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SECTION 4 - Marine Accident Investigation Branch

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The company’s STO was guided by the vessel’s Certificate Checklist matrix when<br />

developing specific training programmes. The matrix included the requirements<br />

for crews’ “Basic Certification”, “Advanced Certification” and “Company Required<br />

Training” and was based on the duties as defined on the muster/emergency plan. A<br />

copy of page 1 of the matrix is at Annex H. Before joining a vessel, it was the STO’s<br />

practice to contact the crew purser to identify any crew training shortfalls against<br />

the Certificate Checklist matrix and focus his training in those areas. He would also<br />

adjust the programme to reflect any specific training requirements identified by the<br />

master and the ship’s SO.<br />

1.18.3 Non-operational ships - training requirement<br />

None of the Malta administration, GL, or the ship’s manager stipulated any particular<br />

change in training emphasis for a vessel emerging from refit which was over and<br />

above that applicable to an operational vessel.<br />

1.18.4 Training delivery<br />

During the early stages of Saga Sapphire’s refit there were about 120 crew on<br />

board, comprising 20 deck, 20 engineering and about 80 hotel staff. During this<br />

time, the STO undertook the role of fire-watch officer and managed the hot work<br />

fire sentry requirement. Towards the end of February 2012, the majority of hot<br />

work had been completed and the STO started his training programme which was<br />

commensurate with the crew build-up.<br />

Determining the crew’s training requirement and promulgating the weekly<br />

training planning schedule was left entirely to the discretion and experience of<br />

the STO. While there was no high-level training guidance, the STO produced a<br />

comprehensive training programme. However, there was no input by the ship’s<br />

SO other than an agreement that the SO would be responsible for delivering of<br />

fire-fighting and liferaft preparation training. Training commenced on 20 February.<br />

Example copies of the training schedules for weeks commencing 20 and 27<br />

February and 5 and 12 March 2012 are at Annex I.<br />

The first drill was carried out on 3 March. Drills were subsequently scheduled each<br />

day at 1830 to maximise the working day, commencing 5 March until arrival at<br />

Southampton, although some were cancelled at short notice.<br />

During Saga Sapphire’s passage to Southampton, the training requirement had to<br />

be re-assessed following receipt of Version 8 of the muster/emergency plan. The<br />

master felt the need for additional training effort and oversight in preparation for the<br />

forthcoming MCA-monitored drills. The master was also concerned that no liferaft<br />

preparation drills had been conducted. Consequently, during one of the morning<br />

management meetings, attended by the ship’s senior officers, on or about 24 March,<br />

the master formally instructed the ship’s SO to assist the STO and carry out liferaft<br />

training.<br />

While in Southampton, Code Bravo (fire) drills were carried out on 26, 27 and 28<br />

March in preparation for the MCA’s expanded PSC inspection planned for 29 March.<br />

During the drills, the crew went to their lifeboat/liferaft stations but the lifeboats were<br />

not lowered and the bowsing tackles were not rigged.<br />

The STO maintained a comprehensive record of all crew who attended the training<br />

sessions.<br />

37

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