Download Report - Independent Evaluation Group - World Bank

WORLD BANK OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENTBridgingTroubled WatersAssessing the World BankWater Resources StrategyGeorge Keith Pitmanhttp://www.worldbank.org/oed2002THE WORLD BANKWashington, D.C.

© 2002 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank1818 H Street, NWWashington, DC 20433All rights reserved.Manufactured in the United States of AmericaFirst Printing May 20021 2 3 4 03 02 01The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect theviews of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.The World Bank cannot guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations,and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply on the part of the World Bank any judgmentof the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.Rights and PermissionsThe material in this work is copyrighted. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or inclusion in any information storage and retrievalsystem, without the prior written permission of the World Bank. The World Bank encourages dissemination of its workand will normally grant permission promptly.For permission to photocopy or reprint, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright ClearanceCenter, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470, www.copyright.com.All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher,World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, fax 202-522-2422, e-mail pubrights@worldbank.org.Cover photo: Courtesy of Ray Witlin.ISBN 0-8213-5140-0Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for.Printed on Recycled Paper

OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENTENHANCING DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH EXCELLENCE AND INDEPENDENCE IN EVALUATIONThe Operations Evaluation Department (OED) is an independent unit within the World Bank; it reports directlyto the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. OED assesses what works, and what does not; how a borrower plansto run and maintain a project; and the lasting contribution of the Bank to a country’s overall development. Thegoals of evaluation are to learn from experience, to provide an objective basis for assessing the results of theBank’s work, and to provide accountability in the achievement of its objectives. It also improves Bank work byidentifying and disseminating the lessons learned from experience and by framing recommendations drawn fromevaluation findings.

ContentsviiAcknowledgmentsixForeword, Prólogo, Avant-ProposxviiExecutive Summary, Resumen, Résumé AnalytiquexxviiAbbreviations and Acronyms1 1. The 1993 Strategy—Still Relevant Today1 A Strategy Was Overdue2 The Bank Strategy2 Strategic Approach to Equitable and Sustainable Water Management4 New Approaches and Initiatives Are Even More Critical Today7 2. The Bank’s Water Assistance and Portfolio7 Different Countries Present Different Challenges8 The Mix of Instruments Has Changed10 A Larger Portfolio Whose Quality Has Improved, Albeit Unevenly12 The Poverty Focus of Water Operations Is Getting Better15 3. The Water Strategy Has Been Only Partially Implemented15 Treatment of Water Issues in CASs Has Been Weak16 Projects Have Become More Responsive to the Strategy17 Regions Have Pursued Different Approaches to Comprehensive WaterManagement18 As Have Subsectors21 Water Projects Tackle Environmental Issues from Different Fronts22 Compliance with Safeguards Is Demanding23 Addressing Institutional Concerns by Involving Stakeholders and thePrivate Sector25 Pricing Promotes Efficiency and Conservation, but There Are FewSuccessful Examples26 The Bank’s Effectiveness on Key Strategy Elements Varies Widelyiii

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategy29 4. Why It’s Difficult to Get Good Results29 Comprehensive Water Management Is Inherently Difficult30 International Water Cooperation Is Essential but Controversial31 Water Is Not Seen as an Important Economic Resource31 Transforming Strategy into Action Is Difficult32 Detailed Guidelines Have Been Lacking32 Selectivity and Good Management Are Important32 Seven Ways to Improve Results37 5. Improving Bank Management and Internal Incentives38 The Bank Is Poorly Organized to Implement the Water Strategy39 But Successful Institutional Approaches Are Evolving39 Staff Resources Are Stretched Too Thinly39 External Stakeholders Also See Problems40 Better Guidelines Are Needed41 6. RecommendationsAnnexes43 Annex A: World Bank Operational Policy 4.07, Water ResourcesManagement45 Annex B: Methodology53 Annex C: Sector Performance—Recovering from a Troubled Past59 Annex D: Assessing Water Project Design Utilizing the Water PolicyMatrix Development for the Bank’s 1993 Water Strategy Paper79 Annex E: Social Development Dimensions of Bank-Financed WaterSector Projects91 Annex F: Resettlement in Bank Water Projects—Results from a RandomSample of 108 Water Projects93 Annex G: Water Resources Management Policy Questionnaire to BankStaff101 Annex H: The Difficulties of Integrated River Basin Management105 Endnotes109 BibliographyText Boxes2 Box 1.1: The Dublin Guiding Principles on Water22 Box 3.1: World Bank Safeguard PoliciesText Figures3 Figure 1.1: Water Availability Continues to Decline in DevelopingCountries4 Figure 1.2: A Comprehensive Framework for Water Management9 Figure 2.1: ESW Is Responsive to the Water Strategy11 Figure 2.2: The Upward Trend in Bank Lending for Water May Be Over11 Figure 2.3: Lending for Water Has Been Concentrated in Relatively FewCountries12 Figure 2.4: Lending to the Traditional Water Sectors Has Declined Sincethe 1993 Strategy13 Figure 2.5: Inclusion of Social Development and Poverty Concerns inWater Projects Has Been Increasingiv

Contents16 Figure 3.1: Improving Responsiveness to the Water Strategy17 Figure 3.2: Post-Strategy Operations Are Still Focused on Projects18 Figure 3.3: Comprehensive Coverage of National and River BasinStrategy Elements Varies by Region19 Figure 3.4: Level of Effort in 1993–99 Differs by Region19 Figure 3.5: Comprehensive Water Management of Projects by Subsector20 Figure 3.6: Subsectoral Compliance with the Strategy Elements Is Mixed27 Figure 3.7: The Bank’s Effectiveness at Implementing the Strategy VariesConsiderably by Sector40 Figure 5.1: Staff Views on Implementing the Bank’s Water StrategyText Tables5 Table 1.1: Annual Investment for Water Must Increase5 Table 1.2: A Much Greater Role for the Private Sector12 Table 2.1: Water Supply and Sanitation Investments in NontraditionalSectors Are Increasing30 Table 4.1: Mature Water Resource Management Organizations Do NotRun Water Businessesv

AcknowledgmentsThis report examines the Bank’s implementationexperience of the 1993 WaterResources Management Policy (OperationalPolicy 4.07) to determine the relevance andefficacy of the Bank’s overall water operationsfor its borrowers. It evaluates the degree towhich the issues identified in the guideline documentWater Resources Management—A WorldBank Policy Paper (1993) have been internalizedinto Bank operations, examines the continuingrelevance of the water Strategy, and makes recommendationsfor refining Bank policy andstrategy in the water sectors. The report is basedprimarily on comparisons of events in the twosix-year periods before (1988–93) and after(1994–99) the Operational Policy and covers allcompleted and new water and water-relatedeconomic and sector work and operations withinthe two periods.The analysis also builds on earlier OED evaluations—inparticular, a 1994 irrigation anddrainage sector review and a 1992 evaluation ofthe first 23 years of Bank lending for water supplyand sanitation. Conclusions were based onan evaluation of over 270 pieces of economicand sector work, 410 projects, 98 Country AssistanceStrategies, and the exit performance of 306water projects completed in the period 1988–99.In addition to an analysis of Bank lending, theevaluation is based on an assessment of nonlendingservices and a review of experience infour focus countries. In-depth review and discussionsbetween Bank staff and country/Regional stakeholders have taken place in Brazil,Yemen, India, and the Philippines on the resultsof the review of activities in the four countries.A special study was undertaken with the SocialAssessment Team of ESSD to examine thepoverty focus and efficacy of social assessmentsin water projects. A questionnaire gathered feedbackfrom the experience of over 100 Bankstaff with the water Strategy and its implementation.Several formal and informal workshopswithin the Bank discussed evaluation methodology,and progress with Bank staff and otherstakeholders.The draft report was critiqued by two peerreviewers, Peter Rogers of Harvard University andDavid Seckler, former Director-General of theInternational Water Management Institute, andthe final draft was circulated to Bank managementfor substantive review. In addition, thestudy report benefited considerably from theguidance of Alain Barbu, Gregory Ingram, RogerSlade, and numerous colleagues in OED. ESSDsupport to the Social Assessment Team and trustfunds provided by the Norwegian governmentsupported the social science and povertyevaluation.The Task Manager for the evaluation, G.T.Keith Pitman, prepared the report. Significantwritten contributions were made by Hans Adler,Ayse Kudat, Bulent Ozbilgin, Eugene Stakhiv,Robert Varley, John Cunningham, Amnon Golan,Inderjeet Singh, and Mark Svendsen. Researchwas conducted by Kavita Mathur, Greg Browder,Saeed Rana, Monica Scatasta, Reno Dewina, andSamir Stewart. Paula Hickman, Catherine Munro,and Ted Rice provided advice and support.William Hurlbut, Bruce Ross-Larson, Carolinevii

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyMcEuen, and Phillip Sawicki edited the report.Soon Wan-Pak, Marcia Bailey, Connie Frye, andHelen Philip provided administrative assistance.The paper also benefited from numerous discussionswith Bank colleagues and with manyindividuals in development partner’s countries.This study was published in the Partnershipsand Knowledge Group (OEDPK) by the Outreachand Dissemination Unit. The task teamincludes Elizabeth Campbell-Pagé (task teamleader), Caroline McEuen (editor), and JuicyQureishi-Huq (administrative assistant).Director-General, Operations Evaluation: Robert PicciottoDirector, Operations Evaluation Department:Gregory K. IngramManager, Sector and Thematic Evaluation: Alain BarbuTask Manager: George Keith Pitmanviii

ENGLISHFOREWORDThe comprehensiveapproach advocated in theBank’s 1993 water strategy is highlyrelevant to the sound and sustainablemanagement of waterresources. Implementing the strategyhas advanced the Bank’s corporategoals and mission, contributingto an emerging global consensus onwater resource management. Butimplementation, although broad, hasbeen partial and uneven, with bigdifferences across Regions, countries,and subsectors. Work remainsto adapt the strategy to diversecountry contexts and to link waterresource management to sustainableservice delivery.The Bank has mainstreamedthe strategy’s principles in extensiveeconomic and sector work.But Bank efforts to nurture policyreform and build domestic capacitieshave not matched the challengesin most countries. Thewater strategy has been incorporatedonly partially in CountryAssistance Strategies (CASs).Organization for EconomicCooperation and Developmentcountries show how difficult comprehensivewater resource managementis, even with soundgovernance, participation, institutions,and skills—all mostly missingin Bank client countries. Andwhile some borrowers share theBank’s vision, few have implementedthe comprehensive principlebecause of these constraints.Thus, not many Bank water projectsare able to address all keyelements of the strategy, such asESPAÑOLPRÓLOGOEl enfoque integral propugnadopor el Banco en laestrategia sobre los recursos hídricos,de 1993, es sumamente pertinentepara la ordenación racional ysostenible de dichos recursos. Laaplicación de la estrategia ha promovidolas metas institucionales yla misión del Banco, al contribuir ala formación de un consenso mundialsobre la ordenación de losrecursos hídricos. Pero dicha aplicación,aunque amplia, ha sido parcialy desigual y se han registradograndes diferencias entre oficinasregionales, países y subsectores.Quedan pendientes las tareas deadaptar la estrategia a diversos contextosnacionales y vincular la ordenacióndel agua con la prestaciónsostenible de servicios.El Banco ha incorporado losprincipios de la estrategia enmuchos estudios económicos ysectoriales. Pero las acciones delBanco para promover reformas depolíticas y fortalecer la capacidadnacional no han respondido a losretos planteados en la mayoría delos países. Esa estrategia se haincorporado sólo parcialmente enlas estrategias de asistencia a lospaíses. Los países miembros de laOrganización de Cooperación yDesarrollo Económicos muestrancuán difícil es la ordenación integralde los recursos hídricos, auncuando exista una gestión públicaeficaz, además de participación,instituciones y conocimientos,requisitos casi inexistentes en lospaíses clientes del Banco. Si bienalgunos prestatarios comparten laFRANÇAISAVANT-PROPOSL’approche globale préconiséedans la stratégie pourl’eau élaborée par la Banque en 1993répond tout à fait aux impératifsd’une gestion rationnelle et durabledes ressources en eau. La mise enœuvre de cette stratégie a permis defaire avancer les buts institutionnelsde la Banque ainsi que la missionqui lui a été assignée, et elle acontribué à dégager un début deconsensus sur la gestion des ressourcesen eau. Mais si la stratégiea été appliquée de manière générale,sa mise en œuvre demeurenéanmoins fragmentaire et inégale,avec des différences marquées entreles Régions, les pays et les soussecteurs.Des efforts restent à fairepour l’adapter aux différents contextesnationaux et pour articuler lagestion des ressources en eau avecl’organisation de services durables.La Banque intègre systématiquementles principes de la stratégieaux études économiques etsectorielles de grande portée. Maisles efforts qu’elle déploie pourfaire avancer les réformes et renforcerles capacités des pays nesont pas à la mesure des problèmesauxquels sont confrontés laplupart des pays. La stratégie pourl’eau n’a été incorporée que partiellementdans les Stratégiesd’assistance aux pays (SAP). Lespays de l’Organisation de coopérationet de développement économiquestémoignent des difficultésque présente la gestion globaledes ressources en eau, même avecdes atouts tels que la saine gestiondes affaires publiques, la participa-ix

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyENGLISHusing economic and financialinstruments to efficientlyallocate water andsafeguard ecosystemswithin a national or riverbasinmanagement framework.Conversely, therehas been significantprogress in the adoption of thestrategy’s institutional, financial,and socioeconomic objectiveswithin the water service sectorsthat have been the traditionalvehicles for Bank assistance.Impediments remain. Untilrecently, the Bank had not organizeditself to treat water resourcesmanagement comprehensively.Comprehensive water resourcesmanagement has high transactioncosts, particularly because manysafeguard policies—and certainlythe most controversial—apply towater-related development. Thus,country management sees manywater interventions as risky venturesin a time of dwindling Bankresources.In addition, water developmenttranscends borders, and the internationaldimension is becomingincreasingly important. While themain water service sectors haveincorporated most of the strategy’srecommendations to improve servicedelivery—water supply andsanitation somewhat better thanirrigation and drainage—there hadbeen no one group (until thisyear) charged with overseeing anddeveloping the Bankwide institutionalretooling needed to ensure aconsistent approach to waterresources management. Goodmodels exist, notably in the Africaand the Middle East and NorthAfrica Regions. And it is expectedthat the new Bank WaterResources Management Group crevisióndel Banco, pocoshan aplicado el principiode manera integral debidoa esas limitaciones. Porende, no son muchos losproyectos del Banco en elsector del agua que puedenabordar todos los elementosfundamentales de la estrategia,como la utilización de instrumentoseconómicos y financieros paraasignar eficientemente esterecurso y salvaguardar los ecosistemasdentro de un marco de gestióna nivel nacional o de lascuencas hidrográficas. En cambio,ha habido progresos notables enla adopción de los objetivos institucionales,financieros y socioeconómicosde la estrategia dentro delos sectores de servicios de aguaque han sido mecanismos tradicionalesde la asistencia del Banco.Subsisten los impedimentos.Hasta hace poco, el Banco no sehabía organizado para abordarintegralmente la ordenación delagua, la cual tiene altos costos detransacción, debido en especial aque muchas políticas de salvaguardia—y ciertamente las máscontrovertidas— se aplican a proyectosrelacionados con el agua.Por eso, los directivos a cargo delas operaciones del Banco en lospaíses consideran que muchasintervenciones relativas al aguason iniciativas riesgosas en tiemposde retracción de los recursosdel Banco.Además, el aprovechamientodel agua trasciende las fronteras yes cada vez más importante elaspecto internacional. Si bien enlos principales sectores de serviciosde agua se ha incorporado lamayoría de las recomendacionesde la estrategia tendientes a mejorarla prestación de los serviciosESPAÑOLtion, les institutions et lescompétences — qui font leplus souvent défaut auxpays clients de la Banque.Et, si certains emprunteurspartagent la vision de laBanque, rares sont ceux quiont pu appliquer le principede la globalité à cause de cescontraintes. C’est pourquoi, peu deprojets de la Banque dans le secteurde l’eau englobent tous leséléments clés de la stratégie, telsque l’utilisation d’instruments économiqueset financiers pour assurerune répartition efficace de l’eauet préserver les écosystèmes dansle cadre d’un plan national oud’un plan de gestion d’un bassinfluvial. Des progrès notables onttoutefois été enregistrés dansl’adoption des objectifs institutionnels,financiers et socioéconomiquesau niveau des services del’eau, qui sont les instruments traditionnelspar lesquels passel’assistance de la Banque.Des obstacles demeurent.Jusqu’à une période récente, laBanque ne s’était pas organiséepour traiter le problème de la gestiondes ressources en eau dansson ensemble. La gestion globaledes ressources implique des coûtsde transaction élevés, en particulierparce que le développementlié aux ressources hydriques faitl’objet de nombreuses mesures desauvegarde et notamment de laplus controversée.C’est pourquoi les responsablespaysconsidèrent que les interventionsdans le secteur de l’eau sontdes opérations risquées à unmoment où les ressources de laBanque diminuent. En outre, lamise en valeur des ressources eneau transcende les frontières, et ladimension internationale prend deFRANÇAISx

Forewordated in early 2000 withinthe Economic and SociallySustainable DevelopmentVice-Presidency will addressthese issues as it developsthe Water Resources SectorStrategy Paper.Perceptions of a loomingglobal water crisis, reinforcedby the Second World Water Conferenceat The Hague in 2000,have made policymakers aware ofthe need to enhance waterresource management in developingcountries. This is creatingopportunities for the Bank torededicate itself to implementinga comprehensive water managementstrategy along the lines ofthe following recommendations:Recommendation 1: Aimcountry dialogue and institutionaldevelopment at integratingsocial and environmentalconcerns with water resourcedevelopment and project implementation.This requires:• Greater attention to linkingwater projects with CAS andpoverty strategies, to achievingbetter understanding of localinstitutions and preferences,and to monitoring and evaluatingproject effects on poverty• Adopting the use of strategicenvironmental and socialassessments, including consultations,as part of the overallwater resources planningprocess• More attention to be given todeveloping economic instrumentsto manage conflict inintegrated water systems, includinggroundwater, and to balancedemands at the river-basin level,and between urban and ruralpopulations, while ensuringaccess of the poor to waterENGLISH(en el abastecimiento deagua y el saneamiento algomejor que en el riego y eldrenaje), ningún grupo(hasta este año) se haencargado de supervisar yformular a nivel de todo elBanco la reorganizaciónnecesaria para asegurar un enfoquecoherente de la ordenacióndel agua. Se cuenta con buenosmodelos, especialmente en lasregiones de África y de OrienteMedio y Norte de África; y seespera que el nuevo Grupo delBanco encargado de la gestión delos recursos hídricos, creado aprincipios de 2000 dentro de laVicepresidencia de DesarrolloSocial y Ecológicamente Sostenible,aborde esas cuestiones alpreparar el documento de estrategiasobre recursos hídricos.Las percepciones acerca deuna inminente crisis mundial delagua, reforzadas por la SegundaConferencia Mundial sobre elAgua celebrada en La Haya en2000, han llevado a los encargadosde formular las políticas atomar conciencia de la necesidadde mejorar la ordenación de esterecurso en los países en desarrollo.Esto está creando oportunidadespara que el Banco vuelva aaplicar una estrategia de ordenaciónintegral según las siguientesrecomendaciones:Recomendación 1: Procurarque en el diálogo con los paísesy en el desarrollo institucionalse incorporen los aspectossociales y ambientales en elaprovechamiento de los recursoshídricos y en la ejecuciónde los proyectos relacionados.Para esto es preciso:• Prestar mayor atención a lavinculación de los proyectosESPAÑOLplus en plus d’importance.Si les principaux services del’eau tiennent compte de laplupart des recommandationscontenues dans la stratégiepour améliorer leurorganisation — de façon unpeu plus rigoureuse pour cequi est de l’alimentation en eau etde l’assainissement que pour l’irrigationet le drainage —, aucungroupe (jusqu’à cette année) n’aété chargé de procéder à la réorganisationinstitutionnelle del’ensemble de la Banque qui s’imposeafin de lui permettre d’adopterune approche cohérente pourla gestion des ressources en eau,et de suivre le déroulement decette restructuration. Il existe desmodèles valables, notamment dansles Régions Afrique, et Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord. Et lenouveau Groupe de gestion desressources en eau créé au débutde l’an 2000 au sein de la ViceprésidenceDéveloppement écologiquementet socialement durable(ESSD) s’attaquera sans aucundoute à ces questions dans le cadrede la rédaction du document destratégie pour les ressources en eau.La perspective d’une crise mondialeimminente de l’eau, renforcéepar la deuxième Conférence mondialesur l’eau tenue à La Haye en2000, a sensibilisé les décideurs àla nécessité d’améliorer la gestiondes ressources en eau dans lespays en développement. Celadonne à la Banque de nouvellesraisons de s’employer à mettre enœuvre une stratégie globale de lagestion de l’eau fondée sur lesrecommandations suivantes :Recommandation 1 : Axer ledialogue avec les pays et ledéveloppement institutionnelsur la prise en compte desFRANÇAISxi

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyENGLISH• More attention to factoringin concerns aboutequitable allocation ofwater and water rightsin light of local culturalpreferences and ruralurbanneeds• Increased emphasis onimplementation of safeguardpolicies during project supervisionby both the Bank and theborrower.Recommendation 2: DeployBank resources and instrumentsmore effectively to nurturecommitment to thestrategy through shared objectives,realistic diagnostics, andpartnerships aimed at policyreform and capacity building.Areas requiring particular attentioninclude:• Updating the Bank’s water policyin the context of the forthcomingSector Strategy Paperand supplementing it with aseries of Bank procedures andgood practice notes for eachsubsector• Making greater use of adaptablelending instruments anddeveloping new, cost-effective,performance-based approachesto project selection, design,procurement, and servicedelivery• Strengthening economic andsector work to allow forimproved diagnosis, higherqualitydialogue with stakeholders,and closer linkageswith Country and PovertyAssistance Strategies• Reorienting capacity buildingin the water sector towardcomprehensive water managementthrough World BankInstitute programs and globaldel sector del agua conlas estrategias de asistenciaa los países y lasestrategias de lucha contrala pobreza, paralograr una mejor comprensiónde las institucionesy preferenciaslocales y observar y evaluar losefectos de los proyectos sobrela pobreza• Realizar evaluaciones ambientalesy sociales estratégicas,inclusive consultas, como partedel proceso general de planificaciónen el ámbito del agua• Prestar mayor atención a lacreación de instrumentos económicospara hacer frente a losconflictos en las redes de aguaintegradas, inclusive las aguassubterráneas, y para equilibrarla demanda a nivel de lascuencas hidrográficas y entrepoblaciones urbanas y rurales,asegurando al mismo tiempo elacceso de los pobres al agua• Prestar más atención a la incorporaciónde las cuestiones relacionadascon la asignaciónequitativa del agua y los derechossobre el agua, teniendoen cuenta las preferencias culturaleslocales y las necesidadesrurales y urbanas• Hacer más hincapié en la aplicaciónde políticas de salvaguardiadurante la supervisiónde los proyectos por el Bancoy el prestatarioESPAÑOLRecomendación 2: Asignarlos recursos y los instrumentosdel Banco de manera máseficaz a fin de fomentar laadhesión a la estrategia a travésde objetivos comunes,diagnósticos realistas y alianzasorientadas a la reformaquestions sociales etenvironnementales dansle cadre de la mise envaleur des ressources eneau et de l’exécution desprojets. Pour cela, il faut :• veiller davantage à articulerles projets centrés surl’eau avec les SAP et les stratégiesde lutte contre la pauvreté afind’avoir une meilleure connaissancedes institutions et des préférenceslocales, et de pouvoirsuivre et évaluer les effets de cesprojets sur la pauvreté ;• utiliser les évaluations stratégiquesenvironnementales etsociales, et notamment lesconsultations, comme élémentsdu processus de planificationdes ressources en eaux ;• veiller davantage à élaborer desinstruments économiques pourgérer les conflits liés auxréseaux hydriques intégrés etnotamment aux eaux souterraines,et équilibrer les ponctionssur les ressources au niveau desbassins fluviaux, et entre lespopulations urbaines et lespopulations rurales, tout enveillant à ce que les pauvrespuissent avoir accès à l’eau ;• se préoccuper davantage del’affacturage pour les questionsconcernant l’allocation équitablede l’eau et les droitsd’usage de l’eau en tenantcompte des préférences culturelleset des besoins des zonesrurales et urbaines ;• accorder, lors de la supervisiondes projets, plus d’importanceà l’adoption de mesures desauvegarde, tant par la Banqueque par l’emprunteur.FRANÇAISRecommandation 2 : Déployerplus efficacement les ressourcesxii

ForewordENGLISHand regional capacitybuildingpartnerships.Recommendation 3:Create and sustain morecomprehensive watermanagement allianceswith like-minded partnersin the private sector, civilsociety, and the developmentcommunity. This requires:• Sustaining involvement inglobal water policy networksand partnerships, with priorityto cross-border, integrated,river-basin planning, driven bystakeholder demand, and tothe resolution of internationalwater disputes.• More attention to in-countrywater partnerships is requiredto build dialogue and leveragelocal knowledge.• Entering new partnerships onlywhere the Bank has a clearcomparative advantage indoing so, clearly specifyingconditions for entry and exit.• Driving the choice betweenprivate and public sectorinvolvement by hard-nosedinstitutional analysis of whatworks and what does not indiffering country contexts.Recommendation 4:Strengthen internal management,monitoring, and evaluationof water resourcemanagement activities througha streamlined organization,more cohesive sector andcountry strategies, enhancedcore competencies, additionaloperational guidance andtraining, and more rigorousquality assurance arrangements.Chief among the issues toaddress:de las políticas y al fortalecimientode la capacidad.Los siguientestemas requieren particularatención:• Actualizar la política delBanco relativa al aguaen el contexto del documentode estrategia sectorial depróxima aparición, complementándolacon notas sobreprocedimientos y prácticasrecomendadas del Banco paracada subsector• Aprovechar más los instrumentosde préstamo adaptables yelaborar nuevos enfoquesbasados en el desempeño yeficaces en función de los costospara la selección y el diseñode los proyectos, lasadquisiciones y la prestaciónde servicios• Mejorar los estudios económicosy sectoriales para obtenerdiagnósticos más precisos, diálogosde mejor calidad con laspartes interesadas y vínculosmás estrechos con las estrategiasde asistencia a los países yde lucha contra la pobreza• Reorientar el fortalecimiento dela capacidad en el sector de losrecursos hídricos para lograruna gestión integral del agua através de programas del Institutodel Banco Mundial y deasociaciones a nivel mundial yregional para el fortalecimientode la capacidad.ESPAÑOLRecomendación 3: Establecery mantener más alianzaspara la ordenación integraldel agua con asociados afinesdel sector privado, la sociedadcivil y las instituciones de desarrollo.Para esto se requiere:• Mantener la participación enet les instruments de laBanque afin d’encouragerl’adoption de la stratégieen fondant l’action sur desobjectifs partagés, desdiagnostics réalistes etdes partenariats axés surles réformes et le renforcementdes capacités. Les domainesqui requièrent une attention particulièreincluent :• l’actualisation de la politiquede l’eau de la Banque dans lecontexte de la prochaine étudesur la stratégie sectorielle, àcompléter par une série denotes sur les procédures et lesbonnes pratiques de la Banquepour chaque sous-secteur ;• le recours plus fréquent auxinstruments de prêts évolutifset la mise au point de nouvellesméthodes efficaces par rapportaux coûts et basées sur laperformance pour la sélectionet la conception des projets, lapassation des marchés etl’organisation des services ;• la réalisation d’études économiqueset sectorielles plus approfondiesafin d’affiner lesdiagnostics, d’engager un dialoguede meilleure qualité avecles parties prenantes et de renforcerl’articulation avec lesStratégies d’assistance aux payset de lutte contre la pauvreté ;• réorienter le renforcement descapacités dans le secteur del’eau pour l’axer sur la gestionglobale des ressources en eaudans le cadre des programmesde l’Institut de la Banque mondialeet des partenariats mondiauxet régionaux pour lerenforcement des capacités.FRANÇAISRecommandation 3 : Créer etmaintenir des alliances plus lar-xiii

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategy• Clarifying the role of thecentral Water ResourceManagement Group andits relationship with SectorBoards and Regionalstaff, particularly in relationto institutional andfinancial aspects of therural water portfolio, and consideringthe establishment ofwater resource managementcoordinating bodies in eachRegion.• Providing more vigilant andindependent quality assurancefor safeguard policies affectingwater development.• Offering incentives and trainingto accelerate staff adoption of acomprehensive approach towater resources management.• Reassessing staffing levels andskills mixes to implement thewater strategy Bankwide. Toensure adequate staffing andcontinuity, reliance on ad hoctrust funds should be reducedand the Bank budgetenhanced.ENGLISHlas redes y asociacionesmundiales sobre políticasrelacionadas con elagua, dando prioridad ala planificación transfronterizae integrada delas cuencas hidrográficas,con el liderazgo delas partes interesadas, y a laresolución de los conflictosinternacionales sobre el agua.Es preciso prestar más atencióna las asociaciones dentro delpaís para entablar un diálogosobre el agua y aprovechar losconocimientos locales.• Establecer nuevas asociacionessólo cuando el Banco tenga enello una ventaja comparativaevidente, especificando claramentelas condiciones deingreso y salida.• Fundamentar la elección entrela participación del sector privadoy el sector público conrigurosos análisis institucionalesde lo que da resultado y loque no da resultado en el contextode diferentes países.ESPAÑOLRecomendación 4: Fortalecerla gestión interna, el seguimientoy la evaluación de lasactividades de ordenación delos recursos hídricos medianteuna organización simplificada,estrategias sectorialesy nacionales más coherentes,competencias básicas mejoradas,más orientación y capacitaciónoperacional y arreglosmás rigurosos para asegurarla calidad. Se han de abordar lassiguientes cuestiones:• Aclarar el papel del Grupo centralencargado de la gestión delos recursos hídricos y su relacióncon las juntas sectoriales ylos funcionarios de las oficinasges pour la gestion del’eau avec des partenairesdu secteur privé, dela société civile et de lacommunauté du développementqui partagent lesmêmes conceptions. Pourcela, il faut :• maintenir la participationaux réseaux mondiaux et auxpartenariats axés sur la politiquede l’eau, en donnant priorité àla planification transfrontière etintégrée des basins flu-viauxfondée sur la demande des partiesprenantes, et à la résolutiondes différends concernant leseaux internationales. Il convientd’accorder une plus grandeattention aux partenariats nationauxdans le secteur de l’eauafin de renforcer le dialogue etd’approfondir la connaissancedu contexte local ;• établir de nouveaux partenariatsdans les domaines où la Banquea manifestement intérêt à lefaire, en spécifiant de façonexplicite les conditions d’entréeet de sortie ;• décider du choix entre la participationdu secteur privé et dusecteur public sur la base d’uneanalyse institutionnelle pratiqueet approfondie de ce quimarche et qui ne marche pasdans les différents contextesnationaux.FRANÇAISRecommandation 4 : Renforcerla gestion interne, le suivi etl’évaluation des activités liées àla gestion des ressources eneau par une politique axée surla rationalisation de l’organisation,l’amélioration de la cohérencedes stratégies sectorielleset nationales, le renforcementdes compétences essentielles, laxiv

Forewordregionales, en particularen lo concerniente a losaspectos institucionalesy financieros de la carterade proyectos hidrológicosrurales, yconsiderar el establecimientode órganos decoordinación de dichos recursosen cada oficina regional• Adoptar medidas de garantíade la calidad más estrictas eindependientes para las políticasde salvaguardia que afectanel desarrollo del sector delagua• Ofrecer incentivos y capacitaciónpara acelerar la adopciónpor el personal de un enfoqueintegral de la ordenación delos recursos hídricos• Reevaluar la dotación de personaly la combinación de aptitudespara aplicar en todo elBanco la estrategia de ordenaciónde los recursos hídricos.Para asegurar que la dotaciónde personal y la continuidadsean adecuadas, es precisodepender en menor medida delos fondos fiduciarios especialesy mejorar el presupuestodel Banco.ESPAÑOLfourniture de directivesopérationnelles et de formationssupplémentaires,et des arrangementsplus rigoureux au plande l’assurance de qualité.Les principaux objectifsdans ce contexte sont lessuivants :• préciser le rôle du Groupe centralde la gestion de l’eau ainsique ses relations avec les commissionstechniques et lesRégions, en particulier pour cequi est des aspects institutionnelet financier du portefeuilledes projets centrés sur l’eau enmilieu rural, et étudier la possibilitéde créer dans chaqueRégion des organes de coordinationde la gestion des ressourcesen eau ;• faire preuve de plus de vigilanceet d’indépendance dansle domaine de l’assurance dequalité pour les mesures desauvegarde touchant la mise envaleur de l’eau ;• offrir des incitations et une formationpour amener le personnelà accélérer l’adoption d’uneapproche globale en matière degestion des ressources en eau ;• réévaluer les dotations en personnelet l’éventail des qualificationsdisponibles pour lamise en œuvre de la stratégiede l’eau dans l’ensemble desservices de la Banque. Afin degarantir une dotation suffisanteen personnel et d’assurer lacontinuité, il conviendra deréduire les recours aux fondsfiduciaires spéciaux et d’accroîtrele budget de la Banque.FRANÇAISRobert PicciottoDirector-General, Operations Evaluationxv

ENGLISHEXECUTIVESUMMARYIn 1997 more than 1.1 billionpeople in low- and middleincomecountries lacked access tosafe water supplies, and far morewere without adequate sanitation.Today, 166 million people in 18 countriessuffer from water scarcity, whileanother 270 million in 11 additionalcountries are considered “waterstressed.” By 2025 affected populationswill increase to about 3 billionpeople, or about 40 percent of theworld’s population, most of them in thepoorest countries. There is now a consensusthat the severity of the problemrequires a strategic approach thatemphasizes equitable and sustainablemanagement of water resources.The Bank’s Water StrategyTo inform development of thenew World Bank Water ResourcesSector Strategy, the OperationsEvaluation Department (OED)undertook the evaluation of howeffectively the Bank’s current strategyhas been implemented. Thecomprehensive approach embodiedin the 1993 Water ResourcesManagement (the Strategy)evolved in response to growingunease within the Bank that wateroperations were failing to deliversustainable development—waterand water-related projects wereamong the poorer performers inthe Bank portfolio—and growinginternational concern about themismanagement of global waterresources and poor service levels,particularly for the poor.The Strategy is highly relevant tosound and sustainable manage-ESPAÑOLRESUMENEn 1997, había en países deingreso bajo y mediano másde 1.100 millones de personas quecarecían de acceso al abastecimientode agua potable y era mayor elnúmero de personas carentesde saneamiento adecuado. Actualmente,166 millones de personas en 18países padecen de escasez de agua, yse considera que otros 270 millones,en otros 11 países, están en situaciónde “estrés” por carencia de agua.Hacia 2025, las poblaciones afectadasaumentarán a unos 3.000 millones depersonas, o un 40% de la poblaciónmundial, la mayoría de ellas en lospaíses más pobres. Hoy día hay unconsenso acerca de que la gravedaddel problema requiere un enfoqueestratégico que haga hincapié enla ordenación equitativa y sosteniblede los recursos hídricos.La estrategia del Banco sobreordenación de los recursoshídricosPara fundamentar la formulaciónde la nueva estrategia para el sectordel agua del Banco Mundial, elDepartamento de Evaluación deOperaciones (DEO) realizó unaevaluación de la eficacia en la aplicaciónde la actual estrategia delBanco. El enfoque integral consagradoen el documento titulado Laordenación de los recursos hídricos(la Estrategia) de 1993 se elaboróen respuesta a la creciente preocupaciónsuscitada en el Banco en elsentido de que las operacionesrelativas al agua no eran conducentesa un desarrollo sostenible—los proyectos sobre recursosFRANÇAISRÉSUMÉANALYTIQUEEn 1997, plus de 1,1 milliardd’habitants des pays à faiblerevenu et à revenu intermédiaire nepouvaient avoir accès à une sourced’eau salubre et un nombre bien plusimportant encore ne disposait pasd’équipements d’assainissementadéquats. Aujourd’hui, 166 millionsd’individus vivant dans 18 pays souffrentd’une pénurie de l’eau, et270 millions d’individus dans 11 autrespays sont considérés comme souffrantd’un « stress hydrique ». D’ici à2025, les populations touchéespasseront à quelque 3 milliards depersonnes, soit à peu près 40 % de lapopulation mondiale, la plupart vivantdans les pays les plus démunis. Ons’accorde maintenant à reconnaîtreque la gravité du problème exige uneapproche stratégique mettant l’accentsur une gestion équitable et durabledes ressources en eau.La stratégie de la Banque pourl’eauDans le cadre de la mise au pointde la nouvelle Stratégie sectoriellepour les ressources en eau de laBanque mondiale, le Départementde l’évaluation des opérations(OED) a entrepris d’examiner l’efficacitéavec laquelle la stratégieactuelle de la Banque avait étéappliquée. La philosophie de l’approcheglobale dont s’inspirait laGestion des ressources en eau (laStratégie) de 1993 a pris corpslorsque la Banque a constaté avecune inquiétude grandissante queles opérations concernant lesecteur de l’eau ne permettaientpas de promouvoir un développe-xvii

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyment of water resources. Itrecognizes that improvingperformance in meetingwater needs requires borrowingcountries to reformtheir water managementinstitutions, policies, andplanning systems. It alsoacknowledges that this wouldmean changes in the Bank’s internalprocesses, training, skill mix,and the resources assigned towater and water-related operations.The comprehensive analyticalframeworks advocated in theStrategy paper are designed tohelp guide decisions about water.There are two major thrusts: toproduce an overarching waterresources management frameworkthat integrates the needs of thewater service subsectors, and topresent a reform agenda andinnovations to improve the relevance,effectiveness, and sustainabilityof the main water servicesubsectors.ENGLISHImplementation Is Broad—but Partial and UnevenImplementing the 1993 Strategyhas advanced the Bank’s corporategoals and mission, contributingto an emerging globalconsensus on water resourcemanagement. But implementation,while broad, has been partial anduneven, with big differencesacross Regions, countries, andsubsectors. Work remains to adaptthe Strategy to diverse countrycontexts and to link waterresource management to sustainableservice delivery.Reform is DifficultWhile many Strategy principleshave been mainstreamed in economicand sector work, and havehídricos y los proyectosrelacionados con este sectorfiguraban entre los demenor rendimiento de lacartera del Banco— y a lacreciente inquietud internacionalacerca de la ordenacióndeficiente de losrecursos hídricos mundiales y losinsuficientes niveles de servicios,particularmente para los pobres.La Estrategia es sumamentepertinente a la ordenación racionaly sostenible de los recursoshídricos. En ella se reconoce quepara mejorar el desempeño en lasatisfacción de las necesidades deagua es preciso que los paísesprestatarios reformen sus instituciones,políticas y sistemas deplanificación relativos a la ordenaciónde este recurso. También sereconoce que esto entrañará cambiosen los procedimientos internosdel Banco, la capacitación, lacombinación de aptitudes y losrecursos asignados a operacionessobre los recursos hídricos y relacionadascon este sector.Los marcos analíticos integralespropugnados en el documento dela Estrategia se han diseñado paraayudar a orientar las decisionesrelativas al agua. Hay dos aspectosprincipales: producir un marcoglobal de ordenación de losrecursos hídricos que integre lasnecesidades de los subsectores deservicios de agua, y presentar unprograma de reforma e innovacionesa fin de mejorar la pertinencia,la eficacia y la sostenibilidadde los principales subsectores dedichos servicios.ESPAÑOLLa aplicación es amplia, peroparcial y desigualAl aplicar la Estrategia de 1993 sehan impulsado los objetivos instimentdurable — dans leportefeuille de Banque,les projets centrés surl’eau ou liés à l’eau étaientceux dont les résultatsétaient les plusdécevants — et que lamauvaise gestion desressources mondiales en eau et lamauvaise qualité des services, enparticulier pour les pauvres, ontsuscité des préoccupations croissantesau sein de la communautéinternationale.La Stratégie répond tout à faitaux impératifs d’une gestionrationnelle et durable desressources en eau. Elle tientdûment compte du fait que lespays emprunteurs doiventreformer leurs institutions, leurspolitiques et leurs systèmes deplanification dans le domaine dela gestion de l’eau s’ils veulentpourvoir de meilleure façon auxbesoins en eau de leurs populations.Elle reconnaît aussi que celaimplique de la part de la Banquequ’elle modifie ses processusinternes, les formations dispensées,la répartition des qualificationset les ressources consacréesaux opérations centrées sur l’eauou liées à l’eau.Les cadres d’analyse d’ensembleque préconise le document deStratégie sont conçus pour guiderles décisions concernant l’eau. Ilsreposent sur deux grandes lignesde force : mettre au point un systèmeglobal de gestion desressources en eau, qui intègre lesbesoins des sous-secteurs desservices d’eau, et présenter unprogramme de réformes et desinnovations afin d’améliorer lapertinence, l’efficacité et la viabilitédes principaux sous-secteursdes services d’eau.FRANÇAISxviii

