Committee on the Independent Commission Against Corruption

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REVIEW OF THE 2013-2014 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE ICAC AND THE INSPECTOR OF THE ICAC COMMENTARY <strong>Committee</strong> comment Limited. It is a futile task for me to embark upon trying to deal with any allegation by one side or another which has been publicly made or by any one individual to determine whether there has been a leak and, if so, by whom and to whom of what...it is capable of being investigated. I am not prepared to undertake it. It would be a waste of time for me to constitute myself as a quasi royal commission and invite journalists to come along and ask them, “Where did you get it?” – I know what the response would be – or to invite members of Commission staff or officers of commissions to say “Did you give X to Y?” But I think allegations of leaks is a fact of bureaucratic and political life in this state – allegations of leaks. The reality of it or the extent of it is something I do not know. 15 31. The <strong>Committee</strong> acknowledges the respective roles of the Commissioner and the Inspector in dealing with allegations of the illegal disclosure of information obtained in the course of an ICAC investigation. It also acknowledges the difficulties in investigating such allegations. 32. Nonetheless, the <strong>Committee</strong> is not satisfied that this issue can be characterised merely as evidence of a ‘blood feud’ between News Limited and Fairfax Media Limited. The underlying issue of the illegal disclosure of information obtained in the course of an ICAC investigation is a serious one. This is reflected in the serious penalties that exist under section 111 of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 for such conduct, including imprisonment. 33. The disclosure of confidential information that someone is the subject of an ICAC investigation has the capacity to cause reputational damage with far-reaching consequences for individuals. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes the Commissioner’s evidence that ICAC officers and witnesses are made aware of the confidentiality provisions. 16 The <strong>Committee</strong> can only add, in light of recent allegations, that the ICAC should take additional steps to reinforce these confidentiality provisions to its officers and witnesses. The <strong>Committee</strong> will continue to monitor this issue. Corruption prevention and education functions 34. While the wider community most often focuses on ICAC’s role of investigating and exposing public sector corruption, the ICAC has important statutory functions to prevent corruption and provide education and advice on addressing corruption risks and protecting against corrupt conduct. The <strong>Committee</strong> examines the ICAC’s performance of these functions in the following section. 35. The Corruption Prevention Division comprises three units: Investigations, Sectorwide Projects and Education. The Division was restructured in the 2013-2014 reporting period due to a long term decline in requests for corruption prevention advice. 17 While the provision of phone and email corruption prevention advice remains an important function, the restructure has allowed the Division to focus its resources on other areas of corruption prevention and education. 15 The Hon David Levine OA RFD QC, Inspector of the ICAC, Transcript of Evidence, 7 August 2015, p 4. 16 The Hon Megan Latham, Transcript of evidence, 7 August 2015, pp 18-19. 17 ICAC, Annual Report 2013-2014, p 34. MARCH 2016 7
COMMITTEE ON THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION COMMENTARY Investigations 36. Officers of the Corruption Prevention Division are attached to most ICAC investigations to identify processes, structures, human factors, external influences and possible legislative issues that are conducive to corrupt behaviour. Investigation reports made by the ICAC may include corruption prevention recommendations, where agencies which are the subject of corruption prevention recommendations are required to inform the ICAC of any plan to respond to the recommendations. In the 2013-2014 reporting period, 72 per cent of corruption prevention recommendations made to agencies were fully implemented. 18 37. The <strong>Committee</strong> asked whether the ICAC considered it had sufficient powers to ensure implementation, given only 72 per cent of corruption prevention recommendations were fully implemented. The ICAC considers its current powers are adequate: Sector-wide projects ...The ICAC has significant soft power around the implementation of recommendations. The failure to implement is transparently displayed on the ICAC website and in the annual report, leaving non-compliant agencies facing public pressure to explain. Should there be intransigence, an escalation protocol is in place in which ultimately the Minister is advised, again creating pressure on the agency to act. The escalation protocol has not been invoked within recent times. This soft power is generally considered appropriate and adequate, the 2013-2014 figures aside, and preferable to the use of legislated powers. 19 38. The Corruption Prevention Division identifies and analyses corruption risks of sector-wide significance, to make corruption prevention recommendations to Government. In the 2013-2014 reporting period the Division published sectorwide reports on IT contractors and the coal allocation and approval system. The Division also conducted a community attitude survey and commenced work on sector-wide projects examining invoice payments, facilities maintenance and employment screening. 39. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that the ICAC selects subjects for sector-wide corruption prevention projects on the basis of the degree of public concern and the extent of corruption risk. The <strong>Committee</strong> asked how the Division measured public concern and whether the results of the community attitude survey played a part in selecting subjects. The ICAC responded that the continuous contact between staff of the Division and the public, suppliers and public officials informed its understanding of issues of importance: The staff of the Division, including the ED, have extensive and continuous contact with the public, suppliers to government and public officials through training, speaking, outreach, investigations, advice, and through the assessment of matters reported to the Commission. These many points of contact that occur annually allow 18 ICAC, Annual Report 2013-2014, p 39 and appendix 5. 19 ICAC, Review of the ICAC 2013-2014 Annual Report, Response to further questions, p 9. 8 REPORT 1/56
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Committee on the Independent Commission Against Corruption

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