissector by adopting several different forms of nonunionemployee representation. More recently,Central and Eastern European countries thathave recently adopted market economies havealso brought additional diversity into industrialrelations systems.Non-union employee representation is a farmore diverse and complex institution than thestereotypical ”company union.” 8 The diversity ofnon-union forms of employee representation canbe partly explained by the fact that non-unionforms of employee representation have nocomplex body of statutory rules, agency regulationsor procedures for court rulings, in contrastto unions.To map out the diversity of non-unionemployee representation and understand itbetter, Taras and Kaufman start by arguing thatNER varies along six distinct dimensions: form,function, topics, representational modes, extentof power and degree of permanence. Secondly,they emphasize the fact that individual opinions7. Id., p.5.8. Daphne Taras et Bruce Kaufman, op. cit., note 3, p. 514.24Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebecon non-union employee representation dependon the perspective or the “frame of reference” thatis used to evaluate them. The authors identifyfour different perspectives that represent thedifferent dimensions or realities of non-unionemployee representation.The first perspective is an evolutionary one,in which non-union employee representationschemes are considered as a mere step in theevolution of employee-employer relations. Thisimplies that non-union employee representationis considered as “an unstable form of voice” thatwill be supplanted by genuine industrialdemocracy.The second and more positive perspective isto consider non-union forms of employeerepresentation as means to unify the interests ofboth employees and employers. Proponents ofthis method of regarding non-union employeerepresentation believe that, in contrast to unionsthat generally foster a confrontational relationshipbetween management and employees, nonunionemployee representation encouragescooperation and the pursuit of commoninterests. Non-union employee representationoffers a venue for promoting employee involvementand empowerment while providing aforum to build outcomes providing mutual gain.The third perspective is to consider nonunionemployee representation as a way to hinderand limit union introduction in the work place.Proponents of unions consider non-unionemployee representation as a way for employersto succeed in blocking certification attempts.Indeed, many cases were identified whereemployers suggested non-union employeerepresentation in reaction to union drives. Ofcourse, union avoidance is an important criterionwhen management considers adopting a nonunionform of employee representation in theirorganization, but empirical evidence seems tosuggest that it is not the only reason, since nonunionemployee representation has been implementedin organizations where the threat ofunion certification was low.The fourth way of considering non-unionemployee representation is to view it as acomplement to trade unionism and not asubstitute. This idea of complementarity hasbeen observed in Europe, where work councilshandle plant-level issues while trade unionstackle industry-wide matters.This last perspective can help us understandwhy non-union employee representation coversonly a small percentage of workers in Canada andthe U.S. Indeed, for non-union forms ofemployee representation and unions both toflourish, it is necessary for policy-makers toadopt a legislative framework that “promotes theoptimal mix of the two forms of voice”. 9 Andsince this type of legislation is unlikely to beadopted in either country in the short or evenmedium term, the future of non-union employeerepresentation in North America remainsuncertain.Also, even though non-union employeerepresentation would avoid some of the flaws ofunions, they are not perfect. Here are some of themain problems: “Most forms of non-unionrepresentation are ‘management dominated’. [...]NER generally lack independence frommanagement and real-decision making power:they consult rather than bargain.” 10 Also, suchprograms are often “merely management’sattempt to gain knowledge possessed by workersin order to increase productivity, reduce workrules, and in general, gain concessions fromunions without sharing decision making.” 11Furthermore, in a study regarding systems ofcollective employee representation in non-unionfirms in the U.K., the author states that, in many9. Id., p. 533.10. Mark Harcourt and Helen Lam, op. cit., note 1, p. 336.11. Id.Montreal Economic Institute25