Executive Summaryguided Bank involvementin an increasing number ofinternational water partnerships,awareness of waterdevelopment issues at thelevel of Country AssistanceStrategies remains elusive.Bank actions are a modestdriving force behind water managementreforms, except in smallcountries. Even then, reformrequires aligning Bank interventionswith country conditions andthe activities of other internationalactors. Other development institutions,including multilateral andbilateral development agencies,nongovernmental organizations(NGOs), and the private sectorcan, and do, influence the paceand direction of reform. Promotingcollaboration with these participantsis an important elementof the Strategy.The Bank has not widelyadopted the comprehensiveprinciples at the heart of theStrategy. This is less a failure,however, than an indication ofthe complexity of water sectorreform. Even with sound governance,participation, institutionsand skills—all largely missing inBank client countries—suchreform takes 10–20 years.Reform also takes time. All toooften the Bank has expectedreform to quickly follow investment.But in water supply andsanitation, making investment conditionalon reform frequently leadsto more successful outcomes.ENGLISHLeadership and OwnershipWhere there are champions forreform, the results can be remarkable.In Brazil the Bank’s waterprograms are successful in thestate of Ceara because of the per-tucionales y la misión delBanco y se ha contribuidoa un consenso mundialincipiente sobre la ordenaciónde los recursos hídricos.Pero la aplicación,aunque amplia, ha sidoparcial y desigual, congrandes diferencias entre las oficinasregionales, países y subsectores.Quedan pendientes tareaspara adaptar la Estrategia a diversosámbitos nacionales y vincularla ordenación de los recursoshídricos con la prestación de serviciossostenibles.ESPAÑOLLa reforma es difícilSi bien muchos principios de laEstrategia han sido incorporadosen los estudios económicos y sectorialesy han orientado la participacióndel Banco en unacreciente cantidad de asociacionesinternacionales relativas al agua,aún no se ha creado suficienteconciencia sobre las cuestionesrelativas al aprovechamiento delos recursos hídricos a nivel de lasestrategias de asistencia a los países.Las intervenciones del Bancoson una pequeña fuerza impulsorade las reformas en la ordenacióndel agua, salvo en paísespequeños; aun en ellos, lareforma requiere que las intervencionesdel Banco se armonicencon las condiciones reinantes enel país y las actividades de otrosparticipantes internacionales.Otras instituciones de desarrollo,entre ellas organismos multilateralesy bilaterales de desarrollo,organizaciones no gubernamentales(ONG) y entidades del sectorprivado, pueden influir sobre elritmo y la orientación de lareforma, y así lo hacen. Promoverla colaboración con esos partici-La stratégie estappliquée de manièregénérale — mais samise en œuvre estfragmentaire et inégaleLa mise en œuvre de laStratégie de 1993 a permisde faire avancer les butsinstitutionnels de la Banque ainsique la mission qui lui a étéassignée, et elle a contribué àdégager un début de consensus surla gestion des ressources en eau.Mais si la stratégie est appliquée demanière générale, sa mise en œuvredemeure néanmoins fragmentaire etinégale, avec des différences marquéesentre les Régions, les pays etles sous-secteurs. Des efforts restentà faire pour adapter la Stratégie auxdifférents contextes nationaux etpour articuler la gestion desressources en eau avec l’organisationde services viables.FRANÇAISLes réformes sont difficilesUn grand nombre des principesqui sous-tendent la Stratégie sontsystématiquement inclus dans lesétudes économiques et sectorielles,ce qui a conduit la Banqueà participer à un nombre croissantde partenariats internationauxpour l’eau, mais la sensibilisationaux problèmes de la mise envaleur de l’eau dans le cadre desStratégies d’assistance aux paysdemeure un vœu pieux. Les interventionsde la Banque ont peud’influence sur les réformes concernantla gestion des ressourcesen eau, sauf dans les petits pays.Et si c’est le cas, encore faut-iladapter les interventions de laBanque à la situation des pays etaux activités des autres acteursinternationaux. D’autres institutionsde développement, et notammentles organismes multilatérauxxix

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyENGLISHsonal interest of the governorand grassroots operationsand management. InIndia the chief minister ofAndhra Pradesh pushedthrough an extensivereform program of the irrigationsector.Cross-Sectoral Operations,Subsectoral DifferencesThe number of cross-sectoralwater resources managementoperations is increasing, butslowly. Most Bank operationsremain project-focused becausethat is seen as the most effectiveway of building capacity, introducingreforms, and enabling economicand sector work in a timeof declining budgets. Indeed, tailoringproject design to the Strategy’sservice-delivery—rather thancomprehensive—initiativesappears to result in fewer problemprojects and catalyzes reform.In consequence, Bank efforts tonurture policy reform and builddomestic capacities have notmatched the challenge in mostcountries.A major problem is that themain water subsectors (water supply,irrigation and drainage,hydropower, flood control, andenvironment) function independently,with little cross-sectoralplanning and cooperation, andthere has been only modestprogress toward integrating waterresources management activitieswithin river basins. Greater attentionis being devoted to makingexisting infrastructure and institutionswork more effectively, butthere is a long way to go.There are also marked subsectoraldifferences—reform in publicsector irrigation and drainagepantes es un importanteelemento de la Estrategia.El Banco no ha adoptadoen forma generalizadalos principios integralesbásicos de la Estrategia. Sinembargo, esto no es tantouna falla, sino más bien unindicio de la complejidad de lareforma del sector de recursoshídricos. Aun cuando se cuentecon una adecuada gestión degobierno, participación, institucionesy conocimientos —todo locual suele faltar en gran medidaen los países clientes del Banco—,las reformas suelen llevar de 10 a20 años.Con frecuencia, el Banco haesperado que la reforma ocurrarápidamente después de las inversiones.Pero en materia de abastecimientode agua y saneamiento,supeditar las inversiones a lareforma suele redundar en resultadosmás satisfactorios.ESPAÑOLLiderazgo e identificación con losproyectosCuando hay paladines de lareforma, los resultados puedenser notables. En el estado deCeará (Brasil), los programas delBanco sobre el agua son eficacesdebido al interés personal delGobernador y a las operaciones ygestión por las comunidades debase. En la India, el primer ministrode Andhra Pradesh impulsóun amplio programa de reformadel sector de riego.Operaciones intersectoriales, diferenciassubsectorialesEstá aumentando, aunque lentamente,el número de operacionesintersectoriales para la ordenaciónde los recursos hídricos. La mayoríade las operaciones del Bancoet bilatéraux de développement,les organisations nongouvernementales (ONG) etle secteur privé, peuventinfluer sur le rythme et lecours des réformes, et c’estce qu’elles font. La promotionde la collaborationavec ces participants est un élémentimportant de la Stratégie.Les principes généraux qui sontau cœur de la Stratégie n’ont pasété largement adoptés par les servicesde la Banque. C’est moins là lesigne d’un échec qu’une indicationde la complexité de la réforme dusecteur de l’eau. Même avec lesatouts que représentent une sainegestion des affaires publiques, laparticipation, les institutions et lescompétences — atouts qui font leplus souvent défaut aux paysclients de la Banque —, il faut de10 à 20 ans pour mener cesréformes à leur terme.Les réformes demandentégalement du temps. Trop souvent,la Banque a pensé que lesinvestissements seraient rapidementsuivis de réformes. Mais,dans le secteur de l’alimentationen eau et de l’assainissement,on obtient souvent de meilleursrésultats lorsque l’investissementest subordonné à la miseen œuvre de réformes.FRANÇAISDe l’importance du leadership et dela prise en charge des opérationspar les acteurs concernésDans les pays où la cause desréformes est entendue, les résultatspeuvent être remarquables.Au Brésil, le bilan des programmesde la Banque dans lesecteur de l’eau est très satisfaisantdans l’État du Ceara parce que leGouverneur s’y intéresse personnellementet que ce sont les pop-xx

Executive Summaryis now significantly behindthat in water supply andsanitation, which is increasinglyacceptingcommercialization and privatization.Other importantelements of the Strategy—legal and policy aspects,institutional development, participationof stakeholders in decisionmakingand decentralization,a focus on the most needy—remain partially implemented.While there was increased attentionto cost recovery, waterquality concerns, and the environment,the broader issues of theeconomic value of water, waterand property rights, and mechanismsto equitably allocate anincreasingly scarce resource havebeen neglected, even when Bankattention to the management oftrans-boundary and internationalwaters increased.ENGLISHManaging ComplexityDetermining the right level ofcomplexity and phasing is one ofthe unresolved dilemmas of amore comprehensive and integratedapproach. Not everythingcan be done at once. The TurkeyIzmir Water Supply and SewerageProject demonstrates the inadvisabilityof committing funds forlarge-scale expansion of facilitiesbefore addressing critical institutionalissues. The Lesotho HighlandWater Project, in contrast,largely complied with theStrategy, but its sheer size andcomplexity created an influentialnational implementation agencythat government will have troublecontrolling, and dam buildingcrowded-out attention to watersupply and sanitation. While it isessential to plan comprehensively,siguen centradas en losproyectos porque se consideraque ésta es la maneramás eficaz de fortalecer lacapacidad, introducir reformasy realizar estudios económicosy sectoriales entiempos de retracción presupuestaria.En efecto, al adaptarel diseño de los proyectos a iniciativasde prestación de serviciosconforme a la Estrategia —y no ainiciativas integrales— se obtienen,al parecer, en menos proyectosproblemáticos y se favorece lareforma. En consecuencia, lasactividades del Banco para promoverla reforma de políticas yfortalecer la capacidad nacionalno han estado a la altura de losretos que enfrenta la mayoría delos países.Un problema importante esque los principales subsectoresdel agua (abastecimiento de agua,riego y drenaje, energía hidroeléctrica,defensa contra las inundacionesy medio ambiente)funcionan independientemente,con escasa planificación y cooperaciónintersectoriales, y sólo seha logrado un progreso relativohacia la integración de la ordenaciónde los recursos hídricos en elámbito de las cuencas hidrográficas.Se está prestando mayoratención a que la infraestructura ylas instituciones existentes funcionenmás eficazmente, pero esmuy largo el camino que quedapor recorrer.También hay marcadas diferenciassubsectoriales: la reforma encuestiones de riego y drenaje enel sector público va ahora muy ala zaga de la reforma en abastecimientode agua y saneamiento,donde hay una aceptación cadavez mayor de la comercializaciónESPAÑOLulations locales qui ont prisen charge les opérations etla gestion des programmes.En Inde, le ministre enChef de l’Andhra Pradesh apu mener à bien un programmede réformes devaste portée dans le secteurde l’irrigation.FRANÇAISOpérations intersectorielles, différencessous-sectoriellesLe nombre des opérations intersectoriellesde gestion des ressourcesen eau augmente, mais lentement.La plupart des opérations de laBanque restent centrées sur lesprojets parce qu’elle considère quec’est la façon la plus efficace derenforcer les capacités, d’introduiredes réformes et d’effectuer desétudes économiques et sectoriellesà un moment où les budgetsdiminuent. De fait, il apparaît que,lorsque les projets sont centrés surl’organisation des services, commele requiert la Stratégie — plutôtque sur un programme d’actionglobal —, il y ait moins de projetsà problèmes et que la dynamiquedes réformes y gagne. C’est la raisonpour laquelle les effortsdéployés par la Banque pour faireavancer les réformes, et renforcerles capacités ne sont pas à lamesure des gageures auxquellessont confrontés la plupart despays.L’une des difficultés majeurestient au fait que le fonctionnementdes principaux sous-secteurs del’eau (alimentation en eau, irrigationet drainage, hydroélectricité,maîtrise des crues et environnement)est compartimenté etqu’il y a peu de planification et decoopération intersectorielles. Enoutre, peu de progrès ont été réaliséspour intégrer les activités dexxi

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyENGLISHgreater success could beachieved through discrete,manageable, andsequenced development.Impediments RemainThere is tension betweenthe demands of the Bank’swater strategy, country prioritiesfor water development, and whatthe Bank can deliver within theconstraints imposed by internalorganization, budgets, and staffingand incentive structures. In watersupply and sanitation, and morerecently in environment, the Bankhas exercised its strategic advantage.But in other areas, particularlyirrigation, the Bank needsinternal reform to become moreeffective.Links across the Bank—particularlyin sharpening the developmentfocus on poverty alleviationand institution building—need tobe strengthened and mainstreamed.Comprehensivetreatment of water resource managementhas high transactioncosts, particularly because manysafeguard policies apply to waterrelateddevelopment. Countrymanagement thus sees manywater interventions as risky venturesin a time of dwindling Bankresources. In addition, waterdevelopment often transcendsborders, and the internationaldimension adds to the complexity.Until 2000, no one group hadbeen charged with overseeingand developing the Bankwideinstitutional retooling needed toensure a consistent approach towater resource management. Butthere are some good models,notably in the Africa and the MiddleEast and North Africa Regions.And it is expected that the newy la privatización. Otroselementos importantes dela Estrategia —aspectosjurídicos y de políticas,desarrollo institucional,participación de los interesadosen la adopción dedecisiones y descentralización,y atención a los más necesitados—aún se aplicanparcialmente. Si bien se prestómayor atención a la recuperaciónde los costos y las cuestiones decalidad del agua y medio ambiente,se han descuidado las cuestionesmás amplias del valoreconómico del agua, los derechosal agua y a la propiedad y losmecanismos para asignar equitativamenteun recurso cada vez másescaso, aun cuando el Bancoprestó mayor atención a la ordenaciónde aguas transfronterizas einternacionales.ESPAÑOLGestión de la complejidadUno de los dilemas aún no resueltosde un enfoque más completoe integrado es la determinacióndel nivel correcto de complejidady de las etapas. No es posiblehacer todo al mismo tiempo. Elproyecto de abastecimiento deagua y alcantarillado en Izmir(Turquía) demuestra que no esconveniente comprometer fondospara una expansión en granescala de las instalaciones si no sehan abordado antes las cuestionesinstitucionales de importancia crítica.En cambio, el proyecto derecursos hídricos en las regionesmontañosas de Lesotho se adhirióen gran medida a la Estrategia,pero debido a su gran tamaño ycomplejidad se creó un influyenteorganismo nacional de ejecuciónque el gobierno tendrá dificultaden controlar, y se prestó excesivagestion des ressources eneau au niveau des bassinsfluviaux. Des efforts sontfaits pour améliorer l’efficacitédes infrastructures etdes institutions existantes,mais il reste encore beaucoupà faire.Il y a aussi des différences notablesentre les secteurs : dans lessecteurs publics de l’irrigation etdu drainage, les réformes accusentmaintenant un sérieux retard parrapport au secteur de l’alimentationen eau et de l’assainissement,où les principes de l’exploitationcommerciale et la privatisationgagnent de plus en plus de terrain.Les autres éléments importants dela Stratégie — aspects juridiques etaspects relevant de l’action gouvernementale,développementinstitutionnel, participation desparties prenantes aux prises dedécision et décentralisation, prioritéaccordée aux plus pauvres —ne sont encore appliqués que defaçon fragmentaire. Si les problèmesde recouvrement des coûts,de qualité de l’eau et de la protectionde l’environnement sontdavantage pris en ligne de compte,les questions plus générales quesont la valeur économique del’eau, les droits d’usage de l’eau etles droits de propriété, les mécanismespermettant de répartiréquitablement des ressources deplus en plus rares ont été négligées,même lorsque la Banque aentrepris de s’intéresser davantageà la gestion des eaux transfrontièreset internationales.FRANÇAISGérer la complexitéDéterminer le bon degré de complexitéet d’échelonnement desopérations est l’un des dilemmesnon résolus de l’approche globalexxii

Executive SummaryBank Water ResourcesManagement Group createdin early 2000 withinthe Environmentally andSocially Sustainable DevelopmentVice-Presidency(ESSD) will address theseissues in the WaterResources Sector Strategy Paper.ENGLISHBetter Guidelines Are NeededOED’s staff survey found thatoverall satisfaction with the Strategydocument is high: about 75percent considered it thorough,consistent with Bank objectives,and relevant to current Bankwork and borrower needs. Butamong informed staff, almost 60percent thought that the recommendationsare difficult to monitorand somewhat platitudinous.Many comments described theStrategy as “another unfundedmandate.” Independent reviewscommissioned by OED also foundthat the Operations Policy is difficultto use as a guidance document:“It is too brief and abstractfor most practitioners and Bankstaff,” noted one respondent.Compounding this, the reviewsfound that the Strategy needs tobe revised, based on lessons andinternational best practices. Inthis, the Bank needs to developsensitive, flexible guidelines thatpermit staff to set assistance prioritiesand to determine acceptabletradeoffs in cases where the waterStrategy imposes competingdemands or where elements ofthe Strategy are not likely to besuccessful.A Truly ComprehensiveStrategyThe prediction of a global watercrisis makes it important for theatención a la construcciónde presas, en desmedro delabastecimiento de agua yel saneamiento. Si bien esimprescindible que la planificaciónsea integral,podrían lograrse mejoresresultados mediante intervencionesde desarrollo discretas,manejables y realizadas ensecuencia.ESPAÑOLSubsisten los impedimentosHay tensión entre las exigenciasde la estrategia del Banco sobrerecursos hídricos, las prioridadesde los países para el aprovechamientodel agua y los serviciosque el Banco puede prestar dentrode las limitaciones impuestaspor la organización interna, lospresupuestos, la dotación de personaly las estructuras de incentivos.En materia de abastecimientode agua y saneamiento, y másrecientemente, de medio ambiente,el Banco ha aprovechado suventaja estratégica; pero en otrasesferas, particularmente la delriego, el Banco necesita unareforma interna para aumentar sueficacia.Es preciso fortalecer los vínculosinternos en el Banco e incorporarlosen las actividades dedesarrollo, en particular en cuantoa centrar el enfoque del desarrolloen la mitigación de la pobreza y elfortalecimiento institucional. Paraun tratamiento integral al tema dela ordenación de los recursoshídricos entraña altos costos detransacción, sobre todo debido aque muchas políticas de salvaguardiase aplican al desarrollorelacionado con el agua. Por eso,los directivos a cargo de las operacionesen los países consideranque muchas intervenciones relatietintégrée. On ne peuttout faire à la fois. Le Projetd’alimentation en eau etd’assainissement d’Izmir(Turquie) montre qu’il n’estpas souhaitable d’engagerdes fonds pour de vastestravaux d’expansion deséquipements sans avoir au préalableréglé les problèmes institutionnelsfondamentaux. Parcontre, le Projet eau dans leszones montagneuses du Lesothos’appuyait dans une large mesuresur les principes de la Stratégie,mais la taille et la complexitémêmes de l’opération a conduit àmettre en place un organismed’exécution national influent quele gouvernement aura du mal àcontrôler, et la construction dubarrage a éclipsé les problèmesd’alimentation en eau et d’assainissement.Une planificationd’ensemble est certes essentielle,mais on peut obtenir de meilleursrésultats avec des opérations dedéveloppement spécifiques, d’uneenvergure raisonnable et échelonnéesdans le temps.FRANÇAISDes obstacles demeurentIl est difficile de concilier à la foisles impératifs de la stratégie del’eau de la Banque, les prioritésdes pays en matière de mise envaleur de l’eau et ce que laBanque peut accomplir comptetenu des contraintes qu’imposentl’organisation interne, les budgets,la composition du personnel etles structures d’incitation. Dans lesdomaines de l’alimentation en eauet de l’assainissement, et plusrécemment dans celui de l’environnement,la Banque a exploitéson avantage stratégique. Maisdans d’autres domaines et particulièrementdans celui de l’irriga-xxiii

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyBank to reposition itself tomeet the challenge. This iscreating opportunities forthe Bank to implement acomprehensive water managementstrategy along thefollowing lines:• Aim country dialogueand institutional development atmaking water developmentmore responsive to social andenvironmental concerns andgive more attention to allocationissues.• Nurture commitment to thestrategy through shared objectives,realistic diagnostics, andpartnerships aimed at policyreform and capacity building.• Create and sustain comprehensivewater managementalliances with like-minded partnersin the private sector, civilsociety, and the developmentcommunity.• Strengthen internal Bank managementand monitoring andevaluation of water resourcesmanagement activities througha more streamlined organization.Foster more cohesivecountry and water sector strategies,enhanced core competencies,additional operationalguidance and training, andmore rigorous quality assurancearrangements.ENGLISHvas al agua son iniciativasriesgosas en momentos enque disminuyen los recursosdel Banco. Además, elaprovechamiento de losrecursos hídricos suele trascenderlas fronteras y ladimensión internacionalaumenta la complejidad.Hasta 2000, no se había encomendadoa ningún grupo lasupervisión y formulación a nivelde todo el Banco de la reorganizacióninstitucional necesaria paraasegurar un enfoque coherente dela ordenación de los recursoshídricos. Existen buenos modelos,especialmente en las regiones deÁfrica y de Oriente Medio y Nortede África; se espera que el nuevoGrupo del Banco encargado de lagestión de los recursos hídricos,creado a principios de 2000 dentrode la Vicepresidencia de DesarrolloSocial y EcológicamenteSostenible, encarará esas cuestionesen el documento de estrategiasobre recursos hídricos.ESPAÑOLEs preciso contar con mejoresdirectricesEn la encuesta del personal realizadapor el DEO se comprobóque en general, hay gran satisfaccióncon el documento de laEstrategia: un 75% de los encuestadosopinaron que era completo,que guardaba coherencia con losobjetivos del Banco y que erapertinente a la labor actual delBanco y las necesidades de losprestatarios. Pero de los funcionarioscompetentes, casi 60% opinaronque las recomendaciones sondifíciles de supervisar y algo triviales.Muchas observaciones aludierona la Estrategia como “otromandato sin financiamiento”. Enexámenes independientes enco-tion, elle doit engager desréformes internes pourdevenir plus efficace.Il faut renforcer et systématiserles liens entre lesservices de la Banque — enparticulier pour mieux centrerles actions dedéveloppement sur la lutte contrela pauvreté et le renforcement desinstitutions. Le traitement global dela gestion des ressources en eauimplique des coûts de transactionélevés, en particulier parce quebeaucoup de mesures de sauvegardes’appliquent au développementlié aux ressources hydriques.C’est pourquoi les responsablespaysconsidèrent que les interventionsdans le secteur de l’eau sontdes opérations risquées à unmoment où les ressources de laBanque diminuent. En outre, lamise en valeur de l’eau transcendesouvent les frontières, et la dimensioninternationale ajoute à complexitédes opérations.Jusqu’en 2000, aucun groupen’a été chargé de procéder à laréorganisation institutionnelle del’ensemble de la Banque qui s’imposeafin de lui permettred’adopter une approchecohérente pour la gestion desressources en eau, et de suivre ledéroulement de cette restructuration.Mais il existe des modèlesvalables, notamment dans lesRégions Afrique, et Moyen-Orientet Afrique du Nord. Et le nouveauGroupe de gestion des ressourcesen eau créé au début de l’an 2000au sein de la Vice-présidenceDéveloppement écologiquementet socialement durable (ESSD)s’attaquera sans aucun doute àces questions dans le documentde Stratégie sectorielle pour lesressources en eau.FRANÇAISxxiv

Executive Summarymendados por el DEO tambiénse comprobó que lapolítica operacional es difícilde utilizar como documentode orientación: “Esdemasiado breve y abstractapara la mayoría delos profesionales y de losfuncionarios del Banco”, dijo unencuestado. En los exámenestambién se comprobó que es precisomodificar la Estrategia sobrela base de las enseñanzas recogidasy las prácticas óptimas internacionales.Al respecto, es precisoque el Banco elabore directricesperceptivas y flexibles que permitanal personal establecer prioridadesde asistencia y determinarsoluciones de compromiso aceptablescuando la Estrategia sobrerecursos hídricos imponga exigenciasen pugna o cuando seaimprobable que algunos de suselementos surtan efecto.ESPAÑOLUna estrategiarealmente integralHabida cuenta del pronóstico deuna crisis mundial del agua, esimportante que el Banco se reposicionepara responder ante esereto. Esto crea oportunidades paraque el Banco aplique una estrategiaintegral de ordenación de losrecursos hídricos acorde con lossiguientes lineamientos:• Procurar que en el diálogo conlos países y en el desarrolloinstitucional el aprovechamientode los recursos hídricosresponda mejor a cuestionessociales y ambientales y prestemás atención a los problemasde asignación de recursos.• Fomentar la adhesión a laestrategia a través de objetivoscomunes, diagnósticos realistasy alianzas orientadas a laIl faut améliorer lesdirectivesL’enquête menée par l’OEDauprès des services de laBanque montre que le tauxde satisfaction concernant laStratégie est élevé : environ75 % des agents considèrentque ce document présente uneanalyse fouillée, cohérente avec lesobjectifs de l’institution et qui correspondbien aux activités actuellesde la Banque et aux besoins desemprunteurs. Mais près de 60 %des agents informés ont estimé queles recommandations sont difficilesà contrôler et qu’elles sont assezbanales. Beaucoup décrivent laStratégie comme « un autre mandatqui ne fait pas l’objet d’un financement». Des enquêtes indépendantesdemandées par l’OEDmontrent aussi que la politiqueopérationnelle est difficile à utilisercomme document de référence :«C’est trop succinct et trop abstraitpour la plupart des hommes deterrain et des agents de la Banque »a noté une personne interrogée.Plus grave encore, les enquêtesmontrent qu’il faut réviser laStratégie sur la base des enseignementstirés et des pratiques optimalesinternationales. À cet égard,il faut que la Banque élabore desdirectives rationnelles et souplesqui permettent aux agents d’établirles priorités d’intervention etd’opérer les arbitrages nécessaireslorsque la Stratégie impose des exigencesantinomiques ou lorsquecertains de ses éléments risquentde se solder par un échec.FRANÇAISUne stratégie véritablementglobaleAvec la crise mondiale de l’eauqui se profile à l’horizon, il estimportant que la Banque se repo-xxv

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyreforma de las políticasy al fortalecimiento dela capacidad.• Establecer y mantenermás alianzas para laordenación integral delagua con asociados afinesdel sector privado,la sociedad civil y los círculosde desarrollo.• Fortalecer la gestión interna, elseguimiento y la evaluación delBanco de las actividades deordenación de los recursoshídricos, mediante una organizaciónsimplificada, estrategiassectoriales y nacionales máscoherentes, competencias básicasmejoradas, más orientacióny capacitación operacional yarreglos más rigurosos paraasegurar la calidad.ESPAÑOLsitionne pour être enmesure de relever cettegageure, ce qui lui offriral’occasion de mettre enœuvre une stratégie globalede l’eau fondée sur lesprincipes suivants :• axer le dialogue avec lespays et le développement institutionnelsur la prise encompte des questions socialeset environnementales dans lecadre de la mise en valeur del’eau et se préoccuper davantagedu problème de répartitiondes ressources en eau ;• encourager l’adoption de lastratégie en fondant l’action surdes objectifs partagés, desdiagnostics réalistes et despartenariats axés sur lesréformes et le renforcementdes capacités ;• créer et maintenir des allianceslarges pour la gestion de l’eauavec des partenaires du secteurprivé, de la société civile et dela communauté du développementqui partagent les mêmesconceptions ;• renforcer la gestion interne dela Banque ainsi que le suivi etl’évaluation des activités degestion des ressources en eaupar des mesures tendant àrationaliser l’organisation del’institution. Encourager l’adoptionde stratégies pluscohérentes pour les pays et lesecteur de l’eau, renforcer lescompétences essentielles,fournir des directives opérationnellessupplémentaires,élargir l’éventail des formationset prendre des dispositionsplus rigoureuses en matièred’assurance de la qualité.FRANÇAISxxvi

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMSADBAFRAPLBPCASCDDCDFCODEDFIDEAPECECAESSDESWEUFAOGEFGPI&DICRIDAIFCIUCNLAC (LCR)LILM&EMNANGOO&MOECDOEDOPPIPPROSANEARPSIPSPQAGRDVRWSSSA (SAR)SALSEAUNDPUWSSWATSALWBIAsian Development BankAfrica RegionAdaptable Program LoanBank ProcedureCountry Assistance StrategyCountry-driven DevelopmentComprehensive Development FrameworkCommittee on Development EffectivenessDepartment for International Development, U.K.East Asia and Pacific RegionEuropean CommissionEurope and Central Asia RegionEnvironmentally and Socially Sustainable Development NetworkEconomic and sector workEuropean UnionFood and Agriculture OrganizationGlobal Environment FacilityGood practiceIrrigation & drainageImplementation Completion ReportInternational Development AssociationInternational Finance CorporationInternational Union for the Conservation of NatureLatin America and Caribbean RegionLearning and Innovation LoanMonitoring and evaluationMiddle East and North Africa RegionNongovernmental organizationOperation and maintenanceOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOperations Evaluation DepartmentOperational PolicyProject Improvement PlanWater and Sanitation Program for Low-Income Urban Population, BrazilPrivate Sector Infrastructure BoardPrivate sector participationQuality Assurance GroupRural Development BoardRural Water Supply and SanitationSouth Asia RegionStructural Adjustment LoanSectoral Environmental AssessmentsUnited Nations Development ProgramUrban Water Supply and SanitationWater Sector Adjustment Loan, IndonesiaWorld Bank Institutexxvii

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyWRMWSSWUAWWVWater Resources ManagementWater Supply and SanitationWater User AssociationWorld Water Visionxxviii

1The 1993 Strategy—Still Relevant TodayThe Strategy embodied in the 1993 Water Resources Management: AWorld Bank Policy Paper is the benchmark for this evaluation. 1 Itevolved in response to growing unease within the Bank that wateroperations were failing to deliver sustainable development and growing internationalconcern about the mismanagement of global water resources andpoor service levels, particularly for the poor.A Strategy Was OverdueWhen the Bank’s water Strategy was issued,water-related projects were among the poorerperformers in the Bank’s portfolio. This wasemphasized by the influential Wapenhans Reportof 1993, which was highly critical of the qualityof the Bank’s water lending as shown in thefindings of OED sector reviews of water supplyand sanitation and of irrigation and drainage, andtrends in OED outcome ratings. 2These sectors had neither comprehensivewater development policy nor guidelines. Almosthalf the water supply and sanitation projectswere begun without an established policy for thesector—and without studies in the sector context.Most failed to tap the synergy available fromcomplementary investments in sanitation andenvironmental protection. Poverty considerationswere mostly bypassed as the Bankresponded to the pressure from influential segmentsof the population for better water and sanitationservices. There was a general failure topromote compliance with cost-recovery provisionsand the implementation of water tariffs andcharges that reconciled economic efficiency,social equity, financial criteria, and autonomousand independent regulatory systems. 3 Thus, toimprove water supply and sanitation in borrowingcountries, OED recommended that theBank should embark on medium-term programsfocused on sectoral adjustment and technicalassistance—followed by investment lending onlywhen minimum and monitorable conditions forhealthy expansion were met.Minimal policy and institutional content werealso the hallmarks of the irrigation and drainageportfolio—despite a marked shift in the late1980s toward sector loans and a definite trendaway from new construction, toward rehabilitation.An increasing aversion to projects involvingsafeguard policies prevailed, particularlyinvoluntary resettlement and land acquisition.Insufficient integration of engineering and socialscience jeopardized better irrigation service to1

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyBox 1.1people, lower unit costs, and water conservation.Financial sustainability was elusive becauseincentive structures that enabled stakeholders towork together to improve performance wereignored. While effective in reaching the ruralpoor, the perceived success of irrigation projectswas strongly affected by macroeconomic conditions,emphasizing the need for comprehensiveappraisal. Clearly, there was a need forbetter policies and a strategic approach to guidethe Bank’s water investment and non-lendingwork.The Bank StrategyThe 1993 Bank Strategy described water policiesneeded to guide internationally sponsored waterdevelopment. And today, most of the majormultilateral development agencies and severalbilateral agencies have adopted, or are formulating,water policies. With few exceptions, thesepolicies derive from the Dublin principles (box1.1) and are consistent with the Bank’s Strategy.The relevance of the key principles underlyingthe Bank’s Strategy was reaffirmed by the1997 United Nations General Assembly SpecialSession, which called for urgent action to addressa looming freshwater crisis—and respond toincreasing Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD) concern aboutpersistent water quality problems, the need forheavy investment in water delivery and treatmentinfrastructure, and growing competition for finitesupplies (OECD 1998). Indeed, a consensusThe DublinGuiding Principleson Water• Fresh water is a finite and valuable resource, essential to sustain life,development, and the environment.• Water development and management should be based on a participatoryapproach, involving users, planners, and policymakers at alllevels.• Women play a central part in the provision, management, and safeguardingof water.• Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and shouldbe recognized as an economic good.endures that the severity of the world’s waterproblems requires a strategic approach thatemphasizes the equitable and sustainable managementof water resources.Strategic Approach to Equitable andSustainable Water ManagementThe Strategy paper was the outcome of a hotdebate. It fell hostage to another debate overpublic access to information—a debate notresolved until 1993—making it doubly contentious.Following protest letters from nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) representing24 borrowing and 8 other countries, the Bankconvened a consultative workshop in Washington,D.C., in May 1992. The lessons from thisworkshop made a substantial difference to theeventual content of the Strategy paper—but notwithout extensive lobbying pressures. The penultimatedraft reflected divisions within the Bankbetween those who would rely on privatizationand market forces to solve the problems of thewater sector and those who preferred a morecomprehensive and participatory approach. Thefinal paper accommodated both perspectives.The Dublin and Rio Conferences, as well ascontemporary Bank work, influenced the Strategy.These ideas and principles were driven bythe concerns of global NGOs in the late 1980sand earlier Bank statements, operational directives,and notes—the most important of whichemerged in 1989–92. 4 They were largely developedby a coalition of water professionals fromdeveloping and developed countries. An overridingconcern of all involved was that waterresources had to be distributed more widely (figure1.1) and protected from degradation (Shiklimanov2000a).The Strategy paper recognized that improvingperformance in meeting water needs requiresborrowing countries to reform their water managementinstitutions, policies, and planning systems.It also acknowledged that this wouldrequire changes to the Bank’s internal processes,training, skills mix, and resources assigned towater and water-related operations. The mainrecommendation was that a new approach—recognizingthat water is a scarce natural resource,subject to many interdependencies in con-2

The 1993 Strategy—Still Relevant TodayFigure 1.1W ater Availability Continues toDecline in Developing CountriesPer capita water availability compared with 1950100%80%Developed countries60%Developing countries - humid40%Developing countries - arid20%0%1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030Yearveyance and use—should be adopted by theBank and its member countries.The twin requirements of comprehensivenessand country-specificity are the centerpiece.Together, they challenge the Bank to avoidcookie-cutter blueprints for institutional reformand water-sector management—and challengeborrowers to look beyond the short-term gainsfrom discrete projects. The aim is to:• Maximize the contribution of water to countries’economic, social, and environmentaldevelopment while ensuring that resourceand water services are managed sustainably.• Encourage and help countries establish comprehensiveanalytical frameworks to fosterinformed and transparent decisionmaking,with an emphasis on demand management.• Promote decentralized implementationprocesses and market forces to guide theappropriate mix of public and private sectorprovision of water services.The comprehensive analytical frameworksadvocated in the Strategy paper are to helpguide decisions about water resources and“enable coherent, consistent policies and regulationsto be adopted across sectors . . . incountries where significant problems exist,or are emerging, concerning the scarcity ofwater, the efficiency of service, the allocationof water, or environmental damage” (WorldBank 1994d, pp. 10–11, 13). There thus aretwo major thrusts: to produce an overarchingwater resources management framework thatintegrates the needs of the water service subsectorsand a reform agenda and innovationsto improve the relevance, effectiveness, andsustainability of the main water servicessubsectors (figure 1.2). Traditionally, themajority of the Bank’s operations dealt withsubsector development.Country situations and constraints providethe pattern to tailor the comprehensive frameworks.Recognizing that many borrowerswould need help in designing a suitable analyticalframework and implementing the correspondingreform effort, the Strategycommitted the Bank to assist governments ininstitutional reforms and in establishing astrong legal and regulatory framework fordealing with pricing, monopoly organizations,environmental protection, and other aspects of3

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyFigure 1.2A Comprehensive Framework forW ater ManagementIntegrated Water Resources ManagementPoliciesStrategiesInstitutionsInstrumentsWatersupply andsanitationIrrigationanddrainagePollutioncontrolWetlandsFisheriesEnergyNavigationFloodmanagementBiodiversityPeopleFoodsecurityEnvironmentWater Service SubsectorsOtherSource: After Global Water Partnership (2000).water management (World Bank 1994d). Themain areas of emphasis in the 1993 Strategyare to:• Build institutional and regulatory capacity inborrower countries sufficient to enable borrowersto implement and sustain the comprehensiveapproach to water-sector planningand management.• Support international cooperation on managementand use of international waterwaysand bodies, recognizing that a truly comprehensiveapproach to water-resource managementextends beyond the borders ofindividual borrowers and beyond the timeframeof individual projects.• Draw on the comparative advantages oforganizations outside the Bank and involvestakeholders in decisions that affect them.Decentralization, participation, and partnershipsare key instruments to increase stakeholderownership and accountability, buildcapacity, and ultimately lower the cost andimprove the effectiveness of operations,maintenance, safeguards, and monitoring andevaluation.• Adopt water rights, pricing, and incentives(including adoption of new technologies andmanagerial approaches) to encourage rationaland efficient allocation of water among competinguses, discourage waste, and ensureadequate water services.• Ensure that water operations enhance humanand natural environments, with special attentionto safeguards, social impacts (particularlyon women), and meeting the needs of thepoor.New Approaches and InitiativesAre Even More Critical TodayApart from the attention needed to reform oldinstitutions and organizations and build newones to deal with the strategic issues in waterdevelopment, the most daunting challenge is tomobilize funds. World Water Vision (WWV) 2000estimates that the annual investment to meet allwater supply and sanitation, irrigation, industrial,and environmental management needs by 2025will be $180 billion—today it is $70–80 billion(table 1.1). The WWV team postulated thatinvestment for agriculture (mainly irrigation and4

The 1993 Strategy—Still Relevant TodayT able 1.1Annual Investment for Water MustIncreaseInvestment ($ billion)IncreaseWater use 1995 2025 1995–2025 (%)Agriculture 30–35 30 -8Environment and industry 10–15 75 500Water supply and sanitation 30 75 150Total 70-80 180 140Source: WWC 2000.T able 1.2A Much Greater Role for thePrivate SectorInvestment ($ billion)IncreaseSource 1995 2025 1995–2025 (%)NationalPublic sector 45–50 30 a -37Private firms 12–15 b 90 c 620InternationalDonors 9 12 33Private investors 4 b 48 1,100Total 70–80 180 140a. Assumes direct government subsidy of $20 billion to the poor.b. Does not include investment by industry.c. Includes investment by industry, excluding hydropower.Source: WWC 2000.drainage) declined because the era of costly,large-scale public capital investment in new irrigationis almost at an end—and that more efficientuser-managed rehabilitation, operation,and maintenance are likely. 5 The public sectorprovides most of the investment (table 1.2), butprivate investments (including contributions byindustry) of $138 billion a year, or almost 70 percentof the total, will be essential.Even international donors are expected toincrease their contribution by a third—to $12 billion.This massive increased investment—whichwould be even greater if irrigation and drainageinvestment were to increase—can be achievedonly if developing countries are able to create aninvestment climate conducive to the private sectorand able to absorb these investments. Thisrequires political stability and attention togovernance and institutions—particularly propertyrights, rule of law, transparency, and participation.The Commission Report of the Second WorldWater Forum (March 2000) stated that:To ensure that environmental quality isimproved and people’s needs are met, theremust be a redoubled effort at technological,financial, and institutional innovation. Withregard to technological innovation this meansmobilizing the knowledge and investmentcapacity of the private sector and supplementingit with strategic investments. With regard to institutionalinnovation, the core challenges arestimulating new forms of involvement of citizensin managing water and providing incentivesfor private sector involvement. TheCommission emphasizes that unless full-costpricing for water services becomes acceptedpractice, none of these will succeed. With commitment,however, the problems can be overcome.A secure world is possible, but we mustchange the ways we manage water.5

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyThis statement supports the assertion that theBank’s 1993 Strategy is highly relevant to currentglobal priorities. Fine-tuning will enablethe Bank to make adjustments in response to lessonsfrom positive and negative changes in theoperating environment. That will involve updatingthe Strategy to ensure congruence with overarchingBank priorities (poverty reduction,governance, sound economic and fiscal management)and the greater focus on achievingresults consistent with the Comprehensive DevelopmentFramework (CDF).6

2The Bank’s WaterAssistance and PortfolioThe Bank has substantially realigned the composition of water operationsand non-lending work to incorporate crosscutting waterStrategy issues in a diverse set of countries.Different Countries Present DifferentChallengesBank actions are generally only a modest drivingforce behind water management reforms, exceptin small countries. Even then, reformrequires aligning Bank interventions with countryconditions and other international actors.Other development institutions, including multilateraland bilateral development agencies andnongovernmental organizations and the privatesector, can and do influence the pace and directionof reform. Promoting collaboration withthese international actors is an important elementof the water Strategy, particularly in large countries—China,India, Mexico, and Brazil—whereit is essential to improve selectivity by leveragingthe relatively small external assistance. Forexample, India is the second-biggest Bank borrowerfor water, yet the Bank’s credits have providedonly about 10 percent of national waterinvestment and less than half of all external assistancefor water development (Pitman 2001).The design of relevant reforms and the timeframe for their implementation crucially dependon the internal dynamics and water situation ofthe country:• Water-short Mexico and Yemen are striving tosustainably manage groundwater in the faceof competing urban and agricultural waterdemand.• The rapidly urbanizing populations of Brazil,China, and India face the key challenges ofproviding water and sanitation while controllingpollution that reduces the resourcebase.• In the central Asian republics, triage to determineappropriate maintenance and rehabilitationof failing irrigation systems is amongthe major development issues.• In Honduras and St. Lucia, land use policiesand regulation are key to sustainable watershedmanagement.• While Pakistan is focused on solving its massivedrainage problems and resultant salinization,flood control has traditionallydominated the agenda in Bangladesh.The challenge of comprehensive waterresource management continues to be addressingthese critical development issues, and copingwith such natural disasters as drought andthe results of El Niño—all without neglecting7

