Committee on the Independent Commission Against Corruption

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REVIEW OF THE 2013-2014 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE ICAC AND THE INSPECTOR OF THE ICAC COMMENTARY 103. A new MOU was struck between the ICAC and the Inspector in May 2015, which is reproduced at appendix 3 to this report. Where the previous MOU required that the Inspector and Commissioner agree to meet every 30 days the new MOU requires that the Inspector and Commissioner (or their nominated delegates) meet ‘periodically’ to discuss relevant issues and raise any matters touching on the Inspector’s functions and the conduct of the Commission. 61 104. The <strong>Committee</strong> notes that while there is no longer a requirement for the Inspector and Commissioner to meet every 30 days, the Inspector stated in his response to further questions asked after the hearing that he is satisfied with current levels of liaison and considers that the working relationship has been effective. 62 The <strong>Committee</strong> further notes that the ICAC considers that the MOU ‘provides an efficient basis for communications between the Commission and the Office of the Inspector.’ 63 <strong>Committee</strong> comment 105. It is important that the Inspector has a productive relationship with the Commissioner enabling the Inspector to perform his or her functions effectively and efficiently. It is also important that there is co-operation from the ICAC in response to the Inspector’s requests for information. 106. The <strong>Committee</strong> will continue to monitor liaison between the Inspector and the ICAC and whether the level of communication prescribed by the current MOU is taking place. THE COMMITTEE’S OVERSIGHT POWERS The role of the <strong>Committee</strong> Legislative provisions 107. When the ICAC was established in 1988, Parliament recognised that the extensive covert and coercive powers conferred on the Commission made accountability and review essential. The <strong>Committee</strong> on the ICAC was established concurrently and forms part of the accountability framework for ensuring that the ICAC’s powers are properly exercised and adequately scrutinised. 108. The <strong>Committee</strong>’s functions are set out in section 64(1) of the ICAC Act as follows: (a) to monitor and to review the exercise by the Commission and the Inspector of the Commission’s and Inspector’s functions, (b) to report to both Houses of Parliament, with such comments as it thinks fit, on any matter appertaining to the Commission or the Inspector or connected with the exercise of its functions to which, in the opinion of the Joint <strong>Committee</strong>, the attention of Parliament should be directed, 2013%20Annual%20Reports%20of%20the%20ICAC%20and%20Inspector%20of%20the%20ICAC%20- %20report%205%2055.pdf, viewed 5 February 2016. 61 Memorandum of Understanding between ICAC and Inspector of the ICAC, dated 29 May 2015, p 3. 62 Inspector of the ICAC, Review of the ICAC Inspector’s 2013-14 Annual Report, Response to further Questions, p 3. 63 ICAC, Review of the ICAC 2013-2014 Annual Report, Response to further questions, p 20. MARCH 2016 21
COMMITTEE ON THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION COMMENTARY (c) to examine each annual and other report of the Commission and of the Inspector and report to both Houses of Parliament on any matter appearing in, or arising out of, any such report, (d) to examine trends and changes in corrupt conduct, and practices and methods relating to corrupt conduct, and report to both Houses of Parliament any change which the Joint <strong>Committee</strong> thinks desirable to the functions, structures and procedures of the Commission and the Inspector, (e) to inquire into any question in connection with its functions which is referred to it by both Houses of Parliament, and report to both Houses on that question. 109. Section 64(2) of the ICAC Act prevents the <strong>Committee</strong> from investigating particular conduct, or reconsidering the ICAC’s decisions, findings or recommendations about particular complaints or investigations: (2) Nothing in this Part authorises the Joint <strong>Committee</strong>: (a) to investigate a matter relating to particular conduct, or (b) to reconsider a decision to investigate, not to investigate or to discontinue investigation of a particular complaint, or (c) to reconsider the findings, recommendations, determinations or other decisions of the Commission in relation to a particular investigation or complaint. 110. In order to effectively conduct its monitoring and review role, the <strong>Committee</strong> is empowered to send for persons, papers and things (section 69 of the ICAC Act). National Crime Authority (NCA) model 111. The legislative provisions for the ICAC <strong>Committee</strong> are closely modelled on the provisions of the Commonwealth National Crime Authority Act 1984, which provided for a joint oversight committee to monitor the NCA. 64 The NCA was a federal law enforcement agency established to investigate serious and organised crime. The NCA had extensive covert and coercive powers and secrecy provisions to conduct investigations; however it had no prosecutorial function. Information gathered by the NCA was handed to bodies such as the Australian Federal Police, Australian Tax Office or Customs. The NCA was superseded by the Australian Crime Commission in 2003. 112. The NCA <strong>Committee</strong> was established to ‘monitor and review the performance by the NCA of its functions and to report to both Houses of Parliament upon any matter appertaining to the Authority or any change which the <strong>Committee</strong> thinks desirable to the functions, structure, powers and procedures of the Authority.’ 65 113. In the early years of its operation, the NCA <strong>Committee</strong> found it was unable to adequately fulfil its monitoring and review functions because it could not obtain sufficient information from the NCA. The NCA <strong>Committee</strong> went as far as 64 The NCA <strong>Committee</strong> was the predecessor of the current Parliamentary Joint <strong>Committee</strong> on Law Enforcement, which monitors the performance of the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Federal Police. 65 Parliamentary Joint <strong>Committee</strong> on the National Crime Authority, The National Crime Authority – an initial evaluation, 1988, p 1, Commonwealth Parliament website, http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/<strong>Committee</strong>s/Joint/Former_<strong>Committee</strong>s/acc/completed_inquiries/ pre1996/initial_evaluation/report/index, viewed 5 February 2016. 22 REPORT 1/56
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