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Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecOne of the proposed solutions is the prehearingvote, 6 which consists of calling animmediate vote within five days of an applicationfor certification being filed and before thehearing on the application. In this way, the unionmay choose when the application is filed, at atime it feels it has the most support. This leavestoo little time for any elaborate campaign by anemployer, but it does provide for a vote as anappropriate test of employees’ wishes. If unfairlabour practices occur despite the short period,the results of the vote can be discarded and thedecision on certification will be based on otherfactors, including cards signed. This would allowfor more privacy and confidentiality than cardmajority certification does while increasing theunion’s credibility when negotiating with theemployer.6. Id., pp. 7-8. The pre-hearing vote was suggested by Innis Christie,professor of labour law and at the time Chairman of the Nova ScotiaLabour Relations Board. The measure was introduced on anexperimental basis in Nova Scotia and later included as a mandatoryfeature.Table 3.1Main arguments for eachunion certification regimeCard Check RecognitionCard check recognition requires signatures frommore than 50% of bargaining unit employees.During a secret ballot campaign, the employerhas greater access to employees.Because of the potential employer pressure orintimidation during a secret ballot election, someworkers feel coerced into voting against a union.Employer objections can delay a secret ballotelection.Allegations against a union for unfair labourpractices can be addressed under existing law.Exiting remedies do not deter employer violationsof unfair labour practices.Card check recognition is less costly for both theunion and employer. If secret ballot electionswere required, the labour relations board wouldhave to devote more resources to conductingelections.Card check and neutrality agreements may lead tomore cooperative labour-management relations.Mandatory Secret Ballot ElectionsCasting a secret ballot is private and confidential. Asecret ballot election is conducted by the labourrelations board. Under card check recognition,authorization cards are controlled by the union.Under card check recognition, employees may only hearthe union’s point of view.Because of potential union pressure or intimidation,some workers may feel coerced into signingauthorization cards.Most secret ballot elections are held soon after apetition is filed.Allegations against an employer for unfair labourpractices can be addressed under existing law. Existingremedies do not deter union violations of unfair labourpractices.Union members must pay union dues. Unionization mayresult in fewer union jobs.An employer may be pressured by a corporate campaigninto accepting a card check or neutrality agreement. Ifan employer accepts a neutrality agreement, employeeswho do not want a union may hesitate to speak out.Source: Gerald Mayer, Labor Union Recognition Procedures: Use of Secret Ballots and Card Checks, Congressional Research Service, April 2007, p. 17.18 Montreal Economic Institute
Union certification: Developing a level playing field for labour relations in QuebecAs regards the cost of the two regimes,unions argue that card majority certificationcosts less than secret ballot certification, whileemployers argue that unionization is more costlyfor workers since, once a union is certified,workers will have to pay union dues. Employersalso claim that, once a union is certified, higherwages, which is usually a goal of unionization,may end up reducing the number of jobs. A reportfor the U.S. Congress 7 summarizes the commonarguments (see Table 3.1).Impact of certificationregime on unionization ratesAlthough little research has been realized sofar in associating different regimes of unioncertification with the rate of union certificationsuccess, the evidence suggests that the cardmajority certification regime may increase thelevel of union certification success while themandatory secret ballot vote certification regimemay decrease it. Moreover, the report to the U.S.Congress argues that: “To the extent thatmandatory secret ballot election or mandatorycard check recognition would affect the level ofunionization, the economic effects may dependon how well labour markets fit the model ofperfect competition. Mandatory card checkrecognition may improve worker benefits andreduce earnings inequality — if more workers areunionized. Mandatory secret ballot elections mayincrease inequality in compensation — if fewerworkers are unionized.” All the results andstatements by various authors are conditional innature, in the sense that they depend on theparticular data used and the particular periodconsidered.Another study 8 evaluates the impact ofvarious tactics used by Quebec and Ontariomanagers during union organizing drives. Itshypothesis is that employers’ actions (requiringemployees to attend anti-union speeches by theemployer, meeting between supervisors and smallgroups of bargaining unit employees, thedistribution of anti-union literature, threatsagainst union supporters, and promises of higherwage or benefits) reduce support for the unionand the probability of certification. The resultsshow that managerial opposition tactics duringcertification campaigns are substantially lower inQuebec and Ontario than in the United States.The practices used by Canadian employers areeffective, however, in reducing the number ofemployees supporting the union.Professor Riddell’s research, 9 using datafrom British Columbia, shows that rates ofcertification success in the private sector werelower in mandatory secret ballot years whencompared to card majority years. Moreover, hisresults show that certification attempts alsodecreased during mandatory secret ballot yearswhen compared to card majority years, asmandatory secret ballots complicate the processof obtaining certification. Thus, Riddell arguesthat the following are the two main reasons forthe decline in unionization:• Mandatory voting is believed to lengthencertification procedures;• Mandatory voting possibly increases theincidence of management opposition,therefore leading to more unionizationfailures.7. Gerald Mayer, op. cit., footnote 1.8. Terry Thomason and Silvana Pozzebon, “Managerial Opposition toUnion Certification in Quebec and Ontario,” Relations industrielles /Industrial Relations, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Fall 1998), pp. 750-771.9. Chris Riddell, “Union Suppression and Certification Success,”Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, No. 2 (May 2001), pp. 396-410.Montreal Economic Institute19
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