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyenvironmental management, institutional development,and financial, economic, and socialsustainability. While the impact, scale, and timingof global warming on water resources andsea levels are contentious, the likely effects needto be included in the discussion of long-term regionaland global water strategies.The Mix of Instruments Has ChangedThe Bank’s work has remained primarily at thecountry level, complemented by selected globalprograms. The custom package of assistancedepends on a country’s needs. Over time, themix and nature of Bank products and serviceshas changed and the Bank has increasinglyleveraged its other assets—cross-country experience,and relationships and capacity to connectclients with additional sources of finance, technicalexpertise, and partnerships.LendingThe range of instruments has changed in the lastdecade. Traditional specific investment lendingdominates (80 percent ), followed by specific investmentand maintenance loans (10 percent).But within this category, loans have financed awide range of activities, from single small-scaleprojects to complex programmatic sectoral operations.Poor experience with technical assistanceloans caused them to be reduced by athird, and only six were made post-Strategy.Adaptable Program and Learning and InnovationLoans, introduced Bankwide in 1997, accountedfor only 7 of the 201 operations since 1993.Sectoral Adjustment Loans (SALs) have beenused sparingly, most notably to leverage reformin Jordan, and an ambitious SAL for water is currentlybeing completed for Indonesia.Since 1989, the Bank has successfully facilitatedthe privatization process to leverage largeprivate investment. Private sector participation(PSP) in water supply and sanitation has grownremarkably, and took off in 1992 in response toglobal liberalization and the easing of fiscal restraints.To date, more than $21.8 billion has beeninvested for 86 water supply utilities, most of itin the well-governed middle- to higher-incomedeveloping countries. The Bank, with the InternationalFinance Corporation (IFC) and theGlobal Environmental Facility (GEF), has beeninvolved in 17 PSP operations. Bank Group investmentsin PSP, which exceed $680 million,cover 12 countries, of which a third are in thelow-income category eligible for IDA funding.Economic and Sector WorkEconomic and sector work (ESW) for water hasmore than doubled since 1991. In 1992–98 thenumber of ESW reports rose from 25 a year toabout 30, falling back slightly during the Bankreorganization of 1997. Unlike much of the earlierwork, which dwelt on traditional technicalissues, ESW after 1992 fully embraced the themes,policy instruments, and objectives of the newStrategy, moving away from traditional watermanagement toward roles for the private sector,participation, and comprehensive water management(figure 2.1). ESW on the private sector,pricing, and markets has seen the biggest increasein attention, but most of this work concernedwater supply rather than either sanitation or irrigationand drainage. Social assessments havebeen notably absent. Partnerships to promoteglobal public water and capacity building are themost notable innovation post-Strategy.PartnershipsBuilding global and regional public policy. TheBank has been instrumental in forming and supportinga growing number of international partnerships.Notable are the Global WaterPartnership and the World Water Council in1996. The two bodies have similar and overlappingobjectives, but they differ in the way theycontribute to sustainable water resources management.The World Water Council is more aforum than a network, views itself as the world’swater policy think tank, and is publishing anew journal, Water Policy, which focuses on policyaspects of water resources. Conversely, theGlobal Water Partnership, initially chaired by aBank Vice President, attempts to translate recommendationsfor action on water managementinto specific services for developing countriesand to catalyze funding mechanisms for serviceimplementation. Through a consultative process,the partnership developed the Framework forAction, establishing a shared view of appropri-8

The Bank’s Water Assistance and PortfolioFigure 2.1ESW Is Responsive to the WaterStrategyPrivate sector, pricing,and marketsParticipationComprehensive watermanagementWater policy analysisEnvironmental managementInstitutional and regulatorySectoral reviewsAddressing the needsof the poorWater managementPost-StrategyPre-StrategySource: OED.0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50Number of ESW activitiesate strategies, mechanisms for implementation,and priorities for immediate action and investmentto obtain a World Water Vision. The frameworkwas presented at the Second World WaterConference organized by the World Water Commissionat The Hague in 2000. The UNDP-WorldBank Partnership on International Waters was establishedin 1998.Not all global policy partnerships are longtermor formal. The World Commission on Damsreceived substantial buy-in across the globe,but was dissolved after issuing its final report inNovember, 2000. 1 An informal partnership betweenthe Bank and Germany has sponsoredfour international roundtables on transboundarywater policy and management to support theGlobal Water Partnership’s Integrated Water ResourcesManagement Window. In addition, theBusiness Partners for Development partnershiphas a three-year water and sanitation componentsponsored by the Bank, the U.K. Department forInternational Development (DFID), and privatewater companies. It is studying public-privatepartnerships in eight countries to see what determinessuccess.The Africa and Middle East and North Africa(MNA) Regions of the Bank are facilitating regionaldialogue on water policy, development,and management. The 1997 MNA Regional WaterPolicy Initiative is a partnership with the EuropeanUnion (EU) and the European InvestmentBank. The Africa Region hosted the Africa WaterResources Management Policy Conference inNairobi (May, 1999), leading stakeholders to establishan African Water Resources Forum toexchange knowledge among African professionalsand practitioners. The Council of Ministersof Water Affairs of the Nile Basin has askedthe World Bank and its partners to organize andhost a consultative group—the InternationalConsortium for Cooperation on the Nile—thatwill seek coordinated and transparent supportfor cooperative projects in the Nile Basin. TheConsortium will emphasize sharing the benefitsof development rather than focusing on allocationalone.Capacity-building Partnerships. The oldestglobal water partnership—the 1977 UNDP-WorldBank Water and Sanitation Program—has beena model of governance for subsequent partnerships.Supported by 11 bilaterals, it seeks to“influence without taking over” in 30 countries.Aiming to meet the needs of the poor, it thus developedself-standing demonstration programs9

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyoutside the scope of the Bank’s lending program.Managed by the Bank, it leverages bilateralexperience into larger-scale investments by theBank and others—and builds capacity tostrengthen national policy reforms forcommunity-based approaches.The World Bank Institute’s (WBI) Water PolicyCapacity Building Program meets the demandfor knowledge and learning dissemination supportedby formal training. Supported by four UNagencies and five bilateral partners since 1994,borrowers qualify if they show commitment towater reform and if Bank staff judge the sustainabilityof program impact to be likely. Ratedas successful by clients, the program has reached9,000 participants in 90 countries. Almost half ofparticipants surveyed said that WBI-sponsoredactivities initiated country reforms of water managementpolicy.The Bank has also been successful in enablinglocal initiatives to grow into international partnershipsto build capacity and country ownershipfor sectoral reform. A 1995 WBI workshopin Mexico gave rise to the International ParticipatoryIrrigation Network, which now has membersin over 44 countries and national chaptersin the 10 biggest borrowers for irrigation. TheNetwork supplements the former BanksponsoredInternational Program for Research inIrrigation and Drainage that moved to the Foodand Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2000.Since 1996, the Bank has supported the AfricanWater Utilities Partnership for Capacity Building,which organizes management assistancefrom more experienced partners to utilities servingrapidly growing urban populations. A similarpartnership is being developed for SouthAsia. In 2000, a new Bank-Netherlands Water Partnershipemanating from the Second World WaterForum began mobilizing significant Dutch fundingto apply practical experience, lessons, andinnovation to Bank-supported operations.A Larger Portfolio Whose Quality HasImproved, Albeit UnevenlyThe Bank is the only lending institution with aglobal mandate to improve water management,and its most visible assistance has been investmentlending. Each year, developing countriesinvest $70–80 billion in water development. Ofthis, multilateral and bilateral agencies supplyabout $9 billion, of which the World Bank providesfrom $2 to $3 billion, or about 3 percentof the global funding for water.Between 1988 and 1999, the Bank approved$28.8 billion (1996 dollars) for water projects,including 319 country-based investment operationsand one regional program (the Aral Sea), risingfrom 56 countries before 1993 to 70 after. 2 Inaddition, the Bank lent about $6.2 billion forwater-focused investments in 91 other projects thatincluded significant water development components.3 Comparing lending for water before andafter the Strategy shows an increase of 21 percent,from $14.5 to $17.5 billion, while overall Banklending increased by 9.4 percent. As a result, theBank’s portfolio of water projects rose steadilyfrom 10 percent of total projects in 1988 to 14 percenttoday, even though the share of lending forwater has declined since 1997 (figure 2.2).Of the lending for water, a third went to EastAsia and the Pacific (EAP), a fifth each to SouthAsia (SA), and to Latin America and the Caribbean(LAC), with the balance divided among Africa(AFR), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), and theMiddle East and North Africa (MNA). This distributionis similar to that of overall Bank lending.The volume of lending for water remainedheavily concentrated before and after the Strategy,with more than half going to only five countries:Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and Mexico(figure 2.3). The share going to China and Indiaincreased from 25 percent before 1993 to almost40 percent after. Indeed, the overall portfoliobecame more concentrated: 85 percent oflending covered 48 countries before the Strategy,but only 24 countries after.Because the Bank’s water activities are fragmentedacross many sectors, Bank involvementin water development is considerably greaterthan suggested by Bank statistics for the traditionalwater sectors. The composition of theBank’s water portfolio has been realigned significantlysince 1993, mainly because of an increasedfocus on the environment and onmultisectoral projects, watershed developmentin agriculture projects, and social sector, transport,and urban investments (figure 2.4). 410

The Bank’s Water Assistance and PortfolioFigure 2.220The Upward Trend in Bank Lendingfor Water May Be OverProjectsPercent of Bank total15105Commitments0Source: OED.1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998YearBank commitments to the “other sectors” categorygrew eightfold after 1993 to reach $6.2billion. And most of this was for water developmentembedded within more general agriculturaldevelopment projects and social sectorprojects (table 2.1). As a result, the amount lent(but not the number of projects) to the traditionalwater subsectors (water supply and san-Figure 2.3Lending for Water Has BeenConcentrated in Relatively FewCountriesChina16%27%India10%14%Indonesia6.1%7.7%Mexico5.7%8.0%Brazil4.7%13.2%PakistanTurkeyVietnamPeruBangladesh0%0%3.6%4.6%2.4%4.7%2.2%2.2%2.4%2.0%Post-Strategy, 1994–99Pre-Strategy, 1983–93Source: OED.0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000Millions of dollars and percentage of total lending11

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyFigure 2.4Lending to the Traditional WaterSectors Has Declined Since the1993 StrategyOther sectorsIrrigation and drainageWater supplyand sanitationEnvironmentHydropowerFisheriesPost-Strategy, 1994–99Pre-Strategy, 1983–930 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000Millions of dollars committedSource: OED.itation, irrigation, and drainage) declined. Giventhat most “other sector” water projects are embeddedin operations managed by nonwaterstaff or are not managed at all in demand-led socialfunds, there is growing concern that waterpolicy oversight and coherence is being diluted.That makes it more difficult to apply the principlesof the Strategy.The Poverty Focus of Water Operations IsGetting BetterThe Strategy gives priority to the provision of adequatewater and sanitation services to the poor.OED’s analysis of Bank Quality Assurance Group(QAG) data found that water projects were notas good as other sector projects in complyingwith the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)poverty strategy. 5 Despite this, more water investmentgoes to poorer countries than Bank investmentas a whole, primarily because irrigationand drainage investments have become moresharply focused on the poorest countries. Indeed,the poverty focus of irrigation and drainageprojects rose by 23 percent after the Strategy.Conversely, formal water supply and sanitationoperations declined by 13 percent—primarily becauseof the increased focus on lending to financiallyviable urban utilities that outweighs thenew generation of pro-poor rural Water Supplyand Sanitation (WSS) projects. Indirect lendingT able 2.1W ater Supply and Sanitation Investmentsin Nontraditional Sectors Are IncreasingInvestment ($millions) a 1988–93 1994–99 Projects (number) 1988–93 1994–99Official WSS 5,556 3,984 Official WSS 64 67Other sectors 56 1,181 Other sectors 8 53Total 5,612 5,165 Total 72 120a. Constant 1996 US $.Source: OED data.12

The Bank’s Water Assistance and Portfoliofor WSS implemented through community-drivensocial funds is strongly pro-poor.Compelling evidence exists that social concernsare being increasingly addressed in wateroperations (figure 2.5), but it is too soon tojudge outcomes. 6 Increasing poverty analysisand establishing institutional mechanisms to targetthe poor and monitor impacts of Bank investmentson poverty enhanced the focus onpoverty alleviation through water operations.But substantial room remains for targeting thepoor and vulnerable populations within watersector operations. Of most concern across theBank is the scant attention given to the direct impactof these operations on the poor.Overall Project Design Has Been ImprovingThe quality of water operations at approval isgenerally better than the quality of all otherBank investments, according to QAG data, butwith some deficiencies. While water operationsaddress social and stakeholder analysis betterthan other Bank subsectors, they are notably deficientin forming appropriate partnerships withother development partners, in pushing for appropriateand realistic reform measures, or in tailoringproject design to meet the needs of targetpopulations.But There Are Subsectoral DifferencesWater projects as a whole ranked behindBankwide projects in conducting adequate analysisof the institutional framework—and wereless realistic in financial appraisal. This was primarilybecause of the rural sector’s weakness indesigning financial management systems andpoor assessment of project risks in irrigationand drainage. In their approaches to social developmentconcerns in project design, irrigationand drainage projects fare significantlybetter than water supply and sanitation. They aremore participatory, incorporate the views andwishes of various stakeholders better in theproject design, and do a much better job ofputting in place social impact and poverty monitoringmechanisms. Water supply and sanitationprojects, by contrast, articulate their developmentobjectives more clearly—and they are 25 percentbetter than the irrigation and drainage portfolioon satisfactory analysis and treatment of insti-Figure 2.5Inclusion of Social Developmentand Poverty Concerns in WaterProjects Has Been IncreasingPercent, two-year project cohort (n=118 projects in total)9080706050403020100◆▲■●◆■▲●■◆●▲1986–88 1989–90 1991–92 1993–94 1995–96 1997–98Year▲◆■●◆■▲●■◆▲●Poverty focus■▲●◆Community participationGenderResettlement13

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategytutional issues, and on the quality and coherenceof economic justification.The weakness of rural sector water operationsalso increases the risk of implementation problems.Factors contributing to the risk are countryconditions threatening achievement ofdevelopment objectives—economic managementand past portfolio performance—and thevigilance of sector management. In “realism,”which flags chronic overoptimism and a failureto recognize implementation problems early on,natural resources management and water supplyand sanitation were near the Bank average(74 percent), while irrigation and drainage weremuch less realistic. Sector management was alsoless proactive in addressing lingering problemsin irrigation and drainage than in water supplyand sanitation. But it was not as bad as naturalresources management, which was way belowthe Bank average.The irony here is that more “realism” will leadto a more problematic portfolio. In the MNA Regionthe high-risk water supply and sanitationportfolio appears to reflect the Bank’s toughand principled stand on urban water reform ina difficult Region, rather than flawed projectdesign and supervision. 7 Of the 16 Bankwidewater supply and sanitation problem projects, 3had risk factors that were political; 3, institutional;and the remaining 10, financial and managerial.None of the Bank’s irrigation operations highlightedfinancial or utility management risks becausethere were few benchmarks against whichto judge them.14

3The Water Strategy Has BeenOnly Partially ImplementedThe Bank has not widely adopted the comprehensive principles atthe heart of the Strategy. This is less a failure, however, than it is anindication of the complexity of water sector reform, which even inOECD countries takes 10–20 years.Only two of the six Bank Regions (AFR andMNA) have produced regional water strategiesin line with the Bank Strategy, and only one(MNA) has developed country and sector strategiesdriven by a regional sequencing of prioritiesfor action. By contrast, some Regions (LAC)are bundling subsector strategies to determinenational and regional strategies. Few borrowerstake a long-term holistic view that water is a vitalresource that needs careful stewardship to ensuresustainability, equitable access, and use.The number of cross-sectoral water resourcesmanagement operations is increasing onlyslowly. Most Bank operations remain projectfocusedbecause that is seen as the most effectiveway of building capacity, introducingreforms, and enabling economic and sectorwork in a time of declining budgets. Indeed, tailoringproject design to the Strategy’s servicedeliveryinitiatives appears to result in fewerproblem projects and catalyzes reform.Treatment of Water Issues in CASs HasBeen WeakThe Strategy emphasizes the critical importanceof embedding projects in country water strategieswithin the CAS framework, a benchmark ofsuccessful Strategy implementation. But this requiressignificant cross-sectoral coordination, aduty for which Bank staff have few incentivesand inadequate resources. If water is mentionedin a CAS, it is more likely to be water supply andsanitation, not irrigation or comprehensive waterresources management. 1 Water supply and sanitation,raised as an issue in 57 countries, is promotedas a way of improving health and laborproductivity and, hence, reducing poverty. Irrigationis mentioned in only 34 percent of CASs,and such issues as water user groups, participatorymanagement, and water rights occur inless than a tenth. Of most concern is the nearabsence of water supply and sanitation issues forAfrica CASs—a Region that is not only poor butis also experiencing rapid urbanization.Only one CAS, for water-short Yemen, explicitlypromotes sustainable water resource useand a need to focus on water. For the other 97countries covered by CASs, 64 have no referenceto a comprehensive framework, a core requirementof the Strategy. A comprehensive approachwas found in the CASs for seven of eight mainlyarid MNA countries (with significant water15

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyissues), but only Ethiopia and Senegal in AFR.Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines in EAPraise all three comprehensive management issues:water policy, water management, and a nationalframework plan. In ECA, the managementof international waters and the control of waterpollution have been a major theme in CASs.The mention of water strategy issues in aCAS is not enough to bring attention to neededreforms and not a very good measure of the efficacyof the water strategy and of ESW. 2 Negligiblecomment in the CAS could mean there areno problem issues—or that they are addressedeither satisfactorily through Bank operations oroutside the framework of Bank country assistance.In Ghana, active reform efforts havestrong domestic ownership and multidonor involvement.Tunisia is recognized as the most advancedcountry in water management in MNA,while South Africa has an exemplary water lawand process for implementing reform. But evenwhere water issues are important, there may beno mention in the CAS because the Bank’s countrymacroeconomists have other perspectivesand concerns.These interpretation difficulties could be overcomeif the CAS included a table showing thecountry’s status in all sectors and the reasons forthe Bank’s level of involvement in each sectoror subsector. This would also have the advantageof making the selectivity criteria for Bankinvolvement more transparent, probably enhancingsynergistic partnerships with other assistanceagencies.Projects Have Become More Responsiveto the StrategyThe new generation of economic and sectorwork has changed the design of Bank waterprojects. Evaluation of the design of 177 waterprojects against the key principles of the Strategyshows that they are increasingly responsive,with the average trend upward since 1993 (figure3.1). 3 Each project was evaluated only againstrelevant Strategy principles. For example, a ruralwater supply project is not a relevant instrumentfor reforming regional or river basin water resourcesmanagement, just as a dam safety or floodprevention project is not a relevant instrumentfor reform of water tariffs and subsidies. So it isFigure 3.1Improving Responsiveness to theW ater StrategyCompliance with the water policy: 4=High, 3=Substantial, 2=Modest, 1=Negligible4.54.03.53.02.52.0—◆— —◆◆———◆ ◆ ◆—◆—1.5— —— — —1.0—◆ Mean— Max0.5— Min0.01992 1994 1996 1998 2000Year16

The Water Strategy Has Been Only Partially Implementedneither practical nor appropriate for any oneproject to fully respond to all the recommendedcomponents of the water Strategy. Indeed, OED’sanalysis found that highly rated projects werethose that focused on four or fewer elements ofthe Strategy in project design.Water projects fell into two classes—the minority(20 percent) considered comprehensivewater resources management at the river basin andnational scales, and the majority (80 percent) focusedonly on the project, with negligible largerscalelinkages. Because very few projects took thecomprehensive view before 1993, this is a notableachievement. Despite the lack of large-scale linkages,project-focused operations scored highly onthe comprehensiveness rating if they includedother Strategy elements in design. In many cases,while projects delivering water service infrastructurewere not appropriate vehicles forreforming basin-wide or national water management,they did tackle systemic institutional reformissues. And many projects appeared to avoid issuesinvolving high transaction costs, long gestationperiods, and high perceived risk.Other important elements of the Strategy—legaland policy aspects, institutional development,and a focus on the most needy—remain partiallyimplemented (figure 3.2). The inadequateattention to the legal and policy aspects of institutionaldevelopment is cause for concern. Theseissues, critical to ensuring the sustainability ofwater reform initiatives, embrace appropriatemechanisms for cross-sectoral coordination, participationof stakeholders in decisionmaking anddecentralization, sufficient powers to enable policyinstitutions to operate effectively, and thequality of the regulatory environment.Regions Have Pursued DifferentApproaches to ComprehensiveWater ManagementThere are substantial differences in the way regionallending operations address comprehensivewater resources development. 4 Adherenceby Region to the comprehensive principle isvaried (figure 3.3). Some of this is due to differencesin hydrologic endowment, level of economicdevelopment, willingness to reform, orpre-Strategy starting point. MNA scored low onits national and basin-level approach becausemany of its large countries do not have largeperennial river basins. The exceptions areFigure 3.2Post-Strategy Operations Are StillFocused on ProjectsComprehensive at project levelWater service organizationsManagement and regulatoryFinance and subsidiesWater service chargesComprehensive at national levelDisadvantaged groupsComprehensive at basin levelLegal, institutions, and policy0 20 40 60 80Percentage of all water operations17

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyFigure 3.3Comprehensive Coverage ofNational and River Basin StrategyElements Varies by RegionEAPECARegionSARLACMNAAFRProjectRiver basinNational0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%Coverage of Strategy principlesMorocco, where the Water Resources Managementproject is piloting a River Basin Agency,and Jordan, where the Jordan River Valley Authorityis central to Bank assistance for reform.The real cause for concern is the scant progressmade at the national and basin level in South Asiaand in Latin America and the Caribbean, althoughthere are exceptions in Brazil, Nepal,and Bangladesh. In Latin America, Bank wateroperations are most active in water supply andsanitation and are not linked to river basin management.Three exceptions are flood protectionassistance in Argentina, water quality managementin Brazil’s Guarapiranga project, and integratedwater resources management in the riverbasins of Brazil’s Ceara state. Most of the Bank’swater-related efforts in Latin America are stronglylinked to commercialization or to ensure environmentaland social sustainability.The Bank scores highly on its responsivenessto the Strategy at the basin level in the ECA andEAP regions, frequently because water projectsdovetail neatly into existing regional sea or riverbasin management organizations. Even so, theBank has been very effective in improving operationand longer-term planning—and, particularlyin China, in augmenting measures to improvefinancial and environmental sustainability.The improvement in strategy responsivenessof regional water portfolios since 1993 is a measureof the Regions’ effectiveness in promotingthe water Strategy (figure 3.4). While MNA andAFR started at the bottom, they show the mostimprovement over the past six years. Startinghigher, Latin America and the Caribbean showsthe smallest improvement. In all cases, the levelof improvement is strongly related to the regionalorganization for water resources management,as discussed in Chapter 5.As Have SubsectorsThe various water subsectors also differ in theextent to which they have followed the Strategy.Subsectors vary substantially in integrating projectsinto policy, institutional, development, andplanning frameworks (figure 3.5). Except forthe water resource management and sector projects,all other subsectors give the greatest attentionto project design issues that attempt tointernalize local externalities. Irrigation—the traditionalhome of water resources planning andmanagement in most client countries—is below18

The Water Strategy Has Been Only Partially ImplementedFigure 3.41993Level of Effort in 1993–99 Differsby Region1999MNAAFRSAECALACEAP2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.6ModestSubstantialResponse to the comprehensive principlethe water supply and sanitation projects in incorporatingStrategy issues.One reason is that irrigation organizationsgenerally have substantial power and vested intereststhat resist reforms that would lessen theirpower base and influence, particularly in SouthAsia and in East Asia and the Pacific, where mostirrigation projects are located. In many irrigationprojects, policies and investments to ensureservice delivery take priority over more globalFigure 3.5Comprehensive Water Managementof Projects by SubsectorSubsectorHydropowerRural water supplyEnvironmentUrban water supplyIrrigation and drainageWater resources andsector projectsProjectRiver basinNational0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%Coverage of Strategy principles19

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyconcerns. Hydropower projects meet the higheststandards at the project level, but they scorebadly at the national level—that is surprising, becausetheir relatively large scale should argue fora more integrated approach.Appropriately, environmental and water resourcemanagement projects are better at dealingwith the bigger picture of water resourcemanagement than with the four subsectorsdealing with service delivery, which are onlymodestly involved in comprehensive water managementat the river basin and national levels.This is a problem for both the Bank and itsclients. Water reform is inherently political, andthe Bank can only facilitate change, not enforceit. Profound organizational problems plague mostcountries, where water jurisdiction and managementare fragmented across many agenciesand split among states and provinces. Compoundingthis in some Regions is a dearth of technicalskills—and different foci. Water supplyutilities have to deal only with securing suppliesand delivering them—effectively a closed system.Irrigation, by contrast, is only one input in a complexagricultural crop production system that isvital to rural development and a national economy.Emerging requirements for addressing thebroad environmental aspects of water resourcesmanagement and maintenance of the ecologicalfunctions of freshwater systems present newchallenges in water resources management.Each subsector addresses the Strategy’s recommendationson water and pricing policy,management, the regulatory environment, andinstitutional reforms in different ways (figure3.6). Water resource management and watersector projects are superior on all criteria, followedby water supply and sanitation projectson six. Irrigation and drainage projects are theworst for five of the eight criteria. Attention tothe needs of disadvantaged groups (poverty,resettlement) and water policy is inadequate.Attention to water service management andregulation received the greatest attention, exceptin irrigation and drainage. Water service organizationsconsidered decentralization of the organization,its regulatory framework for pricingand service quality, operational and financial autonomy,and customer participation in managementdecisions. Again, irrigation and drainagegave the least attention to finance and subsidiesand to water service charges. Because irrigationFigure 3.6Subsectoral Compliance with theStrategy Elements Is MixedSubsectorWater servicesmanagement and regulationWater service organizationsFinance and subsidiesWater service chargesWater resourcesmanagement and regulationWater service policyDisadvantaged groupsWater resources policyWR & SMWSSI & D0% 20% 40% 60% 80%Percent of projects substantially responsive20

The Water Strategy Has Been Only Partially Implementeduses more than three-quarters of the developingworld’s water resources, this is a cause forconcern. In most respects these findings showthat there are fundamental philosophical differencesin the way the sectors are treated. Irrigationand drainage are still very much in thepublic goods domain, dominated by conservativepublic sector agencies. Water supply and sanitationhave moved toward commercializationand, in some cases, privatization.Water Projects Tackle EnvironmentalIssues from Different FrontsWater development has profound impacts on theenvironment and its management. The Bankhas addressed these concerns directly throughenvironmentally focused water projects—andindirectly with safeguard policies to evaluatealternatives and provide plans that minimize ormitigate harmful effects. AFR, ECA, and MNAhave initiated a series of major initiatives withGEF to support integrated management of thebasins of regional seas and major rivers. A newinitiative for cooperative management of theMekong River basin has been undertaken byEAP. In LAC, a new GEF-supported regionalgroundwater management program has beeninitiated. Environmental projects in the water sectorrepresent a major growth area in the workof the Bank and are a source of innovation inapproaches to their identification, preparation,and implementation.Environmental projects are now the thirdlargest category of water-related institutionalsupport and investment in the Bank’s portfolio.This category increased from 11 projects pre-Strategy to 48 projects post-Strategy, and $3.3 billionhas been committed since 1993. Manynational programs deal with environmental managementthrough legislation and regulation thatincludes water and institution-building. Under theBaltic Sea, Danube Basin, and Black Sea environmentalprograms, the Bank is supportingnew initiatives to address the impacts of nonpointpollution from agriculture and rural settlementson surface and ground water resources.Specific projects are concerned with pollutioncontrol, drainage, watershed management, anderosion prevention. Groundwater management,neglected for so long, is beginning to receive theattention it deserves.Groundwater Has Been MismanagedGroundwater mismanagement has profoundsocial and environmental impacts. Most of theworld’s poor rely on groundwater for drinking,and as much as half the irrigation that sustainsthe green revolution has come from groundwater.But the lack of regulation and effectivewater pricing have led to the salinization ofaquifers on which people rely for water suppliesand agricultural employment. Notable examplesof such contamination include thecoastal aquifers of Gaza, Gujarat, west Java, andMexico.The Bank, having nearly ceased to financepublic sector groundwater development, is startingto focus on managerial and remedial measures,an effort it needs to expand rapidly. Mexicohas a new water management regime based ontransferable property rights, management byusers, and the elimination of distorting subsidies,and results are encouraging. In India, ruralpower subsidies promote overpumping ofgroundwater. These distortions are at last beingrecognized and addressed through Banksupportedstate fiscal reform programs.Investment Can Improve Drainage, butSustainability Is KeyPoor drainage spoils as much land as new irrigationcreates. Bank projects have been particularlyeffective in addressing this issue throughinvestment, as in Pakistan, but sustainability remainsa problem. In Egypt and Turkey, investmentin drainage projects enabled irrigated cropyields to double in many areas, but weak linksbetween irrigation and drainage agencies and theemerging water user associations threaten operationand maintenance. Community involvementunderlies the success of soil reclamationthrough better groundwater management anddrainage in Uttar Pradesh.Successful Watershed Management RequiresParticipation and a Long-term PerspectiveAlthough almost $1 billion has been invested inwatershed management, only a few projects are21

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyfree-standing, with three-quarters of the 42 watershedoperations embedded in more general developmentprojects cutting across 11 subsectors. 5The primary focus of the majority of watershedprojects is on improving soil and water conservation,not on managing watersheds as a whole.A quarter of the projects deal with reducing siltation,fewer than 10 percent with pollution reduction,and less than 5 percent with integratedwater management. Projects in Europe and CentralAsia and in East Asia and the Pacific are concernedmore with the effects of pollution andsiltation, those in LAC with agricultural management,and those in Africa with community resourcemanagement.The most successful projects have high governmentand community ownership, mainly becausethey have sharply focused objectives.Poorly performing projects tended to focus onshort-term goals supported by project subsidiesthat could not be sustained in the long term, werenot supported by an enabling environment, anddepended too much on ineffective governmentagencies unable to coordinate effectively at thelocal level or scale up the few successes.Compare them with the successful MadagascarSecond Environment Program prepared entirelyby Malagasy agencies that took a longview—15 years—with the strategy of mainstreamingenvironmental concerns into macroeconomicmanagement and sector programs.Under the program, Malagasy agencies, assistedby 10 donors and four international NGOs,worked in teams to formulate the institutional andinvestment program. With this broad consensuson strategy and coordination, implementationof water-related components is proceeding well. 6Another notable success, China’s Loess PlateauWatershed Rehabilitation Project, has substantiallyreduced local soil erosion by 20–30 million tonsannually (and the total sediment load of the YellowRiver by about 1 percent). It has also broughtsubstantial socioeconomic benefits to marginalfarmers on the plateau.Compliance with Safeguards IsDemandingSince the water Strategy was issued, almostthree-quarters of all water projects have beenclassified as environmentally sensitive—a markedincrease. Seven safeguard policies particularlyapply to water operations (box 3.1). Those classifiedas likely to have potentially adverse environmentalimpacts that are sensitive, diverse,or unprecedented (category A) have tripled innumber and doubled their share in the totalportfolio. There is now greater willingness to acknowledgesite-specific impacts (category B)that can be mitigated or reversed. Presumablya result of more careful project design and/or selection,the proportion of water projects forcinginvoluntary resettlement has fallen by a tenth—to 37 percent of all Bank projects. Dam safetyrequirements are routinely applied to any projectinvolving the impoundment of water. TheIndia and Indonesia dam safety projects havebeen the first Bank operations addressing damsafety per se. 7 Based on the lessons form theseprojects is a second generation of dam safetyprojects and components under the Aral SeaBasin Program and in Albania, Armenia, theKyrgyz Republic, Peru, and Sri Lanka.The compliance at entry of water projectswith safeguards is higher than that of other Bankprojects. But this assessment comes largely froma desk review that dealt with only two environ-Box 3.1W orldBankSafeguardPoliciesThe objective of these safeguard policies is to ensurethat Bank operations do not cause harm whenthey are trying to help. Seven of the policies are theones most likely to be invoked for water operations:Environment• Environmental assessment (OP 4.01)• Natural habitats (OP 4.04)Rural Development• Safety of dams (OP 4.37)Social Development• Cultural property (OPN 11.03)• Involuntary resettlement (OP 4.30)• Indigenous peoples (OP 4.20)International Law• Projects on international waterways (OP 7.50)22

The Water Strategy Has Been Only Partially Implementedmental questions—Was the environmental analysisadequate? Did it cover analysis of alternativesand economic evaluation?—and three stakeholderand social analysis questions. The qualityof safeguards at supervision, however, wasworse. 8 Recently QAG, with the support of theBank’s new Quality Assurance and ComplianceUnit, has expanded the review of projects forquality at entry and quality of supervision to includereview of all ten safeguard policies.Of projects in the A environmental category,82 percent were satisfactorily supervised; forcategory B, this dropped to 55 percent. Why thediscrepancy? Policy guidance of category A projectsis well defined; the projects are highly visibleto Bank management and relatively wellresourced. But policy guidance and compliancestandards for category B projects are poorly defined,allowing considerable discretion for taskmanagers. Much depends on the borrower, whofrequently feels that safeguards are an expensiveBank imposition (as in the Nicaragua SocialFund) and who does not have the institutional,technical, and organizational skills to meet Bankrequirements. Within the Bank, incentives toimplement safeguard policies are weak. Recentdecentralization of responsibility and budgets tothe Regions and country units eroded the capacityof the Environment Department to monitorimplementation of policies, and competitionfor resources reduced the environment to a lowprioritysector. Task managers often viewed environmentalinputs as an added cost and choseto do without specialist help unless absolutelynecessary. These changes diminished the Bank’scapacity to mainstream the environment intocountry programs and to implement its safeguardpolicies effectively (Liebenthal 2002).Some countries have found the Bank’s safeguardpolicies too demanding and too costly,and have sought alternative funding with fewerconditions. In Morocco, a large dam component(a key element of its water resources managementproject) was dropped after completion of essentialpreparation work by the Bank. There are stillechoes from the Narmarda controversy. Whilesafeguard policies have proven to be successfulin integrating environmental and social issuesinto the design of projects, greater efforts areneeded to more effectively implement national environmentaland social legislation, develop countryownership of the safeguard concept, andfoster mainstreaming by borrowers. This revealsthe dilemma of the safeguard policies. Unlessmainstreamed by borrowers, they primarily protectthe Bank from risk and criticism. After intenseopposition by environmentalists, Nepal’s Arun IIIproject was dropped by the Bank—yet Nepal isnow embarking on a dam twice the size on thesame site, using private sector financing.Addressing Institutional Concerns byInvolving Stakeholders and the PrivateSectorThe water strategy insists that policies affectingwater rights be carefully evaluated to ensure thatthey do not harm the poor, who often need waterrights to earn income. There are welldocumentedinstances of such harm. Dams reducethe downstream flow of water. Irrigationwells dry up traditional springs and shallow indigenouswells. Agricultural drainage pollutesdownstream water sources. But this evaluationwas unable to find any Bank projects that systematicallyreviewed pre-project water uses todetermine the effects of the project on water accessand use by different socioeconomic groups.The current emphasis on water rights comesfrom experience in Chile, which has been tradingwater rights and increasing economic efficiencysince 1981. While Chile’s short rivers andsmall drainage basins make it a special case,water trading has been particularly effective inadjusting the allocation of water between urbanand agriculture uses. Several preconditions—including a strong link between water and landrights, a prior history of informal water trading,a sound legal system, a system for registeringwater rights, and good governance—make watertrading work. An independent regulatory systemto allocate water rights and safeguard essentialusers is crucial, as are a good hydrological informationbase and titling system.A major impediment to awarding water rightsis the resistance of borrowers to relinquishingcontrol. Many borrowers fear that private rightswill lead to private monopolies. Many of thesefears are unfounded. Research shows that23

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyinformal water trading of de facto rights takesplace even when expressly forbidden by law, asin Fordwah-Sadiqia in Pakistan and Gujarat inIndia. The issue for the Bank is how to leveragethese examples into public policy discussionswith borrowers. Major efforts are under way onwater rights and pricing in Brazil and Mexico,but substantial resources and time are requiredto identify users and register water rights.Decentralization and Participation Have BeenKey to SuccessDecentralization involves users in planning andmanaging water projects, and encourages stakeholdersto contribute to policy formulation. Traditionallyconsidered in a government context,decentralization also applies to such large projectsas irrigation, with operation and managementdevolved to farmers. The Bank recognizes that avariety of organizations—private firms, financiallyautonomous entities, and community organizations—contributeto decentralizing water delivery.That is why it supports projects that introduce differentforms of decentralized management andthat focus on division of responsibilities betweenpublic and private entities. About 70 percent ofthe Bank’s projects address decentralization ofwater resource management.Including beneficiaries has been central to bettermanagement, and water projects, particularlyirrigation and rural water supply, have donemuch better than other Bank projects in this regard.Beneficiary involvement has facilitatedbetter system operation and management. Despitethis, women all too frequently are overlookedas important stakeholders in land andwater management. Irrigation performance in Albania,India (Andra Pradesh), Mexico, Niger,and Turkey improved when the Bank movedaway from mandating cost-recovery goalsthrough covenants to persuading governmentsthat empowering stakeholders was more effective.The lesson: operation and maintenanceimprove when water user groups have financialautonomy and arrange operation and maintenancethemselves.Second-generation problems are now emergingfrom evaluation of participatory irrigationmanagement (Svendsen and others 2000). Mostnotably, this has to be correctly sequenced withupstream reform of irrigation agencies. In Nepal’sSunsari Morang Irrigation project, the initial delegationof operation and maintenance to waterusers’ groups took place before the reliability ofwater supplies was assured and the groups losttheir raison d’etre. Investment in group formationactivities was premature and had to be repeated.In the Philippines, several groups foundthe operation and maintenance task too technical—ortoo onerous, given their limited accessto heavy equipment—and reverted to state management.Conversely, a Bank credit enabledwater user associations in Turkey to import theirown heavy maintenance equipment.Community-driven Development Works—But Is It Sustainable?Projects that focus on community-driven developmenthave much more social policy contentand poverty focus than other water projects.They use a bottom-up approach in which communityorganizations, as both stakeholders andbeneficiaries, have authority over decisions, includingdirect responsibility to manage internaland external resources. These characteristicsshould mean more ownership and sustainability,because they are sensitive to social developmentconcerns and include the poor.Community-driven development water projectsare often funded through social funds. Mostof the water investment components under socialfunds—between 2 percent and 44 percent ofa fund—tend to be for water supply, drainageworks, and small irrigation schemes. In Laos,under the Luang Namtha Provincial Developmentproject, social funds provide local water schemesand enable technical assistance for training to develop,supervise, and operate water and sanitationsystems. In Angola the Social Action projectfocuses on rehabilitation and expansion of watersupply using appropriate and cost-effective technologies(hand-dug wells) and improves the capacityof NGOs and communities to plan,manage, and maintain investment. This is occurringeven in more developed economies—inthe Russian Federation, the Community SocialInfrastructure project rehabilitates and upgradesexisting water and wastewater infrastructure.24

The Water Strategy Has Been Only Partially ImplementedEvidence shows that water projects managedby social funds do not pay enough attention todeveloping organizations and institutions that ensurelong-term sustainability. The Honduras socialfund evaluation found that 83 percent of thesystems assisted by the project had too littlerevenue to cover operational costs, and halfhad no technical assistance from either the governmentor NGOs.A concern that cuts across all social fundlending is that while the investments are community-and demand-led, there are weak linkagesto the sectoral apex agencies and almostno linkage with national or Bank sectoral strategy.While responsive to the Bank’s waterStrategy, which encourages subsidiarity anddemand-led approaches, the laissez-faire approachmay not necessarily focus on the areasof greatest need. It is difficult to judge whetherthe poor are given priority in these projects becausethe funds are dispersed on a first-come,first-served basis, and the poor are not normallyin a position to take advantage of such opportunitiesunless special efforts are made.Private Provision Is Cost-Effective—But Has ItHelped the Poor?The Bank facilitated the commercialization ofpublic water utilities and regulatory frameworksto leverage substantial private investment. Privatizationof municipal water supplies in Africaand in Latin America and the Caribbean hasachieved greater area coverage at no publiccost. But getting the private sector to focus onthe alleviation of poverty and to design tariffsin a way that does not discriminate against thepoor has proved hard to achieve in practice.Even so, typical full-cost tariffs charged by privatesector utilities range from $0.20 to $0.90 percubic meter, much cheaper than water vendoror trucked supplies, which can be more than 10times more expensive. 9To date, only a few private sector participationmanagement ventures have failed, and thesemainly because of poor governance. In TheGambia, instability following a 1995 militarycoup undermined lease and management contractsfor operation and maintenance. The 1995Aguas del Aconquija concession in Argentina issubject to bitter legal disputes, which the Bankhas tried to mediate, and the losses to the concessionairemay exceed $16 million.There is concern among NGOs that the newfocus on private sector participation will haveadverse consequences for the water and sanitationneeds of the poor. Non-urban areas lackthe economies of scale so attractive to privateinvestment. And peri-urban areas pose thebiggest service challenge to public and privatesectors alike, particularly as they tend to housemigrants escaping from rural poverty. Where theprivate sector cannot deliver or sees the risks astoo high, there may be a case for the Bank tointervene to improve capacity and policy to upgradepublic sector utilities.Pricing Promotes Efficiency andConservation, but There Are FewSuccessful ExamplesWater pricing is key to the Bank’s water strategyand water allocation (Rogers 1992). In theory,underpriced resources are frequentlymisallocated, mismanaged, and wasted. In practice,however, water resources have only a nominalprice set by a small license fee because ofthe economic and cultural difficulties of puttinga value on a natural resource. Consequently, allocationis almost always made by prior appropriationor administrative fiat.Within the water services sectors, efficientwater pricing combined with appropriate fee collectionand good management ensures waterservice delivery by enabling system operationand maintenance—and thus meets the Bank’spoverty alleviation objectives. The corollary ofpricing—attention to cost minimization—focusesmanagerial attention on staffing overheads, systemefficiency, water loss reduction, and efficientbilling systems. This has positive environmentalimpacts, since more efficient water use andattention to production costs (particularly for agriculture)generally reduce water pollution and increaseconservation. And when water is seen asa commodity, more attention is paid to its allocationin the market environment.The Middle East and North Africa was the bestperformingRegion, thoroughly covering pricingand financial issues in the design of projects.25

