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Unemployment cycles

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It is important to note that these p-bounds depend on all other parameters of this economy. We<br />

have performed detailed comparative statics, though we do not report them here. In general, a change<br />

in a parameter value shifts both bounds in the same direction.<br />

θ<br />

θ(1)<br />

θ(0)<br />

p l<br />

p h<br />

p<br />

Figure 3: Effective market tightness θ = v s<br />

: equilibrium with multiplicity range as a function of<br />

aggregate productivity p.<br />

This condition for multiplicity can of course also be expressed in terms of any of the exogenous<br />

variables other than p. The next result states that the existence of multiple equilibria is closely related<br />

to the gains from sorting, i.e. the difference y − y. For low gains from sorting, there is a unique<br />

equilibrium with no on-the-job search. On-the-job search has two costs: 1. the direct search cost k<br />

incurred by the worker; and 2. the indirect search cost incurred by the firm due to shorter expected<br />

duration of a job. As a result, everything else equal, the opportunity cost of opening a job to the firm<br />

is higher. This indirect cost then explains why there cannot be active on-the-job search in equilibrium<br />

when the productivity gains from on-the-job search (measured by y − y) are arbitrarily small.<br />

there is hardly any output gain when filling a job with an employed worker but a discrete increase<br />

in the opportunity cost due to shorter job duration, this discourages vacancy posting, and in turn<br />

disincentivizes workers’ search effort. As a result, it is a dominant strategy not to search.<br />

At the other extreme, when the output gain y − y is arbitrarily large for given search cost k and<br />

vacancy cost c, the gains from on-the-job search swamp costs, irrespective of the behavior of other<br />

workers. It is then a dominant strategy to always search. For tractability, we focus in this result on<br />

the case δ → 0, which, by continuity, implies that the result holds for small δ.<br />

Proposition 2 (Sorting Gains Needed for Active on-the-job search). Let δ → 0, and m(θ) = φ αθ<br />

αθ+1 .<br />

1. When the gains from sorting are small (y − y < ɛ) then there is a unique steady state with<br />

If<br />

15

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