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebeccases, “non-union representatives are less able,trained, expert, or more nervous than their unioncounterparts (and hence less likely to pressmanagement) and/or that management take lessseriously representatives who lack the potentialsanctions of trade unions.” 12Therefore, non-union employee representationcan become an efficient way of creatingdialogue between employees and employers.However, certain conditions need to be in place;for instance, management must be supportiveand genuine in its desire to include and considerworkers’ needs and complaints. Also, thesegroups must be backed up by a clear andinstitutionalized set of sanctions enforceablethrough industrial tribunals. Finally, newlegislation must be adopted to create a legalframework to support non-union employeerepresentation.Even though there are limits to theimmediate large-scale implementation of suchnon-union employee representation schemes,they should remain a very important area ofresearch in both academic and policy-makingcircles. Some studies are showing that non-unionrepresentation is a positive way of ensuring thatemployees have the freedom to choose whateverform of representation they desire in order toachieve a greater voice in the workplace.12. Michael Terry, “Systems of collective employee representation innon-union firms in the UK,” Industrial Relations Journal, Vol. 30,No. 1 (June 2003), pp. 16-30, on page 25.26 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebec5. The relativeeconomic performanceof Quebec, the rest ofCanada and the UnitedStates: growth, jobcreation and privateinvestmentQuebec’s distinct position with regard tolabour relations legislation makes it useful tocompare the province’s economic performancewith that of its direct North Americancompetitors over the last 26 years. 1 Although thisexercise cannot establish a direct causality, giventhe many factors involved, it does help us picturethe ground Quebec could gain by adopting moreflexible labour laws that would favour strongerjob creation and increased productivity inparticular.GDP growth rateFrom 1981 to 2007, the average annualgrowth rate of Quebec’s gross domestic product(GDP) 2 was 2.2%, compared to 2.9% in the restof Canada. This amounts to a 77.0% overallincrease in Quebec’s real GDP and a 112.4%increase in the rest of Canada. Quebec’s real GDPrepresented 23.2% of Canada’s GDP in the early1980s but only 20.2% in 2007.More recently, from 2002 to 2007, theaverage annual variation in real GDP was 1.8% inQuebec, compared to 2.8% in the rest of Canada.Quebec’s real GDP thus rose by 9.4% over thisperiod, whereas real GDP in the rest of Canadawent up by 14.8%. At this pace, Quebec’s GDPwould climb 56.6% in the 25 years from 2007 to2032, while the GDP rise in the rest of Canadawould be 99.3%. Quebec’s economic weightwould then account for only 16.6% of theCanadian total.1. This section draws upon Marcel Boyer, “La performance économiquedu Québec: constats et défis (IV)”, CIRANO, November 2008,http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2008s-29.pdf.2. GDP is a commonly accepted aggregate measure of a country’s or aregion’s economic activity. It measures the value of all goods andservices produced.Figure 5.1Comparison of GDP growth:Quebec, rest of Canada, United States (1981-2007)240220QuebecRest of CanadaUnited States200Index (1981=100)180160140120100801981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007Sources: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 384-0002 (expenditure-based GDP); Bureau of Economic Analysis, May 2007.Montreal Economic Institute27

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecPer capita GDP growthPer capita GDP growth has been following avery different trend. While real GDP has beengrowing more slowly in Quebec than in the restof Canada, the same is true of population. Thismeans that real per capita GDP in Quebec hasbeen following almost the same trend as in therest of Canada: an increase of 50.5% in Quebeccompared to 53.5% in the rest of Canada from1981 to 2007. Since 2000, real per capita GDP hasgone up by 8.8% in Quebec and 10.9% in the restof Canada.Quebec’s real per capita GDP was $22,786 in1981 (in constant 2002 dollars), or 84.5% that inthe rest of Canada. This percentage fell slightly to82.9% in 2007. The fact that Quebec has notmanaged to get its real per capita GDP toconverge toward that in the rest of Canadasuggests that the gap in real terms is growing.Thus, the difference between real per capita GDPin Quebec and that in the rest of Canada went up,in constant 2002 dollars, from $4,178 in 1981 to$5,802 in 2000 and $7,092 in 2007, a 69.8%increase in the 1981-2007 period as a whole.Population growthThe size of the Quebec population aged15 and under has been falling for many years,going from 1.41 million in 1981 (21.5% of totalpopulation) to 1.23 million in 2007 (16.0% oftotal population), a 12.6% decline. Data for therest of Canada show an increase of 6.3% in thiscategory.Quebec’s working-age population, 15 to 64years old, grew by 17.5% from 1981 to 2007,compared to 42.4% in the rest of Canada. Withinthis age group, Quebec saw a 5.0% decline in thenumber of 15- to 44-year-olds and a 76.9% risein 45- to 64-year-olds from 1981 to 2007. Thecorresponding figures for the rest of Canada wererises in both categories, 21.6% and 96.2%respectively. GDP data thus hide a complex andtroubling reality: in relative terms, Quebec islosing population. If this trend were to continue,it would have serious negative consequences forQuebec’s relative economic growth.Figure 5.2Growth in GDP per capita:Quebec, rest of Canada (1981-2007)$45,000Rest of CanadaQuebec40,00035,00030,00025,00020,0001981 1986 1991 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007Sources: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 384-0002 (expenditure-based GDP); CANSIM Table 051-0001.28 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecIdeally, we would want to compare growthin GDP and in GDP per capita in a way that takescost of living changes into account. Thiscomparison can be made only for certain baseyears for which adequate, reliable data are athand. These data include calculations of GDP percapita, expressed in purchasing power parity(PPP), conducted by the OECD 3 for various largecities around the world. We can see that GDP percapita, expressed in U.S. dollars, was $29,100 inMontreal in 2004 compared to $34,900 inToronto (+20%), $32,000 in Vancouver (+10%),$45,600 in Chicago (+57%), $52,800 in NewYork (+81%), and $58,000 in Boston (+99%).Thus, although Montreal has a lower cost ofliving, the difference in the real value of goodsand services production (adjusted for cost ofliving) between Montreal and competing cities isconsiderable.Job creationIn terms of job creation, it can be observedthat the total number of jobs rose in Quebec by1.1 million from 1981 to 2007, up by 38.1%.Again, this increase may appear favourable;however, in the course of this same period, 4.5million jobs were created in the rest of Canada, arise of 53.0%, while the United States created 45.6million jobs, a 45.5% increase. In other words, theQuebec economy has systematically beencreating fewer jobs than the rest of Canada for atleast 25 years, despite an improvement since1999.3. OECD, OECD Territorial Reviews: Competitive Cities in the GlobalEconomy, 2006.Figure 5.3Population growth:Quebec, rest of Canada, United States (1981-2007)%10080Quebec Rest of Canada United States6040200-20Under age 15 Age 15 to 64 Age 65 and overSource: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 051-0001; United Nations Population Division, http://esa.un.org/unpp.Note: For the United States, the period is from 1980 to 2005.Montreal Economic Institute29

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecQuebec’s disappointing job creationperformance is not unrelated to its lowdemographic growth. Again, job creation andeconomic growth are interdependent. Lower jobgrowth implies lower population growth to theextent that people are sufficiently mobile to reactquickly to differences in the availability andquality of jobs offered elsewhere.Figure 5.4Average employment rate:Quebec, rest of Canada,United States (1981-2007)%64Employment and unemployment ratesEmployment rates, as measured by thepercentage of the population aged 15 and overand holding a job, is a credible and revealingindicator of a society’s economic health. Duringthe period from 1981 to 2006, this employmentrate averaged 56.7% in Quebec, 61.4% in the restof Canada and 62.0% in the United States.6260585654521981-2007 2000-2007PeriodsQuebec Rest of Canada United StatesSource: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 282-0055; U.S.Department of Labor, Census Bureau.Figure 5.5Job creation: Quebec, rest of Canada,United States (1976-2007)8070Quebec Rest of Canada United States6050Growth (%)4030201001976-2007 1981-1990 1990-2007 1999-2007 1981-2007PeriodsSource: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 282-0004; U.S. Department of Labor, Census Bureau.30 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecThese results suggest that Quebec’s unemploymentrate (7.2% in 2007) comparesunfavourably with the rates in the rest of Canada(6.0%) and the United States (4.6%): the “real”disparities between unemployment rates (or, moreprecisely, non-employment rates) are actuallygreater. Weak job creation can lead some individualsto stop looking for work, to go intoretirement or simply to leave the workforce, inwhich case they are no longer unemployed eventhough they are not working. This phenomenonresults in Quebec’s true unemployment rate in2007 compared to the rest of Canada probablybeing closer to 11% than to the official rate of 7.2%.Employment insurance recipient rateAs regards the number of employmentinsurance recipients, Quebec’s less than enviablesituation within Canada has not changed for thebetter in the last quarter-century. Year in and yearout, about one-third of Canada’s employmentinsurance recipients come from Quebec,resulting in a substantially higher rate ofrecipients than in the rest of Canada: 28.5recipients per 1,000 inhabitants (age 20 to 64) inQuebec and 17.0 in the rest of Canada in 2007.Private investment spendingData on private investment spending enableus to observe various significant elements inQuebec’s relative economic performance comparedto the rest of Canada. The share of privateinvestment spending in real GDP was lower inQuebec than in the rest of Canada for the entire1981-2007 period. Although public investment asa percentage of GDP has been higher in Quebecthan in the rest of Canada since 1992, totalinvestment spending in real GDP remained lowerin Quebec for the entire 1981-2007 period.Figure 5.6Employment insurance recipient rate:Quebec, rest of Canada (1981-2007)Number of recipients per 1,000 inhabitants (age 20 to 64)80Rest of Canada Quebec7060504030201001981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 276-0002.Montreal Economic Institute31