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyEast Asia and the Pacific, boosted by China’s extremelywell-developed financing regulations,performed almost as well. The best-performingsector was water supply and sanitation, in whichtwo-thirds of all projects covered these issues substantially.Irrigation, heavily influenced by India’slow ratings, was the poorest-performing sector.Were there specific cost-recovery targets?How did these relate to the financial health ofthe agency? Were efficiency and equity taken intoaccount? And did the revenues collected goback into service provision? Globally, most Bankprojects pay lip-service to cost recovery, butonly two-thirds of Bank projects have addressedit substantially. Of the sector loans, those forwater supply sector adjustment were the bestperforming.Conversely, those for the environmentseldom addressed cost-recovery issues.The Bank has been trying to widen the knowledgebase for water supply benchmarks througha Web site for participating utilities. The internationalbenchmarks, such as those disseminatedby the Asian Development Bank, provideonly “order of magnitude” comparisons of efficiency.For the irrigation sector there are virtuallyno benchmarks because the technical, social,and institutional features of irrigation servicearrangements are complex and geographicallydiverse. Many Bank capacity-building efforts inwater supply and sanitation utilities are directedat developing cost accounting and financialmanagement frameworks as the basis for a pricingpolicy. This is lacking for irrigation, whichrelies mainly on financing from budget transfers.The battle to mainstream the economic andfinancial aspects of pricing policy in both sectorshas largely been won inside the Bank butnot in client countries or the international arena.A large external constituency of stakeholders stillwants to maintain social water pricing, which isdifficult to manage with formulaic guidelines. Forpolicies to be effective, countries need an apparatusfor setting prices and the capacity to administerthem. Most client countries have neitherand are hindered by loading the pricing mechanismwith multiple objectives.The Bank’s ability to give practical advice onpricing is diminished because few staff or consultantshave experience in setting tariffs ormanaging the finances of utilities and irrigationauthorities. This shortcoming is being addressedby the Bank’s Water and Sanitation Sector Board.Only a few Bank operations contain irrigationservice–fee components within a work programfor a functioning and financially autonomous irrigationservice provider. Given the politicalsensitivity of pricing, it is essential to be realisticin setting performance targets and linkingthem with institutional reform.The Bank’s Effectiveness on Key StrategyElements Varies WidelyThe results of the qualitative and quantitativeevaluation described above were classified interms of how effectively the Bank has implementedthe Strategy and are summarized forcross-sectoral comparison in figure 3.7. Clearly,much remains to be done, particularly on betteralignment with the Bank’s overarching goalto alleviate poverty, on ensuring that a comprehensiveplanning framework is adopted, andthat more attention is given to allocation and pricing,water rights, gender, and addressing systemicinstitutional problems that have slowed the pathto reform. But, as the next chapter shows, gettingresults will remain a major challenge.26

The Water Strategy Has Been Only Partially ImplementedFigure 3.7The Bank’s Effectiveness in Implementingthe Strategy V aries Considerably by SectorVery effective Moderately effective IneffectiveComprehensive water resources management ❑ Alignment with the Bank’spoverty strategy❑ Working in partnership with other ❑ Raising awareness ❑ Getting borrowers to adoptinternational development of comprehensive comprehensive wateragencies to build consensus on water resources resources managementmanagement of internationalmanagement atwaters country level ❑ Introducing the river basinas a unit of account❑ Environmental ❑ Improving the management andmanagement andconservation of groundwaterpollution control ❑ Improving coordination amongall water users❑Allocation issues andopportunity cost of waterWater supply & sanitation❑ Setting standards and regulatory environment for utilities ❑ Expanding access and ❑ Increasing access to❑ Enabling commercialization and/or privatization of urban participation in rural sanitationwater suppliesand deprived areas❑ Gender concerns❑ Cost-recovery ❑ Decentralization ❑ Ensuring institutional and organizationaland tariffsstandards for other sector WSS❑ Cross-subsidies ❑ Sector poverty strategy❑ Addressing concerns aboutaffordabilityIrrigation & drainage❑ Participatory management ❑ Improving system operation and ❑ Water rightsand water user associationsmaintenance❑ Poverty impact ❑ System redesign for more ❑ Decentralizationefficient operation❑ Water quality and drainage ❑ Gender issues❑ Increasing user ❑ Transparency and full costchargesHydropower❑ Regulatory environment and dam safety ❑ Environmental concerns andsafetyinvoluntary resettlement❑❑accounting of water deliveryserviceOrganizational reform and unbundlingactivities❑ Reforming the legal andregulatory framework❑ Conjunctive use of surface andgroundwater❑ Addressing subsidiesthat discourage waterconservation—e.g. ruralelectricity tariffsIntegrated water sector strategy❑ Multipurpose developmentEnvironmental management❑ Watershed management and ❑ Decentralized managementconservation❑ Institutional and regulatory environment ❑ Strategies to address underlyinginstitutional constraints❑ Participation and Social Concerns ❑ Gender issues27

4Why It’s Difficult toGet Good ResultsThe core business of water resources management is to establish incentivesfor water users to protect and conserve the resource, allocateit to higher-value uses, and reallocate as demand changes. Thisneeds to be done in a holistic way at the river basin level because externalitiesand opportunities for reallocation do not occur just within sectors.Each use has an impact on the resource that affects its value and the perceivedrisks to other users. 1 In the Philippines, for example, private sectorinvestors ranked the lack of watershed protection against polluters as the secondmost critical risk for urban water supply investment, the first being therisk of nonpayment for bulk water supplied to public sector distributors.Comprehensive Water ManagementIs Inherently DifficultIntegrated water resource management by riverbasin organizations is difficult to set up. To beeffective, it requires sophisticated institutionsand good governance—things lacking amongmost of the Bank’s borrowers. A review of globalexperience suggests that a more hybrid approachto integrated water resource management(the Strategy aims to create a perfect superinstitution)would focus on enhanced cooperationamong existing institutions (table 4.1)(Millington 2000). 2 The Bank’s approach to Strategyimplementation has matured along this pathsince 1993.The hybrid approach recognizes that whilewater resources management needs to focus ondefining and enforcing water rights through administrativeand economic instruments, 3 this isviable only when it is supported by specialistknowledge that varies by subsector. More important,these subsectors perform better whenthey have autonomy and clearly defined governanceand accountability. Each subsector’sspecific policy and financing challenges differfrom those of the other subsectors and fromthose of overall water resource management.A recent global review of holistic approachesto planning (OED 2000b) found that it is best toavoid delegating responsibility for integratedplanning to separate “super-institutions” createdspecifically for the task. Experience suggests thatthese are either ineffectual in the short term orunproductive or unsustainable in the long term.29

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyT able 4.1Mature Water Resource ManagementOrganizations Do Not Run Water BusinessesStatus of river basin organizationRiver basin organization function New Developing MaturePlanning. Water and natural resource data collection and processing,systems modeling, water and natural resource planning • • •Project management. Feasibility, design, implementation, operationand management, raising financing • •Allocation. Allocating water shares (quality and quantity), costsharing principles, and user/license to support RBO activities • •Policy and strategy development. For economic, financing, andenvironmental issues, community awareness and participation•Monitoring and evaluation. Water use and shares, pollution andenvironmental conditions, oversight and review of projectspromoted by subsector partners•Source: Modified after Millington (2000).The biggest problem for river basin organizationsis that they tend to take the form of regional structuresthat attempt to claim (but often merely duplicate)the responsibilities of existing regionaldepartments of national ministries.A pervasive problem facing these new organizationsis securing adequate funds for waterresources management activities. To mitigatethis problem, new bodies should be given responsibilityfor coordinating the relevant elementsof existing organizations and ensuringthe participation of stakeholders, includingNGOs, civil society, and the private sector: thegoal should be integrated planning, but notintegrated implementation. Decentralized governance—subsidiarity—isa key component ofthis approach. In practice, however, lack oflocal capacity and basic data are frequently criticalconstraints in Bank client countries. Anotherdifficulty is that river basins frequentlytranscend national borders, and this adds anotherdimension.International Water Cooperation IsEssential but ControversialInternational waters are always a potential sourceof conflict, even more so when they are sharedby water-short countries. The Bank’s primary interestin these situations is to foster economic cooperationfor natural resource management. Butit also has a strong interest in reducing the economicand human costs of water conflicts thatlead to suboptimal development and sometimeswasteful investment.The Bank, with its ability to mobilize funding,its knowledge, and its convening power, hasthe capacity to lead on the issues associatedwith international waters. The Bank’s first forayinto this area, the Indus Water Treaty in the1960s, clearly demonstrated this. It also showedthat solutions take a long time and require a highlevel of commitment. The Indus problem wassolved only because the Bank worked at it for10 years and had the personal commitment ofBank President Eugene Black. It is notable asbeing the only case where the Bank helped establishformal procedures for allocating water betweencountries. Over the last decade a series ofregional programs focused on basin-level environmentalmanagement of freshwater, coastal,and marine resources have been undertaken inECA, MNA, and AFR. The key lessons learned arethat success is based on a shared vision, sustainedcommitment, and broad-based partnerships.The lesson from the Bank’s current portfoliois that each international and intrastate waterproblem has a unique blend of political, environmental,and socioeconomic factors. As the30

Why It’s Difficult to Get Good ResultsAral Sea program illustrates, there are no easysolutions. Before significant funds can be committed,much needs to be done to facilitate partnerships,agree on approaches, and formulatepolicies for each situation. For Bank staff andmanagers there are few institutional incentivesfor undertaking such risky cross-regional endeavorsin times of declining budgets, despitethe requirements of the Bank’s water Strategy.Consequently, corporate culture will need tochange significantly before the Bank can assumeits appropriate leadership role in internationalwaters. And because these usually arehigh-risk situations, often taking years to establishand ensure stakeholder ownership, the Bankshould have a clear exit strategy.Water Is Not Seen as an ImportantEconomic ResourceReforming water management requires concertedaction to elevate social and environmental concerns,set development priorities, correct poorgovernance and ineffective public-sector institutions,and redress large knowledge and skillgaps. Most important, unless the enabling conditionsare in place—a conducive political economyand strong local leadership—a water reformagenda is unlikely to be viable. The agenda isextremely ambitious, and agreeing on the sequenceand scope of activities in a country settingis difficult, time-consuming, and risky.One major difficulty is in linking water developmentto the CAS agenda. Water sector interventionsin CASs are generally subsumed underbroader development goals, such as securingmacroeconomic stability, alleviating poverty, improvingnatural resource use and the environment,or removing infrastructure bottlenecks.The explicit valuation of water as an input topublic health, food production, and environmentalmaintenance is fraught with difficulty,leaving it undervalued until there are problems.Indeed, water issues tend to attract political attentionmainly for extreme events—Bangladesh’sFlood Action Plan, El Nino Emergency Loans forPeru and Bolivia, or the Sudan and ZimbabweDrought Recovery Credits—or when things gowrong—arsenic in Bangladesh’s groundwaterand India’s Narmarda controversy.Transforming Strategy into ActionIs DifficultThe Bank’s water reform agenda has been unclearto most stakeholders and insufficiently linked tonational economic issues. 4 This shows the valueof developing and disseminating short countrywater strategies closely linked to CASs. All stakeholderscomplained about lack of knowledgeand the asymmetry of available knowledge, whichskewed decisionmaking. They argued that theBank needs to be more inclusive, moving beyondthe usual government department clients to involvepoliticians and the public in discussingwater strategy and development priorities.OED’s Rural Vision to Action study of fivecountries found significant differences betweenBank staff and local stakeholders on what wasimportant. 5 Almost two-thirds of country stakeholdersbelieved that the central governmentshould directly allocate their country’s water resourcesamong competing users; only a quarterof Bank staff did. Similarly, Bank staff werethree times more likely than country stakeholdersto believe that small rural communitiescould plan and manage water supply systems.A recent review by the Bank’s Quality AssuranceGroup (QAG) of five water-related piecesof ESW concludes that the relevance of water policyreform needs to be improved, primarilythrough greater management of and attention tomajor pieces of ESW. 6 Management is criticizedfor providing support systems for ESW that are“largely unclear and inadequate.” This lack ofclear priorities is especially true of ESW to supportwater reform. QAG noted that with staff typicallyover-programmed, ESW tends to get lowerpriority, and quality can suffer because of this.QAG criticizes traditional ESW for failing tostrike a balance between short, quick-response,informal tasks and longer gestation, more costlyformal tasks. 7 In commenting on the India watermanagement review, QAG suggests that theseold-style ESW products “may not be the appropriatevehicle for effecting policy change. Crisp,timely, analytical pieces, based on wellconceivedand broadly representative workshopsin the country, can much better serve asinstruments for Bank dialogue and engagementin the sector.”31

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyMajor recommendations are that stakeholdersshould be more closely involved in preparingand reviewing ESW task teams for major sector reportsand should include adequate representationof macro and sector economists to avoid the dialoguebeing restricted to technicians of the Bankand client. In reviewing a sewerage project in Indonesia,for example, QAG commented that thelimited results and impact of the study could haveprobably been achieved quicker, and at a muchlower cost, by organizing a workshop in Indonesiaat which each of the seven cities surveyed by thestudy could have provided a description of issuesthey face as they try to expand service. In contrast,the review of the Water Sector AdjustmentLoan environmental assessment is given highmarks for an outstanding effort to address this issuein a participatory fashion, while raising doubts asto whether this kind of approach was either replicableor affordable for the Bank.Country stakeholders (in Brazil and India) observedthat there seems to be an unwillingnessby the Bank to continually learn from evolvingimplementation lessons—process seemed moreimportant than substance once a project was approved.The staff focus was on meeting disbursementtargets and responding to directivesand mandates from headquarters that the stakeholderssaw as having little relevance to local issuesor concerns. Lack of continuity of Bank staffwas also seen as a problem (Chapter 5). Therewas frustration that Bank staff, because of thesepressures, could not take more time for nonlendingwork and for facilitating public policydebate on water issues.Detailed Guidelines Have Been LackingEven though Water Resources Policy Review andStrategy Formulation (FAO 1995) guidelineswere jointly prepared by the UNDP, FAO, andthe World Bank at the request of the Subcommitteeon Water Resources of the UN AdministrativeCommittee for Coordination, these wereonly modestly effective. There was no followthroughin the Bank (or elsewhere) to make theguidelines fully operational, based on the lessons.Nor was there a realistic assessment of the resourcesrequired to implement them throughlending and nonlending operations.Selectivity and Good ManagementAre ImportantThe theoretical underpinnings of comprehensivewater management are sound, but such a largetask cannot be accomplished everywhere atonce—or quickly. Selectivity is therefore important,as is recognition that the Bank’s projecthorizon of five to seven years is simply tooshort to carry out the reforms needed to establishcomprehensive management. The usual solution—aseries of projects—can work, but onlyif properly sequenced within the comprehensiveframework. China’s Tarim Basin II, the Brazil SecondWater Modernization, and the MoroccoWater Resource Management projects demonstrategood practices in this area. They need tobe adapted and adopted in other water-relatedsectors. It is also important to focus on doing afew things right to demonstrate new approachesthat work. While it is necessary to be comprehensive,it is not necessary to be complex.Seven Ways to Improve ResultsThe Bank has many options for improving performancein the water sector:• Establish ownership and leadership.• Find win-win solutions and opportunities.• Judge results, not plans.• Step up the country and sector dialogue.• Manage complexity and accept tradeoffs.• Use partnerships to build capacity.• Be patient—reform takes time.Establish Ownership and LeadershipMuch of the success of institutional reform isowed to an independent agency outside theconcerned ministries and agencies. In Mali andAlbania, the government ensured the agency’sindependence and freedom to reform. In Brazil,the Bank’s water programs are highly successfulin the state of Ceara because of the personalinterest of the governor and grassroots operationsand management. In India, the chief ministerof Andhra Pradesh pushed through anextensive reform program of the irrigation sector.But in other states and countries there arefew champions, and water sector reform ismired in political indifference and bureaucraticmalaise.32

Why It’s Difficult to Get Good ResultsFind Win-Win Opportunities and SolutionsThe Bank is in a unique position of being ableto see the macroeconomic and political conditionsthat provide opportunities for comprehensivereform. In all cases, the precursors towater reform were outside the water sector—andreform of water is typically second or third generation,following in many cases reform of thepower sector. Macroeconomic crises of the late1980s were the motivating force for irrigation reformin Mexico and for debates on water sectorreform in Australia, Chile, and India. In SouthAfrica, water sector reform has been part of reconstructionof the economy in the postapartheidera. A major change in Poland’senvironmental and water management, supportedby the Bank and other donors, was acceleratedby the ongoing EU accession process.Financial crisis drove water sector reform inBrazil, France, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Turkey, andthe United Kingdom, and more recently in thePhilippines Metro-Manila water concession. Inmany of these cases, water reform also benefitedfrom the synergy of political and economic liberalization.All too frequently, however, Bankwater staff promote reform when the enablingconditions are absent.Judge by Results, Not PlansWater development requires multisectoral cooperationand safeguards that can be costly toclients. In the Yemen Taiz Water Supply project,water supply staff pursued their quest for waterby administrative reallocation from rural to urbanuse—neglectful of insufficient groundwater—while agriculture and social sector staff, cognizantof the importance of water in the rural economyand local needs and customs, argued that amore socially inclusive approach was required.The compromise, a project with many social safeguardcomponents, is proving too complex toimplement effectively. Consequently, there is astandoff between the local landowner and theTaiz water supply agency. The key resourceissue of how to address the groundwater miningon which all livelihoods depend is still unresolved.Similar problems occurred in theTrinidad and Tobago Water Sector InstitutionalStrengthening project. Bank staff in differentsubsectors worked independently with limitedinteraction, sending mixed signals to the client.Frequent changes of task manager due to Bankreorganization caused significant problems forthe government after Bank delays led to theeventual cancellation of a $100 million complementaryinvestment.While the water strategy stresses the importanceof sound environmental and social assessmentand compliance with the Bank’ssafeguard policies (box 3.1), the borrower’scosts of compliance may be significant. Involuntaryresettlement is generally among the importantsocial safeguard issues in water projects.In a Bankwide review of projects that involvedresettlement, the average number of affectedpeople per project had declined from 30,500 to11,600 post-Strategy (Annex F). While a vastmajority of these are only affected by acquisitionof land, a much smaller number need to bephysically relocated. Resettlement action plansare agreed with the borrower prior to project approvalfor regular investment projects, though 16percent are finalized during implementation,due to the programmatic nature of projects. 8Given the need to construct dams to conserveas much water as possible for future demand andthe current lack of capacity to implement safeguardpolicies in some borrower countries, theBank faces significant technical and public relationschallenges in water sector development.The main lesson OED drew from its 1998 resettlementreview was that results rather thanplans should be the touchstone of quality management.9 The main lesson for water operationsis that there needs to be a clear shift from resettlementpolicy and planning to procedures andpractice. There is an urgent need for the Bankto review quality control procedures, includingthe adverse effects of water management, toensure that reviews are transparent and independent.More emphasis needs to be given tosectoral environmental assessment and movingupstream to help borrowers solve root safeguardproblems—institutions, governance, andknowledge gaps—before they get in the way ofdevelopment. There also is rising demand for takingmore explicit account of borrowing countries’policy and regulatory regimes and for making33

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategydetermined efforts to seek harmonization betweendomestic legislation and Bank policiesprior to project processing.Step Up the Country and Sector DialogueUnderstanding the country and sector context isvital for developing a comprehensive developmentstrategy. Morocco’s strong governmentownership, sound sector administrative capacity,and an organization allied with decentralizedwater distribution utilities (Régies) enabled asuccessful outcome. In Metro-Manila, knowledgetransfer and dedication over a number ofyears translated into success. The various watersectors naturally differ in their readiness for reform.In Chile the successful Environmental InstitutionsDevelopment project established aneffective national environmental managementagency, yet regulation of water pollution by miningfailed because of vested interests. Wherepolitical and administrative transaction costs arehigh, reform may be cosmetic—passing a waterlaw, for example—with no attempt to enforce it.Low client commitment and institutional capabilityallied with ambitious project objectivesaccount for much of the poor performance of fourof the six water supply and sanitation adjustmentloans. In Colombia and Honduras, the loansachieved their objective of providing increasedaccess to water by the poor. But they failed intheir institutional objectives, mainly because theproject scope exceeded the capacity of sector institutionsthat suffered from frequent managerialchanges and political interference. In Algeriaand Ghana, similar problems and ill-defined performanceobjectives, poor governance, and corruptionprohibited financial sustainability.Insufficient country and sector dialoguedooms projects to failure, sometimes blinding theBank to changed circumstances. The ambitiousBrazil NE Irrigation Engineering project ignoredthe macroeconomic situation and wavering politicalcommitment to continued investment inpublic sector irrigation. The result? The projectdelivered products no one wanted. Subsectoralreviews can ensure that investment prioritiesare clearly linked to a development strategy ledby borrowers. In India and Pakistan, publictubewell development projects underestimatedthe scale of farmers’ private sector initiatives,making the projects irrelevant because of insufficientbeneficiary involvement in project designand unreliable power supplies. 10Failure to heed the findings of the Argentinepublic sector investment review led to prolongedand expensive involvement in theYacryreta Dam project long after it was shownto be subeconomic. Changed project managementcompounded the Bank’s failure to appreciategovernment sovereignty over procurementregulations and led to withdrawal from Turkey’sBerke Hydroelectric project in 1995, two yearsafter approval of the loan. Similar problems hadalso affected the national drainage project, butwere resolved. A major difficulty is the Bank’scontinued optimism about the public sector’s intentto reform, in spite of substantial evidenceto the contrary.When there is deep country dialogue the resultscan be outstanding, as Mali’s Office duNiger Consolidation Irrigation project demonstrates.The Office was restructured, its financialhealth restored, government monopolies wereunbundled, and agricultural production burgeoned—helpedby improved land tenure andmarket liberalization. This success led otherdonors to invest more, leveraging the Bank’s investmentby 250 percent. In the Baltic Sea EnvironmentProgram and the Nile Basin Initiative,the strong and sustained commitment of thecooperating governments has been critical fortheir success to date.Manage Complexity and Accept TradeoffsDetermining the appropriate level of complexityand phasing is one of the unresolved dilemmasof a more comprehensive and integratedapproach. Not everything can be done at once.Turkey’s Izmir Water Supply and Sewerage project,completed in 1996, demonstrates the inadvisabilityof committing funds for large-scaleexpansion of facilities before addressing criticalinstitutional issues. A gradual program aimed firstat building management capacity and encouragingefficient use of existing facilities wouldhave been a better approach.At the other end of the scale, the LesothoHighland Water Project is one of the few that34

Why It’s Difficult to Get Good Resultslargely complied with the Bank’s water Strategy.A complex project facilitating interregional andinterbasin water transfer, its ambitious engineeringobjectives are nearing full achievement.Its sheer size has created an influential nationalimplementation agency that government willhave difficulty in controlling. The environmentaland social aspects remain only partially implemented,and are now being given increasedattention—as is Lesotho’s water supply and sanitationsubsector after a decade of benign neglect.11 All these examples indicate that while itis essential to plan comprehensively, greatersuccess can be achieved through discrete, manageable,and sequenced development.Indeed, unbalanced growth approaches to institutionaldevelopment are seen as superior tocentralized planning approaches (Ellerman 2000;Hirschman 1994). Successful “unbalanced” interventionsset up tensions and highlight unforeseenproblems that catalyze additional andsequential reform efforts. Thus the Bank’s experiencesuggests developing country waterstrategies as a means to highlight where andwhen to selectively intervene—and then ensurethat the targeted interventions are realisticallyscheduled and funded.A comprehensive attack on all the problemsfaced by an institution cannot hope to achievefinal results in a specified time. 12 Instead, a fewaspects can be identified on which progress isfeasible given the general operational level of theinstitution, and the program can concentrate onthose aspects for a reasonable period—say,three years. After that, the progress made willhave ripple effects on other parts of the institution.At that point, a new program can be designedthat takes account of the newsituation—including changes in personnel—butthat focuses on another limited number of objectives.In sum, institutional development effortsshould abandon comprehensiveness of scopeand schedule, pursuing instead a partial, cumulative,and highly focused approach (Israel1987). Good examples of interventions that createripple effects are governance and institutionbuilding efforts that make service providers accountableto customers (water user associations),and full cost accounting that frequentlyreveals both administrative and technical inefficiencies—notleast, volumetric measurement ofwater supply and consumption.Use Partnerships to Build CapacityCreating a shared vision among the Bank, borrowers,and other development partners is thekey to successful implementation of the Bank’swater Strategy, and the Bank has made somemajor accomplishments on the internationalstage (Chapter 2). The biggest challenge is convertingdonor-led partnerships into country-ledpartnerships. In most countries, the finance ministrydoes not share the Bank’s vision about theimportance of water in their economies. TheBank needs to ensure that the highest levels ofthe government and the Bank understand howcritical water development and managementare to the future of the countries. But one canhardly fault ministers of finance when the bulkof the Bank’s country assistance strategy ignoresthe importance of water.A major concern, however, is that inability tomeet the costs of proliferating partnerships mayhave reputational risks when the Bank fails todeliver. For example, the Bank allocated far lessthan anticipated for the WBI water program, leavinga greater burden for its partners. Indeed,budget cuts have recently skewed the WBI waterprogram toward the area of strongest demand—water and sanitation reform. That deemphasizessectors that need reform the most—nationalwater management, and irrigation and drainage.Such induced selectivity may prove short-sighted.Another area of risk is that performance standardsto judge the efficacy and relevance ofpartnerships and arrangements for monitoringand evaluation are still nascent.Be Patient—Reform Takes TimeAll too often, the Bank has expected reform toquickly follow investment. But in water supplyand sanitation, making investment conditional onreform frequently leads to more successful outcomes.The Indonesia and Jordan water SALs aregood examples of the challenges and achievements,while Mexico’s Second Water Modernizationshows the advantage of the long-termprogrammatic approach. The success of a35

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategysequenced and incremental approach that balanceslearning with doing and building stakeholderownership is illustrated by the first phaseof the Uttar Pradesh Sodic Soils Reclamationproject. It increased agricultural productivityand had a marked impact on poverty. OED’s recentevaluation of the rural water supply sectoremphasized that building stakeholder ownershiptakes time (OED 2000c).36

5Improving BankManagement andInternal IncentivesLong before the Bank’s 1993 water Strategy and policy were published,many staff believed that the lending and nonlending initiativesof the water sector should focus primarily on policies to improve waterservice delivery operations. 1 Task managers knew that adding a multisectoralwater resources management dimension to a lending operation wouldgreatly complicate it, especially when resources allocated to deliveryoperations were already too low and decreasing. The consensus of staff wasthat water-scarce countries needed special attention—otherwise, resourcemanagement should be evaluated (perhaps through a nonlending program)when the viability of water investment was at risk.The challenge was to design a Bank implementationstrategy based on processes and proceduresthat were cost- and resource-effective.Resolving this challenge became important becausepolicy and strategy formulation had includedwidespread participation, coordination,and dialogue with other donors and NGOs. Onegroup of leading NGOs, supportive of the Bank’swater Strategy, was concerned that the Bankwould not be able to deliver on its promises ofaction. 2Thus alerted, management agreed that theBank’s capacities and abilities to implement theStrategy would have to be reviewed and substantiallyincreased if the policy objectives wereto be effectively addressed. But three issuesclouded management’s perception of the problem.First, the demand-led approach made it difficultto define resource requirements. Second,the Bank was then expanding its environmentand social sector staff. And third, the Bank wasaggressively trying to cut overhead costs.While some uncoordinated action was takento assess the resources required, the implementationplan agreed to when the Strategywas presented to the Board was never preparedin detail, and thus never institutionalized. So,adoption has been voluntary, depending onwhether operational units have the interest—ormore important, the resources—to give attentionto water resource management.Advisory staff in the Bank did translate the conceptualframework into practical implementationguidelines for client countries. But the joint37

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyUNDP-World Bank technical paper—A Guide tothe Formulation of Water Resources Strategy (FAO1995)—was seen as an end in itself. As with theStrategy’s implementation plan, there was nofollow-through in the Bank to make the guidelinesfully operational or to assess the internal resourcesrequired to implement the guidelinesthrough lending or nonlending interventions.The Bank Is Poorly Organized toImplement the Water StrategyIn 1995 the operational Regions reverted to atwo-tier system with country management unitsdirectly supported by sector management units.The sector units functioned like the old technicaldepartments, providing specialist staff to respondto a country director’s needs—despite thefact that water knows no borders. Most sectorunits are large (70 to 120 staff) and structuredsuch that water resources management cannotbe treated in a holistic manner. Urban water supplyis separated from rural development (andthus irrigation and drainage), and in some Regionsfrom environment and social development.In addition, demand for sector support isunpredictable because it is controlled by budgetaryprovisions from the country units, and thecontinuity of staff involvement cannot be guaranteed.Until 1999 the Africa and MNA Regionswere the only ones with a functioning water resourcesmanagement unit capable of deliveringa regional approach. Since then, all Regionshave begun to set up regional water teams, andall have lead water specialists/advisors.Strategic leadership for water resources managementremains fragmented within the Bank.Rural development (including irrigation andrural water supply) and the environment areunder the vice-president for Environmentallyand Socially Sustainable Development Network(ESSD). Urban water and sanitation (WSS) isunder the vice-president for Private Sector andInfrastructure Network (PSI), primarily to reflectthe Bank’s strategy of encouraging privatizationof public sector activities, such as watersupply and sanitation. The division of waterrelateddevelopment into two separate organizationalunits may promote other Bank policystrategies (privatization), but specific Bank policyobjectives that require a holistic approach—such as implementation of its water Strategy—get lost by subdivision.Councils and Sector Boards within ESSD andPSI differ in their effectiveness on water issues.Both sector boards have produced a series of performanceimprovement plans focused on the efficiencyof their operations. The Urban WaterSupply and Sanitation Board has been developinga coherent plan to improve the efficiency ofits operations and water service delivery function.But the same is not true of the Rural SectorBoard. Under this board, water-related operations—eventhough they account for half itslending—are only part of a mandate that spansa complex of 16 rural development activities. Asa result, managerial guidance and oversight onwater development get lost in bigger rural developmentissues. It was only in the spring of2000 that a new Water Resources ManagementGroup was formed under ESSD to address this.It is too early, however, to judge the effectivenessof this new set-up and the way that energy,environment, infrastructure, rural development,and WBI training will be coordinated.One possible solution for better water servicedelivery in the rural sector is to focus exclusivelyon the efficiency and sustainability ofwater delivery in the same way that urban watersupply concerns itself only up to the householdtap. The delivery systems for urban water andfor irrigation and drainage are both capitalintensive,with similar economies of scale, organization,subsidies, and financial viabilityissues. In irrigation, this would require full attentiononly up to the bulk delivery and salespoint—where farmers’ water user groups wouldthen take responsibility for further managementand allocation. Indeed, there may be a case forgreater involvement of PSI staff in Bank effortsto reform public sector irrigation agencies to capitalizeon their expertise in unbundling complexpublic sector utilities. That would focus attentionon getting water delivery right and make utilitiesfinancially viable. It could also focus theattention of irrigation staff on improving themanagement of water below the utilities’ deliverypoint and strengthening the linkages betweenirrigated agriculture and rural development.38

Improving Bank Management and Internal IncentivesBankwide thematic groups that focus on thewater service sectors have been successful atknowledge management, particularly in watersupply and sanitation. There is some crosscoordinationamong the various thematic groupson subsectoral issues, and Bankwide discussionto advocate the case for holistic water resourcesmanagement is just beginning, aided by theBank-Netherlands Water Partnership. But theknowledge function is now seriously erodedby recent budget cuts in the Bank.But Successful Institutional ApproachesAre EvolvingDespite the fragmented approach in the Bank,there have been successful examples wherewater resource issues were treated in a holisticmanner, with the encouragement and activesupport of the regional management. None,however, has been institutionalized. And they dependheavily on unpredictable non-Bank budgetarysupport and the use of consultants.The African Water Resources ManagementInitiative unit, set up in 1995, is the only selfcontainedunit in the Bank that has performedas anticipated in the recommendations for implementationof the Strategy. It is a “bottom-up”initiative led by staff with the ability to organizeand attract non-Bank staffing and funding resources.Not dependent on budgetary supportfrom Bank country lending programs, the initiativehas considerable flexibility in choosing priorities.This obviously works, since it is gainingstrength from partnerships with stakeholders tomeet borrowers’ demand for assistance in formulatingtheir water strategies across sectoralboundaries.The comprehensive approach has also madeit possible for the Bank to influence almost allthe key national and international water resourceschallenges in the Region, including riverbasin management. It is still too early to evaluatethe full impact of the initiative, but substantialincreases in Bank budgetary support bythe Africa Region clearly indicate management’srecognition of its positive role.In MNA, a sector manager attracted enoughstaff to one of the sector units to maintain a regionalinitiative on comprehensive water policyreform. But as in the Africa Region, the waterservice sectors remain split under separate sectorunits, and MNA staffing and funding arrangementsmake it difficult to respond to regionalwater challenges in a timely and comprehensivemanner.Staff Resources Are Stretched Too ThinlySince 1993, there has been a substantial increaseof specialist staff in natural resources and environment,a modest increase in water supplyand sanitation, but a substantial decrease in irrigationand hydropower. There has also beena substantial decrease in senior technical staff,primarily due to retirement.The results of an OED survey (Annex G)show that Bank staff clearly believe they lack thefunds and personnel to carry out the Strategy(figure 5.1). Few internal incentives favor thelong-term, comprehensive, cross-sectoral viewrequired for water resource management.Strongly favored is the project-oriented enclaveapproach that focuses on service delivery.Staffing needs and recruitment are contentiousissues, with most staff believing that the Bankhad made little effort to quantify staffing at theregional and sectoral levels or in the networks.Inadequate recruitment of new staff is a significantconcern, as is the loss of skills to implementthe Strategy—a view not shared byless-experienced staff.External Stakeholders Also SeeProblemsNGO interviews also raise some serious questionsabout the perceived barriers to successful Strategyimplementation: “The high degree of internaldisagreement over fundamental aspects of thepolicy, such as whether to adopt a comprehensiveplanning approach, coupled with a lowlevel of interest in the policy shown by water projecttask managers, indicates that without concertedefforts by concerned governments andNGOs, the policy and its new approaches are fragileand may never be fully implemented.” Fromthis and other evidence, the NGOs expressed concernthat “the pressure to lend . . . has not beenremoved and continues to work against aspectsof the water policy that recommend greater39

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyFigure 5.1Staff Views on Implementing theBank’s Water StrategyInsufficient personnelToo much dependenceon outside fundingInsufficient budget for acomprehensive approachLack of staff continuity0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%Proportion of Bank staff in agreementattention to smaller and cheaper alternatives.”And they believe that “there is no clear constituency—eitherinside or outside the Bank—strong enough to ensure that the water policywill be implemented and enforced.”Local stakeholders are confused by the lackof coordination between the Bank’s watersubsectors, and the mixed messages this sends.Country stakeholders say that the Bank appearsto be internally divided on one of thebasic principles agreed at Dublin (to deal withwater holistically)—and that the internal divisionlimits Bank effectiveness, and thus thepressure it can put on governments to developa comprehensive regulatory and institutionalenvironment. Even within the varioussubsectors, the Bank does not practice whatit preaches about integrating the approachesto water development and incorporating environmentalconcerns. Stakeholders in Brazilthought that the Bank’s urban water groupseemed fixated on privatization and water tariffs,driven more by Washington’s agenda thanby local concerns.Better Guidelines Are NeededThe water sector needs better guidelines. OED’sstaff survey found that overall satisfaction withthe Strategy document is high: about 75 percentconsidered it thorough, consistent with Bankobjectives, and relevant to current Bank work andborrowers’ needs. 3 But among informed staff, almost60 percent thought that the recommendationsare difficult to monitor and somewhatplatitudinous. Many written comments describedthe Strategy as “another unfunded mandate.”Independent reviews commissioned by OEDalso found that the operations policy statement (OP4.07; see Annex A) is difficult to use as a guidancedocument: it is too brief and abstract for most practitionersand Bank staff. Compounding this, theyfound that the Strategy needs to be revised, basedon lessons learned and international best practices.In this, the Bank needs to develop sensitive, flexibleguidelines that permit staff to set assistancepriorities and to determine acceptable tradeoffs incases where the water Strategy imposes competingdemands or where elements of the Strategyare unlikely to be successful.40

6RecommendationsRecommendation 1: Aim country dialogue and institutional developmentat integrating social and environmental concerns with waterresource development and project implementation.This requires:• Greater attention to linking water projectswith CAS and poverty strategies, to achievingbetter understanding of local institutions andpreferences, and to monitoring and evaluatingproject effects on poverty.• Adopting the use of strategic environmentaland social assessments, including consultations,as part of the overall water resourcesplanning process.• More attention to be given to developing economicinstruments to manage conflict in integratedwater systems, including groundwater,and to balance demands at the river basinlevel, and between urban and rural populations,while ensuring access of the poor to water.• More attention to factoring in concerns aboutequitable allocation of water and water rights,in light of local cultural preferences and ruralurbanneeds.• Increased emphasis on implementation ofsafeguard policies during project supervisionby the Bank and borrower.Recommendation 2: Deploy Bank resourcesand instruments more effectively to nurture commitmentto the Strategy through shared objectives,realistic diagnostics, and partnershipsaimed at policy reform and capacity building.Areas requiring particular attention include:• Updating the Bank’s water policy in the contextof the forthcoming Sector Strategy Paperand supplementing it with a series of Bankprocedures and good practice notes for eachsubsector.• Making greater use of adaptable lending instrumentsand developing new, cost-effective,performance-based approaches to projectselection, design, procurement, and servicedelivery.• Strengthening ESW to allow for improved diagnosis,higher-quality dialogue with stakeholders,and closer linkages with Countryand Poverty Assistance Strategies.• Reorienting capacity-building in the watersector toward comprehensive water managementthrough WBI programs and globaland regional capacity-building partnerships.Recommendation 3: Create and sustain morecomprehensive water management allianceswith like-minded partners in the private sector,41

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategycivil society, and the development community.This requires:• Sustaining involvement in global water policynetworks and partnerships, with priorityto cross-border integrated river-basin planning,driven by stakeholder demand, and tothe resolution of international water disputes.More attention to in-country water partnershipsis required to build dialogue and leveragelocal knowledge.• Entering new partnerships only where theBank has a clear comparative advantage indoing so, clearly specifying conditions forentry and exit.• Driving the choice between private and publicsector involvement by hard-nosed institutionalanalysis of what works and what doesnot in differing country contexts.Recommendation 4: Strengthen internal management,monitoring, and evaluation of water resourcemanagement activities through astreamlined organization, more cohesive sectorand country strategies, enhanced core competencies,additional operational guidance andtraining, and more rigorous quality assurancearrangements. Chief among the issues to address:• Clarifying the role of the central Water ResourceManagement Group and its relationshipwith Sector Boards and Regional staff,particularly in relation to institutional and financialaspects of the rural water portfolio,and considering the establishment of water resourcemanagement coordinating bodies ineach Region.• Providing more vigilant and independentquality assurance for safeguard policies affectingwater development.• Offering incentives and training to acceleratestaff adoption of a comprehensive approachto water resources management.• Reassessing staffing levels and skills mixes toimplement the water strategy Bankwide. Toensure adequate staffing and continuity,reliance on ad hoc trust funds should be reducedand the Bank budget enhanced.42

ANNEXESANNEX A:WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL POLICY 4.07, WATER RESOURCESMANAGEMENT1. Bank 1 involvement in water resources managemententails support for providing potablewater, sanitation facilities, flood control, andwater for productive activities in a manner thatis economically viable, environmentally sustainable,and socially equitable.2. The Bank assists borrowers in the followingpriority areas:(a) Developing a comprehensive frameworkfor designing water resource investments,policies, and institutions. Within this framework,when the borrower develops andallocates water resources, it considerscross-sectoral impacts in a regional setting(e.g., a river basin).(b) Adopting pricing and incentive policies thatachieve cost recovery, water conservation,and better allocation of water resources.(c) Decentralizing water service delivery,involving users in planning and managingwater projects, and encouraging stakeholdersto contribute to policy formulation.The Bank recognizes that a variety oforganizations—private firms, financiallyautonomous entities, and community organizations—maycontribute to decentralizingwater delivery functions. Thus it supportsprojects that introduce different forms ofdecentralized management, focusing onthe division of responsibilities among thepublic and private entities involved.(d) Restoring and preserving aquatic ecosystemsand guarding against overexploitationof groundwater resources, giving priorityto the provision of adequate waterand sanitation services for the poor.(e) Avoiding the waterlogging and salinityproblems associated with irrigation investmentsby (i) monitoring water tables andimplementing drainage networks wherenecessary, and (ii) adopting best managementpractices to control waterpollution.(f) Establishing strong legal and regulatoryframeworks to ensure that social concernsare met, environmental resources are protected,and monopoly pricing is prevented.The Bank requires legislation or otherappropriate arrangements to establisheffective coordination and allocation proceduresfor interstate water resources.These issues are discussed in the projectdocuments.3. Individual water lending operations are explicitlylinked to the country’s priorities for reformand investment and to the Bank’s program ofsupport.4. If inadequate progress by borrowers in thesepriority areas leads to serious resource misuseand hampers the viability of water-relatedinvestments, Bank lending is limited to operationsthat provide potable water for poorhouseholds or conserve water and protect itsquality without additionally drawing on acountry’s water resources.43

ANNEX B:METHODOLOGY1. Study Design—The Approach Paperof October 21, 1998The Bank’s Water Policy has been operationalsince 1993. Since then the Bank has expandedits sector work and invested $16 billion in over180 new operations costing $40 billion in 80countries. Given this large and diverse portfolio,and CODE’s request for an evaluation ofthe Policy, OED proposes to test compliance ofrecent operations with the Policy, assess its relevanceto country needs, and estimate the efficacy,efficiency, and sustainability of itsimplementation.BackgroundThe challenge for future water management isenormous. In 1995, 29 countries with populationstotaling 436 million experienced waterstress or scarcity. By 2025, about 48 countries willdo so, and the number of people adverselyaffected will exceed 1.4 billion, the majority inthe least-developed countries. 1 Many countrieswith limited water availability also have a largeproportion of their total area in international riverbasins. Where water resources are scarce,dependence on shared water increases the riskof friction and social tensions—as is already thecase along the rivers Euphrates, Jordan, andNile.The Bank’s portfolio of water projectsaccounts for 14 percent of Bank lending.Between 1985 and 1998, the Bank investedmore than $33 billion in water-related projects.Until the mid-1980s, however, the Bank treatedthe various water subsectors (water supply, irrigation,hydropower, drainage, flood control,etc.) separately. It recognized intersectoral impactbut did not seek to systematically optimize waterallocations. The damage to aquatic ecosystemsinherent in some projects was treated, if at all,by limited add-on corrective actions, and rarelyby substantive adjustments to project design.Irrigation and water supply/sanitation projectstried, with varying success, to implement pricingschedules and cost recovery agreements tohelp with recurrent costs and achieve more efficientwater management within projects.In 1993, the Bank issued a comprehensivestatement—Water Resources Management, AWorld Bank Policy Paper. This paper took threeyears to complete, a measure of the range andintensity of the debate that surrounded it. Therewas little disagreement on the fundamentalissue—to reverse the trend whereby demand wasoutrunning supply of fresh water, while its qualitywas declining due to user abuse. While thedebate was over the practicality of proposedsolutions, it also raised awareness at all levelsin the Bank of the relevant issues and the needfor a new approach.The Bank’s Water PolicyThe Bank’s Water Policy has two functions. First,it seeks to encourage reforms in water managementinstitutions, policies, and planning inborrowing countries. Second, it is intended toguide the Bank in helping borrowers createincentives to promote these reforms and thetools to implement them.The Policy has three central themes: (i) acomprehensive analytical framework for identifyingpriorities (holistic planning); (ii) the institutionaland regulatory systems, supported bylegislation, that promote reform (with emphasison decentralization and participation); and (iii)the financial and opportunity costs of water inall its competing uses (an economic good).Annex 1 organizes the recommendations in45

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategymatrix form, and provides a structure for subsequentanalysis and reporting. Two other importantprinciples are that special attention shouldbe given to participation by women because theyare the primary managers of domestic water(the gender dimension), and that the requirementsof the poor for water should take precedence(the poverty dimension).Conceptual Framework of the StudyThe conceptual framework for the main analyticalexercise of the study, depicted in figureB.1, is adapted from the logical frameworkunderlying results-based management. The principalimpact of the Bank’s Policy is identified asthe improvement of water sector performance:the provision of water services, such as irrigationand water supply/sanitation, in an economicallyviable and environmentally sustainablemanner. The Policy meets the Bank’s overarchingobjective of reducing poverty by giving priorityto the water requirements of poorcommunities. The Policy recognizes that, toimprove the performance of the water sector, itis first necessary to help borrowing countriesreform their water management institutions,policies, and planning systems. Thus, reform isidentified as the principal outcome of Bank andother interventions.Improvements in Bank capacity and specificBank interventions are portrayed as inputs andoutputs in figure B.1. The Policy recommendsa number of ways for the Bank to intervene tohelp promote water management reforms. Theseinclude assisting governments through sectorwork and technical assistance in formulatingpriority policy, planning, and institutionalreforms—and investments—that are consistentwith the Bank’s Water Policy. These prioritiesshould guide the Bank’s sector lending programs.Individual lending operations should belinked to and promote the priorities for reformand investment. The Policy also places a highpriority on Bank support for upgrading the skillsof country policy analysts, planners, managers,and technicians.Bank actions are only a modest driving forcebehind water management reforms. 2 A host ofcountry and region-specific variables influencereforms in borrowing countries. Countries differin their water requirements and endowments,economic and political conditions,Figure B.1Conceptual FrameworkImpactsImproved Water Sector performanceOutcomesReforms in water managementinstitutions, policies, and planningInternationalactorsCountry conditionsOutputsBank operations, lending andnonlendingInputsBudget, skills, procedures, and partnerships46

Annexesinstitutional capacities, and environmental problems.Other development institutions, includingmultilateral and bilateral developmentagencies, nongovernmental organizations, andthe private sector, also influence the pace anddirection of reform. And promoting collaborationwith these international actors is an importantelement of the Water Policy. Thus, thedesign of relevant reforms, and the time framefor their implementation, crucially depend on theinternal dynamics and water situation of thecountry, and on the quality of partnershipsinvolved in water sector operations. Figure B.1aligns country conditions and other internationalactors with Bank interventions as contributorsto reform.Study ObjectivesThe purpose of the study is to evaluate theBank’s performance in implementing the WaterPolicy and derive lessons for improving Banklending and nonlending activities and Bank staffcapabilities. Five main issues will be examined:• The extent to which Water Policy themesand priorities have been internalized intoBank procedures, staffing patterns, and staffdevelopment programs• The quality of lending and nonlending instrumentsoperational departments have used toimplement Water Policy priorities• The influence Bank interventions have had onnational and international water resourcepolicies and institutions, and how that influencewas affected by conditions specific toparticular countries and shared river basins• The development effectiveness of Water Policyinstruments in light of those results thatcan be observed• And, most important, country-specific conditionsmost likely to induce water policyreforms—for example, severe water scarcity,fiscal deficits, liberalizing regimes—and the“levers” accessible to the Bank to encourageand shape government interventions.The study will focus on water managementreforms—the outcomes—as the measure of successin implementing the Bank’s Water Policy.Since it is too early to estimate the impact ofBank interventions on the ground, the studywill reflect OED’s conventional standards forassessing value added: the relevance to countryconditions of recent Bank activities, includingeconomic and sector work, portfolio andpipeline investment operations, and developmentsin organization and training; the efficacy,efficiency, and sustainability of activities showingresults; and the contribution of the activitiesto institutional development.MethodologyThe study has four components: a desk review,focus-country studies, thematic studies, and outreach.It will be conducted in three phases. Thephase 1 review will concentrate on the Bank’sactions, phase 2 will expand the analysis toinclude the country and other partner contributions,and phase 3 will consolidate and reportthe findings.Desk ReviewThe desk review will cover all Bank-financedwater projects approved since 1993 as well asprojects nearing approval, a total of about 190operations. The evaluation format will use quantitativescoring to assess in particular the complianceof these projects with respect to theWater Policy. Compliance, in this context, refersto the extent to which the project’s objectives anddesign are intended to promote, or already haveprompted, reforms in water management institutions,policies, and planning consistent with thewater policy matrix (table B.1). The relevanceof Bank nonlending activities, such as sectorwork and policy dialogue with governments, willbe examined because in many countries theyhave led, and even dominated, Bank involvementin water sector reform. The desk reviewwill include in-depth evaluation (including somefield visits where practicable) of up to 10 innovativeprojects promoting reforms to identifylessons for broader application.Focus-Country StudiesThe study will examine the Bank’s role in promotingwater sector reforms in five countries.Brazil has been selected as a pilot because of therapid evolution of its water management system47

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyT able B.1W ater Policy Matrix of RecommendedReformsNational/State LevelNational/state water strategy should reflectsocial, economic, and environmental objectivesand be based on a sound assessment of waterresources. The strategy deal should spell outpriorities for providing water services; establishpolicies on water rights, water pricingand cost recovery, demand management, publicinvestment, private sector participation;and meeting environmental managementneeds. Strategy formulation should be transparentand participatory.Legal, Policy and PlanningInstitutional structures—and laws—at thenational and regional levels to coordinate theformulation and implementation of policiesfor improved water management, waterservice delivery, public investment programsand environmental management. Policy andplanning institutions at the river basin levelmay also be appropriate. Stakeholders activelyinfluence policy decisions, and policy-makersare ultimately responsible to the public.Financing and SubsidiesPublic sector financing should be focused onpublic goods. Water service organizationsshould be partially self-financing and use privatecapital markets; subsidies should betransparent and justified; subsidy programsshould not create perverse incentives.Comprehensive Analytic FrameworkRegional/Basin LevelInvestments, policies, and regulations in onepart of a river basin potentially affect otheractivities in the basin. The framework shouldbe formulated in the context of a broadnational/state strategy, be sensitive to socioeconomicconcerns related to water, andincorporate environmental managementneeds. This is an indicative and dynamic planningprocess. Formulation of frameworksshould be transparent and participatory, andbased on accurate information.Institutional and Regulatory SystemsRegulatory and ManagementAgencies for the regulation of water servicesand the management of water resources.Water services to be regulated with respectto pricing and quality of service. Water managementresponsibilities include inter aliasetting standards, issuing permits, basin operations,and the collection and analysis ofdata. Regulatory and management decisionsshould take place at the lowest appropriatelevel with stakeholder participation.Economic and Social IssuesWater Service ChargesWater service organizations should be financiallyautonomous and operate under a hardbudget constraint with explicit cost recoverytargets. Service charge mechanisms shouldpromote incentives for performance byproviders and efficiency by users. Crosssubsidiesbetween users and regions shouldbe minimized, but equity pursued.Infrastructure ProjectsProjects should be planned and assessed inthe context of a broad river basin and nationalwater strategy. Projects should internalizeenvironmental management needs (e.g.,water quality, in-stream flows). Socioeconomicassessments should accompanyall projects. Project planning should be transparentand participatory, and based on accurateinformation. Projects should be reviewedby appropriate management agencies.Water Service ProvisionWater service organizations should be financiallyand operationally autonomous—withinan appropriate regulatory framework. Waterservices should be decentralized to the lowestappropriate level. Water service customersand users should participate in theformulation of management decisions.Poverty AlleviationSpecial efforts should be directed to meetingthe water supply and sanitation needs ofthe poor and redressing the neglect of therural poor. Policies that undermine subsistenceagricultural or fisheries should be carefullyevaluated and, where necessary, thereshould be adjustments and compensation.in the last 10 years, and the Bank’s large portfolioof projects and economic and sector workin that country. Selection of the other focuscountries will be guided by studies already beingundertaken by OED (such as the CAEs for Chinaand India), the screening criteria developedfrom the desk review, and discussions withinternal and external partners in the study. Countryselection will be regionally balanced, covera significant percentage of Bank-financed water48

Annexesprojects, and reflect diversity in country-specificconditions. For each focus country the study willassess—by desk review and selected city/projectvisits—water management institutions, policies,and planning; the role played by the Bank andother actors; partnership with other developmentagencies; and country-specific conditions.Thematic StudiesDuring phase 2, at least three thematic studies willinvestigate important issues that cannot be adequatelytreated in the desk review and focuscountrystudies. Final selection of these themeswill follow the workshop concluding phase 1.Three subjects have been tentatively programmed:• Bank Capacity. The study would assess theevolution of Bank capacity in all water sectors—staffqualifications, training programs,documentation, coordination with other agencies,and so on.• International Watercourses. The Water Policyadvocates better management of shared internationalwater resources. The Bank is currentlysupporting international cooperation ina number of international basins, including theAral Sea, the Mekong Basin, Lake Victoria, theNile River, and the Senegal River. This thematicstudy would evaluate the success ofthose interventions and include up to fourcase studies.• Implementation of Pricing and Cost RecoveryReforms. Sustained progress toward the objectivesof the Water Policy depends in manycountries on successful implementation ofhigher tariffs for water. Commitment to suchpolicy reforms depends on political will at thelocal level to execute the new pricing regimes.The objective will be to assess whether theWater Policy pricing prescriptions are effectivein the focus countries and identify patternsof successful intervention. The 10in-depth case studies proposed for the deskreview may supply other examples.Internal and External OutreachIn an effort to tap the knowledge and opinionsof Bank staff and other stakeholders, the followingactivities are planned: an entry workshopto discuss study methodology with Bank staffand selected external participants and to helpproduce the design paper; five focus-countryworkshops to be held in-country with governmentofficials, Bank task managers, relevantinternational organizations, and other stakeholdersto discuss the evolution of water managementreforms in the country and the Bank’srole; formal and informal interviews to learnfrom the experience of Bank staff; a phase 1workshop to discuss the results of the deskreview and Brazil focus study and revisit theapproach for phase 2; and stakeholder workshopsnear the end of the study to review the draftreport. Some of the workshops will be professionallyfacilitated by a consultant with experiencein water management issues and waterpolicy evaluation.OED and Partner RolesOED will link the study with ongoing QAGstudies and OED’s CAEs, the rural developmentstudy; the aid coordination study; and otherthematic, country, and project evaluations. At thesame time, OED will work closely with Bankcountry departments, national governments,other development banks and bilateral donors,NGOs, the Global Water Partnership (managedby ESDGW), and other partners, as appropriate.Because of ESDGW’s strong interest in this topic,and because of its intention to build on theresults of the study to formulate a revised Bankstrategy for water resources management, OEDwill carry out the desk review, country casestudies, and workshops in consultation withESDGW. Guidance for the overall study wouldbe provided by a three- or four-person reviewpanel of senior international experts from developedand developing countries.2. ImplementationThe study has three components: a desk review,focus-country studies, and outreach. It was conductedin four phases. Phase 1 involved discussionwith the Bank’s Global Water Unit todevelop the terms of reference for the study anddiscuss the methodology, which was subsequentlydiscussed with Bank staff and selectedexternal stakeholders. The study officially startedafter approval of the Approach Paper by the49

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyBoard’s Committee on Development Effectiveness(CODE) on October 21, 1998. Phase 2undertook detailed examination of Bank data anddocuments, reviewed the Bank’s organizationalresponse to the OP, and initiated a pilot countrystudy in Brazil, and a Roundtable Conferenceto discuss findings in Brasilia, sponsored byOED. Subsequently, internal and external stakeholdersmet in June 1999 to review interimresults and make suggestions for improvement.Phase 3 continued the documentary research andcountry studies. OED participated in two countrystudies and roundtables sponsored by ESSD:India (May 2000) and Yemen (October 2000).GWU undertook two further in-country countrystudies and roundtables in the Philippines andNigeria during 2000. A special OED study wasalso made of China. At all four roundtables, astandard (anonymous) written questionnairewas applied, and these formed the basis fordrawing cross-comparisons among study countryviews on Bank effectiveness. Phase 4, finalizationof the draft report based on feedbackreceived, started in November 2000 after reviewof the first draft OED evaluation report, whichhad been circulated within the Bank and topeer reviewers on September 2000. The reviseddraft was completed on December 20, 2000,and was sent for formal Bank review in orderto present the final report to CODE in late February2000.Desk ReviewThe desk review covered different sets of data:• A comparison of OED’s evaluation ratingsand lessons learned from over 300 water andwater-related operations completed in theperiod 1988–99. These data were then partitionedinto pre- and post-Strategy groupscentered on 1993, and comparisons weremade to establish the differences in countyoperating conditions.• A review of economic and sector work byStrategy elements for the same period andmaking the same comparison to establishhow content—classified under Strategy elements—variedfrom one period to another.• A content review of Bank 410 operationsduring 1988–99 (163 in 1988–93, and 247 in1994–99) to determine how development andproject objectives have changed.• A review of 146 CASs covering 98 countriesto determine responsiveness to the Strategy.• An in-depth review of post-1994 operationsagainst a standard evaluation process (AnnexD) to determine responsiveness to theStrategy.• A special study of 292 QAG evaluations coveringthe period 1997–99 to determine qualityat entry and at supervision based on QAGtypology.• A special study of 103 randomly drawn operationsto determine coverage and trends ofsocial development issues pre- and post-Strategy (Annex E).In addition to desk studies, many Bank taskmanagers were interviewed to check and supplementthe findings from the desk review.Focus Country StudiesThe study examined the Bank’s role in promotingwater sector reforms in five countries.Brazil was selected as a pilot because of therapid evolution of its water management systemin the last 10 years, and the Bank’s largeportfolio of projects and economic and sectorwork in that country. Subsequent country studieswere regionally balanced in order to covera significant percentage of Bank-financed waterprojects and reflect diversity in country-specificconditions. For each focus country the studyassessed—by desk review and selected city/project visits—water management institutions,policies, and planning, the role played by theBank and other actors, partnership with otherdevelopment agencies, and country-specificconditions.Thematic StudiesThe thematic studies were not undertaken, as sufficientfunds were not available.Internal and External Outreach• An entry workshop with Bank staff was heldin December 1998.• Five focus-country workshops were held—two attended by OED, three by ESDGW.50

Annexes• A series of informal workshops was heldwith Bank staff to discuss the methodologyin the period November–April 1999.• A phase I workshop organized by ESDGWwas held in the Bank in June 1999.• Stakeholder workshops to discuss the draftOED report were organized by the WaterResources Management Group in October2000.51

ANNEX C:SECTOR PERFORMANCE—RECOVERING FROMA TROUBLED PASTAt the time the Bank’s water Strategy was underpreparation, water-related projects were amongthe poorer performers in the Bank’s portfolio.Since 1993 that performance has improved,although it remains below the Bank average.While the water Strategy may have contributedto the improving trend, the more immediate influencewas the drive to improve overall Bank performancefollowing the 1993 Wapenhans Report,which was highly critical of the quality of theBank’s lending, and the responses to OED sectorreviews of water supply and sanitation in1992 and of irrigation and drainage in 1995.The recovery, however, has not been evenlydistributed or the same for all subsectors. Watersupply and sanitation has recovered more thanirrigation and drainage since 1993. The principalreason for this is that the water supply and sanitation(WSS) subsector has benefited from multipleProject Improvement Plans (PIPs); irrigationand drainage has had no PIPs. The WSS portfolio,guided by the PIPs, was extensively restructuredafter 1993 to eliminate the most risky projects andto concentrate on institutional development andfinancial and organizational sustainability in theremainder. The irrigation and drainage subsector,in contrast, has been, and remains, weak on policyand institutional issues, focusing instead oncostly participation approaches that enhanceownership among stakeholders but leaveuntouched some more important factors for sustainability.This Annex first reviews the issuescontributing to the poor performance of the past,then analyzes current performance trends.Water and Sanitation Lacked a UnifiedSector ApproachThe 1992 OED evaluation of the WSS portfoliofound that the lack of a sector approach underminedthe Bank’s mission to reduce povertyand missed the synergy from complementaryinvestments in sanitation. Although there weresound sector policies, none addressed the needfor development strategies that were environmentallysustainable or adequately addressedcompeting uses of water. Even so, almost halfof the 120 country-specific projects evaluatedwere begun without an established policy for thesector, or without studies in the sector context.In many cases, the lack of a sector approachmeant that there was insufficient provision forthe poor, and that the Bank responded toomuch to the pressure from influential segmentsof the population for improved water and sanitationservices. Thus many projects addressedimmediate local problems, such as how best toget water supplies quickly into major cities,regardless of other demands for water. Sanitationand environmental protection were onlyancillary considerations. Even when considered,sanitation was normally the first area to bescaled-down or eliminated when escalating costsforced borrowers to revise project plans.The development effectiveness of Bank operationsand their sustainability was frequentlyjeopardized by taking the easy option to increasea country’s infrastructure rather than exercisingthe Bank’s leverage to obtain sector reforms.Only 2 WSS projects demonstrated success inpoverty relief; another 20 claimed success butprovided no means of measuring it. The low prioritygiven to sanitation services and environmentalprotection was often due to the failureof governments in setting up efficient sectororganizations and management and wellbalancedwater resources management strategies.The Bank also failed to promote water tariffs andcharges that reconciled economic efficiency,53

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategysocial equity, and financial criteria. Yet, enforcingsuch pricing policies is a necessary conditionfor efficiency savings and ensuringcontributions to investment that would increasethe share of the population with safe water andsanitation.There was compelling evidence that the prerequisitesfor good utility performance are autonomyand an independent regulatory system.Water supply and sanitation organizations hadrelied too much on government involvement andpublic finances because the Bank did not use itsinfluence to encourage governments to grantmanagement and financial autonomy to utilities. 1Experience showed that the time span on oneproject is too short for developing an enablingframework and building well-staffed and efficientutilities. Thus, OED recommended that the Bankshould embark on medium-term programsfocused on sectoral adjustment and technicalassistance, followed by investment lending onlywhen minimum and monitorable conditions aremet for a healthy expansion.Irrigation’s Success Was Built on WeakPolicy and Institutional FoundationsThe 1995 OED Irrigation and Drainage SectorReview cautioned that the success of irrigationmay be its Achilles’ heel. The review said thatsince irrigation was a major component of thegreen revolution that decreased food prices andallowed greater access by the poor, the successof irrigation might lead to complacency andreduced investment because of lower financialreturns. Although irrigation projects were foundto be effective in reaching the rural poor, theirperceived success was strongly affected bymacroeconomic conditions, further emphasizingthe need for comprehensive appraisal.As investment in new irrigation projectsdeclined in the 1980s, many projects changedfrom a primarily engineering focus to become“rural development” projects with an irrigationcomponent, and there was a marked shift fromfinancing of specific irrigation schemes to sectorloans. The evaluation found, however, thatwhile sector loans appeared to promote reform,in many cases they contained minimal policy andinstitutional content. These projects were alsomore comprehensive and reminiscent of theintegrated rural development loans of the1970s—but may suffer from the problems ofimpracticality because of their complexity anddispersed geographical nature.The evaluation argued that the Bank shouldcontinue to finance large irrigation schemesbecause of the economies of scale and high ratesof economic return. Even so, there was a definitetrend away from new construction toward rehabilitation,but not enough was being done topromote system upgrading, a process that usesengineering and social sciences to improve irrigationservice to people, lower unit costs, and conservewater where it is scarce. In particular, OEDargued that the Bank’s traditional response toinadequate water service delivery—raising watercharges—did not work because it ignored theincentive structure that enabled stakeholders towork together to improve performance. Nascentattempts at participatory irrigation managementwere starting to yield results, yet there was stillinsufficient recognition of the new institutions andgovernance—particularly financial autonomy—needed to make them successful.The environmental and human impact of irrigationdevelopment was a cause for concern.Where health issues were incorporated into irrigationprojects the results were outstanding, buttoo many opportunities for a synergistic approach,as for example with catchment management,were overlooked. Drainage was still the biggestsingle source of environmental problems stemmingfrom irrigation and, in the worst cases,salinization of soils led to loss of productiveland and livelihoods. The record on involuntaryresettlement was mixed (Annex F). Sometimes itsapplication was unsatisfactory, partly becauseof inadequate design due to peripheral Bankinvolvement and inherited problems, and partlybecause of borrowers’ reluctance to fully embracethe Bank’s resettlement policies because of additionalcosts and delays. As a result, there was anincreasing aversion within the Bank and amongborrowers to use Bank finance for projects withresettlement, particularly dams, even when therewas sound economic justification for doing so.Finally, the evaluation showed that therewere a number of Bank institutional constraints54

Annexesto the “new agenda” for irrigation reforms. Therewas a pervasive concern that many of the issuesraised by OED were either marginal or wouldprove to be costly to the Bank, such as resettlement.Irrigation professionals were also waryof increased user participation because theyperceived it would lengthen the implementationperiod and may prejudice project results. A surveyof staff revealed that they thought engineeringdesign aspects were three to four timesmore important than design of agricultural support,production, and marketing facilities. Notsurprisingly, there was concern at the decliningpool of irrigation engineers and their replacementby nontechnical specialists and economists:“there is a risk of decline of quality of work inthe future if this trend continues.” Yet managementrebutted the recommendation for increasedsupervision to ensure construction quality andland acquisition primarily because of the budgetimplications—small in terms of overall projectcost, large in terms of Bank staff resourcesneeded.Many of the deficiencies noted in the twoOED reviews were addressed by managementand corrected through implementing the waterstrategy in the Bank’s subsequent lending andnonlending operations. As Chapters 1 and 2 ofthe main report explain, a concerted effort wasmade after 1993 to shift the direction of Bankwater activities.Portfolio PerformanceThe overall performance of 336 water projectscompleted in the period 1988–99 was below theBank average, based on the assessment of projectresults along three related dimensions—outcome,institutional development impact, andsustainability of project benefits (figure C.1). 2OED’s exit ratings reflect performance over thelife of the project and provide critical insight intothe current policymaking environment of Bankclients and many valuable lessons. Almost halfthe water portfolio was active in the most recentsix years of the period. 3Outcome. OED’s outcome rating is basedon whether the project achieved most of itsmajor relevant goals efficiently and with fewshortcomings, considering the importance of itsmajor stated objectives and the associated costsand benefits. It takes account of how relevantthe project’s objectives were to the country’sFigure C.1Post-Strategy Water Ratings AreBelow the Bank Average140%120%InstitutionaldevelopmentBetter100%Bank average 100%80%60%OutcomeSustainability40%20%Pre-StrategyPost-Strategy1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998YearWorse55

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategydevelopment strategy. The portfolio showedmarked improvement, increasing from just over40 percent satisfactory in 1988 to three-quarterssatisfactory by 1991. Thereafter, satisfactory outcomeratings declined steadily until 1996, whenthey bottomed out at 53 percent. In the last threeyears of the period the score improved, but itremained 5–10 percent below the Bankwideaverage of 72 percent. 4 While this trend seemsbroadly correlated with the introduction of theBank’s water Strategy, this is purely coincidental,since a typical water project is implementedover seven years. Thus, the downward trendstarting in 1991 reflects quality at entry in the earlyto mid-1980s. 5 When the outcome is related tothe date of project approval, the results show thatthe upturn after 1996 follows improved qualityat entry since 1992. Much of this was because theBank increased its attention to portfolio qualityfollowing the 1993 Wapenhans Report.Efficiency is an important component of theoutcome rating. Two-thirds of all water projectshad estimates of economic or financial efficiency.In line with water strategy recommendations,urban water supply projects increasedtheir use of efficiency tests by almost 40 percent.Conversely, there was a decline of 9 percent forirrigation and drainage, and 38 percent forhydropower. There is a marked differencebetween the optimism shown at appraisal andoutcomes for projects completed after 1993—most of it related to institutional performance.Table C.1 shows that the Bank has improved itsestimated rate of return in its water portfolio since1993, and reduced the risks. The most riskysector was water supply adjustment lending,which delivered a rate of return 80 percentbelow expectations—not surprising, given thatmost of the benefits are predicated on relativelyquick and substantial institutional reform. Economicreturns from agricultural projects are notwithout risk either, and mature at about 20 percentless than planned. The least risky projectsare urban water supply and hydropower, primarilybecause outcomes are determined byvery clearly defined development objectives andwell-defined costs.Institutional development. This was higherfor water projects than the Bankwide averagebefore 1994. Emphasis on institutional development—andclient ownership—is essential tomove beyond project financing and to achievelong-lasting improvements in developing countries’utilization of human and financialresources. Despite a long decline between 1991and 1995, institutional development ratingsrecovered because of greater private sectorinvolvement, beneficiary participation, and theadoption of a tougher line with public sectorimplementing agencies (box C.1). One of themost notable features of the water portfolio isthe high correlation of unsuccessful project outcomes(even though most projects substantiallyachieved their physical objectives) with modestor negligible institutional development, andvice versa (figure C.2).T able C.1Acceptable Levels of Efficiency(except for adjustment lending)Average subsectoral economic/financial rate of return (percent)Water sector Inland Irrigation & Urbanadjustment b fisheries drainage Hydropower c water supplyPre-Strategy — 21 13 12.9 10Post-Strategy 3 23 20 12.9 11Pre-Strategy efficiency gap a — -10 -9 0 -1Post-Strategy efficiency gap a -13 -6 -5 -1 -1a. The “efficiency” gap is the difference between appraisal and exit economic or financial rate of return.b. The rate of return is for those projects that had infrastructure investment components; adjustment per se cannot be explicitly measured by standard efficiency tests.c. Returns and ratings for hydropower projects are heavily conditioned by the efficacy of power generation, regulation, and management and only weakly linked to water sector performance.56

AnnexesBox C.1High Borrower Ownership Ensures Successin AlbaniaThe political and economic collapse of Albania provided a windowfor reform of the irrigation sector through the Albania IrrigationRehabilitation Project (1994–2000). The Bank movedquickly from appraisal to approval (10 months) and providedsubstantial supervision to respond quickly to an evolutionary andcommunity-driven reform program. A new Irrigation Code andRegulation for Water Users’ Associations was approved by Parliamentin 1996. A comprehensive Law on Irrigation and Drainagecovering restructuring of all existing public sector water enterprisesinto drainage boards was adopted by Parliament in 1999.Irrigation sector reform succeeded because it had strongcentral government support and newly established local management.Conservative public sector agencies unwilling toreform were bypassed by government and replaced by the privatesector. Water user associations (WUAs) were set up andgiven complete responsibility for operating all irrigation facilities(including reservoirs and primary irrigation canals) over anarea of 70,000 ha, and 12 WAUs have federated. Rehabilitationsignificantly exceeded appraisal projections and at considerablecost savings (32 percent for irrigation and 57 percent fordrainage). The ex-post economic rate of return is estimated tobe 38 percent compared with 17 percent estimated at appraisal.Overall, 85 percent of WUAs have successfully managed WUAadministration, water allocation and distribution, O&M, and feecollection and are beginning to become a focus for self-help onissues of social development and governance. Actual cost recoveryby WUAs ranges from 35 percent to 100 percent, and averages60 percent.There are still unresolved problems. As the ECA Regionnotes: “despite their achievements, WUAs and federated WUAshave yet to prove their sustainability, simply establishing [them]is not a goal in itself . . . but the start of a long journey towardestablishing sustainability.” A large number of absentee landlordsthreatens the sustainability of many WUAs. Agricultureremains primarily at a subsistence stage and economically suboptimalfarm sizes are a disincentive to farming. About 40 WUAshave ceased operation due to lack of interest in agriculture andmass urbanization of farmland around Tirana and Durres. Unresolvedland drainage problems are causing waterlogging of thecoastal plain and depressing agricultural production.Figure C.2Institutional Development IsKey to Satisfactory Outcomes(n=306 projects)60%Proportion ofcompletedwater projectswith institutionaldevelopmentthat is:SubstantialModestNegligible50%40%30%20%10%0%SatisfactoryOED outcome ratingUnsatisfactory57

ANNEX D:ASSESSING WATER PROJECT DESIGN UTILIZING THE WATERPOLICY MATRIX DEVELOPMENT FOR THE BANK’S 1993 WATERSTRATEGY PAPEREvaluation Methodology1. Does the project intervene in a specific category?If yes, score the nature of the interventionaccording to the general criteria listed below.2. If the project does not intervene in a specificcategory, is the category relevant to the projectdesign? If yes, does the SAR/PAD discussthe issue?Scores:4. High: The project design addressed theseissues with no major shortcomings.3. Substantial: The project design addressedthese issues with some major shortcomings.2. Modest: The project design addressed theseissues with numerous shortcomings.1. Negligible: The project design addressed theseissues in a completely inadequate manner.N/R: Category not relevant (N/R) in this projectcontext.N/D: Category appears relevant, but no specificproject component addresses it, and theSAR/PAD does not discuss the category(N/D) in sufficient detail. [Note: this mark hasa negative connotation because, if the issueis relevant, the SAR/PAD should discuss it.]D: Category is relevant, no specific project intervention,but the SAR analyzes the issue.T able D.1Assessment Criteria for InterventionsComprehensive ManagementNational/state level Regional/basin level ProjectsNational/state water resources Regional/basin water resources Water resource planning for physicalStrategy/plan Strategy/plan infrastructureInstitutional DevelopmentLegal and policy Regulatory & management Water service organizationsWater resources: Water resource management: Urban water utilitiesNational/state water laws, policies, decrees Water resource management agencies Irrigation water user organizationsWater councils & commissions Environmental management agencies Rural water user groupsHydropower companiesWater services:Water service regulation:Laws for water service & regulatoryPublic utility commissionsorganizations. Policy statementsand government decreesEconomic and Social IssuesFinancing and subsidies Water service charges Disadvantaged groupsInfrastructure financing terms and conditions Financial management and tariff Low-cost WS&S for rural and urban poorStructure for water service organizations ResettlementGenderIndigenous groups59

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategy1. Comprehensive ManagementA. National/State Level (alphanumericalscore)I. Based on sound assessment of waterresources and alternative developmentscenarios?• Environmental/ecological issues anintegral part of the framework?• Stakeholders fairly represented in frameworkformulation?II. The framework addresses policy issues,such as water rights, water pricing, costrecovery, private sector participation,capacity building, etc.?III. Is there a clear relationship to national/state goals and policies?IV. B. Regional/Basin Level (alphanumericalscore)V. Based on sound assessment of waterresources and alternative developmentscenarios?• Environmental/ecological issues an integralpart of the framework?• Stakeholders fairly represented in frameworkformulation?• Is there a clear relationship to thenational/state framework?C. Projects (alphanumerical score)• Based on a sound assessment of waterresources?• Environmental/ecological issues an integralpart of project planning?• Project embedded in broader regional/basin and national/state frameworks?• Is project planning and review conductedin a transparent and participatorymanner?2. Institutional DevelopmentA. Legal and PolicyWater Resource Policy and Legal Interventions(alphanumerical score)• Are there coordination mechanismsacross agencies and jurisdictions?• Do major stakeholders (water users, civilsociety, NGOs, etc.) participate in policymaking?• Do the policy institutions have sufficientpower to be effective? i.e., budget authority,legal mandates, political backing,etc.?VI. Are the policy institutions supported bycompetent water management agencies?VII. Water Service Policy and Legal Interventions(alphanumerical score)• Effective regulatory framework: pricing,service, environmental standards, etc.?• Water service organizations operate on acommercial basis?• Explicit policy statements regarding: servicepricing, subsidy levels, etc.?• Water service organizations appropriatelydecentralized?B. Management and RegulationWater Resource & Environmental ManagementAgencies (alphanumericalscore)• Agency’s monitoring and planning capabilitystrengthened?• Collaboration with other agenciesinvolved in water management, i.e., environmental,fisheries, agriculture?• Does the agency have an outreach/ publiceducation program?• Plans and decisions reviewed and approvedby an appropriate policyinstitution?VIII. If the agency provides infrastructure (i.e.,bulk water supply or flood control), is thisunit a distinct financial and operationalentity, separated from planning responsibilities?Water Service Regulation Bodies (alphanumericalscore)• Does the body set cost recovery, tariff,and accounting policies?• Does the body monitor the financial performanceof water service organizations?• Does the body review and approve tariffproposals for water service organizations?C. Water Service Organizations (alphanumericalscore)IX. Is the organization financially and operationallyautonomous, and operating ona commercial basis?• Is the organization under an appropriateregulatory framework for pricing andservice quality?60

Annexes• Is the water service organization appropriatelydecentralized?• Do water service customers and usershave a voice in management decisions?3. Economic and Social IssuesA. Financing and Subsidies (alphanumericalscore)• Financing terms explicit?• Are subsidies explicit and justified?• Does the water service organization/agency contribute some degree of selffinancing?• Are nonpublic sources of financing used(private banks, bonds, equity markets, etc.?)B. Water Service Charges (alphanumericalscore)• Are there explicit cost-recovery targets?• Is there a sound financial analysis whichexamines the need for tariff increasesand the impact on the financial health ofthe organization/agency?• Is the tariff structure analyzed with respectto promoting water use efficiency andequity?• Are the collected revenues put back intoservice provision?C. Disadvantaged Groups (alphanumericalscore)• Is there a social assessment of the peopleaffected by the project?• If there is a project component targetedat the poor (i.e., low-cost WS&S), doesit take the special needs of affordability,appropriate technology, community participation,etc. into account?• If resettlement is involved, is there an adequateresettlement plan?• When relevant, are the specific needsand participation of women considered?• When relevant, are the specific needsand participation of indigenous groupsconsidered?Figure D.1W ater Policy Review—Sample ProjectDesign Analysis1. Project Data:Country: ChinaProject Name—ID: Shanxi Poverty Alleviation ProjectEffectiveness Date: September 5, 1996Closing Date: December 31, 2002% Disbursed 45.7Task Manager:Partners Involved:Reviewed By:Checked By:Date Posted: 03/01/992. Project Objectives, Financing, Costs, and ComponentsProject Costs (US $ million) AppraisalTotal 182.8List Financing SourcesShanxi Province 45.7Prefectures/Counties 7.3Farmers 29.8IDA 100.061

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyFigure D.1W ater Policy Review—Sample ProjectDesign Analysis (continued)Executing Agencies:Objectives: Help alleviate poverty in the 20 poorest counties of Yuncheng and Luliang Perfectures in Shanxi Province through activities aimedat raising incomes of about 3 million poor through rehabilitation of an existing irrigation system, improvement of rural roads and construction ofvillage water supply schemes, land development, expansion of livestock raising and horticulture, and expansion of primary agriculture processingcapacity.Components:(i). Construction of a new Pumping Comples Langdian on Yellow River for Yuncheng Irrigation System.(ii). Improvement and expansion of Yuncheng Irrigation System(iii). River beach development with irrigation and rural infrastructure on 13,000 ha in Yuncheng(iv). Construction of 78 village water supply schemes in Yuncheng (620,000 people) and Luliang (64,000 people).(v). Improvement of existing rural roads 209 km in Yuncheng and 118 km in Luliang.(vi). Soil and water conservation works (56 check dams, 4,200 haof afforestation on sloping lands, 13,400 ha of terracing)(vii). Agricultural processing facilities, livestock raising and expansion of area under fruit and nut trees.(viii). Support for program targeted at poor and disadvantaged women.(ix). Project management, training and overseas study tours.3. Overall Design Rating: 3Analytic Framework Institutional & Regulatory Economic and SocialNational/ Basin/ Legal,State Region Infra- Policy & Management Water Financing & Service Poverty/Level Level structure Planning & Regulatory Services Subsidies Charges Gender2.5 3.5 3.5 (WR) ND (WR) N/D 3 3 3.5 3(WS) 3 (WS) 3.54. Water Policy Review Issues:(i). Also the water sector policies and the implementation strategy have been presented and discussed for the region in the context of theproject, their relevance to the national water policy is not discussed. At least one should know how the regional policies are dictated bythe national policy and how the experience of the regional policies will influence the national policies and water management strategies.(ii). The water resources assessment for the region should have been more elaborate. The project discusses the water requirements of thearea, but it does not discuss the resource availability nor does it give the regional or the basin water balance. The conjunctive use of thesurface and groundwater is proposed without throwingf some light on the water balance.5. Implementation Issues:(i). Implementation is ahead of schedule, but the initial momentum of the project progress appears to have slowed down. This may reflecton some weakness in the project design and/or the implementation arrangements.(ii). Progress on many components and amongst the counties is uneven.(iii). The construction of Langdeng Pumping Station, the main source of water supply for the Yancheng Irrigation Area has hit some snag. Thereappears to be lack of commitment by the Government and uncertainty surrounding the financial viability of the scheme. The prefectureis not sure that it will be able to pay the province back for the investment on the pumping station. (A serious issue indeed!)(iv). Counterpart funding is insufficient in some cases.62

AnnexesFigure D.1W ater Policy Review—Sample ProjectDesign Analysis (continued)Evaluation NotesAnalytic FrameworkNational/State Level:Basin/Regional Level:InfrastructureThere is no discussion of the national strategy. The Province has designed the project in accordance with themost plausible development plans. These take into consideration the participation, environmental and otherpolicy issues. The relevance to or impact on the national strategies is not discussed.The project is designed for regional development. The strategy for the development and management of theresources as presented for the region is endorsed by the provincial government. (But, does the provincial governmenthave a formal water sector management strategy?)An excellent presentation. The project fits in the China’s poverty reduction strategy plans which aim at addressingpoor areas through investments in land development, rural works and rural enterprise.However, the water resources assessment (p 3.3–3.6) lacks analysis of resource availability, its firmness andthe regional water balance.Institutional & RegulatoryLegal, Policy & Planning:Management & Regulatory:Water Services:Economic and SocialFinancing & Subsidies:Water Service Charges:Poverty/Gender Focus:EIA is prepared for each prefecture (p 3.40) and approved by NIPA (Annex 13). The stakeholder participation isensured (p 3.53); the area targeting appears to be fine, but the community targeting may be problematic. (p 3.54).An elaborate and good discussion of the socio-economic aspects of the beneficiaries and the PAPs is given (p2.9–2.95 and Annex 12). Resettlement Action Plan based on the Chinese Law of Land Management has beenapproved by IDA (p 3.49)The national water policy is not discussed. The provincial and the regional policies are presented.The capabilities of the governmental agencies have been assessed and the strengthening of the institutionalcapacity is provided for, where needed. (p 4.2). The institutional framework provides for collaboration with theother agencies through the Project Leading Group, which also facilitates overseeing by the provincial governmentand reviewing the project plans etc. (p 4.1) The planning functions are with the provincial governmentwhile the operation is with the prefectures and its subordinate agencies.The village committees appear to have some degree of financial and operational autonomy. However, the influenceof the government is predominant. The water charges are based on volumetric assessment, but the fundsgo to the province through the perfecture. The prefectures, and the counties are responsible for O&M throughfunds provided by the provincial government. (p 4.8)Financing terms are explicit in table 3.2. The subsidies are implicit in the cost recovery arrangements, thoughthe government’s declared policy is to recover all costs from the beneficiaries. (p 4.7). There is qualitative discussionof the risks involved (p 5.26); financial implications and the impact on economic viability should havebeen presented.The cost recovery targets are explicit. The irrigation use is assessed on volumetric basis to recover for O&Mand loan repayment.to the province. The cost recovery on terraces and check dams is 50%, beach land development60%; rural roads full; and water supply schemes full O&M and 60% investment cost. (p 4.7)Technology for addressing poverty issue is fine. The project supports WID through support to China’s WomenFederation63

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyFigure D.2W ater Policy Review—Sample ProjectDesign Analysis1. Project Data:Country: PhilippinesProject Name—ID: Water Districts Development ProjectEffectiveness Date: Not Given in the last PSR of Dec 8, 1998Closing Date: June 30, 2003% Disbursed: NilTask Manager:Partners Involved:Reviewed By:Checked By:Date Posted:2. Project Objectives, Financing, Costs, and ComponentsProject Costs (US $ million) AppraisalTotal 80.7List Financing SourcesIBRD 56.8MWSS/City Government 11.5User Installation Charges 12.4Executing Agencies:Land Bank of the Philippines, LWUA, City Governments and MWSS.Objectives:(i). Help participating LGUs and water districts plan and implement sewerage and sanitation investments based on the residents’ wishesand willingness to pay.(ii). Assist the Government of Philippines in developing a transparent regulatory mechanism in order to facilitate private sector participationin water utilities.Components:(i). TA designed to pilot and field-test a privatized public performance audit system.(ii). Construction of sewerage, sanitation, and drainage infrastructure in the cities of Davao, Cotabato, Calamba and Cagayan de Oro.3. Overall Design Rating: 2.5Analytic Framework Institutional & Regulatory Economic and SocialNational/ Basin/ Legal,State Region Infra- Policy & Management Water Financing & Service Poverty/Level Level structure Planning & Regulatory Services Subsidies Charges Gender3 3 3.5 (WR) 3 (WR) 2 3.5 2.5 3.5 2(WS) 3 (WS) 2.54. Water Policy Review Issues:(i). Generally the water supply and sewerage (WSS) projects are designed in isolation from the national water resources development plans—though they conform to the specific strategies of the WSS sub-sector. The national water plans include those for the various sub-sectors;therefore, the development plans of the sub-sector components must link them to the national plans.(ii). Discussion of gender issues, particularly the role of women, are usually not adequately discussed in the project documents for WSS projects.64