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecFigure 5.7Private investment as a percentage of real GDP:Quebec, rest of Canada (1981-2007)%2520Rest of CanadaQuebec1510501981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 384-0002.Conclusions on Quebec’seconomic performanceThe indicators outlined above are the mainmarkers of a society’s economic health. Theyshow that, in relations to its main partners,Quebec has been losing ground continuously.This situation is not improving. On thecontrary, it tends to deteriorate, as shown byfactors such as the creation of full-time jobs,which has been relatively anemic over the last25 years and more so since the early 1990s, as wellas by the employment rate, which is relativelylow, and by the unemployment rate, which is notonly relatively high but also underestimated.The scope of Quebec’s economic lag can beshown concretely as follows: (i) in the 1981-2007period, only 16.9% of Canada’s new full-timejobs were created in Quebec; (ii) if, during the1981-2007 period, Quebec had created jobs at thesame pace as the rest of Canada and the UnitedStates, it would have created 224,190 jobs morethan the 1,062,000 jobs actually created; (iii) forQuebec’s employment rate (59.7% for 2000-2007) to reach that in the rest of Canada and theUnited States (63.0%), 219,745 more jobs wouldbe needed in 2007, or 5.7% more than the3,852,000 jobs available; (iv) the shortfall inprivate investment in Quebec came to $7.7 billionin 2007 on investments of $48.1 billion (in 2002dollars) and to $73.2 billion for the last 10 yearson investments of $387.6 billion (in 2002 dollars).Why does this situation exist, and how can itbe remedied? How can the current trend bereversed? How can these gaps be filled, pushingQuebec from the rear of the pack toward, andinto, the front of the pack of North Americanregional economies?First and foremost, it must be reaffirmedthat there is no reason to believe people inQuebec are different from other Canadians orfrom Americans in their desire to enhance theirliving standards and those of their children, andnor do they differ in their ability to achieve this.It is high time to reverse Quebec’s tendency towardmarginalization. To have any hope of filling the32 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebecgap in economic efficiency afflicting Quebec andto do so in the next 25 years, there will be a needfor imagination, insight and courage to bringabout the required changes in economicenvironment and policies. We are in a certain waycondemned to be more efficient and moreinnovative than our main competitors.Quebec’s economic difficulties appear toresult essentially from four main causes: a generallack of incentives for adaptation, productivityand innovation; the growing ineffectiveness ofpublic mechanisms for coordination andallocation of resources; opaque and perniciousmanipulation of prices, too often viewed as afavoured support mechanism for organizedinterest groups; and the absence of a balance,comparable to that found among our maineconomic competitors, in labour relationsbetween unions and employers, not only in thepublic sector but also in the private sector, as wehave seen above.This last factor is probably what bestexplains Quebec’s difficulties in terms of privateinvestment and job creation, especially in termsof full-time jobs.It is quite apparent that our private andpublic Quebec companies will not manage tocreate jobs here at the necessary pace becausethey do not find it profitable to do so. Among thefactors explaining this state of affairs, it isimportant not to underestimate the obstacles totechnological and organizational innovation andflexibility too often created, first, by the presenceof too high a level of unionization compared toour main competitors, and also by the difficultyin challenging established supplier networks forgoods and services, especially in the publicsector. 44. On this subject, see Marcel Boyer, Manifesto for a Competitive SocialDemocracy, 2009, www.cirano.qc.ca/~boyerm/20090414_BOYER_Manifesto_en.pdf.Montreal Economic Institute33

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecConclusionThere is no reason to believe that people inQuebec are any different from people elsewherein their ability or willingness to create wealth. Thereasons for our disappointing economicperformance thus have to be sought elsewhere,starting with the institutional constraints that wechoose and impose on ourselves, reducing theprofitability of investments as well as theincentives and flexibility that can lead citizensand businesses alike to adapt to changes in oursocio-economic environment. These investmentsfavour productivity gains and the creation ofquality jobs. Foremost among these institutionalconstraints should be mentioned the relative prounionbias in certification and in votingprocedures on strikes and employers’ offers.In this