AnnexesFigure D.2W ater Policy Review—Sample ProjectDesign Analysis (continued)5. Implementation Issues:(i).(ii).This project is facing major implementation projects, which shows weakness of project design, particularly the financing and implementationarrangements.The last supervision mission has rated the “DO” component unsatisfactory. Project restructuring and even cancellation are currently beingdiscussed.Evaluation NotesAnalytic FrameworkNational/State Level:Basin/Regional Level:InfrastructureInstitutional & RegulatoryLegal, Policy & Planning:Management & Regulatory:Water Services:Economic and SocialFinancing & Subsidies:Water Service Charges:Poverty/Gender Focus:The Government strategies and the work plans are well defined for the water supply and sewerage sub sector.These are based on full stakeholder participation and aim at creating an enabling environment for a largeand rapid infusion of private sector investments and to invest in sanitation infrastructure in a demand-driven,financially sustainable and technologically cost-effective manner. Unfortunately, in discussing the Governmentstrategies, no reference is made to the Government’s strategies and the on-going plan formulation.Same as above.A good participatory approach has been adopted in project formulation starting from the planning to the designstages. This would ensure that the project interventions are demand-driven. (p 4.6P and Annex 13) The projectfollows the Government’s development objectives for the WSS sub-sector. The environmental considerationsare taken into consideration in the project design. No resettlement is needed. The land for the facilities willbe purchased at the market price. The water resources assessment is weak in the project documents. The discussionof the water quality aspects is inadequate.The National Economic development Agency (NEDA) of the Philippines is the nation’s highest policy advisorycommittee, chaired by the President. The NEDA Board laid out policies for water supply and sanitation in 1994,which led to the formulation of strategies for the sub-sector development. These and the National Water CrisisAct of June 1995 provide the necessary regulatory framework for development.The Land Bank of the Philippines would on-lend to the City Level Local Government Units (LGUs) to implementthe project. The water districts would then operate the utilities. The implementation methodology is complexand risky.The Local Water Districts is a “water supply franchise” and would be the water service organization. Theseare autonomous bodies and would have full O&M responsibility.The financing terms are explicit, but difficult. The risk analysis is routine sensitivity evaluation of the probableset backs to the project assumptions.The cost recovery targets are well set based on the beneficiaries’ ability to pay for the services.It is not a poverty targeted operation. The discussion of the indigenous groups and the participation by womenis weak.65

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyT able D.2Water Policy Analysis: Compliance withWater Policy According to the 9-Cell WaterPolicy MatrixProject IDRegionYearSectorSubsectorInstrumentCountryProject name43178 ECA 1999 AI ID SIL Albania Second Irrigation and Drainage Rehabilitation3562 EAP 1994 AI WRM SIL China Xiaolangdi Multipurpose1409 AFR 1998 WY WRM SIL Lesotho Highland Water10478 SAR 1996 UM UWSS SIL Pakistan Balochistan Natural Resources10501 SAR 1997 AI ID SIL Pakistan National Drainage Program7105 LAC 1994 AI ID TAL Ecuador Irrigation TA60132 MNA 1999 UU RWSS SIL Tunisia Greater Tunis Sewerage & Reuse6522 LAC 1994 WU UWSS SIL Brazil Espirito Santo38895 LAC 1998 VM WRM SIL Brazil Federal Water Management8319 ECA 1994 WU UWSS SIL Bulgaria Water Companies Restructuring and Modernization7713 LAC 1996 VM WRM SIL Mexico Water Resources Management3637 EAP 1997 WW RWSS SIL China National Rural Water III36405 EAP 1997 AI WRM SIL China Wanjiazhai Water Transfer36414 EAP 1998 VP ENV SIL China Guanxi Urban Environment49700 EAP 1998 AI ID SIL China Irrigated Agriculture Intensification II35783 ECA 1996 VP WSM SIL Lithuania Siauliai Environment40566 MNA 1998 WR RWSS SIL Morocco Water Resource Management46052 LAC 1997 AI WRM SIM Brazil Ceara Water Resource Management Pilot35805 ECA 1998 WW UWSS SIL Armenia Municipal Development Project3644 EAP 1994 VR WRM SIL China Xiaolangdi Resettlement4010 EAP 1994 VM HYDRO SIL Indonesia Dam Safety39015 AFR 1998 WW UWSS SIL Mozambique National Water Development I4799 EAP 1995 PH HYDRO SIL Thailand Lam Takhong Pump Storage10500 SAR 1998 AI ID SIL Pakistan Punjab Private Sector Ground Water7707 LAC 1994 WW UWSS SIM Mexico Second Water Supply Sanitation7710 LAC 1994 VP UWSS SIL Mexico Northern Border Environment50745 SAR 1999 WY RWSS SIL Bangladesh Arsenic Control8037 LAC 1997 AI ID SIL Peru Irrigation Sub Sector42442 LAC 1997 AA WSM SIL Peru Sierra Natural Resources10463 SAR 1995 VP ENV SIL India Industrial Pollution Prevention4611 EAP 1996 WS UWSS SIL Philippines Manila 2nd Sewerage66

AnnexesComprehensive managementInstitutional developmentLegal and policy Management andregulationEconomic and social issuesOverall scoreNational/state levelRegional/basinlevelProjectsWater resourceWater serviceWater resource &environmentalmanagement agenciesWater serviceregulation bodiesWater serviceorganizationsFinancing andsubsidiesWater servicechargesDisadvantaged group4 4 4 4 4 3.5 3.5 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 44 4 4 4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4 4 N/R4 4 4 4 4 3.5 4 3.5 4 4 4 34 4 4 3 4 D 4 D N/R 4 D 24 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 34 D 4 N/R 4 N/R 4 N/R 4 N/R N/R N/R4 D D 4 N/R D N/D 4 D 4 4 44 N/R N/D 4 4 N/D 4 4 4 4 4 43.5 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 33.5 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 33.5 3 3 N/R 2 N/R 4 N/R N/R D N/R N/R3.5 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 33.5 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 4 4 23.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 N/R 3.5 3.5 4 4 23.5 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.53.5 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 33.5 4 2 4 D N/R 4 N/R N/R N/R 2 N/R3.5 4 3 4 4 N/R 4 N/R 3 1 2.5 33.5 4 4 3.5 NA 3.5 3.5 3.5 4 3.5 3.5 3.53.5 4 4 4 N/R N/R 3.5 3.5 N/R 4 3.5 3.53.5 4 4 4 3 3 3.5 3.5 3 3.5 N/R N/R3.5 4 4 4 3.5 3 3.5 3 3.5 3 3 33.5 4 4 4 N/R N/R 3.5 3.5 N/R 3.5 3.5 2.53.5 D 2.5 3 D D 4 4 4 4 3 2.53.5 D 3 4 4 D 4 ND 4 3 3 23.5 D 3 4 D D 4 ND 4 3 3 33.5 D D 4 D D D 3 4 3 3 43.5 D D 3 D D D D 4 4 3 23.5 D D 4 D D 1 3 3 4 4 43.5 D N/D 3 D N/R 3 N/R N/R 4 4 43.5 N/D N/D 3 N/R N/D N/R N/D 3 3.5 3.5 N/R(continues on following page)67

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyT able D.2Water Policy Analysis: Compliance withWater Policy According to the 9-Cell WaterPolicy Matrix (continued)Project IDRegionYearSectorSubsectorInstrumentCountryProject name51124 LAC 1998 MY UWSS TAL Panama Utilities Restructuring3594 EAP 1996 AI ID SIL China Gansu Hexi Corridor10480 SAR 1997 WS UWSS SIL India Bombay Sewage Disposal41887 SAR 1999 VV UWSS SIL Bangladesh Municipal Services3593 EAP 1994 AM ID SIL China Songliao Plain Agriculture Dev10484 SAR 1996 WW RWSS SIL India Uttar Pradesh Rural WSS10485 SAR 1996 VM WRM TAL India Hydrology Project7701 LAC 1994 AI ID SIL Mexico On Farm and Minor irrigation39022 EAP 1999 UWSS APL Philippines LGU Urban Water and Sanitation1075 AFR 1997 WU UWSS SIL Guinea Third Water Supply10516 SAR 1997 WR RWSS SIL Nepal Rural Water Supply and Sanitation38570 AFR 1997 AI ID SIL Tanzania River Basin Mngmt and Smallholder Irrig Improv3649 EAP 1996 AI ID SIL China Sanxi Poverty Alleviation8173 LAC 1994 AI ID SIL Uruguay NRM and Irrigation Development8288 ECA 1995 WU UWSS SIL Azerbaijan Greater Baku Water Supply Rehabilitation9545 SAR 1995 VM WRM SIL Bangladesh River Bank Protection45629 EAP 1998 WY UWSS SIL Cambodia Urban Water Supply3596 EAP 1995 AI WRM SIL China Yangtze Basin Water3599 EAP 1996 VV ENV SIL China Yunnan Environment3648 EAP 1996 US ENV SIL China Second Shanghai Sewerage8406 ECA 1995 VP WSM SIL Estonia Haapsalu and Matsalu Bays Environment Project764 AFR 1996 WU UWSS SIL Ethiopia Water Supply Development and Rehab39929 ECA 1998 SA RWSS FIL Georgia Social Investment Fund8510 ECA 1996 AI ID SIL Kazakhstan Irrigation and Drainage8595 ECA 1996 WW UWSS SIL Poland Bielsko-Biala Water and Wastewater0 ECA 1999 UWSS SIL Poland Wroclaw Water and Wastewater8867 ECA 1997 WW UWSS SIL Turkmenistan Water Supply and Sanitation4830 EAP 1997 WY UWSS SIL Viet Nam Water Supply3954 EAP 1994 AI ID SIL Indonesia Java Irrigation Imp and WRM4834 EAP 1995 AI ID SIL Viet Nam Irrigation Rehabilitation40720 ECA 1999 WU UWSS SIL Kazakhstan Atyrau Pilot Water Supply and Sanitation68

AnnexesComprehensive managementInstitutional developmentLegal and policy Management andregulationEconomic and social issuesOverall scoreNational/state levelRegional/basinlevelProjectsWater resourceWater serviceWater resource &environmentalmanagement agenciesWater serviceregulation bodiesWater serviceorganizationsFinancing andsubsidiesWater servicechargesDisadvantaged group3.5 N/R 2 N/R N/D 3 N/D 4 4 4 3 33.5 N/R 3.5 3.5 N/R N/R N/R 3 2.5 3.5 3.5 33.5 N/R D 4 N/D D D D 3 4 3 43.5 N/R N/R 3 N/R D N/R 4 4 3 2 33.5 N/R N/R 4 N/R 3.5 N/R 3.5 3.5 3 3.5 33.5 N/R N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R 3 4 3 4 43.5 N/R N/R N/R D 3 4 ? N/R 2 2 N/R3.5 N/R N/R 4 D D D 4 3 4 3 23.5 N/R N/R 3 N/R D N/R D 3 4 3 N/D3.4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3.5 33.3 N/R N/R 4 N/R 3 N/R 3 4 3 D 43.1 4 4 2.5 3 3 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.53 2.5 3.5 3.5 N/D 3 N/D 3.5 3 3 3.5 33 2.5 N/D 3 D 3 3 D 4 2 3 2.53 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 3.53 3 3 3 3 N/D 3 D 3 2 N/D 33 3 3 3.5 N/D 2.5 D 3 2.5 3 3 23 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 3.5 3 2.53 3 3 3.5 N/D 3.5 N/D 3.5 3 3 3 23 3 3 3 N/R 3.5 N/R 3.5 N/R 3.5 3 33 3 3 3.5 3 2.5 3 3 3 2.5 3 2.53 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.5 3 3 33 3 3 3.5 NA NA 3.5 NA NA 3 3 3.53 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 23 3 3 3.5 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.53 3 3 3 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.53 3 3 3 3 3 2.5 2.5 3 2 3 2.53 3 3 3.5 N/D 3 N/D 3.5 3.5 3 3 23 3 3.5 3.5 2.5 3 2.5 3 3 3 3.5 13 3 3.5 3.5 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 3 1.53 3 NA 3 NA NA 3 3 3.5 3 3.5 2.5(continues on following page)69

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyT able D.2Water Policy Analysis: Compliance withWater Policy According to the 9-Cell WaterPolicy Matrix (continued)Project IDRegionYearSectorSubsectorInstrumentCountryProject name46042 ECA 1998 AI ID SIM Kyrgyz Rep Irrigation Rehabilitation38399 ECA 1998 AI ID SIL Macedonia Irrigation Rehabilitation3602 EAP 1996 US ENV SIL China Hubei Urban Environment43444 ECA 1998 WS UWSS SIL Croatia Municipal Environmental Infrastructure Project50911 ECA 1999 VM ENV SIL Georgia Integrated Coastal Management10530 SAR 1998 AI ID SIM Nepal Irrigation Sector Development10418 SAR 1993 WR RWSS SIL India Karnataka Rural WS and Env5435 MNA 1994 WW UWSS SIM Yemen Taiz Water Supply Pilot5907 MNA 1999 WU UWSS SIL Morocco Water Supply V10408 SAR 1993 TR ID SIL India Bihar Plateau Development5731 MNA 1997 WS UWSS SIL Lebanon Coastal Pollution Control and Water Supply9961 SAR 1993 AI ID SIL India Uttar Pradesh Sodic Lands Reclamation6541 LAC 1993 WY UWSS SIL Brazil Sao Paulo Water Quality6206 LAC 1996 WR RWSS SIM Bolivia Rural Water and Sanitation43420 LAC 1998 WU UWSS SIL Brazil Second Water Modernization3507 EAP 1996 PH HYDRO SIL China Ertan Hydro II39983 LAC 1998 WR RWSS SIL Paraguay Fourth Rural Water Supply and Sanitation49166 MNA 1998 AY ID SIL Jordan TA for Agricultural35076 AFR 1998 PH HYDRO SIL Zambia Power Rehabilitation Project6052 LAC 1997 WY FM SIL Argentina Flood Protection50646 SAR 1999 AY ID SIL India Uttar Pradesh Sodic Lands Reclamation II39281 SAR 1996 PH HYDRO SIL Pakistan Ghazi Barotha Hydropower10453 SAR 1994 VI WSM SIL Pakistan NWFP Community Infrastructure10482 SAR 1996 AI ID SIL Pakistan Balochistan Com Irrig Agr1012 AFR 1999 UWSS SIL Guinea-Bissau Water and Energy Project1750 AFR 1997 UU WRM SIL Mali Urban Development and Decentralization1921 AFR 1998 WW ENV SIL Mauritius Environmental Sewerage and Sanitation5173 MNA 1995 AI ID SIL Morocco Rural Water Supply and Sanitation3241 AFR 1995 WU UWSS SIL Zambia Urban Restructuring and Water Supply33965 ECA 1998 VP ENV SIL Bulgaria Environmental Remediation Pilot8051 LAC 1995 WU UWSS SIL Peru Lima Water Rehabilitation70

AnnexesComprehensive managementInstitutional developmentLegal and policy Management andregulationEconomic and social issuesOverall scoreNational/state levelRegional/basinlevelProjectsWater resourceWater serviceWater resource &environmentalmanagement agenciesWater serviceregulation bodiesWater serviceorganizationsFinancing andsubsidiesWater servicechargesDisadvantaged group3 3 NA 3.5 3 3 3.5 3 3 2 2.5 33 3 NA 3 3.5 3 3 3 3 2 2 1.53 3.5 3.5 3 N/D 2.5 N/D 3 3 3 3 13 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.5 33 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 NA 3 3 NA 2 2 33 4 4 4 D 3 4 3 4 2 2 43 D 3 3 D 3 N/D 2.5 3 3 3 43 D 3 4 4 D 4 4 D 2 2 43 D D 3 N/R D N/R 2 3 4 4 33 D N/D 3 N/R D N/R 3 3 3 N/D 43 D N/D 3 N/R 4 N/R 3 3 D D N/D3 D N/R 3 3 N/D 3 N/D 3 3 3 43 N/D 3 3 3 N/R 2 N/R D 2 2 33 N/D N/D 2 N/D 2 N/D 2 4 4 4 43 N/D N/D 3 N/D 4 2.5 4 3 2.5 43 N/D N/D 3 N/D N/D N/D 3.5 3 3 3 1.53 N/D N/D 2 N/D N/D N/D 3 4 4 3 43 N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R N/D N/D 2.5 N/D3 N/R 3 3 N/R 2.5 N/R 3 N/D 3 3 33 N/R D 4 4 3 N/R 1 1 33 N/R D 4 3 N/D 4 N/D 3 3 3 43 N/R D 4 D D D 3 3 3 3 43 N/R N/D 2 N/D 3 N/D 3 4 3 3 43 N/R N/D 2.5 N/D 3 D 2 4 4 2 43 N/R N/R 3 N/R 2.5 N/R N/D 3 3 3 33 N/R N/R 2.5 N/R 3 N/R 3 3 3.5 3 D3 N/R N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R 3 3 4 4 N/D3 N/R N/R 3 N/R D N/R 3 3 3 2 33 N/R N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R 3 3 2.5 3 33 NA NA 2.5 NA NA 3 NA NA 3.5 3.5 NA3 N/R 2 3 2 D 1 3 3 4 4 4(continues on following page)71

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyT able D.2Water Policy Analysis: Compliance withWater Policy According to the 9-Cell WaterPolicy Matrix (continued)Project IDRegionYearSectorSubsectorInstrumentCountryProject name6540 LAC 1993 WY UWSS SIL Brazil Minas Gerais Water Quality6541 LAC 1993 WY WRM SIL Brazil National Water Quality7926 LAC 1995 WS UWSS SIL Paraguay Asuncion Sewerage9093 ECA 1995 WS UWSS SIL Turkey Antalya Water Supply and Sanitation8985 ECA 1998 WY UWSS SIL Turkey CESME- ALACATI Water Supply and Sewerage1667 AFR 1995 WU UWSS SIL Malawi National Water DevelopmentAFR 1997 VM ENV SIL Uganda Lake Victoria Environment34212 SAR 1998 AG ID SIL Sri Lanka Mahaweli Restructuring6010 LAC 1997 AA WRM SIL Argentina Provincial Agricultural Development973 AFR 1996 US UWSS SIL Ghana Urban Environmental Sanitation2669 AFR 1995 UM WSM SIL Swaziland Urban Development924 AFR 1994 WR RWSS SIM Ghana Community Water Sanitation8260 ECA 1994 WS UWSS SIL Albania Durres Water Supply Rehabilitation121 AFR 1994 WR RWSS SIM Benin Rural Water Supply and Sanitation45303 ECA 1997 WU UWSS SIL Kazakhstan Pilot Water Supply Project9964 SAR 1994 AI ID SIL India Haryana Water Resources Consolidation39455 LAC 1996 AI FM SIM St. Lucia Watershed and Environment Management3586 EAP 1994 VM ENV SIL China Shanghai Environment3598 EAP 1995 VP ENV SIL China Liaoning Environment8417 ECA 1995 UM UWSS SIL Georgia Municipal Infrastructure Rehabilitation50910 ECA 1998 UU UWSS SIM Georgia Municipal Development and Decentralization10476 SAR 1995 AI ID SIL India Tamil Nadu WRCP10529 SAR 1996 AI ID SIL India Orissa Water Resources Consolidation34584 ECA 1996 UM UWSS SIL Latvia Municipal Services Development8553 ECA 1995 VP ENV SIL Lithuania Klaipeda Environment4613 EAP 1997 AI ID SIL Philippines Water Resources Development9121 ECA 1998 WW RWSS SIL Uzbekistan Rural Water Supply and Sanitation8778 ECA 1997 WY UWSS SIL Romania Bucharest Water Supply Project8277 ECA 1995 AI ID SIL Armenia Irrigation Rehabilitation37006 LAC 1995 WW UWSS TAL Trinidad andTobago Water Sector Institutional Strengthening72

AnnexesComprehensive managementInstitutional developmentLegal and policy Management andregulationEconomic and social issuesOverall scoreNational/state levelRegional/basinlevelProjectsWater resourceWater serviceWater resource &environmentalmanagement agenciesWater serviceregulation bodiesWater serviceorganizationsFinancing andsubsidiesWater servicechargesDisadvantaged group3 N/R 3 3 4 N/R 3 N/R N/R 2 3 33 N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R N/R3 N/R D 3 N/D 2 2 N/D 2 1 2 12.9 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 22.9 3 3 3 2.5 3 3 3 3.5 3.5 3 2.52.8 3 N/D 3 3 3 3 3 2.5 3 2.5 2.52.8 N/R 3 3 N/R 2.5 N/R 2.5 N/R N/R N/R D2.8 N/D 2.5 3 D N/D 3 N/D 4 3 N/D 22.8 N/D N/D 2 N/D 2.5 2 3 4 3 4 32.7 N/R N/D 2.5 N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R 3 2.5 32.7 N/R N/D 2.5 N/R 3 N/R 3 3 2.5 2.5 D2.7 N/R N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R N/D 2.5 3 3 32.6 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 2.5 2 2.5 32.6 N/R N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R D 2.5 3 3 2.52.5 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22.5 2 D 3 2 N/D 3 N/D 2 1 1 N/D2.5 2 N/R 3 2 N/R 3 N/R N/D N/R N/R2.5 2.5 2.5 3 N/D 3 N/D 3 3 3 2.5 12.5 3 3 3.5 N/D 3 N/D 3.5 2.5 2.5 3 22.5 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2.5 3 22.5 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 3 3 3 2.5 2 22.5 3 3 2 D 3 2 3 3 1 2 22.5 3 3 2 D N/D 2 2 3 1 2 32.5 3 3 2.5 2.5 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.52.5 3 3 2.5 2.5 NA 3 2.5 2 3 2.5 2.52.5 3 3 3 2 3.5 3 3 3 1 2 22.5 3 3 3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 22.5 3 N/R 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 22.5 3 NA 3 2 2 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2 12.5 4 N/D N/R N/D 3 3 3 2.5 2 2.5 N/D(continues on following page)73

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyT able D.2Water Policy Analysis: Compliance withWater Policy According to the 9-Cell WaterPolicy Matrix (continued)Project IDRegionYearSectorSubsectorInstrumentCountryProject name6436 LAC 1995 UM WRM SIL Brazil Ceara (WRM compon.)5680 MNA 1995 VM UWSS SIL Yemen Southern Governorates Rural Development Project5342 MNA 1997 WS UWSS SIL Jordan Amman Water Sanitation Management5344 MNA 1994 AI ID SIL Morocco Sewerage and Water Reuse7020 LAC 1995 AI ID SIM DominicanRepublic Irrigation Land and Watershed43728 SAR 1997 VI ENV SIL India Environment Capacity Building TA8224 LAC 1996 WW UWSS SIL Venezuela Monogas Water3493 EAP 1995 TP NAV SIL China Inland Waterways48521 MNA 1999 WW UWSS SIL Egypt Irrigation Improvement Project35158 SAR 1997 AI ID SIL India Third Andhra Pradesh Irrigation49385 SAR 1998 SY ID SIL India Andhra Pradesh Economic Restructuring34617 AFR 1996 PH HYDRO SIL Mali Selingue Power Rehabilitation4576 EAP 1998 WY UWSS SIL Philippines Water District Development3595 EAP 1994 AP WSM SIL China Second Red Soils II Development35802 ECA 1999 UU UWSS SIL Lithuania Municipal Development1994 AFR 1995 AI ID SIL Niger Pilot Private Irrigation Promotion5902 MNA 1998 AA ID SIL Tunisia Water Supply and Sewerage2957 AFR 1994 WU UWSS SIL Uganda Small Town Water35728 LAC 1998 VM WRM SIL Brazil Bahia Water Resource Management54667 LAC 1998 TU FM ERL Peru El Nino Emergency1564 AFR 1998 WR RWSS SIL Madagascar Rural Water Sector Pilot1738 AFR 1997 AI ID SIL Mali Pilot Private Irrigation Promotion961 AFR 1994 AM ID SIL Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment7607 LAC 1995 AI ID SIL Mexico Rainfed Areas Development7257 LAC 1994 WU UWSS SIM Guyana Guyana Water Sector TA and Rehab44942 ECA 1997 WR UWSS SIL Uzbekistan Pilot Water Supply Engineering4207 EAP 1994 SA RWSS SIL Laos Luang Namtha Provincial Development4974 MNA 1994 WU UWSS SIM Algeria Water Supply and Sewerage10522 SAR 1995 AI ID SIM India Asam Rural Infrastructure48522 MNA 1997 AA FM ERL Lebanon Irrigation Rehabilitation and Modernization74

AnnexesComprehensive managementInstitutional developmentLegal and policy Management andregulationEconomic and social issuesOverall scoreNational/state levelRegional/basinlevelProjectsWater resourceWater serviceWater resource &environmentalmanagement agenciesWater serviceregulation bodiesWater serviceorganizationsFinancing andsubsidiesWater servicechargesDisadvantaged group2.5 D 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 32.5 D 3 3 N/D N/R 1 N/R N/R 3 N/R 42.5 D D 3 N/D D N/R 3 4 2 3 12.5 D D 4 N/R D N/R D 2 4 3 12.5 D N/D 4 N/D N/D N/D 2.5 3 2 2.5 42.5 N/D 3 N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R N/R 2 1 N/R2.5 N/D 3 1 2 3 N/D 4 4 4 3 32.5 N/D N/D 2.5 N/R N/R N/R 3 N/R 3 3 N/R2.5 N/D N/D 3 N/D D 2 N/D 3 1 1 22.5 N/D N/D 2 N/D N/D 1 N/D 2 1 1 42.5 N/D N/D 3 N/D N/R 1 N/R 3 1 3 42.5 N/D N/D N/R N/R 3 N/R 3 2.5 2.5 3 N/R2.5 N/D N/D 3 N/D 3 D 4 2 2 2 N/D2.5 N/R N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R 3 2.5 3 3.5 22.5 N/R N/R 3 N/R N/R 3 N/R N/R N/R N/R 22.5 N/R N/R 2.5 N/R D N/R 2.5 2 2 2 2.52.5 N/R N/R 2 N/R D N/D N/D 2 4 3 32.5 N/R N/R N/D N/R 2.5 N/R 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.52.5 N/D 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 32.5 N/R N/D 3 N/D N/R 3 N/R N/D 1 1 42.4 D N/D 2 N/R 2.5 N/R 2.5 2.5 2.5 2 22.3 N/R N/D D N/R 3 N/R 2.5 3 2 2.5 22.3 N/R N/R 2.5 N/R 2.5 N/R N/D 2.5 3 3 2.52.3 N/D N/D 2 N/D N/D N/D N/D 3 2 N/D 32 1 1 2 1 N/D 1 N/D 3 2 3 22 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 22 3 3 3 N/D 2 N/D 2 2 2 2 32 D 3 3 N/D 2 3 2 3 2 2 12 D D 4 N/D N/D N/D N/D 2 1 1 42 D D 2 N/D D 2 N/D 2 2 2 1(continues on following page)75

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyT able D.2Water Policy Analysis: Compliance withWater Policy According to the 9-Cell WaterPolicy Matrix (continued)Project IDRegionYearSectorSubsectorInstrumentCountryProject name10467 SAR 1995 US UWSS SIL Sri Lanka Colombo Env Improvement1967 AFR 1996 VM WRM SIL Niger Natural Resources Management6894 LAC 1996 WW UWSS SIM Colombia Bogata/Santafe WSS Rehab1331 AFR 1996 AL ID SIL Kenya Arid Land Resource Management1522 AFR 1995 AI ID SIL Madagascar Second Irrigation Rehabilitation9482 SAR 1997 WU UWSS SIL Bangladesh Fourth Dhaka Water Supply55974 LAC 1998 TU FM ERL Bolivia El Nino Emergency3985 EAP 1994 VM WSM SIL Indonesia National Watershed Conservation5521 MNA 1998 AI WRM SIL Yemen Second Public Works3937 EAP 1994 AI ID SIL Indonesia Integrated Swamps Development5321 MNA 1995 AI WRM SIL Yemen Emergency Flood Rehabilitation50418 MNA 1998 AY ID SIL Tunisia Agricultural Sector Investment Loan5721 MNA 1994 AI ID SIM Egypt East Delta Agr Serv5503 MNA 1996 UWSS SIL Tunisia Second Agricultural Sector Investment Loan43367 MNA 1997 WU UWSS SIL Yemen Sana'a Water Supply Sanitation6541 LAC 1993 WY UWSS SIL Brazil Parana Water Quality & Pollution Control10461 SAR 1995 WU UWSS SIL India Madras Water Supply II76

AnnexesComprehensive managementInstitutional developmentLegal and policy Management andregulationEconomic and social issuesOverall scoreNational/state levelRegional/basinlevelProjectsWater resourceWater serviceWater resource &environmentalmanagement agenciesWater serviceregulation bodiesWater serviceorganizationsFinancing andsubsidiesWater servicechargesDisadvantaged group2 D D 2.5 N/D N/D N/D 2 2.5 3 2.5 12 D N/D 2 N/R 3 N/R 3 N/R 2.5 2.5 32 N/R D 2 D D D D 4 4 4 22 N/R N/D 2.5 N/R N/D N/R N/D N/R N/D N/R 32 N/R N/D 2 N/R N/D N/R 2 2 1.5 2 12 N/R N/R 3 N/R D N/R 2 2 2 2 22 N/R N/R D N/D N/D N/R N/R N/D D N/R 32 N/R N/R 3 1 2 1 2 N/R 2 N/R 22 N/R N/R 2 N/R N/D N/R N/D 2 2 1 41.5 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 1.5 3 2 11.5 3 D 2 N/R N/R N/D N/R N/R 1 1 11.5 D N/D 2 N/D N/D N/D N/D 2 1 2 11.5 N/D N/D 1 N/D N/R N/D N/D 2 1 1 31.5 N/D N/D 2 N/D N/D 2 N/D 3 1 1 11.5 N/D N/D 1 3 N/D N/D D 3 1 1 11.5 N/R 2 1 3 3 3 3 D 3 2 11 D D 1 N/D N/D N/D N/D D 3 3 277

ANNEX E:SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DIMENSIONS OF BANK-FINANCEDWATER SECTOR PROJECTSObjectivesThe Social Assessment Team (SAT) within theSocial Development Policy Cluster collaboratedwith Operations Evaluation Department (OED)to analyze the extent to which Bank-financedwater sector projects focus on poverty and socialdevelopment issues. Given the explicit attentionpaid to social development issues in the 1993World Bank Water Resources Management(WRM) Policy, the review focuses on a comparisonof samples from pre- and post-1993water sector projects. The comparison of the preandpost-policy projects aims to establish theextent to which progress has been made withrespect to these issues and the areas that requirefurther improvements. In so doing, urban andrural water supply and sanitation, irrigation, andother water resources management project documentswere reviewed. In addition, water sectorprojects that were subjected to a qualityreview by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG)were also identified and analyzed for their socialdevelopment aspects.ApproachThe analyses relied solely on Project AppraisalDocuments (PADs) and Staff Appraisal Reports(SARs) for analysis of the project. To this end,a comprehensive social development database(SDD) was created. The database consists of sectionson the poverty focus of the project, keysocial issues identified in the project document,stakeholders involved in the design and implementationstages of the project, participation ofthe poor in project design and implementation,social studies completed for the project design,applicability of resettlement issues to the project,and the availability of monitoring systems,with an emphasis on social impact monitoring.MethodologyTo estimate the changes brought about by theBank’s 1993 water Strategy, a stratified randomsample was drawn from the whole cohort ofBank water projects. Stratification involved selectingsamples until each subsector had the samerelative proportion of projects in the Bank portfolio.No attempt was made to stratify to ensurematching regional representation. Two sets ofsample were drawn, one representing projectsapproved in the pre-policy period, 1988–93,and one for the post-policy period, 1994–99.Each project selected was then extensively analyzedby a team of researchers according to thevariable listed in table 2 and database. It isimportant to note that quality assessment ofpoverty/social analyses included in SARs/PADswas not a part of the stock-taking exercise. Noqualitative indicators are thus in the database.Also, a large number of poverty-focused projectsdo not provide sufficiently informing analysesof poverty, its impact, or of social issues. Nor isthere an adequate treatment of institutionalarrangements to bring about targeted changes.A great deal of what would otherwise be consideredas “basic minimum information” is notconsistently provided. For instance, the numbersof direct/indirect beneficiaries and directly/indirectlyaffected populations are missing frommany documents.Poverty and Social Development FocusSeveral indicators were used to characterize thepoverty focus of water sector projects. The firstwas based on the formal determination made bythe project team, often noted on the first pageof a project document. Generally, the formalpoverty applicability of a project is defined bywhether the project targets specific groups within79

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyits components. If no specific targeting is done,then the project is categorized as “Poverty: NotApplicable.” According to this indicator, 42 percentof the water sector projects completed after1993 targeted poverty. This indicator was notused in a majority of the pre-1993 projects; theBank did not have a policy to address povertyapplicability in project summaries.To cope with the problem of defining povertyfocus in a consistent manner in water sector projects,the SA team developed a less stringentdefinition of poverty focus. According to this definition,if a project involved an analysis ofpoverty issues in project regions, made provisionsfor rehabilitating poverty in project regions,or analyzed the poverty impacts in project areas,it was considered poverty focused. The qualityof the poverty focus and targeting of poor peoplewere not judged; rather, the project wasdeemed poverty focused if it had one or moreof the elements of focusing on poverty levels ofpeople in project areas. Throughout the report,comparisons between poverty-focused and nonpovertyprojects are based on these less stringentcriteria.Main FindingsWater projects have a significant, but not universal,focus on poverty. In comparing the preandpost-policy periods, an increased focus onsocial development and poverty concerns inproject appraisals is evident. Participation of thepoor, gender issues, and evaluation of social capitalconstitute a greater focus of social developmentconcerns mentioned in project documents,and this was increasingly evident in the projectscompleted after 1993. As such, the main findingsof the study can be summarized as follows:There is a growing emphasis in integratingpoverty and social development issues inBank-financed water sector projects, particularlyafter the adoption of the Bank’s 1993Water Resources Management policy paper.• The focus on poverty increased from 57 percentprior to 1993 to 63 percent after 1993.The poverty focus was enhanced through anincrease in conducting poverty analysis (36percent pre- to 53 percent post-1993), betterconsideration of poverty impacts (52 percentpre- to 63 percent post-1993), and establishinginstitutional mechanisms to target thepoor (23 percent pre- to 53 percent post-1993) and to monitor poverty impacts (16 percentpre- to 46 percent post-1993).• Involving gender dimensions has become anintegral part of the water sector, particularlyin the water and sanitation subsector. Genderand other social groups are less of a concernin other subsectors. As accepted in theDublin Statement and reiterated in The HagueWater Forum 2000, women play a centralrole in all aspects of water. Among the projectsreviewed, gender is addressed in 30 percentof the pre-1993 projects, but only 54percent of the post-1993 projects. The numberof projects that involved an NGO specializingin gender at the appraisal doubledfrom 8 percent to 19 percent from one periodto the other.• As the Bank has focused more on communitydrivenapproaches, projects that involve communityparticipation have nearly doubledover the past 12 years. Forty-four percent ofthe projects completed prior to, and 67 percentof the projects completed after, 1993consider community participation issues andcan be considered CDD projects.• The focus on distribution issues and equity,while remaining at a modest level, quadrupledfrom one period to the other.There are systematic project characteristicsthat account for differences in poverty/social development focus.• IDA projects are more likely to target poverty,have a higher share of Bank financing, anda higher level of partnerships compared toIBRD projects. IDA projects also have greaterpoverty focus than IBRD-financed projects,both prior to and after 1993.• Projects with smaller financing (in dollarterms) have a sharper poverty focus; both preandpost-policy projects show that where theBank invests large sums, it tends to ignorepoverty/social development issues.• It appears that the Bank has achieved greatercost-effectiveness in its water sector invest-80

Annexesments. Per beneficiary costs of projectsdecreased for both poverty-focused and nonpovertyprojects after 1993. However, perbeneficiary costs of poverty-focused projectsare still higher than are others.• Partnerships with other donors have come toenhance the Bank’s poverty/social developmentfocus. Especially during the post-policyperiod, 74 percent of the projects preparedwith other donors are poverty-focused. Thereis also a clear increase in the participation ofNGOs and civil society organizations in projectimplementation in poverty-focused projects;non-poverty projects have low levels ofcivil society participation in implementation.An analysis of private sector institutions wasincluded in only 30 percent of pre- and 37percent of post-1993 projects.• The sample size is insufficient to makeregional comparisons. There are indicationsthat the Southeast Asia Region projects havea more consistent emphasis on poverty andsocial development dimensions. However, aseparate analysis of Middle East/North Africa(MNA) Region projects, undertaken at therequest of the Global Water Unit (GWU) aspart of a larger quality review process, lookedinto social development aspects of MNA watersector projects. This analysis shows that asomewhat larger than average number ofthese projects also had a focus on poverty andsocial development issues. Details of thisanalysis can also be found in the report.• Of the projects completed after 1993, resettlementwas considered in 68 percent of theprojects, and 41 percent of all projects had aresettlement action plan (RAP) available intheir PAD/SAR. This contrasts sharply with thepre-1993 data that reflected consideration ofresettlement in only 34 percent of the projectsand RAPs in only 19 percent.• Cultural property issues are considered infewer than 10 percent of all projects; most ofthese involve resettlement.• Indigenous peoples are considered in closeto 20 percent of the projects after 1993; mostof these involve resettlement. While this percentageis low, it nearly doubled in comparisonwith the pre-1993 period.Even though 38 percent of the projects usedthe “four-pillar approach” in their socialassessments, this number is nearly doubledin the community-driven water sectorprojects.• Social analysis: There was a remarkableincrease in use of participatory methods toaddress social development concerns. Forinstance, use of broad-based stakeholder consultationsmore than doubled from one periodto the other, together with qualitative beneficiaryassessments and direct consultationswith the poor.• Participation: There was an increase in communityparticipation and consultations withthe poor in both project appraisal and projectimplementation during the post-1993period (for example, community participationin appraisal increased from 30 percent to 61percent). 1 Household and nonhousehold useras well as community participation in projectfinancing also increased in the post-1993period (26 percent of projects pre-1993, and38 percent post-1993); average contributionswere $4.44 million in pre-1993 and $5.3 millionafter 1993.• Institutional analysis: Both prior to and after1993, most projects involved analyses of technicalinstitutions, municipal water systems, andlocal government institutions. However, socialand informal private institution analyses aremuch less common.• Social Impact Monitoring (SIM) is in place in49 percent of the post-1993 projects and thevast majority of these had a focus on socialdevelopment issues. This reflects a significantimprovement in addressing these issues whencompared with the pre-1993 data, in whichonly 30 percent of projects show SIM in placeand of these, only a few have a focus on socialdevelopment issues.Lessons Learned and Areas for FurtherImprovement: A SummaryPolicy matters. There have been majorimprovements in the pro-poor emphasis ofBank-financed water projects since the 1993WRM policy paper across a wide variety ofdimensions, such as poverty analysis, direct81

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyparticipation of the poor in projects, attention togender, assisting client institutions to targetpoverty groups, and the like. While the data indicatean overwhelming change in the socialdimensions of water resource management projectssince 1993, they also indicate areas whereenhanced attention to a more consistent mainstreamingof poverty and social sustainabilitywould improve the Bank’s contribution to theholistic WRM policy that is the consensus of theinternational community.Partnership with other development agenciesenhances the Bank’s focus on poverty andsocial development; further emphases onpartnership matters: Partnership in designingand cofinancing projects with other donors helpsthe Bank to sharpen its social development/poverty focus in water resource projects. This findingsuggests that the Bank would benefit fromimproved partnership with other donors and civilsociety organizations in future WRM projects.Pro-poor/pro-social focus and its qualitycan be enhanced.• There is substantial room for improvement ofpriority-setting in targeting the poor and vulnerablepopulations within water sector projects.Many projects provide a relativelysuperficial analyses of poverty, its socialdimensions, and specific measures for its alleviationthrough water sector interventions.• Since IBRD-financed projects do not have asmuch of a focus on poverty and social issuesas IDA projects, there is scope for improvementof water resource project objectives incountries with higher income levels.• The per beneficiary cost of poverty-focusedprojects continues to be higher than nonpovertyprojects, suggesting the Bank cansharpen its skills to deliver assistance to thepoor more efficiently.• Urban water supply and sanitation projectscan sharpen their poverty focus to catch upwith the greater progress made in this areaby water projects in agriculture and waterresource management generally.• Larger projects (measured in dollar terms)can improve their poverty and social developmentfocus. The quality of poverty andsocial analyses is of particular concern for theprojects that lend large sums for water sectorinvestments.• There is substantial room for improvement inthe quality of poverty analyses incorporatedin water sector projects; a more detailedevaluation that would assess both documentationand results on the ground would beneeded to better specify areas for qualityimprovement.• Analysis of gender issues, often formulatedwithin the framework of poverty and/orexclusionary policies for service delivery, hasbeen integrated into the design of many projects;but attention to gender is seldom translatedinto action or monitored.• The focus of social analysis of water projectsis relatively narrow. Most projects incorporatea focus on one or another social issue, anda holistic social assessment is missing from themajority of projects. Some key issues, such aswater rights, are largely neglected, but requirefuture focus, especially as they relate topoverty.• The low level of poverty/ social monitoringand evaluation (M&E), especially impact monitoring,incorporated in water sector projectsis a serious concern and mirrors the findingsfor Bank projects in other sectors. Measuringimpact, monitoring implementation, and promotinga culture of continuous learning canonly be done through improved M&E, bothin client institutions and in the Bank itself. Therecommendations of the Bankwide task forceon M&E should be implemented withoutdelay in water resource management units.Projects increasingly show that participationis more than a tool for cost recovery, it isalso a mechanism for promoting stakeholderinvolvement and community-driven(CDD) initiatives. There is particular need toformulate CDD approaches to WRM.The greater the share that communities andhouseholds contribute to project financing, thegreater responsibility they take with respect tooperations and maintenance There have beenincreases in the frequency of consultations82

Annexesdirectly with the poor and/or with civil societyorganizations for project design, and in NGOinvolvement in implementation. However, thedata also suggest that decentralized and/or subregionalprojects are not consistently morepoverty focused. Since communities are notmonolithic entities and they respond to microlevelsocioeconomic characteristics, a closerexamination of poverty focus in decentralizedprojects might be needed. Full community ownershipis yet to be evidenced in the Bankfinancedprojects 2 and is an area for future focus,with particular attention to the institutionalaspects.The water sector compares favorably in itssocial development focus with other sectors.Given this strong start, social analysesof water sector projects can be broadened.Pro-poor projects are also pro-social; they concernthemselves more with social dimensions ofdevelopment. Inclusion of a focus on one elementof social sustainability generates focus onother aspects and opens doors for other socialconsiderations. Water sector projects are highlyvariable in their treatment of social issues: notall incorporate holistic consideration of social,environmental, and economic objectives, notall use social analysis or aim to maximize sustainedstakeholder participation. Experienceindicates that the inadequate social and politicalanalysis of watersheds and river basins mayresult in the dominance of power groups in keydecisions. Landless farmers, pastoralists, smallholders,and minority communities have littlevoice in planning and tend to get further marginalizedin implementation.In Bank project appraisal, poverty, participation,and gender are more frequently addressedthan other social issues. Of the safeguard policies,resettlement receives a more routine considerationthan indigenous populations andcultural heritage. Issues relating to equity, ethnicand tribal concerns, and those concerningwater rights and their poverty/social impactsdo not receive the attention they deserve. Thelimited treatment of social development issueswithin the water sector is apparent in Bankproducedpublications, as well as in water sectorlearning efforts of the World Bank Institute(WBI). The learning programs in the SocialDevelopment family also place little emphasison the water sector, and the SD literature insufficientlyexemplifies how a broad range of socialissues play key roles in the design and implementationof water sector projects. Therefore, thewater-sector-related learning exercises and clientcapacity building efforts of WBI might considergiving more attention to poverty and socialdevelopment. The Social Development familymay likewise sharpen its skills to further improvethe quality of social assessments of water sectorprojects.There is a need to incorporate a more systematic,quantified, and well-documentedapproach to social assessment in water sectorprojects.Learning about peoples’ actual behavior andopinions in a continuous fashion is essential toensuring that project objectives are relevant topeople’s needs, and that project implementationtakes account of local realities. The water sectorprojects that are included in this analysis havenot only a narrow treatment of the behavioraland social structural elements, but provide littleevidence that an in-depth knowledge hasbeen acquired. Indeed, only a small percentageof the analyzed projects have all elements of theWorld Bank’s four-pillar approach to socialassessment in place, including; (i) social analysis;(ii) participation; (iii) institutional analysis;and (iv) impact monitoring. Rather, projects documentssuggest that social assessment is deferredto the implementation stage without specificbudget allocation. The findings of the QualityAssurance Group also show that a holistic integrationof social development concerns lagsbehind the performance of other quality concerns(economic, financial, and technical),despite the indication that the water sector performsbetter than others in its treatment ofpoverty and social issues.The analyses show that CDD projects aremore systematic in being built on organizedsocial assessment than projects with a morecentralized design. Indeed, CDD projects havea visibly broader treatment of social development83

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyissues and tend to monitor progress with respectto these more often than other projects.Needless to say, as the focus on WRM, integratedriver basin, and watershed managementincreases, the need for a better understandingof human activities that affect these will also. Coexistingsocial structures and the historical patternsof their interrelationships are particularlyneeded as watershed boundaries and political/administrativeboundaries diverge, the numberand diversity of stakeholders become morecomplex, and as the design of incentives withrespect to soil erosion, waterlogging, salinization,flood runoff, and so forth, become critical.While technical information needs becomemore relevant in establishing aquatic resources,providing this information to the people whoseactivities affect these resources becomes morechallenging. Yet human societies are dynamicand their information and communications structuresrequire careful assessment, which is consistentlylacking in the water sector projects.There is room for a better understanding ofbehaviors, attitudes, informal rules, andlocal modifications of formal laws.A large number of social analyses are basedprimarily on secondary data and qualitativeobservations. A deeper understanding of behavioraland attitudinal patterns as displayed bydifferent socioeconomic and water user groupscould substantially improve the design andimplementation of WRM projects. How do largescaleinvestments impact landlords, smallholders,and the landless? How do the marginal groupscope with forces that may force their displacement?Who are the full range of stakeholders, formaland informal suppliers and users of water?What could be the modality of community participationin large-scale river basin management?Who are the key stakeholders in groundwatermanagement? The relevant inquiries can benefitfrom greater analytical focus on the institutionsas defined as the “rules of the game.” These institutionsalso influence information/communicationstructures, as do values, attitudes, andculture. To the extent that information is a basicrequirement for informed stakeholders, this hasto be provided in a timely and effective way.These are among the many concerns that areinadequately addressed by many water sectorprojects.There is room to further enhance stakeholderinvolvement, especially of communitiesand the informal sector.Water sector projects continue to place theirinstitutional focus on the formal state and/ormunicipal agencies. Other suppliers of water, theproviders of goods and services for water qualityenhancement, including the informal sector,have received less comprehensive attention. Anaccurate understanding of all uses of water andestablishing an appropriate stakeholder participationprocess also require knowledge of localsocial systems. While community involvement isa more common feature of rural water supplyand low-cost urban sanitation projects, themodalities of community involvement in riverbasin and/or groundwater management are lesswell described except in cases where water fora single urban community is to be importedfrom one or two rural communities. Even in thesecases, there is more concern with the supply ofwater than with the quality of water resourcesmanagement. Indeed, there is remarkably littleemphasis on the social dimensions of waterquality management in WRM projects. This is anarea where an accurate understanding of relevantpatterns of behavior, values, and socialinstitutions would substantially contribute to theformulation of quality and quantity enhancementstrategies that would involve local communities.There is room to involve the local, smallscale,and informal private sector.Despite consistent and continued emphasis onprivate sector development, the current deficienciesin the operation of this sector and therequirements for improvement are less well documented.Equally important, insufficient attentionis given to the small-scale and informalprivate sector and the incentives that would beneeded to build the capacity of local private initiatives.Indeed, it appears that “the private sector”is largely associated with large-scale privatefirms and, often, international concerns, andthe question of how to build on the efforts of84

Annexesexisting informal and small-scale private initiativesis not pursued; nor is a description of theiractivities provided. This goes hand-in-hand withthe lack of a behavioral focus on coping strategiesor an attempt to understand how usersmeet their needs when governmental institutionsfail to do so.There is need to further debate social safetyarrangements and cost recovery issues withrespect to poor groups and/or communities.There is an increasing recognition within theinternational community that full cost recoveryin water sector projects may not always be feasible.In infrastructure and irrigation projects, itis reasonable to assume that at least part of thetarget population will not be willing or will nothave the capacity to pay for water. For instance,there are communities with depleted undergroundresources to whom providing low-costwater is not easy. Therefore, it may be necessaryto subsidize the water access of somegroups, or, in cases where the whole communityis poor, the whole community. 3 In so doingwithin a specific project context, the Bank oughtto strengthen its partnership with communities,other donors, and civil society organizations, asthis partnership has proved to have a positiveimpact on the poverty and social focus of itsprojects.An underlying concern in determining waterpricing issues is to anticipate behaviors involvingtraditional practices. Traditional rights andgovernance practices must be fully understoodprior to implementing water pricing to avoidsocial disruption. Inasmuch as inefficient wateruse in water-scarce societies negatively impactsthe poor, any proposed policy interventionsshould be attentive to the disrupting effects ofimplementing water demand management insituations where these systems are operatingeffectively and efficiently.There is need to give more emphasis togender concerns.As mentioned before, incorporation of a balancedgender approach into water sector projectdesign has been increasing, yet is still lowcompared with the poverty focus of these projects.If water sector projects are to face genderissues in project communities and to utilizethem effectively for successful implementation,then they need to pay increasing attention to thefollowing issues:• It is important to carry out social analysisfor better understanding of gender issues.Since water has both domestic and productiveuses, deciphering existing behaviors and mechanismsis integral to examining equity betweenmen and women with respect to access to anduse of water. Detailed social analysis, with afocus on interactions among community membersand their behavioral patterns and disaggregatedby age and gender, therefore, is themost important prerequisite for systematicconsideration of gender issues. 4• Women’s participation can be increasedin all phases of the project cycle throughadoption of an appropriate participatoryframework. Integration of the genderdimension in a project calls for equitableparticipation of both men and women, especiallyin management and the decisionmakingprocess. Related to that, both women’s andmen’s involvement in projects may gobeyond consultations during the projectplanning phase to proactive participation indecisionmaking, management, control, andmonitoring throughout the project cycle.The participation framework and mechanismsthat are put in place need to take intoaccount the possible constraints to women’sparticipation. These include time allocation,feasibility of meeting locations, and avoidingburdens on women who already contributewith unpaid, manual work, yet do nothave any say in decisionmaking in the existingsystem.• An appropriate method of overcoming theadditional burdens women may face in participatingin water sector projects is to investin programs to build on women’s capacity intechnical, managerial, social, and organizationalskills. Such capacity-building activitiescould aim to enhance women’s knowledgeon an array of issues, ranging from leadershipskills to financial management. Increasedcapacity, in turn, is likely to equip the women85

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategywith the necessary skills to have their voicesheard in the system.• It is important to pay special attention towomen’s right to water and ensure thatexisting formal and informal institutionalarrangements do not disadvantagewomen. Mainly because of patriarchalrelations, most women do not have the rightto land, and water rights are tied to landrights. This leaves women in a particularlydisadvantaged and vulnerable position. Theyare not allowed to participate in decisionmakingfor water allocation, they cannotvoice their needs and concerns, and theyhave to find coping mechanisms to accesswater. If the Bank wants to discourage policiesand institutional formats that would disadvantagewomen in water sector projects,it need to be careful in assessing the existingformal and informal institutional arrangements.Water sector project design andimplementation, therefore, need to encouragepolicies and institutional structures thatwould allow women a more equitable say inallocation and use of water. There are anumber of ways of achieving such impact—working with local NGOs in identifyingwomen’s problems and involving communitiesin decisionmaking processes upfront aretwo effective solutions.The water sector offers good opportunitiesto further strengthen the pro-poor/prosocialemphasis. To do so would requiresocial impact monitoring of trends. Thiscan be done by using the database establishedfor purposes of the analysis presentedhere. However, an institutional hostfor the database needs to be identified.The improvement in the policy environment forwater resource management agreed upon by theinternational community has led to a trend forWorld Bank projects to be more socially sustainableand more “pro-poor.” This trend couldbecome a permanent way of doing businessfor all WRM projects, with an emphasis on learningsystematically from results and realities onthe ground, establishing clear definitions of andcommitment to quality, and dealing throughsocial assessment and stakeholder participationwith local specificity that, in the end, is the keyto achieving an impact on peoples’ lives.T able E.1V ariables in Data FileVariable (field) nameReport NoProject IDDouble-checkQAG(Quality Assurance Group)OED(Operations Evaluation Department)CountryRegionNameSectorTypeNationwideDescriptionReport number written on the face of the document.Unique project identification number; can be used to merge the SDD with other Bank databases.Indicates whether project entries are double-checked by B. Ozbilgin for accuracy of recordedinformation.Overall QAG rating for project. Most of those projects do not have QAG ratings, and QAG does notgive out information on individual projects. However, for compatibility with the analytical SPSS database,the variable has been retained in the database.Project OED rating. This variable is obtained from the OED database, if it exists.Project country.Bank Region for the project country.Full name of the project.Main project sector.Project focus (infrastructure provision, or people focused).If the project covers the whole country, this variable is checked.86

AnnexesT able E.1V ariables in Data File (continued)Variable (field) nameRegionalNumber of provincesTotal number of beneficiariesPopulationProject area populationPartnership with UN agenciesPartnership with regionaldevelopment banksPartnership with JOECFPartnership with IFCPartnership with USAIDPartnership with othersPoverty targetedPoverty focusedPoverty specialistPoverty analysisInstitutional mechanisms totarget the poorMechanisms to monitor povertyBudget allocated to monitor povertyPoverty impactPoverty impact calculatedIndirect poverty impactInternational social scientistDescriptionIf the project covers a particular region/province or a number of regions in the country, this variableis checked.For a regional project, indicates the number of provinces and/or cities involved.Total number of expected direct and/or indirect beneficiaries from the project. This number is obtaineddirectly from the PAD/SAR; it is not independently confirmed and not available for all the projects.Country population. If the project document gives a figure, it has been noted here. Otherwise, figuresare obtained from WB indicators for the country.Population of the project area. This value was taken from the project document; it was not availablefor all the projects.Indicates if there is a partnership within the project with various UN agencies.Partnership with regional development banks, which include mainly ADB, IDB, and EBRD.Partnership with bilateral aid agencies. While the code suggests the JOECF, the scope of the variableincludes other bilateral agencies.Indicates partnership with IFC in the project.Indicates partnership with USAID.Indicates partnership with other donors.Poverty applicability as defined by the project. Each project document, on its description page, hasinformation on whether any poverty category is applicable to the project or not. Usually, only projectsincorporating strict, targeted interventions have considered themselves poverty targeting. Thisvariable reflects that information.Poverty focus in the project. Even though a project may not technically be termed poverty targeting,a number of projects involved poverty issues and analysis of poverty for project regions, and madesome provisions and analyzed impact of the project on poverty. These projects, within the scope ofthis variable, have been rated as “focusing on poverty.”Indicates if a poverty specialist is involved in project design. This variable is checked “yes” if thereis an economist involved in project design, although it is not always possible to figure out the responsibilitiesof the individuals involved if the information is not available in the project document.Indicates if an analysis of poverty is undertaken in the project document. It does not necessitate aseparate, full analysis of poverty, and the variable does not make any assertions of quality.Indicates if there are institutional mechanisms established to target the poor (with the exception ofcompliance issues) in the project design.Indicates if there are mechanisms established to monitor poverty impacts (with the exception of complianceissues) during the project implementation.Indicates if there are explicit funds allocated to monitor poverty within the project documentation.Indicates if the project’s impact on poverty levels is considered in design.Indicates if the project’s expected impact on poverty is quantified and articulated.Indicates if the indirect impact of the project on poverty levels is considered.Indicates if there is an international social scientist (Bank staff) involved in project preparation. It isnot always possible to figure out the responsibilities of the individuals involved if that informationis not available in the project document.(continues on following page)87

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyT able E.1V ariables in Data File (continued)Variable (field) nameLocal social scientistInternational social scientistpeer reviewCAS consistencyNationwide sectoralinstitutional analysisOther formal institutionsLocal sector institutionsMunicipalities analysisUniversity analysisLocal formal institutionsPrivate sector institutionsState-owned enterpriseLocal informal institutionsSocial conditionalityResettlement-specific socialconditionalityBroader conditionalityEnvironmental assessmentSocial assessment accordingto 4 pillarsAffordabilityMonitoring of socialdevelopment issuesBudget allocated for socialimpact monitoringFunds for baseline surveyFunds available for baseline updateResettlementResettlement action plan availableResettlement action takenResettlement costResettlement cost ($)Indigenous peopleDescriptionIndicates if local social scientists have been involved in design. This is also difficult to assess.Indicates if there have been international social scientists in the peer review of projects. Thisvariable has the same limitations as those listed above.Indicates if the project is linked and consistent with the poverty reduction objective in the CAS. Aproject may be consistent with CAS, but unless it has a direct linkage to poverty reduction objectivein the CAS, this question is coded “no.”Indicates whether nationwide sectoral institutions are analyzed during the appraisal stage.Indicates whether other formal sector institutions analysis is included in appraisal.Indicates whether local sector institutions analysis is included in design.Indicates an analysis of municipalities and/or local governments.Indicates an analysis universities and local intelligentsia.Indicates analysis of other formal local institutions.Indicates institutional analysis of private sector capacity.Indicates institutional analysis of state-owned enterprise.Indicates whether local informal institutions and civil society analysis is included in the project..Indicates whether or not a social conditionality exists in the legal agreement.Indicates if there is a social conditionality in the legal agreement, it is compliance (resettlement,indigenous people, cultural property) specific.Indicates if there is a broader social condition in the legal agreement, than mere compliance issues.Indicates that the project has an environmental assessment.Indicates that the project has an SA as defined by the 4-pillar approach. It may not explicitly stateit, but if the project has all 4 pillars of the SA (social development issues analysis, institutional analysis,participation framework, and impact monitoring) then it is regarded as following the 4-pillar approach.Indicates whether affordability and/or willingness to pay has been calculated for appraisal.Indicates whether there is an explicit monitoring system for social development concerns.Indicates that explicit funds are allocated in budgeting documents for social impact monitoring. If thebudget does not allocate a line item specially for social impact monitoring, the answer is coded as “no.”Indicates that explicit funds are allocated for a baseline survey/study. This is not necessarily sociallyoriented.Indicates that explicit funds are allocated for an update of the baseline monitoring and evaluation.Indicates that the project considers the relevancy of the resettlement issues and mentions them inthe documentation.Indicates that there is a resettlement action plan available in the project document.If resettlement issues are considered but a resettlement action plan (RAP) is not available, what isthe action taken?Is the resettlement cost clearly indicated?If the resettlement and/or land acquisition cost is indicated in the RAP, what is it in US$ (foreign currencyconverted at the rate indicated in the PAD).Indicates that the project considers the relevancy of indigenous people issues.88

AnnexesT able E.1V ariables in Data File (continued)Variable (field) nameIndigenous people planCultural propertyCultural property planOther interestingBeneficiariesStakeholders in project designStakeholdersStakeholder involvement in budgetCommunity drivenEthnicityUrban-rural equitySub-regional equityLand ownership equityGenderGender NGOsParticipationEquity between rich and poorDirect consultationsParticipation planAdverse impactsEA consultationsBenefits of participation consideredNGO involvementConsultations during implementationConsultations with extractedCompensation for water extractionLand acquisitionAffected populationsRelocated populationsEnterprise acquired effectedEmpirical researchDescriptionIndicates that there is an indigenous people action plan available.Indicates that the project considers the relevancy of cultural property issues.Indicates that there is a cultural property action plan available.Other interesting issues about the project.Lists the names/types of beneficiaries identified within the project documentation.Lists the stakeholders involved/consulted during the design of the project.Lists the stakeholders expected to be involved in the implementation of the project, as indicated bythe PAD/SAR.Lists the stakeholders who are expected to be involved in the project if their involvement is explicitlybudgeted in the project.The project is considered as a community driven project if it has a dimension that involves communitygroups, civil society, NGOs, or user associations.Indicates that the project takes into account ethnicity factors in its design.Indicates that the project takes into account urban/rural equity issues. If adjustments are made, theseissues are assumed to be taken into account.Indicates that the project takes into account sub-regional equity issues (i.e., equity between differentregions in the project area).Indicates that the project takes into account differences between types of landowners (e.g., landlessfarmers vs. big landowners, medium-size holders; etc.).Indicates that gender issues are considered in the project design.Indicates that NGOs/civil society organizations specialize in gender issues are involved in preparationand/or implementation.Indicates that the project involves participation from the low income and poor population.Indicates that the project takes into account equity issues between the rich and the poor.Indicates that the project involves direct consultations with the poor.Indicates that the project mentions participation for the implementation phase. It does not suggestexistence of a structured detailed participation action plan, if the project cites participation forimplementation, this variable is coded “yes.”Indicates that the project design has/reflects discussions with adversely affected populations.Indicates that environmental assessment consultations have been done.Indicates that benefits of decentralization/community participation are specifically considered.Indicates that civil society organizations/NGOs are involved in project implementation.Indicates that there will be consultations with the poor during project implementation.Indicates that people from whose area water will be extracted are consulted.Indicates that these people will be compensated.Indicates that land acquisition is involved in the project.Number of affected population (if available).Number of population to be relocated (if available).Indicates if there are enterprises affected by acquisition/relocation.Indicates that there is systematic, quantifiable, project-specific empirical research for project design.(continues on following page)89

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyT able E.1V ariables in Data File (continued)Variable (field) nameDescriptionRapid rural appraisalIndicates that there is a rapid rural appraisal or other qualitative research.Stakeholder consultationIndicates that there is broad stakeholder consultation (meetings, seminars, conferences, etc.).Secondary dataIndicates that secondary social development oriented data been used.International experienceIndicates that there specific use of international experience, e.g., a similar project done in anothercountry.Resettlement surveysIndicates that there is resettlement survey(s).Indigenous populationIndicates that there are indigenous population studies.Beneficiary assessmentIndicates that there is there a beneficiary assessment.BoardApproximate date that the project went to the board (based on PAD/SAR).Total costTotal project cost in US$ million.IDAIDA financing for the project (US$ million).IBRDIBRD financing for the project (US$ million).OtherOther (unspecified) World Bank financing (US$ million).Regional fundRegional development fund financing (US$ million).Environmental fundEnvironmental fund financing (US$ million).OtherOther financing (US$ million).Central governmentCentral government financing US($ million).HouseholdsHouseholds and individuals financing (US$ million).Non-householdNon-household users financing (US$ million).CommunitiesCommunities financing (US$ million).Local governmentFinancing from local governments (US$ million).WSS financingWater and sewerage company financing (US$ million).ComponentProject components.CostComponent cost (US$ million).Component poverty focusedIndicates that the component has a specific poverty focus.Component other socialIndicates that the component accounts for other social issues (excluding safeguards).Note: Available answers to questions: yes/no/not applicable/unspecified. Variables involving population, cost, etc. are indicated in numbers and $ terms. All other variables are text-based,unless otherwise indicated. Detailed variable types and descriptions are also available in the MS Access file.90

ANNEX F:RESETTLEMENT IN BANK WATER PROJECTS—RESULTSFROM A RANDOM SAMPLE OF 108 WATER PROJECTSResettlement in Water Sector Projects (post-1993)Resettlement notconsidered(18 projects, 32%)Resettlement considered(39 projects, 68%)Average project cost:US$123 millionResettlement action plannot available at appraisal(23 projects, 59%)Average project cost:US$319 millionYearly distribution:1993: 3 projects (8%)1994: 4 projects (10%)1995: 3 projects (8%)1996: 4 projects (10%)1997: 4 projects (10%)1998: 5 projects (13%)Action taken:• 12 projects (52%) dismissedresettlement completely• 8 projects (35%) dismissedresettlement, but foresawfuture possibilities and madeprovisions• 3 projects (13%) includedresettlement in implementation,but did not have a separateRAPResettlement actionplan (RAP) available atappraisal (16 projects,41%)Projects not indicatingRAP cost clearly: 3projects (19%)Average cost of RAP:US$26 millionAverage affectedpopulation:*11,581 people(between 144and 49,830 people)Average RAPcost per affectedperson:* US$5,355*This number is an approximation, because a number of RAPs present the number of people affected in termsof household; therefore, the analysis used an average household size of four to calculate the approximatenumber of affected people. Hence, the average cost per person value is also approximate and is highlysensitive to the level of resettlement financing in individual projects.91

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyResettlement in Water Sector Projects (prior to 1993)Resettlement notconsidered(40 projects, 66%)Resettlement considered(21 projects, 34%)Average project cost:US$134 millionResettlement action plannot available at appraisal(17 projects, 81%)Average project cost:US$390 millionYearly distribution:1986: 1 project (3%)1987: 3 projects (8%)1988: 2 projects (5%)1989: 4 projects (10%)1990: 2 projects (5%)1991: 3 projects (8%)1992: 2 projects (5%)Action taken:• 9 projects (53%) dismissedresettlement completely• 2 projects (12%) dismissedresettlement, but foresawfuture possibilities and madeprovisions• 6 projects (35%) includedresettlement in implementation,but did not have a separateRAPResettlement actionplan (RAP) available atappraisal (4 projects, 19%)RAP not prepared but average resettlementcosts availableNumber of projects: 5 US$ millions: $10.44Average per capita resettlement cost: $2,290Projects not indicatingRAP cost clearly:0 projects (0%)Average cost of RAP:US$30 millionAverage affectedpopulation:*30,460 peopleAverage RAPcost per affectedperson:* US$4,969*This number is an approximation, because a number of RAPs present the number of people affected in termsof household; therefore, the analysis used an average household size of four to calculate the approximatenumber of affected people. Hence, the average cost per person value is also approximate and is highlysensitive to the level of resettlement financing in individual projects.92

ANNEX G:WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT POLICY QUESTIONNAIRETO BANK STAFFThe questionnaire was sent to Bank staff in theperiod January–March 2000. It was precededby two rounds of pre-testing among a randomsample of 20 Bank water staff in the periodNovember–December 1999. The questionnairewas designed using commercial software developedspecifically for market and opinion surveys,and an external Website was used as a post boxto collect responses to the questionnaire. Thisremote Website enabled the responses of Bankstaff to remain anonymous.Considerable difficulty was encountered insetting up a list of potential respondents. Itwas the intent to send the questionnaire to allBank staff and recent retirees who were connectedto water development. The names onthe Bank’s Global Water Unit circulation listformed the initial participant list. Subsequently,this was expanded to include all task managersresponsible for water or water componentprojects—many of those on the larger list weregeneral economists or specialists in other disciplines,such as sociology. In all, a list ofabout 420 names was compiled. It includedabout 150 staff who form the Bank’s core watergroup.After several reminders, a total of 107 staffresponded. Judging by the answers to the initialquestions, almost all of these were from thecore Bank water group, although the exact proportioncannot be determined because of theguaranteed anonymity.Figure G.1Staff QuestionnaireQ1 and Q2 delt with administrative issues.Q3Which of the following best describes your position?Task manager 53% Other 4%Other Bank Staff 20% Retired Bank Staff 2%Lead Specialist 9% Young Professional 0%Outside Consultant 7%Sector Manager 5%Q4 Please give your position title: Response not classifiedQ5How much of your time in the Bank has been spent on water or water-related work?AnswerCumulative75–100% 53% 53%50–75% 15% 68%25–50% 16% 84%Less than 25% 14% 98%None 2% 100%(continues on following page)93

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyFigure G.1Staff Questionnaire (continued)Q6 Recent Bank reports have expressed concern that the retirement of Yes 60%technical water staff since the early 1990s has undermined the Bank’sability to manage lending and ESW for water. Do you agree the Bankshould be concerned? No 40%Q7How long before you plan to retire?Within a year 1–2 years 3–5 years > 5 years6% 8% 11% 76%Q8 How many years (of cumulative experience) have you been working for the Bank ?Cumulative BankAnswersexperienceMore than 20 years 11% 11%15 to 20 5% 16%12 to 14 11% 27%9 to 11 11% 37%6 to 8 25% 62%3 to 5 14% 77%Less than 3 years 23% 100%Q9How many years of professional water or water-related experience do you have?Cumulative professionalAnswersexperienceMore than 30 years 17% 17%25 to 30 13% 30%20 to 24 16% 46%15 to 19 8% 54%10 to 14 11% 65%5 to 9 15% 80%1 to 4 18% 98%less than 1 year 2% 100%Q1OWhich of the following Bank Regions have you worked in?East Asia and Pacific 50% Middle East and North Africa 39%Africa 45% Latin America and Caribbean 37%South Asia 42% E. Europe and Central Asia 23%None 2%Q11Are You HQ or country basedHQ based (DC) 65% Country based 26%Non-Bank staff—Not relevant 8% Don’t know 1%94

AnnexesFigure G.1Staff Questionnaire (continued)Q12Q13 & Q14Q15How much time in total have you spent working in a developing country?(either in the Bank or in another job?)AnswersCumulative ProfileMore than 20 years 23% 23%More than 11 but less than 20 years 33% 56%More than 5 but less than 10 years 2% 58%Less than 5 years 12% 70%More than 6 months but less than 1 year 3% 73%Short trips, with no trip exceeding 6 months 8% 81%No experience 2% 83%Select any of the following subjects in which you have professional expertise (Q13) and you have beensignificantly involved in (more than 5% of your time) over the past 5 years as water-related activities (Q14)Q13Q14PersonalBank WorkwithwithexpertiseexperienceWater Resources and WR Management 56% 47%Water Supply and Sanitation 50% 51%Economics 44% 40%Water Planning 39% 30%Participatory Management 38% 41%Rural Water Supply 37% 32%Cost Recovery & Tariff 29% 32%Irrigation Management 28% 25%Evaluation 27% 24%Finance 27% 22%Sewerage and Waste Disposal 26% 26%Water Quality 22% 16%Utility Operation and Management 22% 22%Privatization 22% 30%Training 21% 20%Irrigation Engineering 18% 13%Environmental Management/Science 16% 15%Other 14% 3%Public & Environmental Health 12% 6%Legal & Regulatory 11% 10%To which Network(s) do you belong?ESSD 44% FPSI 46%HD 3% OCS 2%PSD 1% PREM 6%None 6% Don’t know 10%(continues on following page)95

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyFigure G.1Staff Questionnaire (continued)Q16Q17Q18Q19Q20Which of the following water-related mailing lists are you on?Water Sector (WATER HELP DESK) 77% Rural WS&S (WSINF) 48%Water Thematic Group (RSBG16) 57% Other (not listed above) 13%Have you read, or are you familiar with, the contents of the ”Water Resources Management: A Policy Paper”published by the Bank in 1993?Yes No Don’t know72% 22% 6%Indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statementsabout the Water Resources Management Policy PaperSomewhat Somewhat Don’tTrue true untrue Untrue knowI found this helpful 54% 37% 8% 1% 0%WRMP is consistent with the Bank’s objectives 41% 33% 14% 6% 6%The document is thorough 27% 46% 20% 4% 3%The paper is too long 17% 41% 17% 23% 3%The document is clear and unambiguous 13% 56% 28% 3% 1%Indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statementsabout the Water Resources Management Policy PaperSomewhat Somewhat Don’tTrue true untrue Untrue knowThe document is practical for Bank staff to use 29% 24% 32% 11% 4%The paper only responded to the DublinStatement of 1992 to show the bankhad a water policy 13% 20% 31% 12% 24%The policy document has actionablerecommendations 38% 32% 21% 6% 3%The policy described in this document ismonitorable 17% 25% 35% 19% 4%The WRMP document is relevant tomy Bank work 49% 25% 18% 1% 6%Indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statementsabout the Water Resources Management Policy PaperSomewhat Somewhat Don’tAgree agree disagree Disagree knowThe paper is too complex 7% 30% 23% 25% 16%This document is mainly a set of platitudes 7% 41% 24% 12% 16%The text is too dense 10% 34% 23% 17% 16%The document gives realistic advice 14% 27% 33% 8% 19%The Paper is relevant to Borrowers’ needs 22% 34% 24% 4% 17%96

AnnexesFigure G.1Staff Questionnaire (continued)Q21Q22Q23Indicate how much you agree or disagreeSomewhat Somewhat Don’tDisagree disagree agree Agree knowThe different sectoral/sub-sectoral units in myregion work harmoniuosly on waterpolicy issues 20% 26% 30% 6% 18%Cross-sectoral cooperation in the Bank hasimproved since the 1993 water policy 10% 17% 22% 8% 44%There is insufficient FINANCE forcomprehensive & holistic approachesto water in ESW/operations 4% 10% 27% 32% 27%There are insufficient PERSONNEL forcomprehensive/holistic approachesto water in ESW/operations 4% 9% 32% 29% 27%Senior councils are effective in helping toimplement the water policy 12% 17% 22% 5% 44%Bank staff do not have the skills to implementthe water policy 21% 29% 23% 3% 25%Indicate how true you think the followingstatements areSomewhat Somewhat Don’tTrue true untrue Untrue knowThe Bank has shown a high degree ofleadership in promoting integrated waterresources management 19% 33% 28% 9% 11%The Bank has practiced what it preacheswith water policy 13% 26% 27% 15% 20%The water policy HAS been institutionalizedmy REGION 8% 28% 22% 10% 33%The water policy HAS NOT beeninstitutionalized in my Sector 8% 31% 20% 14% 28%The water policy HAS NOT beeninstitutionalized in my UNIT 10% 26% 20% 19% 25%Indicate how much you agree or disagreeSomewhat Somewhat Don’tAgree agree disagree Disagree knowThere is not enough continuity in Bank staff toimplement the water policy 16% 37% 17% 11% 19%I/we (my team) are dependent on non-Bankfunding (e.g., trust funds) to implementthe policy 37% 23% 6% 8% 27%(continues on following page)97

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyFigure G.1Staff Questionnaire (continued)Q23Q24Q25Q26(continued)Somewhat Somewhat Don’tAgree agree disagree Disagree knowBank staff do have sufficient experience toimplement the water policy 17% 40% 20% 8% 15%Adding integrated water resources managementto specific water operations is very difficult 26% 32% 15% 15% 13%Most of our clients support the integratedwater resources management policy 15% 34% 26% 7% 17%Indicate how true you think the following statements are trueSomewhat Somewhat Don’tTrue true untrue Untrue knowStaffing needs to implement the policyHAVE been quantified at unit level 5% 12% 14% 19% 51%Staffing needs to implement the policyhave NOT been quantified at regional level 17% 18% 5% 7% 54%Staffing needs to implement the policyhave NOT been quantified at sectoral level 13% 15% 9% 5% 58%Staffing needs to implement the policy atnetwork level HAVE been quantified 4% 7% 12% 11% 66%Indicate how much you agree or disagreeSomewhat Somewhat Don’tAgree agree disagree Disagree knowI have taken advantage of the EDI/WBIWater Resources Management programs 14% 14% 41% 18% 12%EDI/WBI is effective at disseminatingthe water policy with borrwers anddevelopment partners 10% 27% 25% 3% 34%The Bank has been effective at buildinginternational cooperation for waterresources management 19% 32% 23% 3% 23%The Bank has been more careful inincorporating health safeguards inwater projects since the policy 13% 25% 28% 4% 31%Indicate how effective you think the Bank has been at the following activitiesSomewhat Not very Not Don’tEffective effective effective effective knowPartnering with bilaterals to coordinateand implement water policy reforms 14% 51% 19% 8% 9%Dealing with water in a more integratedcross-sectoral manner 8% 44% 37% 8% 4%Paying attention to environmental impactof water operations 10% 73% 12% 2% 3%98

AnnexesFigure G.1Staff Questionnaire (continued)Q26Q27(continued)Somewhat Not very Not Don’tEffective effective effective effective knowDeveloping relationships with NGOs tofurther the water policy agenda 3% 52% 35% 6% 5%Treating water as an economic good(opportunity costing of water) in its projectappraisal of loans/credits 10% 54% 24% 7% 5%Integrating watershed management andriver basin planning/management activities 9% 32% 39% 5% 16%Indicate how effective you think the Bank has been at the following activitiesSomewhat Not very Not Don’tEffective effective effective effective knowCoordinating with UN partners onimplementing water reform 13% 45% 22% 10% 10%Focusing on the poverty implications ofwater management 6% 43% 38% 10% 4%Institutionalizing the Bank’s water policy 4% 44% 33% 6% 14%Enhancing the participation of womenin water operations 2% 41% 38% 5% 15%Getting private participation in thewater supply sector 15% 58% 19% 4% 4%Recruiting enough new water specialiststo replace retiring Bank staff 3% 24% 30% 25% 17%Integrating water quality and environmentalissues with institutional designs forwater allocation 5% 35% 32% 9% 19%99

100T able G.1Cross-tabulation of the responses of105 survey participantsStaff Expertise and Bank Work Experience (first line/columnshows the number of respondents in each category, body oftable shows number of staff in both categories)Q14: Areas in which Bank Staff have significant BANK water experienceEconomicsFinanceWater planningWater resources andWR managementEnvironmentalmanagement or scienceWater supply andsanitationRural water supplySewerage andwaste disposalNumber 42 23 31 49 16 54 34 27 6 17 10 43 14 26 23 21 34 31 25 3Q13 Bank staffs’ professional expertiseEconomics 47 37 13 13 26 8 19 13 7 1 7 3 19 5 13 9 6 18 18 13 2 79Finance 28 12 18 3 9 2 19 6 10 3 4 6 7 1 5 11 7 16 17 10 - 64Water planning 41 16 7 29 27 10 21 10 12 3 13 3 19 5 13 13 13 11 10 13 1 71Water resources and WRmanagement 59 27 8 26 47 11 21 11 12 1 11 5 20 14 22 14 16 18 15 13 2 80Environmental management/science 17 7 2 6 8 9 6 8 6 2 8 4 8 3 6 1 4 2 2 6 - 53Water supply and sanitation 52 16 14 16 15 4 49 25 25 5 13 5 21 1 4 16 11 20 21 12 - 94Rural water supply 39 11 6 11 16 4 29 27 15 1 6 3 18 6 9 5 7 11 6 10 2 69Sewerage and waste disposal 27 9 11 9 8 3 25 11 21 4 9 3 12 1 2 10 6 13 10 12 - 78Public/environmental health 13 4 5 6 4 3 10 6 5 4 6 3 8 - 2 2 1 3 3 3 - 31Water quality 23 8 4 12 12 7 14 5 10 3 14 4 8 1 4 7 6 9 8 5 1 61Legal/regulatory 12 7 7 4 6 4 5 4 4 2 4 7 6 1 3 2 5 5 6 5 - 58Participatory management 41 14 8 16 19 6 24 17 11 4 6 5 34 6 13 9 12 11 6 9 2 83Irrigation engineering 19 8 3 9 18 4 2 5 - - 4 2 9 10 14 1 6 4 1 5 1 53Irrigation management 30 14 4 11 26 7 4 8 - - 4 3 16 12 23 4 9 5 2 7 1 77Utility operation and management 23 7 10 8 9 - 18 5 10 2 5 4 7 2 4 16 8 14 13 8 - 70Training 22 8 4 12 9 3 11 5 5 - 4 4 10 2 9 9 14 9 9 6 1 64Cost recovery/tariff 31 14 12 7 12 2 19 11 11 2 6 6 9 3 7 10 9 21 18 8 1 68Privatization 23 10 11 5 5 1 16 8 10 3 3 6 8 - 2 9 7 16 22 7 - 96Evaluation 29 8 10 8 9 2 15 8 10 2 5 6 11 2 9 10 11 12 11 19 2 66Other 14 5 1 3 6 5 4 1 1 - 1 - 8 2 6 1 3 1 - 4 3 21Public environmentalhealthWater qualityLegal regulatoryParticipatorymanagementIrrigation engineeringIrrigation managementUtility operation andmanagementTrainingCost recovery/tariffPrivatizationEvaluationOtherPercentage of expertiseutilized in Bank workBridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyPercentage of Bank experienceusing expertise 88 78 94 96 56 91 79 78 67 82 70 79 71 88 70 67 62 71 76 100

ANNEX H:THE DIFFICULTIES OF INTEGRATED RIVER BASINMANAGEMENTRecognizing that it would be difficult to implementthe water strategy in client countries, theBank and the UNDP produced a guide on capacity-buildingfor countries interested in formingstrategies for managing water resources (LeMoigne and others 1994), and its prescriptionswere reinforced by all the UN family (UN/WMO1997). A key principle was to build nationalcapacity to manage water resources through theprocess of strategy formation adapted to countryconditions. It was envisaged that the countrystrategies would be a set of medium- tolong-term action programs and measures to supportachievement of broad development goalsand to implement water-related policies. Mostimportant, measures would include developingmanagerial capacity, building institutions, andenhancing human resources.Critical elements for successful strategy formulationwere specified as a clear national statementof development objectives and key waterpolicies, supported by government commitmentat the highest level to using a comprehensiveapproach in formulating a water strategy. Oncecommitted, a high-level policy committee wouldguide a team of national experts charged withdetermining partners and processes for strategyformulation.In practice, however, there have been few successes,and this approach has failed when ownershipwas low and many of the critical elementswere imposed as lending conditions. That wasa fate similar to that imposed on National EnvironmentalAction Plans, with a similarly chillingeffect on local ownership and capacity building.Most notably, the Bank’s desire to time-table strategyformulation and resulting investment planshas resulted in importation of expatriate specialiststo “assist” the national effort, but who inpractice substitute for inadequate local capacity.The most notable examples of this have beenin Bangladesh and Mozambique. In Bangladesh,large expatriate teams undertook the nationalwater planning effort in the late 1980s and early1990s, and in a clear demonstration that nolocal capacity was created, a new expatriateteam is currently producing a third iteration ofthe national water plan. Mozambique suffereda similar experience.The MNA Region is notably successful inassisting clients to develop an orderly regionaland country strategy framework (box H.1), butthis has not led to investment lending that is betterthan in other Regions because it is difficultto mainstream water strategies and improve performanceof line agencies.Successes in strategy adoption are linkedwith good local capacity and ownership, withthe country in the driver’s seat. An irony is thatlow-key Bank advisory support under these circumstancesis generally more successful (forexample, in Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela)than highly visible Bank-sponsored nationalwater strategies and plans (Bangladesh). Therecent Argentina and Ghana water resourcesmanagement strategies put together by nationalexperts are best-practice examples. It is salutaryto compare the pragmatic Argentine approachthat recognizes local problems and only recommendsa few tasks in the short term, to theBank-driven agenda in India that made 52 recommendationsfor reform in 1991, achieving little,and the 1998 water resources strategy thatmakes even more recommendations.Regrettably, the global experience with implementingstrategies for integrated water resourcesmanagement is that while the concept is sound,it is extraordinarily difficult to implement suc-101

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyBox H.1MNA Water Strategy DevelopmentMNA, along with AFR, is one of the regions in the Bank whereits water activities in agricultural, industrial and potable waterdevelopment and management is integrated under one sectorleader—and this has led to a more comprehensive approach.Agriculture is the biggest consumer of water in the regionaccounting for about 85 percent of demand. Consequently, theBank initiated its water strategy work in 1993 with a regionalexamination of the MNA’s regional experience of improving theefficiency of water use in agriculture. The following year MNApublished its regional water strategy for managing water. In linewith this strategy, the focus turned on detailed water sectorreviews of individual countries with significant water problems:Egypt (1993), Tunisia (1994), Morocco (1995), Jordan (1997)and currently Yemen. These studies were followed up by aseries of regional roundtables of stakeholders that discussedcommon water development issues and solutions—the Bank wasthere to listen and learn how to tailor investments to felt needs.The most recent roundtable on Policy Reforms in WaterResources in MNA (1999) looked at case studies developed bystakeholders in Jordan, Oman, Tunisia and Yemen.cessfully, even in OECD countries (Barrow 1998;OECD 1998; Millington 2000). Even where thereis local ownership, there is a danger that the mostdominant water agency—typically the irrigationdepartment, frequently cosmetically renamedas the water resources agency—will capture thestrategy for its traditional vested interests. Thishappened in Turkey, for example, under twobank-financed projects. In Brazil, the PLANSAmodel of the 1970s and 1980s created powerfulstate water companies, based on the premise thatinstitutional strengthening alone would be sufficientto improve and sustain the efficiency ofstate water companies. Instead, it produced alarge and inefficient bureaucracy and a highlypoliticized management culture with few incentivestructures to serve the poor or address environmentalissues. Similar problems arose inSub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Nigeria’s LakeChad Basin Commission and the Niger BasinAuthority. Indeed, one reviewer found he couldnot “recognize a single . . . body that had . . .played an effective role in planning and coordinatingthe development of a single river basin”(Scudder, 1989, 1994).The Bank’s strategy advocates setting-up riverbasin organizations (RBOs) to implement waterstrategy. However, there is no single globalmodel that has proved successful, since eachmust adapt itself to local realities and needs. Areview of 11 RBOs (Millington 2000) indicatedthat only the most mature (The Rhine Commission,Murray Darling Basin Commission) haveevolved to limit themselves to resource managerand standard-setter/regulator, while the MekongCommission and Niger River Basin Authoritylimit themselves primarily to resource management.The rest adopt a dual role of resource managerand operator and service provider—themost notable being the TVA and the Jordan ValleyAuthority. Unfortunately, earlier Bank initiativeshave advocated design of RBOs thatmeasured everything against fixed targets and didnot allow for a natural evolution (Frederiksen1992b): “the nature of reform of water institutionsdemands a will to attack the situation in acoherent, comprehensive manner. Piece-mealor simple solutions do not exist.” Unfortunately,this blanket mechanistic approach is frequentlypolitically impracticable and tends to fail, whilean organic, adaptive approach succeeds(Maxwell and Conway 2000).A recent global review of holistic approachesto planning (OED 2000b) found that it is best toavoid delegating responsibility for integratedplanning problems to “super-institutions” createdspecifically for the task. Experience suggeststhat these are either ineffectual in the short termor unproductive or unsustainable in the longterm. The biggest problem for RBOs is that theytend to take the form of regional structures thatattempt to claim (but often merely duplicate) theresponsibilities of existing regional departmentsof national ministries. This happened to theRiver Basin Councils and Aquifer Committees inMexico. Additionally, a pervasive problem facingthese new organizations is securing adequatefunds for water resources management102