regard, it is important to enable ourcompanies to compete on a level playing fieldwith our main commercial competitors byimproving our legal framework in labourrelations. It is imperative to establish secret-ballotvoting by all members of a bargaining unit incertification procedures and to recognize votingrights for all members covered by a collectiveagreement in balloting for strikes or employers’offers. In a similar vein, our laws and regulationsshould recognize fully the various non-unionforms of employee representation in a companyor certification unit.The stakes are significant. Chronic deficits inprivate investment are both witness andprecursor to steady degradation in capacity forproduction and innovation and thus in Quebec’scompetitive position. Investing in Quebec looksless profitable in relative terms, and this relativelylow level affects the Quebec economy’s futureproductivity. The situation is all the moreworrying in that the Quebec economy is veryopen to the outside: exports account on averagefor nearly 60% of its production, with one-thirdof this going to the rest of Canada and two-thirdsto international markets. Three employees out offive thus rely directly or indirectly on ourcompetitiveness compared to the rest of thecountry and to our international partners and,accordingly, in our ability to raise productivity,which itself depends heavily on the scope ofprivate investment.We are talking here about relative and notabsolute degradation: Quebec’s compound economicgrowth of nearly 2.2% a year on averagesince the early 1980s has enabled the province toachieve appreciable gains in living standards. Butcompetition from regional societies (cities,provinces and U.S. states) that generate privateand collective wealth more effectively willgradually lead to the relative degradation ofQuebec’s services and institutions.People in the labour movement areobviously aware of these changes in the socioeconomicenvironment of individuals andcompanies. They are seeking a new path and newmeans both to survive and to pursue their mainstated goal, namely the defence of justice and thedignity of labour. 1 By the admission of their ownanalysts, unionists have to deal with some seriouschallenges, in particular those of aligningdemands for solidarity and democracy internally,confronting erosion in the representative capacityof union organizations and doubts raised in thisregard, meeting growing demands for flexibilityin the workplace, and recognizing that thereconfiguration of production systems worldwide,with establishment of new logistics andmarket liberalization, has led to greater capitalmobility. 2 Other challenges include acknowledgingthe growing permeability of public-1. See Larry Haiven, Stéphane Le Queux, Christian Lévesque and GregorMurray, “Union Renewal Amid The Global Restructuring Of WorkRelationships”, Just Labour, Vol. 6 & 7 (Fall 2005), pp. 23-36.2. Id.,p.38.34 Montreal Economic Institute

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in Quebecprivate boundaries and the increased challengesto former government monopolies due both tonew technologies, that weaken or destroy the verybases of these monopolies, and to their partial ortotal privatization.Although people in the labour movementmay tend to see a worldwide plot behind thesechallenges orchestrated by governments andemployers’ groups, the fact remains that greatercompetitive pressures resulting from globalizationof markets, new technologies (in information,communications and production) and theinternationalization of cultures have been a majorsource of effectiveness, efficiency, gains in wellbeingand declines in poverty in every country andregion that has adhered to these developments byfavouring a better balance between flexibility,adaptation and security, accountability, and goodgovernance in private and public institutions.This will have to be the same for Quebec ifit truly wishes to reverse its current trend towardmarginalization. A first step would includeoverhauling its legal framework in labourrelations, first by establishing mandatory votingby secret ballot, open to all members of the unitconcerned, for union certification and votes onstrikes or employers’ offers, followed by theestablishment of greater worker democracythrough recognition of other forms of representation.Such an overhaul is likely to enable Quebeccompanies to compete on a level playing fieldwith firms in competing jurisdictions inattracting investment and favouring job creation.Montreal Economic Institute35

Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecReferencesLabourWatch Association of Canada,http://www.labourwatch.com.Marcel Boyer, La performance économique du Québec :constats et défis (IV), CIRANO, 2008,http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2008s-29.pdf.Marcel Boyer, Manifeste pour une social-démocratieconcurrentielle, 2009, http://www.cirano.qc.ca/~boyerm/20090414_BOYER_Manifeste_fr.pdf.Pascale Gauthier, Les grands dossiers en relations detravail, Conseil du patronat du Québec, November 2007.Keith Godin, Milagros Palacios, Jason Clemens,Niels Veldhuis and Amela Karabegoviç, An EmpiricalComparison of Labour Relations Laws in Canada andthe United States, Fraser Institute, May 2006.Larry Haiven, Stéphane Le Queux, Christian Lévesqueand Gregor Murray, “Le renouveau syndical et larestructuration du travail,” Just Labour, Vol. 6 & 7(Fall 2005), pp. 37-42.Mark Harcourt and Helen Lam, “Union certification:A critical analysis and proposed alternative,”WorkingUSA: The Journal of Labor and Society,Vol. 10, No. 3 (August 2007), pp. 327-345.Roy Heenan, Card Majority Certification, presentationbefore the National Finance Industry EmploymentLaw Committee (Philadelphia), June 2007.Susan Johnson, “Card Check or MandatoryRepresentation Vote? How the Type of UnionRecognition Procedure Affects Union CertificationSuccess,” Economic Journal, Vol. 112 (April 2002),pp. 344-361.Danny Kaufer and Michael Grodinsky, The EmployeeFree Choice Act (EFCA): Lessons to Be Learned from theCanadian Experience, presentation before the AmericanEmployment Law Council, October 2008.Norma Kozhaya, The consequences of a strong unionpresence in Quebec, Economic Note, Montreal EconomicInstitute, September 2005.David Lee and Alexandre Mas, Long-run impacts ofunions on firms: New evidence from financial markets,1961-1999, National Bureau of Economic Research,Working Paper No. 14709, February 2009.Guy Lemay and Norma Kozhaya, The perverse effects ofanti-scab measures, Economic Note, Montreal EconomicInstitute, January 2005.Gerald Mayer, Labor Union Recognition Procedures: Use ofSecret Ballots and Card Checks, Congressional ResearchService, April 2007.OECD, Trade union density in OECD countries (1960-2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/42/39891561.xls.OECD, OECD Territorial Reviews: Competitive Cities inthe Global Economy, 2006.Human Resources and Skills Development Canada,Trade union application for certification,http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/lp/spila/clli/irlc/07trade_union_application_for_certification.shtml.Human Resources and Skills Development Canada,Union membership in Canada – 2008,http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/labour_relations/info_analysis/union_membership/index.shtml.Chris Riddell, “Union Suppression and CertificationSuccess,” Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2(May 2001), pp. 396-410.Chris Riddell, “Union Certification Success UnderVoting Versus Card-Check Procedures: Evidence FromBritish Columbia, 1978—1998,” Industrial & LaborRelations Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (July 2004),pp. 493-517.Statistics Canada, Union coverage rates,http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/71-222-x/2008001/sectionk/k-rates-taux-eng.htm.Statistics Canada, “Unionization,” Perspectives onLabour and Income, Vol. 9, No. 8 (August 2008),Catalogue No. 75-001-X.Daphne Taras, “Evolution of Nonunion EmployeeRepresentation in Canada,” Journal of Labor Research,Vol. XX, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 31-51.Daphne Taras and Bruce Kaufman, “NonunionEmployee Representation: Introduction,” Journal ofLabor Research, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 1-8.Daphne Taras and Bruce Kaufman,“Nonunion EmployeeRepresentation in North America: Diversity, Controversyand Uncertain Future,” Industrial Relations Journal,Vol. 37, No. 5 (August 2006), pp. 513-542.Michael Terry, “Systems of collective employeerepresentation in non-union firms in the UK”, IndustrialRelations Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1 (June 2003), pp. 16-30.Terry Thomason, “The effect of accelerated certificationprocedures on certification success in Ontario,” Industrialand Labor Relations Review, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1994),pp. 207-226.Terry Thomason and Silvana Pozzebon, “ManagerialOpposition to Union Certification in Quebec andOntario,” Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations,Vol. 53, No. 4 (Fall 1998), pp. 750-771.Niels Veldhuis, Milagros Palacios and Keith Godin,Measuring Labour Markets in Canada and the UnitedStates: 2008 Report, Fraser Institute, August 2008.36 Montreal Economic Institute

About the authorarcel Boyer, senior economist at the Montreal EconomicMInstitute (MEI), is one of Canada’s best known economists.He holds a Ph.D. in economics from Carnegie MellonUniversity and is professor emeritus of economics at the Universityof Montreal. He is also a fellow at the Center for InteruniversityResearch and Analysis on Organizations (CIRANO) and at the C.D.Howe Institute and sits on the board of the Quebec agency forpublic-private partnerships. In 1985, he received the triennalMarcel-Dagenais Prize for Scientific Excellence awarded by theSociété canadienne de science économique and in 2002 the Marcel-Vincent Prize awarded by the Association francophone pour lesavoir (ACFAS) for the exceptional quality of his work in socialscience. He was elected to the Royal Society of Canada (TheAcademies of Arts, Humanities and Sciences of Canada) and hasserved as president of the Canadian Economics Association and ofthe Société canadienne de science économique.

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