Annexesactivities. To mitigate these problems, new bodiesshould instead be given responsibility forcoordinating the relevant elements of existingorganizations and ensuring participation ofstakeholders, including NGOs, civil society, andthe private sector: integrated planning, but notintegrated implementation. Decentralized governance—subsidiarity—isa key component ofthis approach. Notwithstanding this new paradigm,lack of baseline data and adequate monitoringleads to decisions based on falseassumptions.103

ENDNOTESChapter 11. This document was the basis for the Bank’sOperational Policy (OP) 4.07 (Annex A). However,the OP is limited to core mandatory provisions.For evaluation, the full Policy Paper(Strategy hereafter) is the appropriate reference,since it incorporates the guidance needed toachieve development effectiveness.2. Annex C contains an evaluation of 306completed Bank water and water-related projectsexiting between 1988 and 1999.3. Indeed, 78 percent of countries participatingin sector operations did not live up to financialcovenants, and the Bank took remedialaction in one case only. One reason, OED found,was that the Bank may have required reformsto be implemented too quickly or before the borrowerswere fully committed.4. OD 4.00, Annex B: Environmental Policyfor Dam and Reservoir Projects (1989); OD 4.01:Environmental Assessment (1991); OD 4.02:Environmental Action Plans (1992); OD 4.15:Poverty Reduction (1991); OD 4.20: IndigenousPeople (1991); OD 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement(1990); OD 7.50: Projects on International Waterways(1990); OD 14.70: Nongovernmental Organizationsin Bank-Supported Activities (1989);OMS 2.12: Project Generation and Design—Local Involvement (1978); OMS 2.22: FinancialPerformance Covenants for Revenue-EarningEnterprises (1984); OMS 3.72: Energy, WaterSupply, Sanitation and Communications (1987).5. Bank Management disagrees with the projectedreduction of investment going to agricultureshown in table 1.1 and states that itshould show an increase. Management arguesthat according to the results of long-term foodsupply and demand forecasts by the InternationalWater Management Institute and the InternationalFood Policy Research Institute, additionalinvestment in irrigation and drainage will bekey to ensuring adequate and affordable foodsupplies, particularly for the poor. In addition tofinancing a modest increase in irrigated area, newinvestment will be required for technology toimprove water use efficiency and to redress historicallyinadequate investment in drainage andirrigation rehabilitation.Chapter 21. Bank Management is currently evaluatingissues and recommendations made in Dam Commission’sReport and has indicated that it willaddress these in the context of the forthcomingWater Sector Strategy Paper.2. Thirteen countries ceased borrowingbecause of graduation from the Bank, civil wars,or economic mismanagement. Forty countriesstarted borrowing, most as a result of economicliberalization (Europe and Central Asia and EastAsia and Pacific Regions), others as a result ofsuccessful peace negotiations (Lebanon, WestBank and Gaza, Angola).3. Water investment in other sectors averaged44 percent of the loan when its sharecould be determined.4. The hydropower portfolio after 1993includes 11 dam projects and 49 environmentalprojects. The ratio before 1993 was 16 dam projectsto 11 environmental projects.5. The Bank’s Quality Assurance Group(QAG) has independently evaluated the qualityof 292 projects at entry over the period 1997–99against consistent Bankwide standards. OEDdisaggregated these data to compare the qualityat entry of water and non-water projects.6. OED, together with a social assessment teamfrom the Bank’s ESSD network, evaluated thesocial concerns and poverty focus of 103 randomlyselected project appraisal documents, half completedbefore the water strategy came into effectand half after (details are given in Annex E).7. The WSS Sector Board observed in 2000 that:“the key step to turning around our portfolio isto first put all the problems on the table as theMNA Region has done over the last two years,which helps explain the fact that it now tops(along with ECA) the problem projects leaguetable in W&S” (internal Bank communication). Inthe MNA case there is clear evidence that this leadsto better policy even though it is a painful processin the short term. The same is true of the watersupply and sanitation sector as a whole.Chapter 31. There are 146 CASs covering 98 countries.Some countries had only one CAS, some two,105

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategyand a few had three. OED analyzed all the CASsfor a number of specific water issues.2. An aggregate CAS water strategy indexwas developed taking account of the main waterstrategy issues—countries were scored on thisbasis. To answer the CAS issue fully wouldrequire that all countries be assessed for thenature of their water problems, and that allexternal assistance and the countries’ own effortsbe evaluated together. Only then could thecountry lacunae in the Bank’s water operationsbe clearly identified.3. A joint team from the Operations EvaluationDepartment and Environmentally andSocially Sustainable Development Network teamevaluated the design of 170 projects (a 100 percentsample of the 1993–99 cohort) for responsivenessto the 1993 water Strategy documentagainst 11 criteria grouped under three categories:comprehensive framework, institutions,and economic and social considerations. Methodologyand details are described in Annex B.The group of evaluators graded each project intoone of four classes: high, substantial, modest, andnegligible. For this report, the high and substantialclasses were merged for simplicity.4. Members of the Bank’s Water ResourcesManagement Group express strong reservationsabout the validity of using management informationdata in this section of the report forderiving conclusions of a cross-sectoral andcross-regional nature.5. The total cost of all projects involvingwatershed management since 1990 is $2.37billion.6 A recent QAG review revealed significantproblems with the forestry subcomponents andsupervision.7. Dam safety is a consideration for 104 Bankprojects. Many are not classified within theBank’s water sectors and include mine-tailingsdams.8. The section is based upon an ongoing surveyby the QAG RSA3 of FY 99 that contained200 randomly selected projects, of which 50were subjected to detailed review by a group ofenvironmental specialists. Water projects wereonly part of this sample. Evaluative questionswere directed at determining whether there wasadequate supervision of environmental conditionalities;sufficient action to ensure satisfactoryimplementation, M&E, and mitigation and management;continued stakeholder consultation;and appropriate action if compliance with safeguardswas inadequate.9. Of course, these tariffs would be higher ifthe full opportunity costs of the water wereadded.Chapter 41. Domestic, industrial, and irrigation usetends to pollute downstream supplies or groundwater,while irrigation accounts for more than70 percent of global fresh water consumption.Dams modify seasonality and bring the need toreconcile the competing objectives of powergeneration, flood control, and irrigation supply.2. Annex H: The Difficulties of IntegratedRiver Basin Management.3. Administrative measures include definingsupplies volumetrically and qualitatively, watershedprotection, registering water rights, andenforcement of permits. Economic instrumentsinclude extraction and pollution fees, and regulatingwater markets.4. This section is based on the results ofstakeholder workshops held to discuss countryexperience of water development and the roleof the Bank. Country studies for Brazil, India, thePhilippines, and Yemen were prepared by ateam drawn from ESSD’s Global Water Unit(ESGWU) and OED. These studies were circulatedprior to the workshops in Brazil (March1999), prepared jointly; in Yemen (September1999) and the Philippines (April 2000), preparedby ESGWU; and in India (May 2000), preparedby OED.5. Latvia, Morocco, Mozambique, Peru, andthe Philippines.6. QAG used a 15 percent random sample ofESW products for the period FY98–99 thatincluded five water studies, for: India (1998),Yemen (1998), Indonesia and Brazil (1999), andIndonesia (sewerage, 1999).7. QAG, 1998. The areas where particularattention needs to be paid in future ESW are inensuring that the work meets its own statedobjectives (less than two-thirds achieved this) and106

Endnotesthat recommendations are realistic. Only half (53percent) of the ESW satisfactorily included recommendationsthat were realistic in light ofsocial, political, and administrative constraintsand that were suitably prioritized. These allwork to undermine the likely impact of ESW.8. Management commented that while resettlementplanning quality has improved significantlysince the 1994 Bankwide resettlementreview, there has not been a comprehensivereview of resettlement implementation for projectsprepared since the early 1990s. However,feedback from task teams suggests that systematicefforts would need to be undertaken tostrengthen the institutional, technical, and organizationalskills of borrowers to meet Bankrequirements on social policies.9. There were also major recommendationsabout how compensation packages should berestructured, particularly regarding the land-forlanddeal. As these are adequately dealt withwithin the Environmentally and Socially SustainableDevelopment Network and are outsidethe scope of this review, they are not discussed.10. 6 India UP Tubewells Cr 1332; PakistanPrivate Tubewells Development project Cr 2004.Much could have been learned from Bangladesh,where at the same time the Bank had been successfulin enabling private sector participationin groundwater development—and this learningexperience was hindered by the split of theSouth Asia Region among two independentoperating departments.11. Bank management objects to this statement,which is based on the findings of OED’srecent Lesotho Country Assistance Evaluation(Hassan 2002).12. The ideas summarized in this paragraphare derived from Ellerrman 2000.Chapter 51. Senior Water Advisor, personal communication.2. A strong letter from an NGO group was sentto the U.S. Executive Director’s office.3. Overall, 72 percent of the 107 staff surveyedhad read the Bank’s water strategy paper. However,only two-thirds of the FPSI staff had readit compared with 80 percent of ESSD staff.Annex A1. Bank includes IBRD and IDA, and loansinclude credits.Annex B1. This is based on the UN (1995) low populationprojection. The medium-growth projectionwould increase those at risk to 2.8 billion.2. Globally, approximately US$60 billion peryear is invested in water projects. Only 10 percentis funded by external sources, of which theBank contributes half.Annex C1. Indeed, 78 percent of countries participatingin sector operations did not live up to financialcovenants, and the Bank took remedialaction in one case only. One reason, OED found,was that the Bank may have required reformsto be implemented too quickly or before the borrowerswere fully committed.2. The analysis is based on project numbersonly as each project represents an opportunityto implement Bank strategy; an analysis weightedon Bank commitment gives a better outcome,typically 5–10 percent higher.3. A total of 157 projects (47 percent of theportfolio) were active after 1993, and 92 (27percent) after 1995; 38 projects were approvedafter 1990 and half their implementation was inthe post-Strategy period.4. The number of project exit results declinessharply after 1995.5. Only 9 of the 336 were approved after 1993.Annex D1. Africa in this context is Sub-Saharan Africaonly, north Africa is covered under the Bank’sMNA Region.Annex E1. The analysis also looked into commonvariables such as GNP per capita, country population,and national and/or regional scope ofthe project in a multiple regression analysis todetermine if those differences have an effect oncommunity participation, consideration of genderissues, and consultations with the poor. Theanalysis concluded that the relationship between107

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategythese factors and the inclusion of a communitydrivenapproach, gender issues, and participationis not significant.2. As also supported by OED’s evaluation ofrural water projects, insufficient focus oninstitutional capacity retards sustainability ofCDD initiatives.3. A case in point is communities in the AralSea area. Within that area, water diversions havehad disastrous effects on these communities’livelihood and contributed to declines in theirincomes, living standards, and health.4. The Methodology for Participatory Assessmentis a useful toolkit that combines genderandpoverty-sensitive indicators for conductinga thorough social analysis. See Dayal, van Wijk,and Mukherjee 2000.108

BIBLIOGRAPHYAbernethy, Charles L., Hilmy Sally, Kurt Lonsway,and Chegou Maman. 2000. Farmer-BasedFinancing of Operations in the Niger ValleyIrrigation Schemes. Research Report 37, InternationalWater Management Institute.Colombo.Adams, Adrian. 2000. The River Senegal: FloodManagement and the Future of the Valley.Issue Paper 93. London: International Institutefor Environment and Development.Ahmad, Masood, and Gary P. Kutcher. 1992.Irrigation Planning with Environmental Considerations:A Case Study of Pakistan’s IndusBasin. World Bank Technical Paper 106.Washington, D.C.Alcázar, Lorena, Lixin Colin Xu, and Ana MariaZuluaga. 2000. Institutions, Politics, and Contracts:The Attempt to Privatize the Water andSanitation Utility of Lima, Peru. World BankPolicy Research Working Paper 2478. Washington,D.C.Bandaragoda, D.J. 1999. Institutional Changeand Shared Management of Water Resourcesin Large Canal Systems: Results of an ActionResearch Program in Pakistan. ResearchReport 36, International Water ManagementInstitute. Colombo.Barghouti, Shawki. 2002. “Growing Challengesto Water Resources Management.” SustainableDevelopment International (1) 43–52.Barlow, Maude. 1999. Blue Gold: The GlobalWater Crisis and the Commodification of theWorld’s Water Supply. San Francisco: InternationalForum on Globalization.Barrow, Christopher J. 1998. “River Basin DevelopmentPlanning and Management: A CriticalReview.” World Development 26(1):171–86.Berger, Thomas R. 1994. “The IndependentReview of the Sardar Sarovar Projects,1991–92.” Water Resources Development 10(1):55–66.Berkoff, D. J. W. 1990. Irrigation Managementon the Indo-Gangetic Plain. World Bank TechnicalPaper 129. Washington, D.C.Bhatia, Ramesh, Rita Cestti, and James Winpenny.1995. Water Conservation and Reallocation:Best Practice Cases in ImprovingEconomic Efficiency and EnvironmentalQuality. A World Bank-ODI Joint Study. Washington,D.C.: World Bank.Bird, Ashley, and Riki Therivel. 1996. “Postauditingof Environmental Impact StatementsUsing Data Held in Public Registers of EnvironmentalInformation.” Project Appraisal11(2): 105–16.Black, Maggie. 1998. Learning Water and SanitationCooperation 1978–1998. UNDP-WorldBank Water and Sanitation Program. Washington,D.C.: UNDP-World Bank.Brew, Douglas, and Norman Lee. 1996. “Reviewingthe Quality of Donor Agency EnvironmentalAssessment Guidelines.” ProjectAppraisal 11(2): 79–84.Briscoe, John. 1999a. “The Changing Face ofWater Infrastructure Financing in DevelopingCountries.” Water Resources Development15(3): 301–8.——. 1999b. “The Financing of Hydropower, Irrigationand Water Supply Infrastructure inDeveloping Countries.” Water Resources Development15(4): 459–91.——. 1996. “Water as an Economic Good: The Ideaand What it Means in Practice.” InternationalCommission on Irrigation and Drainage, CairoConference, Special Session R.11: 177–201.——. 1995. The German Water and SewerageSector: How Well It Works and What ThisMeans for Developing Countries. Transportation,Water, and Urban Development Department.Washington, D.C.: Water and SanitationDivision, the World Bank.Byrnes, Kerry J. 1992. “Water Users Associationsin World Bank-Assisted Irrigation Projects inPakistan.” World Bank Technical Paper 173.Washington, D.C.Chowdhury, Mushtaque, Md Jakariya, MdAshiqul H. Tareq, and Jalaluddin Ahmed.1998. “Village Health Workers Can Test TubewellWater for Arsenic.” Dhaka Monday Focus,March 30, 1998.Clarke, Robin. 1991. Water: The InternationalCrisis. London: Earthscan.Correia, Francisco Nunes (ed). 1998. Institutionsfor Water Resources Management inEurope. Rotterdam: Balkerma.Cosgrove, William. 1997. Water Policy ReformProgram. Evaluation Report, Economic109

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyDevelopment Institute. Washington, D.C.:World Bank.Cosgrove William J., and Frank R. Rijsberman.2000. World Water Vision: Making Water Everybody’sBusiness. London: World Water Council.Dayal, Rekha, Christine van Wijk, and NilanjanaMukherjee. 2000. “Methodology for ParticipatoryAssessments: With Communities, Institutionsand Policy Makers.” Water and SanitationProgram. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.de Silva, Samantha. 2000. Community-basedContracting: A Review of Stakeholder Experience.Washington, D.C.: World Bank.DFID (United Kingdom Department for InternationalDevelopment). 1998. Maintaining theValue of Irrigation and Drainage Projects.TDR Project R 6650. London.Donahue, John M., and Barbara Rose Johnston(eds.). 1998. Water, Culture, and Power: LocalStruggles in a Global Context. Washington,D.C.: Island.DSE (German Foundation for InternationalDevelopment). 1998. “Global Water Politics:Cooperation for Transboundary Water Management.”In lst Petersberg Round Tables,International Dialogue Forum. Berlin: DSE.Easter, K. William, Mark W. Rosegrant, and ArielDinar. 1999. “Formal and Informal Markets forWater: Institutions, Performance, and Constraints.”World Bank Research Observer 14(1):99–116.EC (Commission of the European Community).2000. “Communication from the Commissionto the Council, the European Parliament andthe Economic and Social Committee: PricingPolicies for Enhancing the Sustainability ofWater Resources.” Brussels.EDI (Economic Development Institute). 1997.“Capacity Building for Implementing PIM.”International Network on Participatory IrrigationManagement (INPIM) Newsletter 6.Washington, D.C.: World Bank.EIB (European Investment Bank). 1999. An EvaluationStudy of 17 Water Projects LocatedAround the Mediterranean Financed by theEuropean Investment Bank. Luxembourg.El-Ashry, Mohamed T. 1991. “Policies for WaterResource Management in Semi-arid Regions.”Water Resources Development 7(4): 230–34.Ellerman, David. 2000. Hirschmanian Themes ofSocial Learning and Change. World BankPolicy Research Working Paper, Washington,D.C.Eriksen, John, and Roger Poulin. 1993. ContrastingApproaches for Water Policy Developmentin Tunisia and Sri Lanka: LessonsLearned from USAID Mission Experience.USAID ISPAN, Bureau for Asia and the NearEast, Washington, D.C.: AID.Euroconsult, Delft Hydraulics Laboratory, andRoyal Tropical Institute. 1987. Study onOptions and Investment Priorities in IrrigationDevelopment. Synthesis Report. Arnhem, Delft,and Amsterdam.Evans, Alison. 2000. Poverty Reduction in the1990s: An Evaluation of Strategy and Performance.Operations Evaluation DepartmentStudy Series. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.Evenson, Robert E., Carl E. Pray, and Mark W.Rosegrant. 1999. Agricultural Research andProductivity Growth in India. Washington,D.C.: International Food Policy ResearchInstitute.FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of theUnited Nations). 1997. “Irrigation TechnologyTransfer in Support of Food Security: Proceedingsof a Subregional Workshop inHarare, Zimbabwe, April 14–17, 1997.” WaterReports 14. Rome.——. 1996. Guidelines for Planning Irrigationand Drainage Investment Projects. FAO InvestmentCentre Technical Paper 11. Rome.——. 1995. Water Resources Policy Review andStrategy Formulation. Rome.Faruqee, Rashid. 1995. Structural and PolicyReforms for Agricultural Growth: The Caseof Pakistan. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.Feitelson, Eran, and Marwan Haddad. 1996.Identification of Joint Management Structuresfor Shared Aquifers: A Cooperative Palestinian—IsraeliEffort. World Bank TechnicalPaper 415. Washington, D.C.Foster, Stephen, John Chilton, Marcus Moench,Franklin Cardy, and Manuel Schiffler. 2000.Groundwater in Rural Development: Facingthe Challenges of Supply and Resource Sustainability.”WorldBank Technical Paper 463.Washington, D.C.110

BibliographyFox, James. 2000. “Applying the ComprehensiveDevelopment Framework.” OED WorkingPaper Series 15. Washington, D.C.: OED.Frederiksen, Harald D. 1992a. Drought Planningand Water Efficiency Implications inWater Resources Management. World BankTechnical Paper 185. Washington, D.C.——. 1992b. Water Resources Institutions: SomePrinciples and Practices. World Bank TechnicalPaper 191. Washington, D.C.Frederiksen, Harald D., Jeremy Berkoff, andWilliam Barber. 1993. Water Resources Managementin Asia: Volume I, Main Report.World Bank Technical Paper 212. Washington,D.C.——. 1994. Principles and Practices for Dealingwith Water Resources Issues. World BankTechnical Paper 233. Washington, D.C.Frederiksen, Kenneth D. 1993. Balancing WaterDemands with Supplies: The Role of Managementin a World of Increasing Scarcity. WorldBank Technical Paper 189. Washington, D.C.GEF (Global Environmental Facility). 1997. “GEFOperational Programs.” Washington, D.C.——. 1996a. “Project Implementation Review.”Washington, D.C.——. 1996b. Annual Report 1996. Washington,D.C.: World Bank.Ghana, Ministry of Works & Housing. 1998.Ghana’s Water Resources: Management Challengesand Opportunities. Accra.Griffin, Charles, John Briscoe, Bhanwar Singh,Radhika Ramasubban, and Ramesh Bhatia.1995. “Contingent Valuation Meets the ColdTruth of Actual Behavior: Predicting Connectionsto New Water Systems in Kerala,India.” World Bank Economic Review 9 (3).Grigg, Neil S. 1996. Water Resources Management:Principles, Regulations, and Cases. NewYork: McGraw-Hill.Groenfeldt, David, Mark Svendsen, and AnjuSharma. 1996. Proceedings of the Second InternationalSeminar on Participatory IrrigationManagement: Antalya, Turkey, April 10–17,1996. The Economic Development Instituteof the World Bank and the General Directorateof State Hydraulic Works. Antalya: DSI.GWP (Global Water Partnership). 2000a. “IntegratedWater Resources Management.” TechnicalAdvisory Committee Background Paper4. Stockholm.——. 2000b. Towards Water Security: A Frameworkfor Action. Stockholm: GWP.——. 1997. Global Water Partnership: Buildinga Network for Sustainable Water Management.”Stockholm: GWP.Hanna, Nagy. 2000. “Implementation Challengesand Promising Approaches for the ComprehensiveDevelopment Framework.” OED WorkingPaper Series 13. Washington, D.C.: OED.Hassan, Fareed. 2002. Lesotho: Development ina Challenging Environment, A Joint WorldBank–African Development Bank Evaluation.OED Study Series. Washington, D.C.: WorldBank.Hirschman, Albert O. 1994. “A Propensity toSelf-Subversion.” In Rethinking the DevelopmentExperience: Essays Provoked by the Workof Albert O. Hirschman, L. Rodwin and D.Schon, eds. Washington, D.C.: BrookingsInstitution.——. 1961. The Strategy of Economic Development.New Haven: Yale University Press.Head, Chris. 2000. Financing of Private HydropowerProjects. World Bank Discussion Paper420. Washington, D.C.ICID (International Commission on Irrigationand Drainage). 1998. Planning the Management,Operation, and Maintenance of Irrigationand Drainage Systems: A Guide for thePreparation of Strategies and Manuals. WorldBank Technical Paper 389. Washington, D.C.IDB (Inter-American Development Bank). 1998a.Beyond Tradeoffs: Market Reforms and EquitableGrowth in Latin America. Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution.——. 1998b. “Strategy for Integrated WaterResources Management.” IDB Strategy Paper.Washington, D.C.Israel, Arturo. 1987. Institutional Development:Incentives to Performance. Washington, D.C.:World Bank.IUCN–World Conservation Union. 2000. Visionfor Water and Nature Project. Monitoring andEvaluation Report. Gland, Switzerland.——. 1997. Large Dams: Learning from the PastLooking at the Future. Workshop Proceedings.Gland, Switzerland.111

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyJohansson, Robert D. 2000. Pricing IrrigationWater: A Literature Survey. World Bank PolicyResearch Working Paper 2449. Washington,D.C.Katz, Travis, and Jennifer Sara. 1997a. “MakingRural Water Supply Sustainable: Recommendationsfrom a Global Study.” UNDP-WorldBank Water and Sanitation Program, Washington,D.C.——. 1997b. “Making Rural Water Supply Sustainable:Report on the Impact of ProjectRules.” UNDP-World Bank Water and SanitationProgram, Washington, D.C.Keller, Andrew, R. Sakthivadivel, and DavidSeckler. 2000. Water Scarcity and the Role ofStorage in Development. Research Report 39,International Water Management Institute.Colombo.Kinzer, Stephen. “A Slow, Dusty Death for theParched Aral Sea.” International HeraldTribune, October 30, 1997.Kirmani, Syed, and Guy Le Moigne. 1997. FosteringRiparian Cooperation in InternationalRiver Basins: The World Bank at Its Best inDevelopment Diplomacy. World Bank TechnicalPaper 335. Washington, D.C.Kloezen, Wim H., Carlos Garces-Restrepo, andSam H. Johnson III. 1997. Impact Assessmentof Irrigation Management Transfer in the AltoRio Lerma Irrigation District, Mexico. InternationalIrrigation Management Institute.Colombo.Langford, K. John, Christine L. Forster, and DuncanM. Malcolm. 1944. Toward a FinanciallySustainable Irrigation System: Lessons from theState of Victoria, Australia, 1984–1994.WorldBank Technical Paper 413. Washington, D.C.Laos, Ministry of Public Health. 1998. “The LaosExperience: Indigenous, Sustainable, Replicable.”Background paper to the InternationalConference on Water and Sustainable Development.Vientiane.Lee, Terence Richard. 1999. Water Managementin the 21st Century: The Allocation Imperative.U.K.: Edward Elgar.Le Moigne, Guy, Ashok Subramanian, Mei Xie,and Sandra Giltner. 1994. A Guide to the Formulationof Water Resources Strategy. WorldBank Technical Paper 263. Washington, D.C.Le Moigne, Guy, K. William Easter, Walter J.Ochs, and Sandra Giltner, eds. 1994. WaterPolicy and Water Markets: Selected Papersand Proceedings from the World Bank’s NinthAnnual Irrigation and Drainage Seminar,Annapolis, Maryland, December 8–10, 1992.World Bank Technical Paper 249. Washington,D.C.Le Moigne, Guy, Shawki Barghouti, and LisaGarbus, eds. 1992. Developing and ImprovingIrrigation and Drainage Systems: SelectedPapers from World Bank Seminars. WorldBank Technical Paper 178. Washington, D.C.Le Moigne, Guy, Shawki Barghouti, GershonFeder, Lisa Garbus, and Mei Xie, eds. 1992.Country Experiences with Water ResourcesManagement: Economic, Institutional, Technologicaland Environmental Issues. WorldBank Technical Paper 175. Washington, D.C.Liebenthal, Andres. 2002. Promoting EnvironmentalSustainability in Development: AnEvaluation of the World Bank’s Performance.OED Study Series. Washington, D.C.: WorldBank.Livingston, Marie Leigh. 1993. Designing WaterInstitutions: Market Failures and InstitutionalResponse. World Bank Policy Research WorkingPaper 1227. Washington, D.C.Lobo, Crjspino, and Gudrun Kochendorfer-Lucius. 1995. The Rain Decided to Help Us:Participatory Waterthed Management in theState of Maharashtra, India. EDI LearningResources Series. Washington, D.C.: WorldBank.Marcus, Amy Dockser. “Water Fight: Egypt FacesProblem It Has Long Dreaded: Less Controlof the Nile.” The Wall Street Journal, August22, 1997.Maxwell, Simon, and Tim Conway. 2000. “NewApproaches to Planning.” OED Working PaperSeries 14. Washington, D.C.: OED.Meinzen-Dick, Ruth, Richard Reidinger, andAndrew Manzardo. 1995. Participation inIrrigation. Environmental Department ParticipationSeries Paper 003. Washington, D.C.:World Bank.Merrett, Stephen. 1997. Introduction to the Economicsof Water Resources: An InternationalPerspective. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.112

BibliographyMillington, Peter. 2000. River Basin Management:Its Role in Major Water InfrastructureProjects. WCD Thematic Reviews. Cape Town:World Commission on Dams.Molden, D. 1997. Accounting for Water Use andProductivity. SWIM Paper 1, InternationalIrrigation Management Institute. Colombo.Moore, D., and L. Sklar. 1998. “Reforming theWorld Bank’s Lending for Water: the Processand Outcome of Developing a WaterResources Management Policy.” In The Strugglefor Accountability—The World Bank, NGOsand Grassroots Movements, J.A. Fox, and L.D.Brown). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Ochs, Walter J., and Bishay G. Bishay. 1934.“Drainage Guidelines.” World Bank TechnicalPaper 195. Washington, D.C.:OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operationand Development). 1998. “Water Consumptionand Sustainable Water Resources Management.”OECD Proceedings. Paris: OECD.OED (Operations Evaluation Department). 2000a.“Moving from Projects to Programmatic Aid.”OED Working Paper Series. Washington, D.C.——. 2000b. “New Approaches to Planning.”OED Working Paper Series. Washington, D.C.——. 2000c. “Rural Water Project: Lessons fromOED Evaluations.”OED Working Paper Series3. Washington, D.C.——. 1998a. India Impact Evaluation Report—Comparative Review of Rural Water SystemsExperience. Report 18114. Washington, D.C.:World Bank.——. 1997. Lessons of Fiscal Adjustment: SelectedProceedings from a World Bank Seminar.Washington, D.C.: World Bank.——. 1994. A Review of World Bank Experiencein Irrigation. Report 13676. Washington, D.C.:World Bank.——. 1992. Water Supply and Sanitation Projects:the Bank’s Experience—1967–1989. Report10789. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.——. 1981. Water Management in Bank-Supported Irrigation Project Systems: An Analysisof Past Experience. Report 3421.Washington, D.C.: World Bank.Pitman, G.K. 2002. “India: World Bank Assistancefor Water Resource Management.” OED IndiaCAE Working Paper Series. Washington, D.C.Plusquellec, Herve. 1997. “The Future of Irrigation.”Keynote speech for EDI Regional Seminaron Sustainable Irrigation. WashingtonD.C.: World Bank. Photocopy.Plusquellec, Herve, and Thomas Wickham. 1985.Irrigation Design and Management: Experiencein Thailand and Its General Applicability.World Bank Technical Paper 40.Washington, D.C.Plusquellec, Herve, Charles Burt, and ThomasWickham. 1994. Modern Water Control in Irrigation:Concepts, Issues, and Applications. WorldBank Technical Paper 246. Washington, D.C.Renault, D., and I.W. Makin. 1999. ModernizingIrrigation Operations: Spatially DifferentiatedResource Allocations. Research Report 35,International Water Management Institute.Colombo.Rodts, Roland P.A. 2000. “Netherlands Supportto the Water Sector in Mozambique: Evaluationof Sector Performance and InstitutionalDevelopment.” The Netherlands Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Policy and Operations EvaluationDepartment, The Hague.Rogers, Peter. 1992. Comprehensive WaterResources Management—A Concept Paper.Washington, D.C.: World Bank.Rosegrant, Mark W. 1997. Water Resources in theTwenty-First Century: Challenges and Implicationsfor Action.Discussion Paper 20. Washington,D.C.: International Food PolicyResearch Institute.Rosegrant, Mark W., and Shobha Shetty. 1994.“Production and Income Benefits fromImproved Irrigation Efficiency: What is thePotential?” Irrigation and Drainage Systems8: 251–70.Rosegrant, Mark W., and Mark Svendsen. 1993.“Asian Food Production in the 1990s: IrrigationInvestment and Management Policy.”Food Policy 18 (1): 13–32.Rosegrant, Mark W., Genato Gazmuri Schleyer,and Satya N. Yadav. 1995. “Water Policy forEfficient Agricultural Diversification: MarketbasedApproaches.” Food Policy 20(3): 203–23.Sadoff, Claudia. 1996. The Price of Dirty Water:Pollution Costs in the Sebou Basin. EnvironmentalEconomics Series Paper 038. Washington,D.C.: World Bank.113

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategySaleth, R. Maria, and Ariel Dinar. 1955. EvaluatingWater Institutions and Water Sector Performance.World Bank Technical Paper 447.Washington, D.C.Salman, Salman M.A. 1997. The Legal Frameworkfor Water Users’ Associations: A ComparativeStudy. World Bank Technical Paper 360. Washington,D.C.Scudder, T. 1994. “Recent Experiences with RiverBasin Development in the Tropics and Subtropics.”Natural Resources Forum 18(2):101–114.——. 1990. “Victims of Development Revisited—ThePolitical Costs of River Basin Development.”Development Anthropology Network8(1): 1–5.——. 1989. “River Basin Projects in Africa.” Environment31 (2): 4–32.Seckler, David. 1996. The New Era of WaterResources Management: From ‘Dry’ to ‘Wet’Water Savings. Research Report 1, InternationalIrrigation Management Institute.Colombo.Seckler, David, Upali Amarasinghe, David Molden,Rhadika de Silva, and Randolph Barker. 1998.World Water Demand and Supply, 1990 to2025: Scenarios and Issues. International WaterManagement Institute. Colombo.Semedema, Lambert. 2000. Irrigation-InducedRiver Salinization: Five Major Irrigated Basinsin the Arid Zone. International Water ManagementInstitute. Colombo.Serageldin, Ismail. 1994. Water Supply, Sanitation,and Environmental Sustainability: TheFinancing Challenge. Directions in DevelopmentSeries. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.Sharma, N. P., T. Damhang, E. Gilgan-Hunt, D.Grey, V. Okaru, and D. Rothberg. 1996.African Water Resources: Challenges andOpportunities for Sustainable Development.World Bank Technical Paper 331. Washington,D.C.Shiklimanov, Igor A. 2000a. World WaterResources at the Beginning of the 21st Century.Summary of the Monograph. IHP Unesco.Soussan, John. 2000a. “Institutional Development:Netherlands Support to the Water Sector,1988–1998, Case Studies.” The Hague:Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.——. 2000b. Netherlands Support to the DrinkingWater Sector in India: Impacts on InstitutionalDevelopment and Change. The Hague:The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Spulber, Nicolas, and Asghar Sabbaghi. 1998. Economicsof Water Resources: From Regulationto Privatization. 2d ed. Norwell, MA: KluwerAcademic.Sri Lanka, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.1998. Community Water Supply andSanitation Project. Battaramulla, Sri Lanka.Svendsen, M., and others. 2000. “A Synthesis ofBenefits and Second-Generation Problems.”In Proceedings of the Second InternationalSeminar on Participatory Irrigation Management,Anlalya, Turkey. Analya: DSI.Thomas, Robert, Michael Colby, Richard English,William Jobin, Bechir Rassas, and Peter Reiss.1993. Water Resources Policy and Planning:Towards Environmental Sustainability. USAIDISPAN, Bureau for Asia and the Near East.Washington, D.C.: AID.Umali, Dina L. 1993. Irrigation-Induced Salinity:A Growing Problem for Development andthe Environment. World Bank Technical Paper215. Washington, D.C.UNDP-World Bank. 2000. Voice & Choice forWomen: Water is Their Business. Water andSanitation Program, South Asia Region. Washington,D.C.: World Bank——. 1999. Water and Sanitation Services for thePoor: Innovating through Field ExperienceProgram Strategy: 1999–2003. Washington,D.C.: World Bank.United Nations/World Meteorological Organization.1997. Comprehensive Assessment ofthe Freshwater Resources of the World. NewYork: United Nations.USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development).1994a. Future Directions for ImplementingWater Policy: Report on a USAID-Sponsored Workshop, April 28–29, 1994.ISPAN, Bureau for Asia and the Near East.Washington, D.C.: AID.——. 1994b. A Strategic Framework for Water inAsia. ISPAN, Bureau for Asia and the NearEast. Washington, D.C.: AID.——. 1994c. Water Strategies for the Next Century:Supply Augmentation vs. Demand Man-114

Bibliographyagement. ISPAN, Bureau for Asia and theNear East. Washington, D.C.: AID.USEPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).1995. Watershed Protection: A StatewideApproach. Assessment and Watershed ProtectionDivision. Washington, D.C.van Hofwegen, Paul J.M., and Frank G.W.Jaspers. 1999. Analytical Framework for IntegratedWater Resources Management: Guidelinesfor Assessment of InstitutionalFrameworks. Rotterdam: Balkema.van Koppen, Barbara. 1998. “More Jobs PerDrop: Targeting Irrigation to Poor Womenand Men.” Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute,Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Vermillion, Douglas L., Madar Samad, SuprodjoPusposutardjo, Sigit S. Arif, and SaifulRochdyanto. 2000. An Assessment of the Small-Scale Irrigation Management Turnover Programin Indonesia. Research Report 38,International Water Management Institute.Colombo.Walker, Ian, Fidel Ordonez, Pedro Serrano, andJonathan Halpern. 2000. “Pricing, Subsidies,and the Poor: Demand for Improved WaterServices in Central America.” World BankPolicy Research Working Paper 2468. Washington,D.C.Wang, Rusong, Zhiyun Ouyang, Hongjun Ren,and Qingwen Min. 1999. China Water Vision:The Eco-sphere of Water, Environment, Life,Economy & Society. Beijing: Research Centerfor Eco-Environmental Sciences and ChineseAcademy of Sciences.Whittington, Dale, Jennifer Davis, and ElizabethMcClelland. 1999. “Implementing a DemanddrivenApproach to Community Water SupplyPlanning: A Case Study of Lugazi,Uganda.” Water International 23: 134–45.Whittington, Dale. 1998. “Administering ContingentValuation Surveys in DevelopingCountries.” World Development 26(1): 21–30.Williams, Meryl. 1996. “The Transition in the Contributionof Living Aquatic Resources to FoodSecurity.” Food, Agriculture, and the Environment,Discussion Paper 13. Washington, D.C.,International Food Policy Research Institute.Winpenny, Jim. 1997. Water Policy Issues. DFIDWater Resources Occasional Paper 2. London.Wolf, Aaron T. 1996. “Middle East WaterConflicts and Directions for Conflict Resolution.”Food, Agriculture, and the Environment,Discussion Paper 12. Washington,D.C., International Food Policy ResearchInstitute.World Bank, ADB, FAO, UNDP, and NGO WaterResources Group, Institute of Water ResourcesPlanning, Vietnam. 1996. Vietnam: WaterResources Sector Review, Main Report. Washington,D.C.: World Bank.World Bank. 2000a. “Bolivia Urban Water Supply:Main Issues and Recommendations.”Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office.Washington, D.C..——. 2000b. “Brazil: Private Participation in theWater Sector: Case Studies, Lessons, andFuture Options.” Report. 19896-BR. Washington,D.C. Photocopy.——. 2000c. “Argentina: Water Resources Management—PolicyElements for SustainableDevelopment in the XXI Century.” Report20729-AR. Washington, D.C. Photocopy.——. 2000d. Maintaining Utility Services for thePoor: Policies and Practices in Central andEastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.Washington, D.C.——. 2000e. “Micro Infrastructure: RegulatorsMust Take Small Operators Seriously.” Viewpoint,Private Sector and Infrastructure Network.Washington, D.C.——. 2000f. Private Solutions for Infrastructure:Opportunities for the Philippines. Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility. Washington,D.C.——. 2000g. “The World Bank and the Water Sector.”BrazilCountry Management Unit, Brasilia.——. 2000l. “Water and Sanitation Report, 98–99.”Water and Sanitation Program. Washington,D.C.——. 2000m. “Water Concessions.” Viewpoint217. Washington, D.C.——. 1999. Groundwater: Legal and Policy Perspectives—Proceedingsof a World Bank Seminar.World Bank Technical Paper 456.Washington, D.C.——. 1998a. “Brazil: Second Water Sector ModernizationProject—PMSS II.” Appraisal Report16771. Washington, D.C.115

Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources Strategy——. 1998b. India Water Resources ManagementSector Review: Initiating and SustainingWater Sector Reforms. Report 18356-IN. Washington,D.C.——. 1998c. Recent Experience with InvoluntaryResettlement: Overview. Report 17538, OperationsEvaluation Department. Washington,D.C.——. 1998d. International Watercourses:Enhancing Cooperation and Managing Conflict—Proceedingsof a World Bank Seminar.World Bank Technical Paper 414.Washington, D.C.——. 1997a. “United Arab Emirates: NationalWater Strategy Study.” Middle East Department,Washington, D.C. Photocopy.——. 1997b. “Water for Life.” World Bank WaterProgram Communications Campaign, FY98–99.Washington, D.C.——. 1997c. Environment Matters at the WorldBank: World Bank Environmental ProjectsJuly 1996–June 1997. World Bank EnvironmentDepartment. Washington, D.C.——. 1995d. From Scarcity to Security: AvertingA Water Crisis in the Middle East and NorthAfrica. Washington, D.C.——. 1994a. Pakistan Irrigation and Drainage:Issues and Options. Washington, D.C.——. 1994b. World Development Report 1994:Infrastructure for Development. New York:Oxford University Press for the World Bank.——. 1994c. “Multipurpose River Basin Developmentin China.” Economic Development.——. 1994d. Water Resources Management. AWorld Bank Policy Paper. Washington, D.C.——. 1993. A Strategy for Managing Water in theMiddle East and North Africa.Washington, D.C.——. 1991. Environmental Assessment Sourcebook.Washington, D.C.Wouters, Patricia K. 1996. “An Assessment ofRecent Developments in International WatercourseLaw through the Prism of the SubstantiveRules Governing Use Allocation.”Natural Resources Journal 36.WWC (World Water Commission). 2000. WorldWater Vision: A Water Secure World. CommissionReport. London.WWC (World Water Council). 1998. Water in the21st Century. Paris.WWF (World Wildlife Fund) 1994. EconomicEvaluation of Danube Floodplains. A WWFCase Study. Rastatt.Xie, Mei, Ulrich Kuffner, and Guy Le Moigne.1960. Using Water Efficiently: TechnologicalOptions. World Bank Technical Paper 205.Washington, D.C.116